Rachel Lauren Goldstein v. James Sabatino

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 22-0678

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Rachel Lauren Goldstein,

Petitioner,

v.

James Sabatino,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas

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Argued February 20, 2024

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The primary question presented is whether “territorial

jurisdiction”—a criminal concept—is a jurisdictional requirement

underlying a district court’s power to issue a civil protective order under

Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The district court

issued a protective order under Chapter 7B’s predecessor 1 against a

1 When this suit was filed, the protective-order provisions were housed

in Chapter 7A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Because Chapter 7B is the

Massachusetts resident, based on conduct that occurred entirely within

Massachusetts borders. On appeal, the respondent challenged the

district court’s personal jurisdiction over him and its subject matter

jurisdiction over the proceeding. The court of appeals vacated the order

and dismissed the case, holding that the district court lacked territorial

jurisdiction—a purportedly nonwaivable, third jurisdictional

requirement. The court of appeals did not address personal jurisdiction.

Though we disagree with the court of appeals’ territorial-

jurisdiction analysis, we agree with the respondent that the district

court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, we affirm the

court of appeals’ judgment vacating the protective order and dismissing

the case.

I. Background

Rachel Goldstein and James Sabatino dated for about two years

in Massachusetts; their relationship ended in 2017. In March 2020,

after almost three years with no communication, Sabatino began

contacting Goldstein through texts and calls, informing her that he had

found sexually explicit photos and conversations shared between her

and someone she dated before Sabatino. The photos and conversations

were apparently stored on a cell phone that Goldstein had loaned to

Sabatino during their relationship. Despite Goldstein’s request that

Sabatino return the phone, he refused. Goldstein became concerned

current version, the provisions cited in this opinion have not been

substantively revised, and any revisions to other provisions do not affect our

analysis, we generally reference Chapter 7B to minimize obsolete citations.

2

that Sabatino would use these texts and images to “control her and ruin

her career.”

Goldstein served Sabatino with a cease-and-desist letter

demanding that he cease communicating with her and return the phone.

In May 2020, a Massachusetts court granted Goldstein a protective

order against Sabatino. He subsequently violated the order and was

arrested. In June, the Massachusetts court extended the protective

order for another six months and included a prohibition on any further

contact by email, by text, or via a third party.

The same month, Goldstein moved to Harris County, Texas.

While the Massachusetts protective order was still in effect, 2 Sabatino

began filing small-claims lawsuits in Massachusetts against Goldstein

for defamation, lost wages, malicious prosecution, reimbursement for

pet care and a vacation they took together, and the cost of the cell phone

he was prevented from using. Sabatino also made at least two HIPAA

complaints against Goldstein (a doctor), which were later determined to

be unfounded.

In October 2020, Goldstein filed an application for a protective

order against Sabatino in Harris County. 3 On November 13, Sabatino

The record contains no information regarding the status of the

2

Massachusetts protective order after December 1, 2020, when the extension

ended.

3 Attorneys with the Harris County District Attorney’s Office filed the

application on Goldstein’s behalf. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 81.007(a) (“The county

attorney or the criminal district attorney is the prosecuting attorney

responsible for filing applications under [Title 4, Subtitle B of the Family Code,

which governs protective orders] . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.008

3

was served with citation and notice of a December 3 hearing, which took

place via Zoom. Sabatino did not file a special appearance and

participated in the Zoom hearing pro se. At the hearing, Goldstein

testified and offered copies of the text-message exchanges with Sabatino

and the lawsuits he had filed against her. After her testimony, the

district court allowed Sabatino to “directly examine” himself. Sabatino

testified that there was no evidence he had harmed or would harm

Goldstein, that the “text message issue has already been litigated in

Massachusetts,” that the civil suits against Goldstein were all filed in

Massachusetts, and that the Texas long-arm statute “does not apply in

this case.”

