Opinion

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company A/S/O JC Investment, Inc. Restaurant Development, LLC v. JPC Group, Inc.

  • 157 A.3d 1
  • 2017 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 66
  • 2017 WL 931667
Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 9, 2017
Status
Published
Author
Leavitt
On the bench
Leavitt, Wojcik, Colins
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 57.9%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

State Farm Fire and Casualty :

Company A/S/O JC Investment, Inc.; :

Restaurant Development, LLC, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 916 C.D. 2016

: Argued: February 6, 2017

JPC Group, Inc. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: March 9, 2017

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) appeals a

decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that

denied State Farm’s motion in limine to preclude JPC Group, Inc. from presenting

evidence on its asserted qualified immunity defense. The trial court did so because

it concluded that JPC Group was acting as an employee of the City of Philadelphia

when it demolished a fire-damaged building and, thus, immune from tort liability.

JPC Group counters that all of the issues State Farm raises in this appeal were

waived due to its failure to file a post-trial motion. We reverse and remand for

further proceedings.

Background

On December 24, 2012, a fire severely damaged a three-story building

at 4912 Baltimore Avenue in the City of Philadelphia (City). To investigate the

origin of the fire, the Fire Marshal decided that either the front or back of the

building had to be removed. The inspectors from the City’s Department of

Licensing and Inspection expressed concern that the demolition work created the

risk of damage to the one-story buildings on either side of the damaged three-story

building. JPC Group was selected to do the demolition work because it had

previously performed such work for the City.

The City has an annual Master Demolition Contract (Contract) with

JPC Group. The Contract authorizes JPC Group to submit demolition service bids

to the City “in open competition with other contractors so qualified.” Reproduced

Record at 36a-37a (R.R. ___). The Contract provides “no guarantee that the

contractor will be awarded bids against this Contract.” R.R. 37a. To be eligible to

participate, JPC Group is required to provide security in the form of a

“performance bond” and “payment bond” as prescribed by the City. R.R. 38a.

JPC Group is further required to carry its own liability insurance that names the

City, its officers, and employees as additional insureds. In addition, the Contract

requires JPC Group to indemnify the City for any costs, expenses, damages, and

liabilities the City might incur as a consequence of JPC Group’s performance of

demolition services.

Richard Quigley, an inspector for the Department of Licensing and

Inspection, testified in his deposition that the City chose JPC Group to demolish

the fire-damaged building “because of the way the building was situated … a three

story building above two one story buildings. So we wanted to bring on somebody

who had the equipment and the manpower and the experience … to deal with the

situation.” R.R. 452a; Notes of Testimony, 10/24/2014, at 11-12 (N.T. __).

In preparation for the demolition process, JPC Group laid down tires

and sheets of plywood on the roofs of the adjacent one-story buildings to protect

them from falling bricks. The company then moved its excavator onto the scene to

2

perform the demolition work. The Fire Marshal, who was present at the scene, set

up a “command post” at an adjacent property to watch the demolition.1 During the

process, the sidewalls of the building collapsed outward, causing damages to the

adjacent one-story buildings, one of which was owned by Jason and Min Lee, JC

Investment, Inc., and Restaurant Development, LLC (Owners).

State Farm, acting as Owners’ subrogee, sued JPC Group for

negligence. Owners also sued.2 The trial court consolidated the two matters. JPC

Group asserted in its answer with new matter, inter alia, that State Farm’s claims

were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The parties deposed the City’s

Fire Marshal, inspectors, Chief of Contractual Services at the Department of

Licensing and Inspection, as well as several employees of JPC Group. State Farm

also prepared an expert report to show that JPC Group acted negligently in

demolishing the fire-damaged building.

On July 7, 2015, State Farm filed a motion in limine with the trial

court to preclude JPC Group from presenting evidence on its asserted defense of

qualified immunity. On December 4, 2015, State Farm’s counsel sent a letter to

the presiding judge of the upcoming trial, suggesting that the trial court rule on the

1

Fire Marshal Andrew Robinson testified in his deposition as to the reason he set up the

command post: “We’d go in there and we’d talk about it…we say what we observed on the outer

side, what we want to do next, what we want to have the crane operators do. And that was just

someplace to get out of the cold … it was the warmest of the two properties.” R.R. 133a; N.T.,

10/24/2014, at 66. The Fire Marshal further testified: “[The] property gave us access to the area

where we could see down into the property as the equipment operator was extracting the building

beams, and stuff, out of there. From his property we could see down into it.” R.R. 133a; N.T.,

10/24/2014, at 67.

