The opinion
No. 958 November 5, 2025 617
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
LINUS KORBIN NORGREN,
Petitioner,
v.
PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent.
Psychiatric Security Review Board
192913;
A183359
Submitted September 9, 2025.
Harris S. Matarazzo filed the brief for petitioner.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
618 Norgren v. PSRB
TOOKEY, P. J.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of the
Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB), entered after
a hearing, concluding that petitioner, “being affected by
a qualifying mental disorder which, when active, renders
him a substantial danger to others, is under the jurisdiction
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board.” On appeal, we
understand petitioner to contend that the PSRB’s determi-
nation that he is dangerous to others when his qualifying
mental disorder is active is not supported by substantial evi-
dence. ORS 161.351(2)1; ORS 183.482(8)(c).
We agree with petitioner, and so we reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Petitioner was found guilty except for insanity on
three charges of second-degree assault stemming from an
assault petitioner committed in October 2013. On November
8, 2019, the trial court ordered that petitioner be placed under
the jurisdiction of the PSRB on conditional release for a max-
imum of 10 years. Petitioner was diagnosed with bipolar I
disorder, and notably the court that adjudicated petitioner
found that petitioner was not a substantial danger to others.
In a “Psychological Evaluation and Violence Risk
Assessment Update” dated September 7, 2020, a psychol-
ogist who evaluated petitioner’s “violence risk in the com-
munity” reported that petitioner is “considered to be at low
risk of future violent acts in the community regardless of
whether he is under PSRB supervision.”
1
Specifically, as explained below, the PSRB determined that petitioner’s
“qualifying mental disorder” was in “remission,” but that, “when active,” that dis-
order renders him “a substantial danger to others.” Consistent with that determi-
nation, we understand the basis for the PSRB’s order to be ORS 161.351(2), which
provides, in relevant part:
“[A] person affected by a qualifying mental disorder in a state of remission
is considered to have a qualifying mental disorder. A person whose qualify-
ing mental disorder may, with reasonable medical probability, occasionally
become active and when it becomes active will render the person a danger to
others may not be discharged. The person shall continue under supervision
and treatment necessary to protect the person and others.”
We note that, on appeal, the PSRB points to ORS 161.351(2) in its discussion of
the applicable law.
Cite as 344 Or App 617 (2025) 619
As of September 16, 2022, the terms of petitioner’s
conditional release required him to participate in treatment
at a community-based behavioral health center; meet with
his case manager weekly; participate in individual therapy
weekly; submit to both scheduled and unannounced home
visits; abstain from alcohol, illegal drugs, and marijuana;
submit to random urinalysis tests; and participate in 80
hours of structured activity each month, as well as other
conditions. While on conditional release, petitioner worked
part time and shared an apartment with others. Petitioner
has been symptom free and has not used medication for his
bipolar disorder since 2014.
The PSRB held a hearing on September 21, 2022,
and petitioner sought “discharge” from PSRB jurisdiction.
The PSRB then ordered an independent evaluation pursu-
ant to ORS 161.346(2).2
The report prepared by the evaluator concluded
that petitioner “meets criteria for a qualifying mental disor-
der, specifically bipolar disorder, most recent episode manic,
severe, with mood-congruent psychotic features, in full
remission.” Further, the report noted that petitioner’s “bipo-
lar symptoms are not currently active” but that if petition-
er’s “qualifying mental disorder does become active, it may
cause him to become a danger to others, as it would increase
his risk for future violence.” The report also concluded that
petitioner “presents a low risk of violence in the community,”
but that his “continued psychiatric and behavioral stabil-
ity and positive progress will largely depend on continued
abstinence [from drug use], monitoring for signs of psychi-
atric decompensation, and his ability to utilize support and
resources when needed.” Further, the report noted that if
“factors that contributed to violence in the past return, his
risk would increase.”
2
ORS 161.346(2) provides:
“To assist the board in making the determination described in subsection (1)
of this section, the board may, at any time, appoint a psychiatrist or licensed
psychologist to examine the person and to submit a report to the board.
The report must include an opinion as to the mental condition of the per-
son, whether the person presents a substantial danger to others and whether
the person could be adequately controlled with treatment as a condition of
release.”
620 Norgren v. PSRB
The PSRB continued the hearing on May 10, 2023,
and subsequently entered the order that is before us on judi-
cial review. In that order, the PSRB, relying largely on the
report prepared by the evaluator, concluded that petitioner,
“being affected by a qualifying mental disorder which, when
active, renders him a substantial danger to others, is under
the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board.”
