Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center-El Paso v. Loretta K. Flores

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 22-0940

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Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso,

Petitioner,

v.

Loretta K. Flores,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas

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Argued September 11, 2024

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice

Young joined.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion.

In this case, we consider whether a state university’s immunity

from suit has been waived with respect to an employee’s

age-discrimination claim. The employee applied to be the university

president’s chief of staff, and a significantly younger candidate was

chosen for the position. The employee alleges she was not selected

because of her age, in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code,

while the university maintains the president simply hired the more

qualified candidate. The question presented is whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to whether the university’s stated reasons for

not giving the employee the chief-of-staff position were a mere pretext

for discrimination. The university contends that the employee adduced

no evidence of pretext and that Chapter 21 therefore does not waive the

university’s immunity from suit. We agree and hold that the court of

appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of the university’s plea

to the jurisdiction with respect to the employee’s age-discrimination

claim. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment as to that

claim and render judgment dismissing the case.

I. Background

This is Loretta Flores’s second age-discrimination suit against

her employer, Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso.

We begin with an abbreviated account of the facts underlying the first

suit, which provide important context and are described in more detail

in our opinion in Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso

v. Flores, 612 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2020) (Flores I).

A. Flores I

Flores has worked for the University since 1993. Until 2013, the

University operated as a regional campus of the Texas Tech University

School of Medicine. At that time, Flores served as director in charge of

operations in the office of the regional dean, Dr. Jose Manuel de la Rosa.

The school transitioned to a separate university within the Texas Tech

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University System, to be led by a president rather than a regional dean.

Initially, Flores continued in her director position and supported both

the interim president and Dr. de la Rosa.

The University hired Dr. Richard Lange as its first president in

July 2014 and subsequently appointed Dr. de la Rosa as the University’s

provost and vice president of academic affairs. President Lange

restructured the president’s office to eliminate the director position and

create an “assistant to the president” position that would involve more

clerical, administrative duties. In March 2015, President Lange

appointed Vanessa Solis, who had worked in the dean’s office since 2010,

to the assistant position. He informed Flores that she would be

reassigned to the provost’s office to continue working with Dr. de la

Rosa. Based on her job duties after the transition, in August 2015 Flores

was reclassified as an “executive associate,” a position that commanded

a lower salary than she had been receiving as director. 1 She was

fifty-nine years old.

Flores filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. In August 2016, she sued the

University for age discrimination under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code, 2

1 Before her reassignment, Flores received a substantial raise in

recognition of her service as director during the transition. Flores I, 612

S.W.3d at 303. Her new executive-associate salary, the maximum available

for that position, was higher than her pre-raise salary as director but lower

than her salary immediately before her reclassification. Id. at 303–04.

2 Chapter 21’s predecessor was enacted as the “Commission on Human

Rights Act,” in reference to the administering state agency. Commission on

Human Rights Act, 68th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 7, § 1.01, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 37,

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alleging that she was “replaced” as director by the younger Solis, who

was in her mid-thirties. Id. at 303–04. The trial court denied the

University’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.

Id. at 304. We reversed and dismissed the case, holding that “a

reasonable juror could not conclude that Solis took or was placed in

Flores’s former position as director in the president’s office.” Id. at 308.

Rather, “the evidence establishe[d] only that President Lange

restructured and reorganized the president’s office, resulting in the

elimination of Flores’s director position and the creation of a new and

different assistant-to-the-president position.” Id. at 310. Further,

Flores presented no evidence that she was treated less favorably than

younger, similarly situated employees. Id. at 312.

B. Flores II

Meanwhile, in July 2016—almost a year after Flores submitted

her EEOC complaint and shortly before she filed suit in Flores I—

President Lange created a new “chief of staff” position in the president’s

office. The “essential functions” of the new position included:

• oversee presidential initiatives and special projects as directed

by the president;

• serve as a liaison for the president to a variety of internal and

external constituencies;

37. In 2003, the Legislature transferred the powers and duties of the

Commission on Human Rights to the Texas Workforce Commission. Act of

June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 302, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1279, 1279.

Nevertheless, courts, including this Court, have sometimes continued to refer

to Chapter 21 as the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, or TCHRA. We

now refer simply to Chapter 21.