The district court found that it had jurisdiction over the parties

and the subject matter. It also found that there was reason to believe

Goldstein was the victim of stalking pursuant to the Texas Penal Code

and then-Chapter 7A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Based on these

findings, the district court granted a lifetime protective order preventing

Sabatino from, among other things, communicating with Goldstein

except through an attorney or going near Goldstein’s residence or place

of work. 4

(“To the extent applicable, except as otherwise provided by this subchapter,

Title 4, Family Code, applies to a protective order issued under this

subchapter.”).

4 Specifically, the order prohibits Sabatino from:

(a) Committing dating violence against [Goldstein];

4

On appeal, Sabatino challenged the district court’s personal

jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction over the

protective-order proceeding. Goldstein responded that Sabatino waived

personal jurisdiction when he failed to file a special appearance and

that, because Goldstein lived in Harris County, the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction to hear her application and issue a protective

order.

The court of appeals agreed that the district court had subject

matter jurisdiction because Goldstein applied for the protective order in

the district court of the county where she resides. 649 S.W.3d 841, 847

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022) (citing former TEX. CODE CRIM.

(b) Communicating with [Goldstein] in any manner except

through []her attorney of record or a person appointed by the

Court;

(c) Communicating a threat through any person to [Goldstein];

(d) Going to or [within 200 feet of] the residence or place of

employment or business of [Goldstein] . . . or any future

residential and employment addresses of [Goldstein]

provided that a [compliant] “Notification of Change of

Address” is filed . . . ;

(e) Possessing a firearm, unless the person is a peace officer, as

defined by Section 1.07, Penal Code, actively engaged in

employment as a sworn, full-time paid employee of a state

agency or political subdivision;

(f) Engaging in conduct directed specifically toward [Goldstein],

including following [her], that is likely to harass, annoy,

alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass [her];

(g) Harming, threatening, or interfering with the care, custody,

or control of a pet, companion animal, or assistance

animal . . . that is possessed by [Goldstein] or by a member

of [her] family or household[.]

5

PROC. art. 7A.01(b)(1) (current version at id. art. 7B.001(b)(1))). 5 The

court did not address Sabatino’s challenge to the district court’s personal

jurisdiction over him. However, the court of appeals concluded that,

“[p]roperly understood,” Sabatino’s challenge was to “the trial court’s

territorial jurisdiction, which is a distinct jurisdictional requirement in

all suits” that “cannot be waived.” Id. at 847–48. As none of the conduct

that gave rise to the protective order took place in Texas, the court of

appeals dismissed the case for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Id. at

849–50.

We granted Goldstein’s petition for review.

5 Article 7B.001(b) provides:

An application for a protective order under this subchapter may

be filed in:

(1) a district court, juvenile court having the jurisdiction of a

district court, statutory county court, or constitutional

county court in:

(A) the county in which the applicant resides;

(B) the county in which the alleged offender resides; or

(C) any county in which an element of the alleged offense

occurred; or

(2) any court with jurisdiction over a protective order under

Title 4, Family Code, involving the same parties named in

the application.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.001(b). We need not and do not address

whether this provision imposes jurisdictional limitations on a court’s authority

to preside over a protective-order proceeding.

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II. Territorial Jurisdiction

A court has power to decide a case “only if it has ‘both subject

matter jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over

the parties.’” TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. 2016) (quoting

Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010)). In criminal

cases, an additional jurisdictional concept known as “territorial

jurisdiction” comes into play when a criminal offense occurs partly or

wholly outside the boundaries of the State. Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d

350, 352 & n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04).

Under the Penal Code, territorial jurisdiction over an offense exists if

(1) either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs

inside this state; (2) the conduct outside this state constitutes an

attempt to commit an offense inside this state; (3) the conduct outside

this state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense inside this state,

and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs inside this state; or

(4) the conduct inside this state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or

conspiracy to commit, or establishes criminal responsibility for the

commission of, an offense in another jurisdiction that is also an offense

under the laws of this state. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04(a). Absent such a

connection, the State may not criminally prosecute an offender. See

Allen v. State, 620 S.W.3d 915, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“To be clear,

Appellant cannot be held liable in Texas for the acts committed in Iowa.”

(citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04)).

The court of appeals imported this distinctly criminal

jurisdictional component into Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings.

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649 S.W.3d at 848–50. Because such proceedings are undisputedly civil

matters, this was error.

Chapter 7B authorizes issuance of a protective order when “the

court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the

applicant is the victim of sexual assault or abuse, stalking, or

trafficking.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.003(b). 6 Among other

things, the court may prohibit the alleged offender from communicating

with the applicant or the applicant’s family or household “in a

threatening or harassing manner” and from “engaging in conduct

directed specifically toward the applicant or any member of the

applicant’s family or household . . . that is reasonably likely to harass,

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass the person.” Id.

art. 7B.005(a)(2)(A)(i), (C).

Chapter 7B thus authorizes a protective order when the court

finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent engaged in

conduct that would qualify as an offense under certain provisions of the

Penal Code. But that is not akin to prosecuting the respondent for the

underlying offense. Rather than punish someone for past conduct, a

protective order protects the applicant and prevents future harm. See,

e.g., id. art. 7B.005(a)(1) (when issuing a Chapter 7B protective order, a

court may, among other things, “order the alleged offender to take

action . . . that the court determines is necessary or appropriate to

prevent or reduce the likelihood of future harm to the applicant or a

member of the applicant’s family or household”). As the court of appeals

6 The Family Code authorizes issuance of a protective order upon a

finding that family violence has occurred. TEX. FAM. CODE § 85.001(b).

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itself recognized, Chapter 7B proceedings are civil matters. 7 649 S.W.3d

at 847. Thus, they do not implicate the “territorial jurisdiction” required

in criminal proceedings. Stated another way, as in any civil case, a court

presiding over a Chapter 7B proceeding must have “subject matter

jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the

parties.” TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 36. The court of appeals erred in

imposing a third, nonwaivable territorial limitation on the court’s

jurisdiction that applies only in criminal cases.

Sabatino nevertheless insists that “territorial jurisdiction” is a

longstanding, distinct jurisdictional requirement in civil cases. We

disagree. Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), our case law

7 In In re Commitment of Fisher, we recognized that a civil statute can

be “‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’

to deem it ‘civil.’” 164 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2005) (alteration in original)

(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). In conducting that

evaluation, we apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s “Kennedy factors,” which

include:

(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or

restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a

punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of

scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional

aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether

an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected

is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in

relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)). We

need not engage in an exhaustive analysis of these factors to conclude that

Chapter 7B is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to controvert its “civil”

status—indeed, neither the parties nor the court of appeals suggests otherwise.

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consistently treated the concept of territorial jurisdiction as a subsidiary

consideration relevant to personal jurisdiction. That is, the cases

discussing territorial jurisdiction did so for the purpose of establishing

jurisdiction over a defendant such that he could be justly bound by a

court’s judgment. See Armstrong v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., 46

S.W. 33, 35 (Tex. 1898) (“[C]orporations and persons, doing business

within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, are subject to its law.”);

Traylor v. Lide, 7 S.W. 58, 61 (Tex. 1887) (describing territorial

jurisdiction as limiting a court’s exercise of power when it lacks in

personam jurisdiction over a party); see also Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518

S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. 1975) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to

render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over

the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial

jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment

personally binding him.”).

This understanding of territorial jurisdiction was grounded in the

U.S. Supreme Court’s 1887 holding in Pennoyer v. Neff that a court could

not constitutionally bind a defendant to a judgment unless the court

acquired jurisdiction “by service of process within the State, or his

voluntary appearance.” 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1887). In Ferrer v. Almanza,

667 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2023), we traced the development of the law

governing personal jurisdiction and service of process, culminating with

the Supreme Court’s complete “retreat” from Pennoyer in International

Shoe, in which the Supreme Court recognized that due process no longer

required “a defendant’s ‘presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a

court’ to render a judgment against that defendant.” Id. at 739 (quoting

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Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). We affirmed in Ferrer that, in the context

of a statute tolling limitations during a defendant’s “absence from this

state,” such “absence . . . depends not on physical location but, rather,

on whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction and service.”

