Case law

Rachel Lauren Goldstein v. James Sabatino

Texas Supreme Court · May 24, 2024

Chapter 7B thus authorizes a protective order when the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent engaged in conduct that would qualify as an offense under certain provisions of the Penal Code. … Rather, Pennoyer established a regime in which territorial jurisdiction was the only way for a court to achieve personal jurisdiction over a party.

Collins v. Warren

63 Tex. 311 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 16, 1885

It is alleged that the administrator qualified in March, 1869, and died in 1873. While there are several breaches of the bond alleged, the respective dates at which such breaches occurred are not stated. … Warren for maladministration, and that might have been done at any time by establishing these alleged breaches of bis bond. His qualification as administrator was in March, 1869.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. McCardell

6 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 549 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1963

On the other hand, Special Issue No. 12 appears to inquire of facts which would establish Section 12c rights. We are at a loss to know whether petitioner proceeded under one or both theories. … Clearly the pleading does not inform us, and it is insufficient for that reason. Rule 45; Pabst v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 125 Tex. 52 , 80 S.W.2d 956 .

Friedman v. American Surety Co. of New York

137 Tex. 149 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 9, 1941

Subdivision a of Section 7 of Article 5221b of this Act establishes an Unemployment Compensation Fund. … It provides that such fund is established as. a special fund, separate and apart from all public moneys or funds of the State.

Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Gordon

70 Tex. 80 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 24, 1888

asking the implication, and when the consideration on which the asserted contract is founded is declared to have been delivered or 'given through mere sympathy, and not as a matter of right under a contract sought to-be established … Cases have arisen in which it was held that the acceptance of a provision operated a satisfaction, but this was in cases in which this clearly appeared to be the intention of the parties.

Texas Mutual Insurance Company, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, Tasb Risk Management Fund, Transportation Insurance Company, Truck Insurance Exchange, Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Valley Forge Insurance Company v. Phi Air Medical, LLC

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2020

Other courts have held that state-law caps on insurer reimbursement for air-ambulance transports are preempted by the ADA because such laws establish a mandatory fixed maximum rate for reimbursement. … The scheme thus clearly relates to PHI’s prices because it controls the amount that PHI is entitled to collect from the insurer, the party from whom the TWCA prescribes reimbursement of medical benefits. See TEX.

Mingus, Receiver v. Wadley

115 Tex. 551 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 16, 1926

Mingus was by that court appointed receiver of the Reciprocal, gave bond, and qualified as such. … As to the county where suit to set aside an award may be brought, the statute is clearly mandatory.

Kuechler v. Wright

40 Tex. 600 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1874

That the Constitution of 1866, though superseded, is not annulled in this' respect by its successor, but its provision as to reserved sections is revived and continued and in no manner qualified by Article 10, Section 5, … If such is the law, I think it should be clearly and distinctly announced.

Swilley v. McCain

374 S.W.2d 871 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1964

Swilley that established the title through the Young heirs by stare decisis.” … Article I, Section 19 of our Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St. provides that: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Texas Utilities Electric Co.

995 S.W.2d 647 · Texas Supreme Court · May 27, 1999

The intention to contract or confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied. See id. … Consequently, a presumption exists that parties contracted for themselves unless it “clearly appears” that they intended a third party to benefit from the contract.

Weiner v. Wasson

900 S.W.2d 316 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 21, 1995

Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1988), expanded the exceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine upon which Felderhoff was based. … Jilani did not change the law governing parent-child immunity articulated in Felderhoff .

Thomas Brandon Perthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Laboratories, Llc

Texas Supreme Court · May 20, 2022

It argued that the employment agreement’s text clearly displaced any role for the procuring-cause doctrine. … Primo, 512 S.W.3d 890, 892–93 (Tex. 2017) (discussing several of the “well-established rules of contract construction”).

McCraw v. Maris

828 S.W.2d 756 · Texas Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1992

We consider whether the duplicate beneficiary designation form constitutes hearsay and, if it does, whether it qualifies under any exception to the hearsay rule. … This latter testimony is clearly inadmissible hearsay. Donna Maris' will was admitted by the trial court.

Bland Independent School District v. Blue

44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 125 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 7, 2000

provided financing for the building itself and work done on it, which might arguably be improvements to real property within the meaning of the statute, and not as to financing for furnishings in the building that were clearly … The court in Firemen’s cited this limitation in the context of determining a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. To this extent we disapprove the language of Firemen’s.

Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc.

50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1148 · Texas Supreme Court · Aug 31, 2007

I The Medicare Advantage Program Medicare was established in 1965 as part of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 -1395ggg (2000). … Establishment of the Medicare Advantage Program, 70 Fed.Reg. 4588, 4589 (Jan. 28, 2005).

Willis v. Owen

43 Tex. 41 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1875

The Legislature shall establish a uniform sys- “ tern of public free schools throughout the State. “ Section 5. … It is also quite obvious that none of the constitutional powers or functions of the superintendent can be taken from him, absolutely or in a qualified manner, by requiring him to exercise them in conjunction with some other

Chad Seward, Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., and Point 2 Point Global Security, Inc. v. Rogelio Santander Sr. and Julia Garcia, Individually and as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Rogelio Santander Jr., and Crystal Almeida

Texas Supreme Court · May 9, 2025

The governmental unit may still be protected by immunity from suit, even if its employee is entitled to dismissal under this section. Franka v. … They clearly are not trespassers.

Carr v. Radkey

8 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 536 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 28, 1965

Brown who operated the rest home, as well as some others, gave testimony which would clearly support a jury finding that Miss Hewlett did not have testamentary capacity at the time she wrote the instrument. … After being so qualified, Dr. Hoerster was asked a hypothetical question.

Ramirez v. Smith

94 Tex. 184 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 22, 1900

During the same year Lucia, the widow of Lino Ramirez, qualified as survivor, inventorying the land in controversy as part of the community estate, and she and Antonio formed a partnership for carrying on the stock business … Haynes owned that grant, and it clearly appears from matters in the record outside of the judgment, and was virtually conceded in the trial below, that such grant included all the land claimed under it.

Black v. American Bankers Insurance Company

15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 142 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 5, 1972

. § 1395cc), which reads: “Any provider of services shall be qualified to participate under this title (Title XVIII) and shall be eligible for payments under this title if it files with the Secretary an agreement . . . … Clearly, Medicare’s derivative obligation to pay arises from the eligible patient’s original incurrence of the obligation, without which there could be no payment under the Act from Medicare to the hospital.