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• gather, investigate, research, analyze, and study information

affecting University-wide, intradepartmental, or

interdepartmental operations;

• advise the president on issues related to University policy,

process, and practice;

• handle questions, concerns, and requests on behalf of the

president to solve problems and mediate disputes;

• oversee the president’s office scholarships and administer

their budgets;

• develop sustainability plans for scholarship funds;

• administer budget for special projects and onetime financial

commitments of the president’s funds;

• report on financial viability of commitments; and

• mentor the administrative staff in the president’s office.

The position’s “required qualifications” included a graduate degree and

ten years of experience “in positions of increasing management

responsibility in complex organizations.”

Before the position was officially posted, President Lange learned

that Amy Sanchez, the director of the University’s office of auditing

services, was considering leaving the University to pursue other

opportunities. President Lange informed Sanchez about the upcoming

position and encouraged her to apply.

Flores, Sanchez, and five external candidates applied for the

chief-of-staff position. 3 President Lange interviewed only Flores and

3 The job posting for the position stated that it was a “confidential

posting,” but President Lange testified he did not know what that meant and

he had not been involved in generating the document other than to forward the

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Sanchez. At the time, he was aware of Flores’s EEOC complaint

regarding her reassignment and knew her age. Nevertheless, during

Flores’s interview, he asked her how old she was. According to President

Lange, the question was a rhetorical one intended to address the

“elephant in the room”—Flores’s EEOC complaint. Flores did not

answer the question.

After interviewing Flores and Sanchez, President Lange hired

Sanchez for the position. At the time, Flores was sixty years old, and

Sanchez was thirty-seven. Flores submitted a second charge of

discrimination to the EEOC and, after being issued a right-to-sue letter,

filed her second lawsuit against the University under Chapter 21.

Flores alleges that the failure to select her for the chief-of-staff position

constitutes both age discrimination and retaliation for her earlier

complaints about her reassignment.

As in Flores I, the University filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which

the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed in part and

dismissed the retaliation claim, 657 S.W.3d 502, 517–18 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022), and Flores does not challenge that portion of the court of

appeals’ judgment here. The court of appeals affirmed as to the

discrimination claim, holding that Flores raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether age was a motivating factor in the

University’s decision not to select her for the chief-of-staff position. Id.

at 512–15. We granted the University’s petition for review.

job description and requirements to the human-resources department. In any

event, given that five external candidates applied for the position, we ascribe

no significance to the “confidential posting” designation.

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II. Discussion

As a state university, the University is immune from suit absent

an express legislative waiver. Flores I, 612 S.W.3d at 305. Chapter 21

waives that immunity, “but only if the plaintiff alleges facts that would

establish that the state agency violated the Act and, when challenged

with contrary evidence, provides evidence that is at least sufficient to

create a genuine fact issue material to that allegation.” Id. (citing Alamo

Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770–71 (Tex. 2018)).

In evaluating the University’s jurisdictional plea, we assume the

evidence supporting the plaintiff’s allegations is true, resolving all

doubts and indulging reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

However, “we cannot disregard evidence necessary to show context, and

we cannot disregard evidence and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff

if reasonable jurors could not.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771.

A. Legal Framework

Under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code, an employer may not

discriminate against an individual “because of” certain characteristics,

including age. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051(1). An employment practice is

unlawful “if discrimination ‘was a motivating factor for [the] practice,

even if other factors also motivated the practice.’” Quantum Chem.

Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 479–80 (Tex. 2001) (quoting TEX. LAB.

CODE § 21.125(a)).

Before a case is tried on the merits, and in the absence of direct

evidence of discrimination, we use the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework to evaluate whether a plaintiff has created

a fact issue on her statutory claim. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola,

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121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). 4 Under that framework, (1) the plaintiff must

create a presumption of illegal discrimination by establishing a prima

facie case; (2) the defendant must then rebut that presumption by

establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment

action; and (3) the plaintiff must then overcome the rebuttal evidence by

establishing that the defendant’s stated reason is a mere pretext.

Flores I, 612 S.W.3d at 305. As we held in Alamo Heights, because a

statutory violation is necessary to establish an immunity waiver—such

that jurisdiction and the merits intertwine—all three steps of the

framework “are relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.” 544 S.W.3d at

783–84.

B. Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case requires evidence that the employee:

(1) was a member of the protected class (that is, 40 years of

age or older), (2) was qualified for the position at issue,

(3) suffered a final, adverse employment action, and

(4) was either (a) replaced by someone significantly

younger or (b) otherwise treated less favorably than others

who were similarly situated but outside the protected class.

