Case law

McGaffic v. Redevelopment Authority of New Castle

732 A.2d 663 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 7, 1999

Section 705 of the Code provides that a “qualified valuation expert” may testify as to the valuation of property. … However, the Code does not define “qualified valuation expert” or provide any guidance as to the necessary qualifications of a valuation expert except to provide that, “[i]f otherwise qualified, a valuation expert shall not

Ross v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers

8 Pa. Commw. 204 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 13, 1973

Nor should we overlook the high school seniors intending to further their education, who are indeed threatened in a real sense with respect to qualifying for college entrance. … We do decide in the instant case that the facts reasonably found to exist by the lower court are sufficient to establish as a matter of law a threat to the health, welfare or safety of the public.

Hugie v. Horn

730 A.2d 1042 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 26, 1999

Clearly, Petitioner falls within the parameters for classification as a dangerous offender. … Again, because Petitioner was convicted of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in 1993, he qualifies as a person who would be initially classified within the statutory definition of a sexual predator.

Tanya J. McCloskey, Acting Consumer Advocate v. PA PUC

195 A.3d 1055 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 11, 2018

Therefore, the long-term viability of the safeguard condition is clearly questionable. (OCA’s Brief, Appendix D at 2) (footnotes omitted). … come from the transaction but also to establish that substantial affirmative benefits flow to its ratepayers.

Johns v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

87 A.3d 1006 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 21, 2014

Absent intent, the words of the statement itself must objectively establish a threat. Id. … “Hurt” is clearly a form of physical harm. Regardless of the verb tense, Claimant’s communication qualifies as an expression of intent to inflict harm. J.S.; Aversa.

Department of Human Services v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, Inc.

154 A.3d 431 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 8, 2017

The majority has unnecessarily complicated a very straightforward statute by adding qualifying language to make the words fit a desired interpretation. … The basic precepts of statutory construction require adherence to certain established principles.

American Casualty Co. v. Phico Insurance

145 Pa. Commw. 184 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 24, 1992

[hospital] acting in the course and scope of his employment” and that DiRienzo qualifies as a “health care provider.” … Clearly, DiRienzo is ineligible to participate in the Cat Fund as a health care provider within the meaning of Section 701(a) of the Act.

Delaware Township Board of Auditors v. Delaware Township

132 A.3d 523 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 5, 2016

In March 2006, the Delaware Township Board of Supervisors approved the creation of a new defined benefit pension plan for qualifying township employees. … Cmwlth. 1983) 10 (observing that the legislature may establish a procedure whereby public officials with a dual interest can establish their own compensation, e.g. a pension, but

Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board

5 A.3d 448 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 16, 2010

Fourth, Keystone contends the Board erred in granting an extension because it is no longer qualified and suitable to hold a slot machine license. C. … Clearly, Keystone’s petition to re-open was untimely under 58 Pa.Code §§ 494a.6(a) and (f). d.

DeWeese v. Weaver

880 A.2d 54 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 26, 2005

We qualified this determination by noting: [W]e decide only that amendments to a previously codified law do not escape the mandate of Article III, Section 3 merely because the amendments are made to a single codified law. … Moreover, they contend that even if this claim has not been waived, it is without merit as the title in this case clearly met constitutional muster.

Selfspot, Inc. v. Butler County Family YMCA

818 A.2d 587 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 25, 2003

The arbitrator concluded that the complaint therefore did not establish a violation of Section 8(b) of the Act and that it consequently also did not establish a violation of Section 8(h), and he terminated the arbitration … The Court notes, however, that the language of Section 8 clearly does indicate that Section 8(b) embodies the substantive prohibition of that Section.

Commonwealth v. D'Agata National Trucking Co.

25 Pa. Commw. 365 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 1, 1976

D’Agata’s argument that C & R could not be “fit, willing and able,” because it had no equipment, is clearly without merit. … Finding No. 12, as qualified by the above-quoted language, is supported by substantial evidence.

1400 Main Holdings, LLC v. PA Human Relations Commission

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 6, 2024

Section 5(h)(3.1) goes on to qualify, however, that, in the case of a rental, “a landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, grant permission for a modification if the renter agrees to restore the interior of the premises … The record also establishes that there are 376 units at [the Property]. Id.

Geneva House, Inc. v. Minsec of Scranton, Inc.

25 A.3d 427 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 1, 2011

Our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. … As a result, the issue is whether Minsec’s community corrections center qualifies as a continuation of the previously approved nonconforming use of the subject property.

Christ the King Manor v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare

911 A.2d 624 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 22, 2006

The title of HB 1168, as set forth before, clearly reflected the amended contents of the bill. … If the state plan is approved, the state will qualify for federal funding, which will cover part of the costs of the state’s medical assistance program....

Robal Associates, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Charlestown Township

999 A.2d 630 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 23, 2010

In this regard, the proposed sledding hill near several residential buildings and roads did not qualify as open space. … This determination, which is one of many on the minimum open space issue, clearly supports the conclusion that Ro-bal’s plan failed to meet the requirement.

J.E. Trivelpiece v. Briar Creek Borough ZHB

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · May 7, 2026

The Board decided that Applicant’s current use is a qualifying nonconforming use to which he is entitled. Bd. Dec. at 1. … It is anticipated that [Applicant] will argue that the industrial use and driveway are not part of this special exception application[;] however, it clearly is.

Pennsylvania Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents v. Foster

150 Pa. Commw. 572 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 23, 1992

Department of Health, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 469, 570 A.2d 1350 (1990), for the proposition that the grant of intervention in an administrative proceeding is not a basis for establishing standing on appeal. … The agreement clearly states that it is not contrary to law. . The United States Code definition of "bank holding company" is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 .

Alliance Home of Carlisle v. Board of Assessment Appeals

852 A.2d 428 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 15, 2004

Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 1 , 487 A.2d 1306 (1985), our .Supreme Court set forth a five-part test for determining whether an entity qualifies as a “purely public charity” under the Pennsylvania Constitution: [A]n entity qualifies … Exemptions are established in the appropriate taxing statute.

Summit Township Industrial & Economic Development Authority v. County of Erie

980 A.2d 191 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 10, 2009

Clearly, only these municipalities are initially eligible for municipal grants pursuant to Section 1403(c)(2)(v). … to the municipalities affected by the establishment of a licensed gaming facility, (emphasis added and footnote omitted).