Id. at 744. Our analysis in Ferrer reflects the understanding that

territorial jurisdiction was subsumed into the minimum-contacts

analysis.

The U.S. Supreme Court has understood International Shoe the

same way. Specifically, the Court held that “Due Process does not

necessarily require the States to adhere to the unbending territorial

limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer.” Burnham v. Superior Ct. of

Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990). Territorial jurisdiction has not been

recognized as a separate jurisdictional consideration in the civil courts.

Rather, Pennoyer established a regime in which territorial jurisdiction

was the only way for a court to achieve personal jurisdiction over a party.

However, after International Shoe, a party’s presence within the

territorial jurisdiction of a state was no longer required to satisfy the

due process requirements of personal jurisdiction. After this shift, the

term “territorial jurisdiction” quickly fell into desuetude.

In his supplemental briefing in this Court, Sabatino relies on the

well-settled presumption against a statute’s having extraterritorial

effect to argue that “territorial jurisdiction” is a longstanding

prerequisite in civil cases. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach,

217 S.W.3d 430, 443–44 (Tex. 2007). This presumption is that a statute

has no extraterritorial effect “[u]nless the intention to have [the] statute

operate beyond the limits of the state . . . is clearly expressed or

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indicated by its language, purpose, subject matter, or history.” Id. at

443 (quoting Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 187

(Tex. 1968)). 8 However, the presumption is not jurisdictional in an

adjudicative sense; it does not concern a court’s power to render a

binding judgment. Thus, as Sabatino disclaimed any challenge to

Chapter 7B’s reach or the validity of the order’s provisions in the court

of appeals, the issue is not before us. In any event, because, as discussed

below, we ultimately hold that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction over Sabatino, we need not address his argument in this

Court about the presumption against legislative extraterritoriality. 9

III. Personal Jurisdiction

The court of appeals did not reach Sabatino’s personal jurisdiction

issue, but in the interest of judicial economy we will address it in the

first instance here. See Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex.

2022).

Even if the Legislature has overcome this presumption by clearly

8

expressing that a statute applies to extraterritorial conduct, there are also

constitutional limitations on the statute’s extraterritorial reach. Daccach, 217

S.W.3d at 446.

9 We also do not answer a related question—whether a person is the

victim of an offense under the Texas Penal Code, for purposes of the

protective-order statutes, if all the relevant conduct took place between

non-Texas residents in another jurisdiction. Answering that question could

involve considerations similar to the territorial jurisdiction analysis employed

by the court of appeals, but the answer would dictate whether a protective

order is available on the merits, not whether the court has jurisdiction over the

proceedings. Only jurisdictional questions are before us in this appeal; we

therefore hold only that a lack of territorial jurisdiction in the criminal sense

is not a jurisdictional bar to a Texas court’s consideration of a civil

protective-order application.

12

Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant when (1) our long-arm statute authorizes it and

(2) doing so comports with federal and state constitutional due process

guarantees. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550,

558 (Tex. 2018). But because Texas’s long-arm statute extends personal

jurisdiction as far as the federal constitutional requirements allow, the

“federal due process requirements shape the contours of Texas courts’

jurisdictional reach.” Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tex.

2016).

The assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant is constitutional when two criteria are met: (1) the defendant

has established “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) the

exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 36 (quoting Int’l

Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). To establish minimum contacts, the defendant

must have “purposefully [availed] itself of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and

protections of its laws.” Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414

S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013).

The purposeful-availment analysis is guided by three main

principles, which bear repeating. See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country,

Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). First, only the

defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant; the unilateral activity

of a third party is not. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d

569, 575 (Tex. 2007). Second, the defendant’s contacts must be

“purposeful” as opposed to “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Id. And

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third, the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by

availing itself of the jurisdiction. Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785.