Flores I, 612 S.W.3d at 305. In Flores I, we held that Flores failed to

create a fact issue with respect to her prima facie case because a

4 Because Texas’s anti-discrimination statutes are analogous to their

federal counterparts, the “federal statutes and the cases interpreting them

guide our reading of [Chapter 21].” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,

372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012). Federal authorities interpreting Title VII “do

not bind us,” but they do “assist us in our independent obligation to construe

Texas law.” Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Niehay, 671 S.W.3d

929, 937 (Tex. 2023).

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reasonable juror could not conclude that she was “replaced” by Solis or

treated less favorably than others who were “similarly situated” to

Flores but outside the protected class. Id. at 310, 312. Here, the

University does not dispute the existence of a prima facie case: Flores is

over forty years of age and thus a member of a protected class; she was

qualified for the chief-of-staff position; she was not hired for the position;

and the person who was hired—Sanchez—is significantly younger.

C. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

The parties also do not dispute that the University articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, rebutting the

presumption established by the prima facie case. In support of its plea

to the jurisdiction, the University attached an affidavit from President

Lange attesting that he selected Sanchez for the chief-of-staff position

because she “was simply the better qualified candidate—mostly because

of her auditing and accounting background and skillset, and broad range

of experience.” More specifically, President Lange attested that he

considered Sanchez’s experience as director of the office of auditing

services, which “gave her familiarity with each of [the University’s]

various departments,” to be “extremely valuable to the position” and

that Flores did not have a comparable auditing and accounting

background. He also testified in his deposition that Sanchez had “more

experience” in “the areas that I was most interested in,” specifically,

“[b]usiness, audit, [and] grants.” Relatedly, President Lange attested

that he asked Flores during her interview “whether she had any

experience with auditing, accounting, or budgeting—skill sets that were

important to the Chief of Staff position. Ms. Flores responded that she

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did not have any significant experience in these areas.” Finally,

President Lange averred that “based on my observations and

experiences during the period in which Ms. Flores supported me before

her reclassification [to executive associate], I also lacked confidence in

certain of her competencies, such as grant management, auditing,

budgeting, and her ability to follow instructions and receive constructive

feedback.”

In light of these stated reasons, we turn to the third “pretext” step

of the analysis. Here, the parties part ways in their evaluation of the

evidence.

D. Pretext

At this third step, we examine whether Flores presented

evidence, sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, that the

University’s stated reasons for its employment action were a pretext for

discrimination. See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. The United

States Supreme Court has held that evidence that would allow the

factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s stated reason, in conjunction with

the requisite prima facie case established at step one, “may permit” an

inference “that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory

purpose” even in the absence of additional, independent evidence of such

discriminatory intent. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 147, 149 (2000). Citing Reeves, we have similarly noted that

in a pretext case, a “plaintiff can usually provide sufficient evidence of

discriminatory intent by showing that the employer’s proffered reason

for the adverse action is false.” Quantum Chem., 47 S.W.3d at 476

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(emphasis added). 5 However, the Reeves Court recognized that

“[c]ertainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has

established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject

the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that

the action was discriminatory.” 530 U.S. at 148. 6 The parties dispute

whether this case presents such an instance. See Owens v. Circassia

Pharms., Inc., 33 F.4th 814, 826 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that the case

presented “one of those instances” where a prima facie case and evidence

that the defendant’s explanation was false were insufficient to create a

fact issue on whether the explanation was a pretext for discrimination).

The University argues that Flores presented no evidence that the

University’s stated reasons for its employment action were false and,

even if she did, the evidence nevertheless does not support an inference

of discriminatory intent. We agree with the University that the evidence

5 In Canchola, we explained that when conducting an evidentiary

review of a jury’s verdict in a discrimination case that has been fully tried on

its merits, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis does not apply;

instead, the question is whether the evidence supports the jury’s “ultimate

finding” that discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the adverse

employment action. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739. At that stage, evidence of

the falsity of an employer’s stated reasons does not equate to evidence that the

real reason was unlawful discrimination. Id. at 740 (“The relevant inquiry is

not whether the [employer’s stated reasons] were a pretext, but what they were

a pretext for.”).

6 “For instance,” the Court noted, “an employer would be entitled to

judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created

only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and

there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no

discrimination had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.

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does not permit a reasonable conclusion that the proffered justification

for selecting Sanchez over Flores was false, let alone discriminatory.

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that both Sanchez and

Flores met the “required qualifications” for the chief-of-staff position.