2

Owners sued JPC Group to recover the monetary damages that are not covered by State Farm’s

insurance policy. As noted above, Owners’ action was consolidated with State Farm’s. Owners’

appeal to this Court, also decided today, was separately docketed. Lee v. JPC Group, Inc., (Pa.

Cmwlth., No. 1000 C.D. 2016, filed March 9, 2017).

3

immunity issue before trial. Counsel stated that the immunity issue, which

“features so prominently in JPC Group’s defense,” is “plainly a threshold question

whose answer decides whether JPC can be held liable.” State Farm’s Reply Brief,

Exhibit A at 1. Specifically, State Farm’s counsel suggested the following

procedure for the trial court to rule on the immunity issue: “counsel could submit

short briefs on the [immunity] issue first thing Monday morning … the Court could

consider these short briefs, and then hold oral argument. Then … counsel could

either begin the trial with opening statements, or hear Your Honor announce her

decision in favor of immunity (which would effectively end the trial).” State

Farm’s Reply Brief, Exhibit A at 2. After sending the above letter, State Farm

filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court refused to consider as

untimely.

On December 7, 2015, both parties appeared before the trial court and

first addressed the status of the case. State Farm’s counsel informed the court that

there were a number of undecided motions in limine, some of which related to the

immunity issue. The trial court acknowledged that immunity would be the “first

and foremost” issue to be decided. R.R. 600a. JPC Group’s counsel stated that his

client had responded to the motion in limine, and that “the only question is whether

[the judge] want[s] to decide [the immunity issue] on papers or whether [she]

want[s] to hear testimony from the witnesses with regard to that issue.” R.R. 601a.

Assured by JPC Group’s counsel that live testimony from the witnesses would not

be different from the depositions, the trial court decided to rule on the immunity

issue based on the depositions. The matter was continued until December 9, 2015.

On December 9, 2015, the parties reconvened and the trial court

denied State Farm’s motion in limine. The court found that JPC Group acted as an

4

employee of the City on the date of the incident and, thus, was immune from

liability under what is commonly known as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims

Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§8541-8542 (Tort Claims Act).3 State Farm appealed to the

Superior Court, without first filing post-trial motions. The Superior Court ordered

State Farm to show cause as to the basis for appellate jurisdiction. State Farm

responded that it was not required to file post-trial motions because the trial court

had not conducted a trial; rather, the court had issued a final order by ruling on

State Farm’s motion in limine. The Superior Court later transferred the case to this

Court.

On appeal,4 State Farm argues that the trial court erred in deciding that

JPC Group acted as an employee of the City and is immune under Section 8541 of

the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. State Farm contends that JPC Group acted

as an independent contractor for the City. JPC Group responds that all of the

issues that State Farm raises in its appeal were waived due to its failure to file post-

trial motions. JPC Group also argues that, in any event, the trial court did not err

in holding that it acted as an employee of the City and, thus, is immune from

liability.

3

Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this

subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person

or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.”

42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Section 8542 provides exceptions, i.e., the circumstances where a local

agency may be found liable for damages caused by its employee. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542. The trial

court, in holding that JPC Group is immune from liability under Section 8541, did not consider

the applicability of any of the exceptions in Section 8542.

