Case law

Texas State Board of Examiners v. Texas Medical Ass'n

60 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 477 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 24, 2017

Like other mental-health professionals, MFTs in Texas are trained and qualified to perform diagnostic assessment using the DSM and are tested on that ability as part of their licensing requirements. … Presuming, as we must, that the Therapists Board acted within its authority when it issued the diagnostic-assessment rule, we cannot say that the Medical Association established that the rule is invalid. III.

Boon v. F. M. Weathered's Administrator

23 Tex. 675 · Texas Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1859

It is remarkable, that the proper manner of impeaching a witness has not yet been clearly settled in practice; and it is even more remarkable, that the principles upon which the testimony of witnesses may be discredited, … Of course, as preliminary to this, the impeaching witness must qualify himself, by stating that he is acquainted with the general reputation of the witness, whose testimony it is sought to impeach. Mr.

Griffin v. Tucker

102 Tex. 420 · Texas Supreme Court · Apr 28, 1909

The constitutional provision is as follows: “The Legislature shall at its first session enact a law whereby the qualified voters of anv county, justice’s precinct, town, city (or such subdivision of a countv as may be designated … The courts are not authorized to put any limitation upon this provision unless it is expressed or clearly implied in some other part of the statute.

Texas Prudential Insurance Company v. Dillard

158 Tex. 15 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 20, 1957

these witnesses testified unequivocally to the fact of the respondent’s having seizures prior to the time he took out the policy, and the portion of their testimony pointing toward good health of the insured is obviously qualified … Hughes, 348 Mo. 829 , 155 S.W. 2d 250 , the insured had diabetes a few years prior to receipt of the policy and died of diabetes, but it was not clearly established that he had diabetes when he received the policy.

Queen Insurance v. State

22 L.R.A. 483 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1893

This clearly appears by the context. … Every act therein defined is clearly a restriction in trade, in the most comprehensive meaning of those terms.

Coastal Corp. v. Garza

979 S.W.2d 318 · Texas Supreme Court · Sep 24, 1998

Noting that it is "difficult ... to establish conflicts jurisdiction," [6] we stated in Gonzalez v. … The court of appeals in Obersteller held that section 101.106 was not an immunity statute, while other courts in City of Galveston v. Whitman [14] and Davis v. Mathis [15] earlier had concluded to the contrary.

Kinerd v. Colonial Leasing Co.

800 S.W.2d 187 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1990

We must therefore apply the common law to determine whether the transaction between Kinerd and Colonial qualified as a bona fide credit sale under a time price differential. See Rotello v. … Colonial must therefore establish as a matter of law that its credit sale to Kinerd was a time price differential, and this it cannot do.

Employees Retirement System of Texas v. Xavier Duenez and Irene Duenez

Texas Supreme Court · Jul 3, 2009

Just as an appeal to the Board of Trustees would qualify as a contested case, so too would the decision of a participant not to appeal. See Tex. … Gov’t Code § 2001.202. 8 Clearly, then, filing suit is not a prerequisite to exhausting administrative remedies, as the Court suggests. ___ S.W.3d ___.

Parker, Gary

Texas Supreme Court · Jan 16, 2015

An appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the trial judge's opinion was clearly erroneous and arbitrary. … by the State for enhancement purposes without a qualified expert to properly match his fingerprints.

Sv v. Rv

933 S.W.2d 1 · Texas Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1996

The doctrine of parent-child immunity does not encompass sexual abuse. "The immunity is limited to transactions that are essentially parental." Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1988). … There are some types of expert testimony to which the nonexclusive factors adopted in Robinson are clearly inapplicable.

In Re J.O.A.

283 S.W.3d 336 · Texas Supreme Court · May 1, 2009

Instead, the Department submits that the right to appeal a termination order is a statutory right, not a constitutional one, and that the Legislature clearly has the power to restrict, limit, or even deny that right. … We accordingly agree that a parent's use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct. 4 *Page 346 Timothy admitted to daily marijuana use before the twins were

James Construction Group, LLC and Primoris Services Corporation v. Westlake Chemical Corporation

Texas Supreme Court · May 20, 2022

Westlake responds that under well-established Texas law, substantial compliance with a contract’s notice requirements is sufficient to satisfy them. … So, clearly, you can say a 72-hour period started at that time. But we’re not using the word “notice,” and we’re not using the word “default.”

Swilley v. McCain

374 S.W.2d 871 · Texas Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1964

Swilley that established the title through the Young heirs by stare decisis.” … Article I, Section 19 of our Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St. provides that: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due

Heb Ministries, Inc., Southern Bible Institute, and Hispanic Bible Institute v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and Commissioner Raymund Paredes

Texas Supreme Court · Aug 31, 2007

The Establishment Clause forbids any “law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const . amend . I. In State v. … others to do so “clearly effectuate[s] a state preference for one model of religious education over others, a preference that the Establishment Clause does not permit.” ___ S.W.3d at ___.

Sears v. Bayoud

33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 228 · Texas Supreme Court · Feb 14, 1990

We are of the opinion and hold that this record amply establishes that Mr. … As set forth above, McCorkle is not qualified under the constitution of this state to hold the office for which he applied.

Galbraith Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Sam Pochucha and Jean Pochucha

Texas Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2009

Such a construction would defeat the recognized purpose for statutes of repose, that is, the establishment of a definite end to the potential for liability, unaffected by rules of discovery or accrual. … Because application of the revival statute in this instance effectively renders the period of repose indefinite, a consequence clearly incompatible with the purpose for such statutes, we conclude that the Legislature intended

Rachel Lauren Goldstein v. James Sabatino

Texas Supreme Court · May 24, 2024

Chapter 7B thus authorizes a protective order when the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent engaged in conduct that would qualify as an offense under certain provisions of the Penal Code. … Rather, Pennoyer established a regime in which territorial jurisdiction was the only way for a court to achieve personal jurisdiction over a party.

Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local No. 941 v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc.

154 Tex. 91 · Texas Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1954

The former are clearly employers, and the latter have lately been so defined by the new Section 2 (2, 11), 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 152 (2, 11). … To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result.

In Re East Texas Medical Center Athens

Texas Supreme Court · Apr 25, 2025

If a party timely objects, the court still must grant the motion “unless the objecting party establishes that the defendant failed to adequately plead the facts establishing the third party’s responsibility, even after receiving … Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Tex. 2009) (“The Act outlines a process by which a general contractor qualifies for immunity from common-law tort claims brought by the employees of its subcontractors.”); Paradissis v.

Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Elchehimi

51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 626 · Texas Supreme Court · Mar 28, 2008

To survive summary judgment, Elchehimi must raise a fact issue that his vehicle’s collision with the axle-wheel assembly qualified as “actual physical contact” with a “motor vehicle” or a legally recognized substitute for … We decline, however, to adopt an integral part test not present in the text of the statute and inconsistent with the relatively bright line established by the Legislature.