Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Fincham v. Wendt

    59 Or. App. 416 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 29, 1982

    That result is clearly wrong. A mechanical reading of the statute must therefore fail. … Waibel, 276 Or 189 , 554 P2d 492 (1976), claimant does not qualify as an employe. [Footnote omitted.]

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Lenon v. Public Employees Retirement Board

    228 Or. App. 20 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 29, 2009

    That is so, PERB maintains, because paragraph 6 incorporates former ORS 237.153, and the text of that statute clearly precludes petitioner from receiving the sick leave benefit. … An ‘active member’ is one who ‘is presently employed by a participating employer in a qualifying position.’ ORS 238.005(12)(b).

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • American Federation of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac

    208 Or. App. 350 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 4, 2006

    That is, the court found that without the forgeries, neither measure would have qualified for the ballot. … Consistently with the foregoing, there are some circumstances in which ORS 162.085(1) would clearly apply.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

    350 Or. App. 744 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 17, 2026

    Those arguments and the evidence plaintiff points to in support of those claims do not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LeafFilter was plaintiff’s employer. … Plaintiff did not otherwise produce evidence showing that defendants engaged in qualifying activities under the statute.

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Multnomah County v. Talbot

    56 Or. App. 235 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 8, 1982

    He also has the duty, if he has reason to believe that property ceases to qualify as historic property, to request that the preservation officer determine if the property continues to qualify; when so requested, the preservation … Clearly, the assessor is not a disinterested bystander. He has a statutorily imposed involvement under the legislative scheme.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • State v. Taylor

    271 Or. App. 292 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 20, 2015

    In a bench trial, a defendant can preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence if the “defendant clearly raises the issue in closing argument.” Id. … Given that understanding of the term “dwelling,” entry into any part of a building in which people reside at night qualifies as entry into a dwelling.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Division

    219 Or. App. 607 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 7, 2008

    Petitioner was clearly afforded an opportunity to communicate with counsel or others, and she in fact did so. 4 She does not argue that she should have been provided with additional time to communicate; she argues only that … Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; equal protection.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Mercado v. Rogue Disposal & Recycling, Inc.

    347 Or. App. 874 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 18, 2026

    Plaintiff clearly alleged ultimate facts that, if true, are sufficient to establish the first two elements. … Defendant’s direct or imputed knowledge of the protected activity is necessary to establish a causal connection.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co.

    77 Or. App. 663 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 12, 1986

    “If an employer directly discharges an at-will employee in such a manner as to make the discharge [wrongful] it would defy both reason and fairness to immunize him from liability simply because he has been clever enough to … Jurisdictions that recognize the concept of constructive discharge have established different elements that the plaintiff must prove.

    Modified on other grounds by Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 302 Or. 616 (1987)Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Drake v. Alonso

    285 Or. App. 620 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 17, 2017

    It establishes a prima facie case for granting the restraining order, and that’s what a restraining order is based on in the initial stage. … Respondent’s argument is not entirely clear and, at times, could be viewed as contending that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the facts that it had found qualified as “abuse” under FAPA.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • State v. Phillips

    317 Or. App. 169 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 26, 2022

    Oneill, 256 Or App 537, 543-44, 303 P3d 944, rev den, 354 Or 342 (2013), that description risks miscommunicating the nature of defendant’s evidentiary burden as established by the legislature. … For example, the state points to ORS 686.440, which provides civil immunity for a veterinarian who decides to euthanize “a seriously injured or seriously ill animal,” but only if the veterinarian “does not know who owns the

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • McLaughlin v. Wilson

    292 Or. App. 101 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 31, 2018

    It is worth noting, however, that some legislators and proponents of HB 2352 were careful to qualify their descriptions of the bill as nonsubstantive. … . *** So, you know, I'd hate to have the impression that there is absolutely nothing in here that constitutes a change in any substance, but clearly the effort here was to keep it as non-substantive as possible ***."); Tape

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Wetherell v. Douglas County

    204 Or. App. 732 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 22, 2006

    It is difficult for me to see how the legislature and LCDC could have worded general statutes and regulations to more clearly show that they would disapprove of the use contemplated here. … practices and other forested lands that maintain soil, air, water and fish and wildlife resources.” 4 With respect to Friends’ Goal 4-based challenge, LUBA determined that the county had misconstrued its comprehensive plan as establishing

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department of Washington County v. Slack

    17 Or. App. 57 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 1, 1974

    “Kent clearly requires a statement of reasons for a waiver and transfer order under constitutional ‘due process’ and ‘assistance of counsel’ requirements. … Since, however, the majority opinion renders such a disposition impossible, I rest my dissent on the ground that, from the cold record, the state, in my view, has clearly failed to support its burden of establishing that

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Board of Parole

    350 Or. App. 432 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 10, 2026

    Petitioner contends that the board violated his due process right to notice and the opportunity for a fair hearing by not clearly advising him about his prehearing decisions and the hearing process that it intended to use … Similar to the federal equal protection provision, Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution prohibits laws “granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Blank v. US Bank

    252 Or. App. 553 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 26, 2012

    Green later signed a concurrence letter, in which he agreed with employer’s legal counsel that claimant’s “medical history and the diagnosis of [CSS] clearly raises the possibility that idiopathic factors caused [claimant … Claimant contends that the board erred both legally and factually by relying on Green’s concurrence letter and deposition testimony to deny compensability because, according to claimant, that evidence established that “[Green

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Williams v. Joyce

    4 Or. App. 482 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 14, 1971

    Rogers that Negroes could not qualify for tenancy in the apartment because they would be incompatible with his mother-in-law who occupied the adjoining apartment. Mr. … “These difficulties of proof may be the reason that some states provide that a person discriminated against may recover a penalty of a minimum amount and such other damages as may be established, and others establish the

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • State v. Miles

    273 Or. App. 271 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 26, 2015

    Thus, in defendant’s view, the evidence could not establish that C considered her hips and legs to be intimate parts. … Whatever the commission and the legislature meant to do, however, they clearly decided not to do that.” Id. at 462-63 (citation omitted).

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Nulph v. Board of Parole

    279 Or. App. 652 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 27, 2016

    OR-OSHA, 356 Or at 599 ; Bergerson, 341 Or at 416 (where the agency failed to exercise its discretion “remand [was] necessary to allow the [agency] to complete the legislative meaning of the [delegative] term ‘clearly an … The board also has not defined that term through rulemaking and did not reference any previous orders in which it defined the term or established criteria to determine whether a prisoner has established “reasonable cause”

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Wilson v. B. F. Goodrich Co.

    52 Or. App. 139 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 11, 1981

    In Conachan we also recognized (at 61) that most courts now apparently hold that on the question of earning capacity it is proper to consider, under some circumstances, employment for which plaintiff was qualified at the … As such, the case is clearly distinguishable from the Holdsclaw vs.

    Cited 9 timesPublished

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