4

Whether a person acts as an independent contractor or an employee is a question of law fully

reviewable by this Court. Johnson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Dubois Courier

Exp.), 631 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo,

and the scope of review is plenary. The Medical Shoppe, Ltd. v. Wayne Memorial Hospital, 866

A.2d 455, 459 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

5

Post-trial Motions

We first consider whether State Farm was required to file post-trial

motions in order to preserve the issues raised in this appeal. Post-trial motions are

required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 227.1, which states, in

relevant part, as follows:

Rule 227.1. Post-Trial Relief

(a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial

Relief filed by any party, the court may

(1) Order a new trial as to all or any of the issues;

or

(2) Direct the entry of judgment in favor of any

party; or

(3) Remove a nonsuit; or

(4) Affirm, modify or change the decisions; or

(5) Enter any other appropriate order.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa. R.E. 103(a), post-trial

relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,

(1) If then available, were raised in pre-trial

proceedings or by motion, objection, point for

charge, request for findings of fact or conclusions

of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method

of trial; and

(2) Are specified in the motion. The motion shall

state how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial

proceedings or at trial. Grounds not specified are

deemed waived unless leave is granted upon cause

shown to specify additional grounds.

(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after

6

(1) Verdict, discharge of the jury because of

inability to agree, or nonsuit in the case of a jury

trial; or

(2) Notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision

in the case of a trial without jury.

PA. R.C.P. No. 227.1. In short, a party must file post-trial motions at the

conclusion of a trial in any type of action in order to preserve claims that the party

wishes to raise on appeal. Issues not raised in a timely post-trial motion will be

deemed waived. Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. 2002). The Supreme

Court has held that Rule 227.1 “speaks only to the post-trial scenario, and not to all

instances where reconsideration by the trial court might be salutary.” Newman

Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi’s Family Markets, Inc., 52

A.3d 1233, 1248 (Pa. 2012) (Newman).

The parties do not dispute the fact that post-trial motions must be filed

at the conclusion of a trial to preserve claims for appellate review. They disagree

on whether a “trial” preceded the trial court’s December 9, 2015, order ruling that

JPC Group was immune. JPC Group argues that because the parties agreed to

proceed to a non-jury trial “on the papers,” there was “a trial by reading the

depositions and other documents submitted to the Court at time of trial.” JPC

Group Brief at 1. Thereafter, the trial court judge signed a Trial Worksheet,

showing that she had conducted a non-jury trial. JPC Group Brief at 2; Exhibit A.

JPC Group argues that, in holding that it was an employee of the City, the trial

court acted as a fact finder and, thus, its December 9, 2015, order was a “verdict.”

Because State Farm appealed a “verdict” without first filing post-trial motions, it

should be deemed to have waived all of the issues in this appeal.

7

State Farm responds that despite the form of the trial court’s order, no

“trial” took place. What the parties agreed to, State Farm alleges, was to resolve

the immunity issue pre-trial, as a threshold issue in State Farm’s motion in limine.

The trial judge’s ruling was based on a review of the motion and the accompanying

exhibits. There were no opening statements. State Farm was not on notice that the

trial court was conducting a non-jury trial rather than making a pre-trial ruling on a

dispositive motion. In fact, the trial court specifically stated that the ruling at issue

was made on the motion in limine.

To further its argument, State Farm directs our attention to the note

that accompanies Rule 227.1(c): “[a] motion for post-trial relief may not be filed to

orders disposing of preliminary objections, motions for judgment on the pleadings

or for summary judgment, motions relating to discovery or other proceedings

which do not constitute a trial.” PA. R.C.P. No. 227.1(c), note (emphasis added).

State Farm argues that the trial court’s December 9, 2015, order disposed of its

motion for summary judgment; therefore, a post-trial motion was unnecessary and,

in fact, prohibited.

The Rules of Civil Procedure do not define the term “trial,” and they

do not address what constitutes a “trial” under Rule 227.1.5 To ascertain the

meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure, we employ the rules of construction for

guidance. See PA. R.C.P. Nos. 51-153. Rule 126 provides that the Rules “shall be

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of

every action or proceeding to which they are applicable.” PA. R.C.P. No. 126.

5

Regarding non-jury trials, Rule 1038(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant

part, “the trial of an action by a judge sitting without a jury shall be conducted as nearly as may

be as a trial by jury is conducted and the parties shall have like rights and privileges, including

the right to move for nonsuit.” PA. R.C.P. No. 1038(a).

8

“The object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court.” PA. R.C.P. No. 127(a). Further,

Rule 129(e) provides that “[a] note to a rule or an explanatory comment is not a

part of the rule but may be used in construing the rule.” PA. R.C.P. No. 129(e).