They each have a graduate degree—Sanchez received an MBA in 2007,

and Flores received an MBA in 2013. Further, both have the requisite

ten years of experience “in positions of increasing management

responsibility in complex organizations.” Sanchez worked her way from

a staff auditor at a school district, to assistant director of the University

of Texas at El Paso’s office of auditing and consulting services, to

director of the University’s office of auditing services. She is also a

certified public accountant and a certified internal auditor. Flores began

her career at the University as an administrative secretary and then a

coordinator (a more senior secretarial position for one of the

departments) before being promoted to executive associate to the

regional dean and then director of that office before her reclassification

as an executive associate in the provost’s office.

Flores first argues that her strong record of performance in the

director position, which involved many of the same duties as the

chief-of-staff position, belies the University’s claim that President Lange

believed Sanchez to be the better-qualified candidate. 7 Indeed, Dr. de

7 As an alternative to showing pretext by evidence that the employer’s

proffered explanation is false, the Fifth Circuit has held that the plaintiff may

also show pretext via evidence that she “is ‘clearly better qualified’ than the

person selected for the position.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp.,

482 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella

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la Rosa submitted a recommendation letter on Flores’s behalf attesting

to a “perfect alignment between her prior experience and [the

chief-of-staff] position.” 8 We disagree with this narrow account of the

candidates’ qualifications.

There is no question that Flores had significant relevant

experience from her time as director of the regional dean’s office before

and during the University’s transition—e.g., managing various special

projects, assisting the dean with strategic planning, and serving as the

dean’s “problem solver” and liaison to other departments and agencies—

and had received consistently positive evaluations from Dr. de la Rosa

over the years. However, there is also no question that Sanchez had

more accounting and finance experience and that, as director of the

University’s office of auditing services, she had in-depth institutional

knowledge and experience across all departments following the school’s

transition to a four-year university. Relatedly, President Lange testified

in his deposition that Flores had “an experience poorly managing

grants” with respect to the student-run free clinic, resulting in the

removal of that responsibility. Flores confirmed that in April 2015, her

responsibility for the clinic’s budgeting had been removed due to

SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir. 2001)). Flores does not contend in this Court

that she is “clearly better qualified” than Sanchez; rather, she asserts that the

reason given by the University for the decision to hire Sanchez over Flores—

President Lange’s conclusion that Sanchez was the better-qualified

candidate—is unworthy of credence.

8 In his deposition in Flores I, however, Dr. de la Rosa testified that

when President Lange began his tenure and they discussed the transition,

Dr. de la Rosa said that he did not think Flores and President Lange “would

make a good fit.”

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concerns about proper fund management. This incident occurred while

she was working with President Lange and before she had made any

discrimination complaints. 9

Certainly, then, both candidates had their strengths, and we will

not lightly second-guess the manner in which President Lange weighed

those qualifications. See Martinez v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 775 F.3d

685, 688 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating that “employers are generally free to

weigh the qualifications of prospective employees, so long as they are

not motivated by [discrimination]” (emphasis removed)). The court of

appeals, however, concluded that the evidence calls President Lange’s

credibility into question because “the areas of business, audits, grants,

and finances [that President Lange claimed were most relevant to his

decision] were not listed to any degree on the job description [he created]

for the chief of staff position.” 657 S.W.3d at 515. Flores similarly

asserts that President Lange relied on “subjective and previously

unmentioned hiring criteria” in asserting that Sanchez was the better

candidate. See Stennett v. Tupelo Pub. Sch. Dist., 619 F. App’x 310, 322

(5th Cir. 2015) (stating that such reliance “could help support a rational

jury’s finding of pretext”); see also Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d

917, 926 (5th Cir. 2010) (“An employer’s reliance on a previously

unmentioned job requirement to justify a challenged hiring decision

9 The testimony of both President Lange and Flores regarding this

incident, which Flores stated was documented in an email, controverts the

court of appeals’ assertion that “[t]here is no contemporaneous documentation

of any problems with or concerns over Flores’ work or her competencies” until

after she complained of age discrimination. 657 S.W.3d at 514–15.

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would raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.”). But the

record simply does not support that assertion.

As discussed, the job description for the chief-of-staff position

included, among other things:

• “[o]versee the president’s office scholarships and administer

their budgets”;

• “develop sustainability plans for scholarship funds”;

• “[a]dminister budget for special projects and onetime financial

commitments of the president’s funds”; and

• “[r]eport on financial viability of commitments.”