Here, the analysis is simple. Goldstein does not point to any

purposeful contacts that Sabatino made with Texas—in fact, she points

to no contacts at all. The predicate conduct underlying the protective

order took place entirely in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and

most of it took place while both Goldstein and Sabatino were

Massachusetts residents. 10

Goldstein does not dispute the absence of contacts between

Sabatino and Texas. Rather, Goldstein argues that Sabatino waived

any challenge to the district court’s personal jurisdiction by entering a

general appearance. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, which governs

special appearances for the purpose of challenging personal jurisdiction,

provides that “[e]very appearance, prior to judgment, not in compliance

with this rule is a general appearance.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1). “A party

enters a general appearance,” and thus waives a challenge to personal

jurisdiction, “when it (1) invokes the judgment of the court on any

question other than the court’s jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts

that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative action from

the court.” Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. 2004).

Goldstein argues that Sabatino failed to file a special appearance in

10 Sabatino filed small-claims lawsuits against Goldstein after she

moved to Harris County, but they were filed in Massachusetts, and notice of

those suits was directed to Goldstein’s Massachusetts address. We thus need

not address how serving Goldstein with those suits in Texas would have

impacted the analysis.

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accordance with Rule 120a and entered a general appearance by

appearing at the December 2020 hearing via Zoom.

In evaluating this procedural waiver question, we are mindful of

Sabatino’s status in the district court as a pro se litigant. We have said

that “[t]here cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with

counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.” Mansfield

State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978). Still, courts

should “review and evaluate pro se pleadings with liberality and

patience.” Li v. Pemberton Park Cmty. Ass’n, 631 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex.

2021). This is especially true when the application of a procedural rule

“turns on an actor’s state of mind . . . [which] does not create a separate

rule, but recognizes the differences the rule itself contains.” Wheeler v.

Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005). Accordingly, the specific facts

and circumstances of this case are crucial for our analysis.

When Sabatino was served with the application for a protective

order, the district court sent a notice to the parties setting the date for

the December hearing and requiring them to file sworn motions on their

appearances before the hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1) (“[A] special

appearance shall be made by sworn motion filed prior to motion to

transfer venue or any other plea, pleading or motion.”). Sabatino failed

to do so. However, he also filed no other pleadings or motions asking for

relief or otherwise indicating that the action was properly pending.

Further, “we have never held and decline to hold today, that merely

appearing as a witness in a cause serves as a general appearance,

subjecting one to the jurisdiction of the court.” Werner v. Colwell, 909

S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1995).

15

Moreover, Sabatino raised the issue of personal jurisdiction as

soon as he was permitted to speak substantively on his own behalf.

After being sworn in as a witness himself, Sabatino began his testimony

as follows:

SABATINO: Okay. So I just want to say for the record

that the plaintiff has testified that no physical harm or

threats of physical harm took place, either within our

relationship or after our relationship. She testified that to

that effect --

THE COURT: I’ve heard her testimony, sir.

SABATINO: Okay. The second one is that the text

message issue has already been litigated in the state of

Massachusetts. Texas -- the long arm statute from Texas

does not apply in this case.

This exchange demonstrates that, at the very least, Sabatino

challenged personal jurisdiction at his first opportunity to offer any

sworn testimony. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1) (“[A] special appearance

may be made by any party either in person or by attorney for the purpose

of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of

the defendant . . . .” (emphasis added)). Thus, interpreting Sabatino’s

actions liberally and with patience, we do not view his appearance at the

Zoom hearing as constituting a general appearance or a waiver of his

sworn challenge to the district court’s personal jurisdiction.

IV. Conclusion

The court of appeals erred in holding that territorial jurisdiction

is an independent jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7B protective-

order proceedings. However, we hold that the district court lacked

personal jurisdiction over Sabatino, who did not enter a general

16

appearance. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment

vacating the protective order and dismissing the case.

Debra H. Lehrmann

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 24, 2024

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