In Newman, 52 A.3d 1233, our Supreme Court considered whether a

remand proceeding constituted a “trial” for the purpose of the post-trial motion

requirement. The Supreme Court declined to adopt a definition for “trial” under

Rule 227.1. However, it stressed that it had “a strong interest in the preservation of

consistency and predictability in the operation of our appellate process,” and

recognized that the consequence of failing to file post-trial motions is significant.

Id. at 1246. Accordingly, the Supreme Court explained that

to warrant the heavy consequence of waiver, in a rules

schemata designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of disputes, the applicability of the Rule should

be apparent upon its face or, failing that, in clear decisional law

construing the Rule.

Id. at 1247 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, there

must be “sufficient predictability to practicing attorneys regarding when post-trial

motions must be filed.” Id. at 1249.

After reviewing the language of Rule 227.1 and the existing case law

interpreting the Rule, the Supreme Court concluded that post-trial motions are not

required in an appeal from a remand proceeding.6 Id. at 1248. The Court also

reviewed the trial court’s order on remand, and concluded that the trial court did

6

In making that determination, the Supreme Court did not decide whether prior decisions

correctly interpreted Rule 227.1; rather, the Court focused on whether those decisions conveyed

notice to practicing attorneys regarding when post-trial motions must be filed.

9

not view its activities on remand as a trial.7 The Court concluded that the

appellants were not on notice that the remand proceeding constituted a “trial”

under Rule 227.1 and, thus, could not be reasonably expected to file a post-trial

motion when appealing from the trial court’s order on remand. Id.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, we reject JPC

Group’s assertion that the trial judge conducted a non-jury trial “on the papers.”

The trial court’s December 9, 2015, order ruled on State Farm’s motion in limine.

As was the case for the appellants in Newman, State Farm was not on notice that

the trial judge was conducting a trial that would conclude in a verdict. At the

December 7, 2015, hearing, the trial judge acknowledged the multiple motions in

limine, including the one to preclude JPC Group from presenting evidence on its

immunity defense. The trial judge also observed that immunity was a threshold

issue. Based on assurances by JPC Group’s counsel that the witnesses’ live

testimony would be the same as their deposition testimony, the trial judge decided

to rule on the immunity issue based on the depositions and related documents.

On December 9, 2015, when the parties and the witnesses reconvened,

the trial court denied State Farm’s motion in limine. The trial court explained that

it found JPC Group to be an employee of the City when the accident occurred. No

opening statements or oral arguments were made on either December 7 or

7

The trial court, on remand, was directed by the Superior Court to calculate damages based upon

the existing record and terms of a lease agreement. The trial court recalculated the damages as

directed. Its order stated, in relevant part, “[c]ounsel … correctly argues that there is no need nor

is it appropriate to take additional evidence in this matter. The trial has ended and the directives

of the Superior Court require that the trial court compute damages of record consistent with its

opinion.” Newman, 52 A.3d at 1247-48. The Supreme Court found that the language “the trial

has ended” clearly indicated that the trial court did not view its activities on remand as a trial. Id.

at 1248.

10

December 9, 2015; no briefs were submitted. Reasonably, State Farm concluded

that the trial judge was ruling solely on the motion in limine.

Further, Rule 227.1 and the existing decisional law do not provide

“sufficient predictability” that appealing from a ruling made “on the papers” would

require filing of post-trial motions. By its plain terms, Rule 227.1 does not address

the circumstance of a “trial on the papers.” Rather, Rule 1038(a) governing non-

jury trials provides that “the trial of an action by a judge sitting without a jury shall

be conducted as nearly as may be as a trial by jury is conducted and the parties

shall have like rights and privileges….” PA. R.C.P. No. 1038(a) (emphasis added).

The decisional law does not suggest that the Supreme Court contemplated a “trial

on the papers” when it adopted Rule 227.1. To the contrary, the Court recognized

that certain proceedings, such as motions for summary judgment or motions related

to discovery, do not constitute a trial. Case law further provides that when a trial

court disposes of a motion in chambers and the jury has heard no evidence, the trial

court’s disposition is not considered a verdict. DiGregorio v. Keystone Health

Plan East, 840 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. Super. 2003). Likewise, here, State Farm was

not on notice that its appeal from the trial court’s ruling “on the papers” would

require it to first file a post-trial motion.

