Case law

Leong's, Inc. v. Oregon State Lottery Commission

142 Or. App. 460 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 31, 1996

The basis of the denial was explained as follows: “[We have] determined that you do not qualify as a Video Lottery retailer under OAR 177-100-060 and OAR 177-040-010 for the following reason(s): “A conviction for any gambling … ‘control persons’ of those establishments still have gambling convictions on their records, Petitioners are being treated unfairly by Respondents’ denial.

Smith v. Di Marco

207 Or. App. 558 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 6, 2006

The second incident clearly qualifies. It involves not just hostile speech, but physical confrontation. Respondent took swings at petitioner and reached in the door to take C away. … The third incident also clearly qualifies. Again, it involved both hostile, threatening language as well as physical confrontation.

Fox v. Collins

213 Or. App. 451 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 20, 2007

Finally, subsection (3) establishes that a cause of action otherwise revived by subsection (2) must be “refiled within one year after [January 1, 2004].” Or Laws 2003, ch 768, § 2(3). … Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts. Were it otherwise, the paramount powers of Congress could be nullified by ‘prophetic discernment.’

Dempsey v. Senior Services Division

92 Or. App. 163 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 20, 1988

A mentally retarded person can qualify for an “exception” and obtain placement in an SSD facility only by establishing that no appropriate MHD facility is available and that the SSD facility is “capable of serving [his] needs … The statutes, like the rules, clearly contemplated the establishment of different facilities under the auspices of different agencies to provide the services needed by persons with different problems.

Farris v. Johnson

222 Or. App. 377 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 24, 2008

Rather, a petitioner can generally establish that a respondent was aware that a contact was unwanted by establishing that the respondent was “subjectively * * * aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the contacts … Because respondent *383 had been served with a temporary SPO, he clearly was aware that the contact with petitioner’s husband was unwanted. The next question is whether the contact alarmed petitioner.

Whitehead v. Clarno

308 Or. App. 268 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 30, 2020

“The requirement that electors must be eligible to vote at the time they sign initiative petitions is long and well established. [See] Sajo, 297 Or [at] 660. … Paulus, 297 Or 646, 653-54, 688 P2d 367 (1984), that decision established only a necessary, but not invariably sufficient, requirement for a person to be a “qualified voter” entitled to sign a petition under Article IV, section

Nakashima v. Board of Education

204 Or. App. 535 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Mar 15, 2006

The statute prohibits discrimination in hiring and employment of otherwise qualified disabled persons. ORS 659A.112(1). … to have “implied a concern under the Establishment Clause.”

Corey v. Department of Land Conservation & Development

210 Or. App. 542 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 31, 2007

Subparagraphs (B) and (C) clearly do not apply, because DLCD did not have authority to suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew anything. … The court held that the claimant had a protected property interest in the benefits, even though he had not fully qualified for them.

Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific

62 Or. App. 698 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 27, 1983

The trial court ruled that defendant had established a qualified privilege, and that ruling is not challenged. … Restatement (Second) Torts, § 575, comment b at 198. *706 Plaintiffs first allegation of damage clearly alleges special harm, and the question is whether there was evidence that River’s speech was a substantial factor in

De La Cruz Gomez and De La Cruz

342 Or. App. 659 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 20, 2025

At a February 2024 hearing held on the court’s own motion, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that youth qualified as a “vulnerable youth.” … Because the trial court’s authority to appoint a guardian results from evidence that the youth is a “vulnera- ble youth” (a condition also listed in ORS 125.305(1)(a)), this sentence clearly describes a precondition for the

Clarkston v. Bridge

21 Or. App. 1 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 7, 1975

Under the factual situation at bar, respondent *3 could only have the paternity of her child adjudicated in a URESA proceeding if Oregon’s URESA qualified under ORS 109.070(5) as an “other provision, of law” by which paternity … may be established.

State v. Maybee

235 Or. App. 292 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 12, 2010

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that “[t]he legislature clearly intended that defendant’s sales are subject to the provisions of ORS 180.440.” … , in the Qualifying Escrow Act, a system whereby those manufacturers would be required to “establish a reserve fund to guarantee a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term profits

Walters v. PSRB

341 Or. App. 41 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 4, 2025

ORS 161.351(1); ORS 161.346(1)(a);.2 1 Our conclusion that the PSRB failed to establish that petitioner has a quali- fying mental disorder obviates the need to address petitioner’s second assignment of error, arguing … Based on my review of the more recent record those issues that were present at the time have—have clearly resolved and adjust- ment disorder is not a cyclic disorder.

Kluge v. Oregon State Bar

172 Or. App. 452 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 14, 2001

The government body claiming exemption must demonstrate that the public record qualifies for the exemption. … However, ORS 192.490(1) does not relieve the Bar of its burden to establish a record sufficient to support summary judgment.

Young v. Alongi

123 Or. App. 74 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Sep 1, 1993

Fanning, 310 Or 514 , 800 P2d 773 (1990), and Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities, which, upon the … The record before us consists of appellant’s motion, her affidavit describing her indigency, the court’s guardianship judgments filed on May 28, 1992, establishing guardianship and dismissing the petition for writ of habeas

State v. Branch

243 Or. App. 309 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jun 1, 2011

In that regard, the court stated: "`[N]o particular reason of logic or good sense exists to immunize particular areas or principles simply on the basis of longevity or the fact that their introduction antedated imposition … Thus, this qualified concurrence. That said, and to be sure, invocation of judicial notice in this case is hardly routine either. Indeed, it is exceptional.

Farnworth v. Rossetto

285 Or. App. 10 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 26, 2017

It *17 provided that if, based on a review of the application, the city’s finance officer determined that the applicant did not qualify for the issuance of a license, the finance officer was required to notify the applicant … The city did not raise discretionary-function immunity as a defense or as a ground for summary judgment. See ORS 30.265(6)(c).

Northwest Advancement v. Bureau of Labor

96 Or. App. 133 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 12, 1989

Appellants argue that the statute only *139 authorizes WHC to establish suitable hours of employment, not to prohibit employment altogether. Again, we disagree. Appellants rely on Ore. Newspaper Pub. v. … Former OAR 839-21-107 provided that minors employed as newspaper carriers and newspaper vendors were not subject to the administrative regulations promulgated under ORS 653.305. 8 Exemption from regulation is clearly an immunity

Kilminster v. Day Management Corp.

133 Or. App. 159 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 22, 1995

In this case, the statutory source of the immunity is ORS 656.018. … In both cases, clearly there is no legal bar to bringing the action, but in both, the statutory immunity could be raised as a defense.

Norgren v. PSRB

344 Or. App. 617 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Nov 5, 2025

is considered to have a qualifying mental disorder. … But a mere “possibility” that cannot be “discounted” is insufficient to establish “danger” based on a mental disorder that is in remission.