Case law

SPIVEY v. TICE

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 28, 2024

Spivey has established good cause by first seeking state court review of his claims. … At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that Spivey’s prior convictions did not qualify as crimen falsi and could not have been used against him. (Evid. Hrg.

Williams v. City of Lancaster, Pa.

639 F. Supp. 377 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 18, 1986

essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities … In light of these factors, I cannot say that the detention was too long to qualify as an investigatory stop. Neither can I say that Gatchell had no reason to be suspicious of this group.

Drexelbrook Engineering Co. v. Travelers Insurance

710 F. Supp. 590 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 29, 1989

The parties do not dispute that the SS White Plan qualifies as an employee-benefit plan. … This language clearly indicates that Travelers and SS White entered into a stop-loss arrangement.

PEPE v. LAMAS

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 18, 2022

Congress did not validly abrogate or purport to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity against damages claims under § 1983, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in this … Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[f]iling a formal prison grievance clearly constitutes protected activity”).

Anspach v. City of Philadelphia

630 F. Supp. 2d 488 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 29, 2008

Alternatively, Defendants assert that these remaining claims cannot stand due to Defendants’ immunity from suit or that they should be stricken due to insufficient specificity. … Given that the identical plaintiffs are here suing the identical defendants on all but one of the very same claims that were previously dismissed by this Court and affirmed by the Third Circuit and that it clearly appears

Bowes v. Travelers Insurance

173 F. Supp. 2d 342 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 4, 2001

Both plaintiffs dealt with The Travelers’ agent Gary Daniels, and both established trusts for their policies and named Charles P. Bowes as trustee. … Because there are no allegations of telephone solicitations in the complaint, this section is clearly not applicable.

DAVIS v. JANE DOE

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 8, 2024

A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. … share[s] in the immunity conferred to the States by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Northumberland County v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.

53 F. Supp. 278 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 29, 1943

In accordance with the opinion cited, testimony of qualified witnesses was heard both as to the actual character of the land involved and the amount of tax due. … Dolf, supra, the testimony here clearly established that the lands described in Findings of Fact Nos. 5 to 9, inclusive, are seated, and that the lands described in Findings of Fact Nos. 35 to 37, inclusive, are unseated.

DOE v. WEINTRAUB

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 10, 2024

For those reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established an injury in fact. … ‘clearly erroneous.’” (citations omitted)); cf.

Finley v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

1 F. Supp. 2d 440 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 23, 1998

So here’s a man almost qualified for a full pension, but he has to wait to sixty-two and his hips are starting to hurt him. … Counsel clearly intended to bring the fact of Finley’s pension to the jury’s attention; indeed, it was a dominant theme running throughout the opening statement.

Stornawaye Properties, Inc. v. Moses

76 F. Supp. 2d 607 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 6, 1999

Moses qualified on his own for the loan in question and that Stornawaye therefore cannot collect interest from her or foreclose on collateral in her name. … The contract establishes an obligation to keep interest current, including past due interest, following the sixty day grace period. b.

Merit v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority

315 F. Supp. 2d 689 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 30, 2004

This is clearly not the law, 26 and the cases cited by SEPTA do not stand for this proposition. … There is no such evidence before the Court, so Plaintiffs “regarded as” claim fails. * * * * * Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA or the PHRA

In re Egalet Corp.

340 F. Supp. 3d 479 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 2, 2018

It is the final, official FDA document establishing the scope of exclusivity specifically at issue in this case. V. … And if it didn't qualify for exclusivity, then MorphaBond must-it would only not qualify for exclusivity if MorphaBond did qualify for exclusivity.

North Philadelphia Community Board v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of Higher Education

330 F. Supp. 1107 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 30, 1971

Temple University applied for and received funds to establish a community mental health center under the auspices of its Health Sciences Center. … The present case is clearly distinguishable from the case cited by plaintiffs in which individuals were allowed standing to challenge discrimination in employment practices in Alabama state mental institutions.

WARREN HILL, LLC v. SFR EQUITIES, LLC

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 25, 2020

The documents at issue explain the workings of the VPP established by the state of Illinois as well as the workings of VAP as a Qualified Purchaser which buys the state’s accounts receivable … The public clearly has a valid interest in the records at issue.

Kane v. Kyler

201 F. Supp. 2d 392 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 7, 2001

"It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland [for assessing ineffective assistance claims] qualifies as 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' " Williams, … In other words, Strickland often requires habeas courts, in assessing counsel's representation, to look beyond clearly established Supreme Court precedents.

Residential Reroofers Local 30-B Health & Welfare Fund v. a & B Metal & Roofing, Inc.

976 F. Supp. 341 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 28, 1997

The CBA provides for employer contributions to the Funds for time worked by or paid to qualifying employees. … Clearly, Defendant is not claiming a defense of fraud in the execution of the contract where it claims that it terminated the CBA.

BIOVAIL LABORATORIES, INC. v. Torpharm, Inc.

326 F. Supp. 2d 605 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 13, 2004

Rather, it is qualifying the term; to treat this usage as a definition would be to severely alter the term’s meaning. 4 Biovail misinterprets the significance of a Markush group. … This statement goes no further than the already established description of a Markush group in establishing whether listing a group of chemicals as a Markush group is equivalent to providing a definition.

EASTERN PARALYZED VETERANS ASS'N OF PA. v. Sykes

676 F. Supp. 597 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 14, 1987

Departures from particular requirements of these standards by the use of other methods shall be permitted when it is clearly evident that equivalent access to the facility or part of the facility is thereby provided. 49 C.F.R … Part 27, established separate, independent criteria for compliance with the regulation, and both sets of requirements must be satisfied. DOT Memorandum at p. 13.

Furry v. Lehigh Valley Health System

902 F. Supp. 2d 645 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 28, 2012

In the first step, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 10 Id. … To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show “ '(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the