Case law

Bollinger v. OBRECHT

122 Pa. Commw. 562 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 11, 1989

as it rested upon the particular nature of the qualified immunity doctrine for federal officials. … Under federal case law, a federal official is immune for his harmful actions if the conduct does not violate a “clearly established law.”

Gilius v. Bd. of Supv., Fairview T.

122 Pa. Commw. 371 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 28, 1988

Here, the negligence counts of the landowners’ complaint are clearly barred by Subchapter C. The Board is a local agency for the purposes of Subchapter C. … These counts clearly sound in tort, because in essence they charge that the Board, acting through its agent, Mr.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company A/S/O JC Investment, Inc. Restaurant Development, LLC v. JPC Group, Inc.

157 A.3d 1 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 9, 2017

JPC Group asserted in its answer with new matter, inter alia, that State Farm’s claims were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. … On July 7, 2015, State Farm filed a motion in limine with the trial court to preclude JPC Group from presenting evidence on its asserted defense of qualified immunity.

Glenn v. Horan

765 A.2d 426 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 3, 2001

Specifically, the Township asserts (1) that Glenn’s complaint is legally insufficient because she failed to allege any facts in her complaint to establish a prima facie case, and (2) that the Township is immune from suit … Philadelphia Law Department —Claims Division, 721 A.2d 65 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (nylon rope designed to control pedestrians qualified as a traffic control for governmental immunity purposes).

Malia Et Ux. v. Monchak

116 Pa. Commw. 484 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 2, 1988

No underlying facts were pleaded which, if proven, would establish, or from which it could be inferred, that Monchak was acting maliciously or that Vollbrecht knew she was. See Thorpe. … However, the cases cited in Acker clearly have not interpreted section 8550 in that manner.

Faust v. Com., Dept. of Revenue

140 Pa. Commw. 389 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 7, 1991

However, it is well established that sovereign immunity is the law in Pennsylvania and is grounded in Article 1, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. E-Z Parks, 110 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 635-636, 532 A.2d at 1276 . … Clearly, the defendant-appellees enjoy the immunity provided by 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Further, intentional tort claims and civil rights actions are not within the narrow exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b).

Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall

877 A.2d 560 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 23, 2005

Accordingly, we first must consider whether Defendants, as members of Borough Council, qualify as “high public officials.” In Hall v. … Because the candid discussion and determination of the “non-responsibility” of bidding contractors is clearly part of the performance of a Borough Council member’s official duties, Defendants’ actions fall within the scope

Muldrow v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

88 A.3d 269 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 26, 2014

SEPTA maintains that Eleventh Amendment immunity and state statutory immunity are two distinct concepts which do not share common origins or qualifying criteria. … The Supreme Court clearly distinguished between federal Eleventh *273 Amendment immunity and state statutory immunity, as follows: [S]tates cannot confer immunity on entities against a suit brought under federal law by mere

Pennsylvania State University v. Derry Township School District

711 A.2d 615 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 12, 1998

In doing so, PSU clearly qualifies as a Commonwealth instrumentality, defined by this court as follows: we must interpret the phrase ‘instrumentality of the Commonwealth’ according to its common and approved usage as required … Here, [PSU] utilizes the six parcels to operate its College of Medicine, clearly within the stated purpose of a university.

Reading Housing Authority v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Berks County

103 A.3d 869 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 12, 2014

In this case, 12 of the units are reserved for low-income housing and the rental rate for these “public units,” all one-bedroom apartments, is established according to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development … While SEPTA is free to lease its real estate to tenants and is under the direction to raise revenue, clearly the leasing of real estate, solely to raise revenue, is not an activity connected to SEPTA’s purpose.

Boettger v. Miklich

142 Pa. Commw. 136 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 23, 1992

This interpretation of a qualified or good faith immunity is clearly at odds with an interpretation which holds that a good faith defense is never available to acts arising from a misinterpretation of a statute. 12 This Court … therefore follows the law of qualified immunity now established by the United States Supreme Court, and in so doing gives deference to the relevant legislative history of the Act cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in

Repko v. Chichester School District

904 A.2d 1036 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 10, 2006

Lienhard, the Supreme Court clearly established the test: Chattels used in connection with real estate are of three classes: First, those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements, and not peculiarly … Contrary to the trial court’s interpretation of Grieff that the government entity was not immune because “the care of personalty caused a dangerous condition to occur on the real property,” the actual holding in Grieff clearly

Norwegian Township v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment Appeals

74 A.3d 1124 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 12, 2013

(holding that a good-faith effort to develop a property, including the expenditure of funds, qualifies that property for a tax exemption). … Though not required for a property to be tax-immune/exempt, the trial court also found that the Township made a good-faith effort to develop the Property (as established by the Township’s testimony that it had continued to

Pickering v. Sacavage

164 Pa. Commw. 117 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 17, 1994

For a party to qualify for this absolute immunity from suit, he must establish that: (1) he is a “high public official;” *125 and (2) the allegedly defamatory statements were made while he was acting within the scope of his … Clearly, Sacavage’s office had been implicated in the news reports to have engaged in unlawful and reprehensible activities.

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Board of Revision of Taxes

777 A.2d 1234 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 31, 2001

whether SEPTA is immune from taxation. … We note that the General Assembly explicitly established SEPTA as an agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth in Section 1711 of the Public Transportation Law (Law), 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711.

Babcock v. Com., Dept. of Transp.

156 Pa. Commw. 69 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 30, 1993

waived pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4), or alternatively, that the log was personal property under the control of DOT and it qualifies for the exception under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3). … The right-of-way off the highway or cartway is clearly neither intended to be used nor is regularly used for vehicular travel.

Davis v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

980 A.2d 709 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 10, 2009

SEPTA contends that under Pennsylvania law, SEPTA is clearly entitled to sovereign immunity. We agree that under Pennsylvania Law, SEPTA is protected by the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity. … Clearly, the Commonwealth regards SEPTA as a Commonwealth agency for purposes of sovereign immunity.

Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals

142 Pa. Commw. 424 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 17, 1991

was necessary after resolution of the immunity and exemption issues. … Out of these concepts a basic principle has been recognized that property owned by the Commonwealth cannot be taxed by a local taxing body in the absence of a statute clearly authorizing it to do so.

Pettineo v. City of Philadelphia Law Department-Claims Division

721 A.2d 65 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 4, 1998

In its answer to Pettineo’s complaint, the City contended that it was immune from suit and raised the defense of governmental immunity under Section 8541 of the Act. … Thus, we hold it was error to grant the City’s post-trial motion for judgment n.o.v. because the jury’s verdict was not clearly incorrect as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s decision.

M. Mazur v. J. Cuthbert

186 A.3d 490 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 16, 2018

qualify as a “pleading.” … where the defense is clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.”