Case law

Messmore's Estate

290 Pa. 107 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 14, 1927

This document described the coal' land held in trust, amounting, if the tract was divided, to about 169 acres, and directed that her executors (only one qualified ) should have entire control thereof “for a period of five … It is also suggested that the court is without jurisdiction to surcharge with the proceeds of the sale of this land, and that the right to recover must first be established in the common pleas after issue granted to pass

Beisgen Estate

387 Pa. 425 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Dec 29, 1956

If the aforesaid parol evidence was admissible, it would clearly establish that the testatrix did not intend to include her bank account or stock in and by the words “personal effects”. … The Court held that The Presbyterian Home in the Presbytery of Erie was qualified to receive this devise.

Commonwealth v. Charlett

481 Pa. 22 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 5, 1978

This was the situation in In re Martorano, 464 Pa. 66 , 346 A.2d 22 (1975), cited in the majority opinion, where Martorano was imprisoned for refusal to testify before a grand jury after he had been granted immunity from … As to the $150,000 fine, its conditional nature clearly indicates a civil contempt. Brocker v. Brocker, supra ; In re Martorano, supra.

Commonwealth v. Mock, M., Aplt.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 20, 2019

In light of this, they argue that a prior offense is not established by a violation, but rather requires a conviction. Id. … Accordingly, although Haag’s earlier offense qualified as a prior offense under subsection (a) because it resulted in a conviction prior to sentencing on the second offense, it did not qualify as a prior offense under subsection

Lock Estate

431 Pa. 251 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 6, 1968

The record of the hearing established, inter alia, that the decedent, Mike Lock, and Esther Lock were married on May 25,1952. The marriage was the second for each. … It is not to be assumed that merely because testimony in a former proceeding does not qualify under [the former testimony] exception to the hearsay rule that it is inadmissible.

Commonwealth v. Colson

507 Pa. 440 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 4, 1985

One of these is that the jury was improperly death qualified. Prospective jurors who stated that they would not under any circumstances vote for the death penalty were excluded. … Appellant also requested discovery of plea bargains, deals, or immunities offered to witnesses. The Commonwealth represented that there were no such deals.

In re: Canvass of Provis. Ballots Appeal of Walsh

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 13, 2024

A review of these rules demonstrates that intent does play a crucial role in the establishment of residency under the Election Code. … There is no suggestion that establishment of a new place of residence can be accomplished through intent only prior to the actual relocation.

Gillard v. AIG Insurance

609 Pa. 65 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 23, 2011

The lawyers who regularly serve the Energy Association’s members, especially the counsel who are full-time employees, are exposed to a continuous stream of client communications (many of which are clearly confidential client … Such approach is consistent with logic and established principles of statutory construction.

Wayne M. Chiurazzi Law Inc. v. MRO Corp.

626 Pa. 303 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 16, 2014

The majority qualified its finding by holding that the statutory pricing schedule does not apply to non-paper copies of records such as those produced by electronic means or on CD-ROM. … The statutory pricing schedule only then follows, but introduced by the important qualifier that the payment shall not exceed the amounts set forth as the pricing schedule.

Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk

46 Pa. 112 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 1, 1863

Such being the case it becomes material, as this cause must go down to be tried again, to state clearly the principles which should regulate that trial. … It is the locum tenens of the state, and is clothed with the state’s immunities. This was held in Coon v. The Monongahela Navigation Company, 6 Barr 382, and so it has often been ruled since.

Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc.

357 Pa. Super. 322 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Aug 12, 1986

This is not to suggest that the reasonable relationship test is immune from valid criticism, which is particularly sharp in the defamation context. … trial court in this case was clearly proper.

Cooper v. Schoffstall

588 Pa. 505 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 7, 2006

D. & C.4th 221, 223 (2001) ("Clearly such discovery [of financial information regarding an opposing party’s expert witness] would not be permitted absent an order of court for 'cause shown' pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(a) … While adherence to the general standard pertaining to discovery certainly cannot be sufficient to establish additional “cause shown” under Rule 4003.5, we agree with Dr.

Driscoll v. Corbett

620 Pa. 494 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 17, 2013

Clearly, then, there is substantial tension between the pronouncements of these two cases. While Gondelman is the more recent of these two, this Court has most recently repeated Stander’s assertion. … Such a revision to the organic law of the Commonwealth will only be deemed to violate the constitution that it amends (if at all) where the challenger has shown — clearly, palpably, and plainly — that the amendment is so

City of Pittsburgh v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

620 Pa. 345 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 25, 2013

Claimant notes that any worker who qualifies for and receives a pension always has the opportunity to remain attached to the labor market, including workers who accept Social Security “old-age” benefits. … Glen Alden Coal Co., 377 Pa. 7 , 104 A.2d 104 (Pa.1954) ] clearly established that entitlement to benefits under the Act is contingent upon proof that the claimant suffered an injury or disease in the work place and the injury

D'AMBROSIO v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

494 Pa. 501 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 8, 1981

In doing so, the majority (1) overlooks statutory construction principles, and (2) without any factual basis whatsoever, assumes that the U.I.P.A. is effective. *514 First, the words of the U.I.P.A. clearly demonstrate that … (xv) Refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's request to do so unless: (a) The insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect

Commonwealth v. Ludwig

583 Pa. 6 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 19, 2005

of the offense of third-degree murder were automatically bootstrapped into any separate offense classified as a type of third-degree murder, there would be no need to separately create such an offense because the conduct qualifying … Clearly, this risk was one that a reasonable person would have avoided if placed in Ludwig's situation.

Commonwealth v. Ford

570 Pa. 378 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Oct 25, 2002

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish that his allegations have not been previously litigated or waived. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). … Although the report ultimately concluded that Appellant was competent, it also clearly revealed that Appellant had a troubled childhood and learning problems. 7 Despite the information contained in Dr.

Ice City, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America

456 Pa. 210 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 24, 1974

On July 10, 1972, appellants, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, demanded in writing the appointment of independent appraisers qualified to determine the extent and amount of lost income. … Here, appellants fully performed their appraisal obligations and established their entitlement to bring an action for the recovery of the loss.

Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp.

427 Pa. 439 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 14, 1967

Thus it did not qualify as “taking of employment”. In the instant case, there was a clear change in Kiley’s employment status when the covenant was agreed to. … Clearly, here is a case of no consideration for the covenant.

Schreffler v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

567 Pa. 527 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 18, 2002

We further stated that “[i]t must clearly appear the amounts were so paid and received as compensation under the act, and not as wages for employment, and the disability or further disability must be attributable to an injury … We are now called upon to decide an issue not before us in Chase, viz., whether voluntary payments of medical expenses qualify as “payments of compensation” such that the limitations period of section 315 is tolled.