JPC Group argues that the trial court, by reviewing depositions and

other documents, made factual findings, which is the hallmark of a “trial” under

Rule 227.1. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to adopt such a rule. In

Newman, the Supreme Court stated:

[W]e could adopt a more limited rule requiring post-trial

motions any time fact-findings were involved, on grounds that

resolution of a factual dispute, however narrow or discrete, is

sufficiently like a trial to trigger the underlying rationale. But,

our task is not to implement a principle animating a Rule, via a

11

waiver holding; rather, the task is to determine whether the

language in our Rule, or governing decisional law, fairly

conveys that such a requirement already exists, such that

noncompliance requires a waiver finding.

Newman, 52 A.3d at 1248.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s

December 9, 2015, order was not rendered at the conclusion of a trial; rather, it

was a ruling on a motion in limine. According to Rule 227.1(c) and its

accompanying notes, such a ruling does not constitute a trial. State Farm’s appeal

of an order disposing of a motion in limine, therefore, did not require filing of a

post-trial motion under Rule 227.1.

Independent Contractor Status

State Farm argues that the trial court erred in deciding that JPC Group

acted as an employee of the City and is immune from liability under Section 8541

of the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Rather, JPC Group acted as an

independent contractor for the City on the date of the accident. We agree.

Section 8501 of the Judicial Code defines the term “employee” as

follows:

Any person who is acting or who has acted on behalf of a

government unit whether on a permanent or temporary basis,

whether compensated or not and whether within or without the

territorial boundaries of the government unit, including any

volunteer fireman and any elected or appointed officer, member

of a governing body or other person designated to act for the

government unit. Independent contractors under contract to the

government unit and their employees and agents and persons

performing tasks over which the government unit has no legal

right of control are not employees of the government unit.

12

42 Pa. C.S. §8501 (emphasis added). “While no hard and fast rule exists to

determine whether a particular relationship is that of employer-employee or owner-

independent contractor, certain guidelines have been established and certain factors

are required to be taken into consideration.” Edwards v. Workers’ Compensation

Appeal Board (Epicure Home Care, Inc.), 134 A.3d 1156, 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2016) (quoting Hammermill Paper Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 243 A.2d 389,

392 (Pa. 1968)). These factors include:

(1) control of manner the work is done; (2) responsibility for

result only; (3) terms of agreement between the parties; (4)

nature of the work/occupation; (5) skill required for

performance; (6) whether one is engaged in a distinct

occupation or business; (7) which party supplies the

tools/equipment; (8) whether payment is by time or by the job;

(9) whether work is part of the regular business of employer;

and, (10) the right to terminate employment.

Edwards, 134 A.3d at 1162. The existence of an employer-employee relationship

is a question of law based on the facts presented in each case. Id.

Although no one factor is dispositive, control over the work to be

completed and the manner in which it is to be performed are the primary factors in

establishing an employer-employee relationship. Id. Control exists where the

alleged employer possesses the right to select the employee; the right and power to

discharge the employee; the power to direct the manner of performance; and the

power to control the employee. Id. (citing American Road Lines v. Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board (Royal), 39 A.3d 603, 611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)).

Here, JPC Group, a company engaged in the business of excavation

and demolition, performs demolition work for the City pursuant to an annual

Master Demolition Contract with the City. The Contract identifies JPC Group as a

“contractor” and requires it to indemnify the City; carry its own liability insurance;

13

name the City and its employees as additional insureds; and provide security prior

to commencing work. There is no guarantee that the City will assign demolition

work to JPC Group; rather, the company must submit bids and compete with other

qualified contractors. Further, JPC Group can turn down a job that it believes it

cannot perform safely.

On the date of the accident, the City chose JPC Group to demolish the

fire-damaged building because it possessed “the equipment and the manpower and

the experience” to complete the work. R.R. 452a; N.T., 10/24/2014, at 12. JPC

Group provided the tools to perform the demolition. It selected the method of

demolition and retained control over the demolition process. Neither the Fire

Marshal nor the Department of Licensing and Inspection instructed JPC Group on

the manner in which the work was performed.

