Case law

SCOTT v. TONKIN

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 9, 2020

Fifth, the court concluded that Tonkin was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. … The requirements for Younger abstention are clearly met in this case. First, the criminal proceedings against Scott are still pending.

Adhi Parasakthi Charitable, Medical, Educational, & Cultural Society of North America v. Township of West Pikeland

721 F. Supp. 2d 361 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 25, 2010

Although the lease *386 agreement is clearly between the Township and a Christian church, it, again, is not clear what use was being permitted. The room leased was the “Black Box theatre.” … After examining the Montgomery School’s application, we cannot conclude that it qualifies as similarly situated for the purposes of Defendant’s regulatory interests.

Pagliaccetti v. Kerestes

948 F. Supp. 2d 452 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 10, 2013

On habeas review, the Court must determine whether the state court’s adjudication of the claims raised was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or (2) based on an unreasonable … (finding that even if error, no prejudice had been established).

Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey

497 F. Supp. 2d 627 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 20, 2007

Thus, in this situation, the robots.txt file qualifies as a technological measure effectively controlling access to the archived copyrighted images of Healthcare Advocates. … The tests for these claims require nothing more than what is required under copyright law to establish infringement.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. McGee

895 F. Supp. 2d 669 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 13, 2012

The facts alleged as to Robert fall short of establishing a plausible inference that he is liable as a tippee. … The distinction between the monies used to purchase stock and the profits realized was clearly drawn in SEC v. Heden, 51 F.Supp.2d 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999).

PRICE v. COMMONWEALTH CHARTER ACADEMY CYBER SCHOOL

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 14, 2021

Clearly, there is nothing improper about an hour-for-hour deduction from the CEA. … In contrast, the undisputed facts clearly establish that Plaintiff was not precluded from using the CEA to fund the revised course plan at Fusion.

KOSIBA v. THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 20, 2023

A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. … Maxx, Virtua, and ABCE qualify as state actors subject to liability under § 1983, her claims against these entities must be dismissed. B.

JOHN v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 2, 2024

“In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress has created a federal cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Id. … “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.

Tereance D. Ex Rel. Wanda D. v. School District

570 F. Supp. 2d 739 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 5, 2008

Wanda argued that exceptions under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f)(3)(D)(i) applied because the District withheld information about the availability of autistic support classrooms and because the District did not clearly inform her … Because the court grants summary judgment on the ground that § 1415(f)(3)(C)’s limitations period may not be applied retroactively, the court will not address plaintiffs’ alternative arguments that they qualify under exceptions

In Re General Instrument Securities Litigation

209 F. Supp. 2d 423 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 27, 2001

Judge Leinenweber, in certifying the class, determined that class counsel was “well-qualified” and was “vigorously litigating” the action. (Class Cert. Order at 9.) … As described above, plaintiffs faced many obstacles in establishing both liability and damages.

Yeboah v. US DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INS

223 F. Supp. 2d 650 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 26, 2002

Plaintiff's primary evidence in response consists of a report by a highly-qualified child psychiatrist, Dr. … Julian's case does not tend toward either extreme — the clearly physically, sexually abused child or the opportunistic college student.

PRELLE v. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, (OFAC)

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 4, 2025

Prelle’s Complaint before issuing summons if his claims are frivolous or malicious, if he does not state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if he seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief … The Office of Foreign Assets Control is the successor to the Office of Foreign Funds Control established at the beginning of World War II when Germany invaded Norway with the purpose of preventing the Nazis from using

Kimmel v. Peterson

565 F. Supp. 476 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 27, 1983

Muir is also a legal entity, as was the Village. 26 Thus, under the Bennett approach, Muir would qualify as an “enterprise” for RICO purposes. In support of their position, defendants cite United States v. … Substantial assistance or participation is required to establish liability as an aider-abettor.

McDonough v. Toys" R" US, Inc.

638 F. Supp. 2d 461 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 15, 2009

The subclass clearly includes only consumers of BabyBjorn carriers “distributed by Regal Lager.” (PL’s Definitions 1.) … Because the restraints caused higher prices, average prices would clearly have been lower without them.

REHOBOTH PETROLEUM INC. v. PETROLEUM MARKETING GROUP, INC.

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 6, 2025

In weighing the factors, the Third Circuit explained that the movant “must establish the first two factors and only if these ‘gateway factors’ are established does the district court consider the remaining two factors.” … Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that the legislative history of the PMPA did not give rise to a “clearly expressed legislative intent” to override the plain terms of the PMPA); Douglas v.

In Re Penn Central Transportation Co.

458 F. Supp. 1234 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 17, 1978

In sum, at the very early stages of the case the basic question was clearly drawn. … The “six months rule,” as it has come to be known, was developed by the courts in the early days of railroad receiverships, and later refined and qualified.

Petrosky v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance

141 F. Supp. 3d 376 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 30, 2015

As the trial court had aptly explained: The accident clearly involves a continuous chain of events from the impact until the vehicles and body came to rest. … Under Pennsylvania law, “a court should not impute to an insurance company the benefit of qualifying language which it chose not to adopt.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.

RANSOME v. TERRA

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 14, 2024

established federal law. … Thus, the use of the above standard was not “contrary to clearly established federal law.” (Doc. No. 19 at 8.)

DiPIETRO v. ARCHBISHOP WOOD HIGH SCHOOL

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 16, 2024

“These characteristics . . . taken together, clearly point[ed] to the conclusion that the [defendant] was primarily a religious organization.” Id. at 229. A similar analysis applies here. … Plaintiff acknowledges the school’s religious features and offers no theory as to why it would not qualify for a religious exemption.

Breyer v. Meissner

23 F. Supp. 2d 521 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 27, 1998

The Congressional power to exclude aliens has long been recognized by the Court “as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Id. … As Deputy Assistant Secretary of *534 State John Adams has stated, this provision “clearly discriminates against U.S. citizen mothers with offspring born before 1934.”