Flores and the court of appeals gloss over these duties, which correspond

directly with Sanchez’s finance and accounting experience, and instead

appear to focus on the fact that the specific words “accounting,” “audit,”

and “grants” were not used. That fact is at most a technicality. In taking

such a narrow and unsupported view of the position to which Sanchez

and Flores applied, the court of appeals created a fact issue where none

exists.

Next, the parties dispute the ramifications of the evidence that

President Lange encouraged Sanchez to apply for the chief-of-staff

position before it was posted. Flores argues that the fact that he “sought

out the younger Sanchez rather than Flores for the position . . . despite

its similarity to her former duties” undercuts President Lange’s claim

that he hired Sanchez because of her qualifications. The University

responds that if, as Flores claims, President Lange “preselected”

Sanchez for the position before Flores even applied, then he cannot be

accused of discriminating against Flores. Cf. Mauro v. S. New England

Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 387–88 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that no

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evidence called into question the employer’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for selecting a qualified younger employee for

a position rather than the plaintiff—that it had created the position

specifically for that employee to prevent her from being laid off).

Both parties stretch the evidence to support their respective

inferences, neither of which is reasonable. As noted, all the evidence

shows is that President Lange encouraged Sanchez to apply for the

chief-of-staff position upon learning that she was considering leaving

the University to pursue other opportunities. It indicates neither that

he “preselected” her nor that he sought her out over other potential

candidates. We fail to see how this evidence has any bearing on whether

President Lange’s stated reason for hiring Sanchez—that she was more

qualified for the position—was a pretext for discrimination against

Flores.

Finally, Flores argues that President Lange’s inquiry regarding

her age during her interview is some evidence of pretext. 10 Again, we

disagree. Certainly, age-related comments by the relevant

decisionmaker can be evidence supporting a finding of pretext. See

Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, LP, 793 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2015)

(holding that doubts the plaintiff raised about the validity of

performance warnings he was given, “combined with the ageist

comments that [we]re potentially corroborated by the firing of both [the

10 Flores does not assert that this inquiry constitutes “direct evidence”

of discrimination. Rather, she offers it as additional circumstantial evidence

pertinent to the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. See Reed v. Neopost

USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2012).

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plaintiff] and [another older employee], would allow a jury to conclude

that age was the reason for the termination”). But as with any other

evidence, the inquiry regarding Flores’s age must be considered in

context. See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 774.

Flores and President Lange agree that he asked Flores how old

she was, that he then told her she did not have to answer the question,

and that she in fact did not answer. As noted, President Lange testified

that he already knew Flores’s age and that the question was a rhetorical

one intended to address the “elephant in the room.” 11 That “elephant”

was the fact that, at the time of the interview, Flores had already

submitted a claim of discrimination to the EEOC premised on her

reassignment and reclassification to executive associate. 12 President

Lange recalled telling Flores in connection with the question that he did

not care about her age and that her age “did not matter.” Flores disputes

that he made those statements, but she conceded in her deposition that

there “[c]ould have been” some context to the question that she does not

remember.

In the context of the ongoing dispute in which age was an issue,

President Lange’s reference to age does not call into question the

11 Flores argues that a factfinder could disregard President Lange’s

“self-serving statement” that he already knew Flores’s age. The statement

may be self-serving, but we see no basis to disregard it given President Lange’s

involvement in the events underlying Flores I. Indeed, when Flores was asked

at her deposition whether she thought President Lange knew her age before

the interview, she responded, “I’m sure he had an idea.”

12 As noted, Flores filed suit in Flores I based on that earlier complaint

shortly after President Lange hired Sanchez as his chief of staff.

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reasons given by the University for hiring Sanchez over Flores. An

acknowledgment of Flores’s pending discrimination complaint—the

subject of Flores I—is not an admission of discrimination by President

Lange or the University, nor does it remotely undercut President

Lange’s position that Sanchez was more qualified to be his chief of staff.

In sum, reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Flores

failed to present evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to

disbelieve the University’s stated reasons for selecting Sanchez as the

president’s chief of staff. In turn, we hold that Flores has failed to

present evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that age

was a motivating factor behind that decision.

III. Conclusion

The University is immune from suit absent some evidence that it

violated Chapter 21. Because Flores presented no such evidence, the

University’s plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted.

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment as to the

discrimination claim and render judgment dismissing the case for lack

of jurisdiction.

Debra H. Lehrmann

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: December 31, 2024

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