In holding that JPC Group was an employee of the City, the trial court

credited the testimony of the Fire Marshal and other City employees. Specifically,

the Fire Marshal testified that he set up a “command post” at the scene to watch the

demolition process and to discuss what “[he] want[ed] to have the crane operators

do.” R.R. 133a; N.T., 10/24/2014, at 66. Michael Curran and Richard Quigley,

inspectors from the Department of Licensing and Inspection, also testified

regarding the standard procedures for a fire-related demolition. Curran testified

that the Contractual Services of the Department of Licensing and Inspection had

the ability to “hire and fire and pay the contractor.” R.R. 565a; N.T., 10/24/2014,

at 22. Curran also testified that a meeting was usually held among the Fire

Marshals, the inspectors, and the contractor; the Fire Marshals would provide

directions, and the inspectors would address safety issues. Id. Quigley testified

14

that the Department acted as a “liaison” between the Fire Marshals and the

contractor:

[Question]: So who tells them when to stop taking down a

structure?

[Answer]: Well, what happen[s] is … L& I [The Department] is

like kind of a liaison between a Fire Marshal and the contractor.

So the Fire Marshal says, well, I want them to stop right there

and like bring some of the debris out so we can sift through it

and look for, you know, whatever they’re looking for. And so

they’ll tell me that. And I’ll tell [the contractor] … [to] stop for

a minute and spread this debris out so they can check what they

want to check.”

R.R. 457a; N.T., 10/24/2014, at 30. The trial judge, based on the above testimony,

found that the City exercised sufficient control over JPC Group’s demolition work

to be an employer. We disagree.

Quigley’s testimony indicates only that he inspected the progress of

JPC Group’s work, which “does not require an inference of exclusive control over

the manner of performance of the work, but rather only of interest in the result.”

Cox v. Caeti, 279 A.2d 756, 758 (Pa. 1971). Similarly, the meetings held among

the Fire Marshal, the inspectors, and JPC Group reflected, at most, a discussion of

the desired end result and safety considerations. We therefore conclude that the

testimony of these witnesses does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the

City, through its Fire Marshal or the inspectors, controlled the manner in which

JPC Group performed the demolition work.

The trial court also found that the City’s payment of JPC Group by the

hour was evidence of an employer-employee relationship. Such finding was based

on the testimony of Stephen Gallagher, a supervisor at the Contractual Services of

the Department of Licensing and Inspection, who testified that the bill JPC Group

15

submitted showed “[t]he men that were there, per hour; the equipment there per

hour.” R.R. 472a; N.T., 10/24/2014, at 16. This testimony, however, reflects only

that JPC Group charged an hourly rate for labor and equipment, which is consistent

with the customary practices for many independent contractors. Thus, the trial

court’s legal conclusion is not supported by the evidence.8 Moreover, the fact that

JPC Group submitted an itemized bill to the City after it completed the work shows

that JPC Group was paid by the job, another hallmark of an owner-independent

contractor relationship. Edwards, 134 A.3d at 1162.

Conclusion

In summary, we hold that State Farm was not required to file post-trial

motions from the trial court’s order denying State Farm’s motion in limine. We

further hold that the trial court erred in finding that JPC Group acted as an

employee of the City and was immune from liability under Section 8541 of the

Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for

further proceedings on State Farm’s negligence claim.

______________________________________

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

8

Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in finding that JPC Group acted as an

employee of the City, such finding would not automatically warrant a conclusion that JPC Group

is immune from liability under Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Section

8541 provides, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be

liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the

local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S. §8541(emphasis added).

If an enumerated exception to immunity in Section 8542 is applicable, the local agency will be

liable. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542. The trial court did not consider the applicability of any of the

exceptions in Section 8542.

16

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

State Farm Fire and Casualty :

Company A/S/O JC Investment, Inc.; :

Restaurant Development, LLC, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 916 C.D. 2016

:

JPC Group, Inc. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9th day of March, 2017, the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dated December 9, 2015, is REVERSED

and the above-captioned matter is REMANDED for further proceedings in

accordance with the attached opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

______________________________________

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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