Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
4,219 results
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Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n
611 Pa. 56 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 28, 2011
Clearly, the proviso language of Section 5302(b)(2) was not intended to penalize employees for serving with unions by depriving them of the benefits of their state service while so serving. … We believe that more must be shown to establish that the arbitration award has violated Section 5302(b).
Cited 10 timesPublishedKistler v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission
610 Pa. 516 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 22, 2011
In Rebottini , the evidence established that the board members were motivated by a desire to increase their salaries for their service on the board. … To that end, the General Assembly specified its intent “to define as clearly as possible those areas which represent conflict with the public trust.” Id. at 1097 (quoting 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a)).
Cited 12 timesPublished558 Pa. 313 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 27, 1999
However, as this is Appellant’s fourth petition for collateral relief, Appellant does not qualify for this exception which only applies to a first PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. … Again, Appellant fails to understand that this court in Peterkin clearly noted that the time requirements under the *331 amendments to the PCRA are jurisdictional.
Cited 1,036 timesPublishedO'Donnell v. Allegheny Co. Tax Apl of: Fox Chapel
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 27, 2021
There is nothing in the plain language of Section 303 suggesting that an employment nexus is a prerequisite for a payment to qualify as compensation. … It merely offers a non-exclusive list of common examples of remuneration that the Department believes qualify as compensation.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCommonwealth, Aplt. v. Rosario, K.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 16, 2023
As the statute exists, there is no qualifying language to the word “probation,” suggesting that the conditions relate to probation broadly, and not limited to the term of probation. … I find the majority’s reliance on implication unnecessary, as the plain language of the statute itself clearly reveals that revocation can occur at any time following a hearing.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCommonwealth, Aplt. v. Rosario, K.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 16, 2023
As the statute exists, there is no qualifying language to the word “probation,” suggesting that the conditions relate to probation broadly, and not limited to the term of probation. … I find the majority’s reliance on implication unnecessary, as the plain language of the statute itself clearly reveals that revocation can occur at any time following a hearing.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCommonwealth v. Johnson, H., Aplt.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 22, 2023
It is well established there is no general requirement to life-qualify jurors and, accordingly, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do so. … Eakin and McCaffery had “clearly established personal biases . . . related to racial bias” and appellant is African American.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCommonwealth v. Knox, J., Aplt.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 21, 2018
The totality of these circumstances establish a sufficient link between the creation of the song and video, its publication and promotion, and Knox. … The tone of the lyrics chosen for this song demonstrates clearly that Knox was angered by his prior arrest and the effect that the arrest had upon his financial situation.
Cited 0 timesPublished599 Pa. 166 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 17, 2008
Thus, despite the reference to “conviction” in relation to a crime of violence in subsection (a)(1), the Legislature clearly intended the elements in Section 9714 to be determined at sentencing. … We reasoned that visible possession of a firearm “is neither included in the definitions of the felonies enumerated in section 9712(a) nor does it establish the culpability required under those definitions.”
Cited 29 timesPublishedIn re Nomination Petition of Guzzardi
627 Pa. 1 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 1, 2014
Appellants, qualified electors and registered voters, filed a petition to set the nomination petition aside in the Commonwealth Court. See 25 P.S. § 2937; 42 Pa.C.S. § 764. … The procedures there established are ‘exclusive and must be strictly followed as substantive law.’ ”) (quoting Hockemeier v. Berra, 641 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo.1982)).
Cited 23 timesPublishedPA Enviro Defense Fdn, Aplt. v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 5, 2022
In PEDF II, we held Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution “establishes a public trust, pursuant to which the natural resources are the corpus of the trust, the Commonwealth[] is the trustee, and the people … But PEDF II did not hinge on a finding the trust funds would “be clearly spent on non-trust purposes” once moved to the General Fund. Id.
Cited 0 timesPublishedIn Re: Chester Water Auth; Cross Aplt. Chester Co.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 21, 2026
by a municipality” because CWA, while established under the MAA in 1939, is no longer the same project established at its inception. … House Amici observe that in neighboring provisions, the MAA utilizes terms that clearly identify an incorporating municipality with specificity. Id.
Cited 0 timesPublished4 Serg. & Rawle 509 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 19, 1818
Raym. 937, clearly held the law to be so. … This is clearly established, and I shall barely refer to Martindale's Lessee v. Troop, 3 Harr. & M'Hen. 244, in the General Court and Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Cited 7 timesPublishedIn Re: Chester Water Auth; Cross Aplt. Chester Co.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 21, 2026
by a municipality” because CWA, while established under the MAA in 1939, is no longer the same project established at its inception. … House Amici observe that in neighboring provisions, the MAA utilizes terms that clearly identify an incorporating municipality with specificity. Id.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCommonwealth v. Olson, J., Aplt.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 31, 2019
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and that “Birchfield dramatically departed from that precedent and is clearly new.” Brief for Commonwealth at 6 n.2. … Further, unlike Miller and Montgomery, which were premised upon “group characteristics” of juveniles, Birchfield “did not define a class, or discuss the characteristics of any group, much less immunize anyone due to the
Cited 0 timesPublished347 Pa. Super. 403 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 27, 1985
All other crimes are left to the numerous and qualified local law enforcement agencies. It is absurd to adopt the Commonwealth’s rationale. … It is a well established rule of statutory construction that the preamble of a statute may be considered in the statute’s construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924.
Cited 14 timesPublishedCommonwealth v. Katona, D., Aplt.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 21, 2020
It concluded that Katona’s voluntary disclosures to the CI qualified as the independent source of information, and, further, that the search warrant “did not rely upon evidence derived from an unlawful wiretap, but rather … The observed or anticipated pattern of rogue and/or bad faith conduct on the part of the police that this Court was clearly so intent on stamping out in Melendez through its restrictive
Cited 0 timesPublishedIn Re: Chester Water Auth; Cross Aplt. Chester Co.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 21, 2026
by a municipality” because CWA, while established under the MAA in 1939, is no longer the same project established at its inception. … House Amici observe that in neighboring provisions, the MAA utilizes terms that clearly identify an incorporating municipality with specificity. Id.
Cited 0 timesPublished623 Pa. 253 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 17, 2013
Having established that Appellant’s above claims are waived, we proceed now to examine Appellant’s remaining issues. 10 I. … Additionally, the trial evidence established all of the following facts.
Cited 265 timesPublished602 Pa. 224 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 30, 2009
The trial court determined that the sole purpose of the physical and emotional abuse appellant inflicted upon P.B. was to cause her pain and anguish, and that the myriad wounds covering the majority of P.B.’s body clearly … It would defy logic and common sense to interpret the statute so that defendants who inflict pain and suffering over a course of time on their victims are deemed immune from the aggravator.
Cited 66 timesPublished
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