Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

744 June 17, 2026 No. 562

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion

pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited

except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Thomas MATTESON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEAFFILTER NORTH, LLC,

a foreign limited liability company,

and Sally Bloomstrom, individually,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

Zack HICKMAN,

individually; Lumber Installation Group, LLC,

a domestic limited liability company;

and Jason Lumber, individually and as the single member

of Lumber Installation Group, LLC,

Defendants.

Washington County Circuit Court

23CV27227; A184754

Andrew Erwin, Judge.

Submitted October 15, 2025.

Thomas Matteson filed the briefs pro se.

Melanie E. Rose, Duncan J. Campbell, and Smith Freed

Eberhard, PC, filed the brief for respondents.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and

Hellman, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J.

Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 744 (2026) 745

ORTEGA, P. J.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendants LeafFilter

North, LLC, Lumber Installation Group, LLC, Jason

Lumber, Zack Hickman, and Sally Bloomstrom, seeking

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages,

following a dispute that arose relating to his work install-

ing LeafFilter products.1 As relevant here, plaintiff alleged

statutory claims against Bloomstrom and LeafFilter based

on ORS chapters 652 and 653, (the wage claims) and ORS

chapter 658 (the licensing claims), as well as declaratory

and injunctive claims based on those statutes. The trial

court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment

under ORCP 47 and, following a hearing, dismissed plain-

tiff’s claims. Plaintiff now appeals from the general judg-

ment of dismissal, challenging the denial of his motion to

amend the complaint and the grant of summary judgment

to defendants, and raising other arguments about conduct of

the proceedings. Having reviewed plaintiff’s arguments on

appeal, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s

motion to amend was within its allowable discretion, that

it did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, and that there is no merit to any of plaintiff’s

other assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm.

Motion to amend. Plaintiff assigns error to the

denial of his motion to amend the complaint. “We review a

trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint for abuse of discretion. In applying that standard,

we uphold the trial court’s decision unless it exercises its

discretion in a manner that is unjustified by, and clearly

against, reason and evidence.” Alexander v. State, 283 Or

App 582, 590, 390 P3d 1109 (2017) (citations omitted). We

consider the following factors in evaluating whether the

trial court abused its discretion: “(1) the proposed amend-

ment’s nature and its relationship to the existing pleadings;

(2) the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party; (3) the timing

1

The claims against Lumber Installation Group, LLC, and Jason Lumber

were voluntarily dismissed. The claims against Zack Hickman and the wage-re-

lated claims against Sally Bloomstrom were dismissed under ORCP 21 A, and we

affirmed that dismissal in a nonprecedential memorandum opinion, also issuing

today. Matteson v. LeafFilter North, LLC, 350 Or App 736 (2026) (nonprecedential

memorandum opinion).

746 Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

of the proposed amendment; and (4) the colorable merit of

the proposed amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments included, among

other things, adding three defendants associated with

LeafFilter’s parent company and additional claims regard-

ing those defendants, as well as unlawful employment dis-

crimination claims under ORS chapter 659A. The trial court

held a hearing and denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the

complaint, because plaintiff’s proposed amendments were

dependent on facts that were at issue in defendants’ pending

motion for summary judgment. As to the proposed amend-

ment to include additional defendants and licensing claims,

the trial court determined that if plaintiff is unable to estab-

lish that Bloomstrom or her employer received compensation

for supplying labor—which was at issue on summary judg-

ment—they would not qualify as a construction labor con-

tractor for the purpose of the licensing claims regardless of

which named entity employed Bloomstrom. As to the discrim-

ination claims, those claims would be predicated on proof of

an employer-employee relationship between the corporation

and plaintiff—also at issue on summary judgment—and the

claims appeared to be time-barred. On the basis of the record

before it, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its dis-

cretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.

Summary Judgment. Plaintiff assigns error to the

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The mov-

ing party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, declarations, and admissions on file

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter

of law.” ORCP 47 C. “No genuine issue as to a material fact

exists if, based on the record before the court viewed in a

manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively

reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party

on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary

judgment.” ORCP 47 C. We conclude that the trial court

did not err in dismissing the wage claims and the licensing

claims.

Plaintiff’s wage claims against LeafFilter were

based on ORS chapter 652, relating to payment and

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 744 (2026) 747

collection of wages, and ORS chapter 653 as it relates to

minimum wage. Both of those categories of claims are predi-

cated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

See ORS 652.320(7) (a “wage claim” is “an employee’s claim

against an employer for compensation for the employee’s

own personal services”); ORS 652.310(2) (an “employee” is

“any individual who * * * renders personal services wholly

or partly in this state to an employer who pays or agrees to

pay such individual at a fixed rate”); ORS 653.055 (specify-

ing that an “employer who pays an employee less than the

wages to which the employee is entitled * * * is liable to the

employee affected” (emphases added)).

Plaintiff therefore had the burden to produce

admissible evidence that created a genuine issue of material

fact regarding whether LeafFilter was plaintiff’s employer.

Plaintiff’s pay stubs are in the record showing that plaintiff

was paid by a subcontractor, and not by LeafFilter. In sup-

port of his claim, plaintiff points to text messages that show

that there was a gap in time between the time he met with

a LeafFilter representative, submitted employment forms,

and participated in training, and his first day of work as an

installer under the subcontractor who ultimately employed

plaintiff and processed his pay. He also argues the contract

between LeafFilter and its subcontractors is invalid, unen-

forceable, and a “ruse.” Those arguments and the evidence

plaintiff points to in support of those claims do not establish

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LeafFilter

was plaintiff’s employer. Having reviewed the pertinent

portions of the record, we conclude that the trial court did

not err in dismissing plaintiff’s wage claims on the basis

that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether LeafFilter was plaintiff’s employer.

Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s determina-

tion that plaintiff’s licensing claims were precluded on the

basis that there were no genuine issues of material fact as

to whether Bloomstrom and LeafFilter acted as construc-

tion labor contractors. In order to qualify as a construc-

tion labor contractor, a person must both engage in speci-

fied conduct—recruiting, soliciting, supplying or employing

workers to perform construction labor for another person or

748 Matteson v. LeafFilterNorth, LLC (A184754)

entity—and also do so at an “agreed remuneration or rate of

pay.” ORS 658.405(2). Having reviewed the pertinent parts

of the record, the trial court did not err in determining that

Bloomstrom and LeafFilter did not receive payment for pro-

viding plaintiff to another entity to perform construction

work, and that there was no genuine issue of material fact

on that issue. Plaintiff did not otherwise produce evidence

showing that defendants engaged in qualifying activities

under the statute. Absent any genuine issues of material

fact that those defendants did not receive any “agreed remu-

neration” for supplying labor, the trial court did not err in

dismissing the licensing claims. Plaintiff’s related claims

for declaratory and injunctive relief were predicated on the

applicability of those statutes to defendants’ activities; con-

sequently, it was not error to dismiss those claims as well.

Further, the trial court did not err in determining that

LeafFilter’s corporate structure—i.e., that its parent com-

pany was Leaf Home, LLC, and that Bloomstrom may have

been employed by the parent company—would not alter the

analysis for the purpose of summary judgment absent any

indication that Bloomstrom or the corporate entities were

themselves paid by the subcontractors for the service of pro-

viding labor to them.

We have reviewed plaintiff’s additional assignments

of error, including (but not limited to) arguments that he

was denied procedurally fair and impartial hearings, that

he was subject to disparate treatment as a pro se plaintiff,

and his assignments of error regarding proceedings prior to

the dismissal, and conclude that they do not present a basis

for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.