Specifically, in the order, regarding whether peti-
tioner continues to have a “qualifying mental disorder,” the
PSRB framed the issue before it as whether petitioner’s qual-
ifying mental disorder was “in remission or has resolved.”
Relying on the evaluator’s report, for three principal rea-
sons, the PSRB found that petitioner’s mental disorder was
merely “in remission.”
First, in its order, the PRSB noted that the evalua-
tor explained that, although “it is possible that [petitioner]
falls within the population of individuals with bipolar I dis-
order who show good outcome[s] and thus ha[ve] not exhib-
ited another mood episode in a prolonged period of time,”
the “mere absence of a mood episode within the past nine
years does not necessarily equate [to] the absence of manic
or depressive episodes in the future or of the disorder in
general.” As the evaluator observed, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) “indicated
that 90% of people go on to have a recurrent mood episode,”
but that the DSM “does not specify the timeline at which
future episodes are likely to reoccur.” The evaluator further
noted that research “has shown that subthreshold symp-
toms may account for much of the chronicity of bipolar disor-
der,” explaining that “subsyndromal manic and hypomanic
symptoms were found to be three times more common than
symptoms at the threshold for mania.”
Second, in its order, the PSRB pointed to what it
described as the evaluator’s “juxtaposition between [peti-
tioner’s] stress at the time of the instant offense and in the
recent years.” On that issue, the PSRB quoted a section of
the report explaining the “facilitating role” that “stressful
life events * * * can play in the development of mental illness
when combined with biological predisposition,” that peti-
tioner was experiencing stressful life events when he “first
Cite as 344 Or App 617 (2025) 621
exhibited mood symptoms,” and that, although “records
have consistently suggested that [petitioner] has success-
fully navigated subsequent stressful life events without the
reemergence of psychiatric symptoms, such as incarceration
and Covid-19, it is also important to note that stress is mul-
tifaceted and can manifest in different forms.” As a result,
the report explained that the evaluator could not “with cer-
tainty, discount the possibility of another mood episode in
the face of other stressors that may impact [petitioner], par-
ticularly given his young age.”
Third, in its order, the PSRB considered what it
described as the PSRB’s “ameliorating influence[ ] * * * in
[petitioner’s] psychiatric stability.” In doing so, it relied on
a section of the report that provides that petitioner’s “life
since 2013 has been carefully managed by providers in
order to reduce the likelihood of another mood episode,” and
noted that petitioner “has responded well to non-medical
treatments for bipolar,” which it called “a positive sign for
the course of his illness, should he continue to be provided
this structured treatment.”
Next, having determined that petitioner’s mental
disorder was merely in “remission” and not “resolved,” the
PSRB determined that petitioner is a substantial danger
to others when his mental disorder is active. In doing so,
the PSRB adopted the view of the evaluator that “the most
salient risk factors” rendering petitioner dangerous are “his
history of violence, major mental illness, characterological
traits, traumatic experiences, and supervision response.” It
further noted that the evaluator’s report explains that peti-
tioner’s “history of violence has occurred exclusively in the
context of mania and psychosis” and that although there was
only one such “episode of violence,” it was “an act of severe
violence where the victim was injured in a number of ways”;
that petitioner’s “past exposure to trauma, when triggered,
may affect [his] decision making abilities and reaction
towards perceived threats”—i.e., he may “believe himself
to be at greater risk of being harmed and react pre-emp-
tively to thwart a threat that is in fact not present”; and that
when petitioner experiences manic symptoms his “underly-
ing grandiosity may be magnified,” which, in turn, “could
622 Norgren v. PSRB
manifest as feelings of invincibleness or aggression when he
feels threatened, humiliated, insulted, or provoked.”
Concerning petitioner’s dangerousness, the PSRB
also pointed to a section of the evaluator’s report describing
petitioner’s “lack of emotional empathy * * * in [petitioner’s]
discussion of his offense.” In the evaluator’s view that “could
negatively impact his capacity to appreciate other people’s
experiences, which may result in some difficulties for [peti-
tioner] to navigate challenges in the community without
supervision and increase his risk for negative interactions
with others that could escalate to a violent incident.”
Thus, as noted, largely based on the evaluator’s
report, the PSRB determined that petitioner is “affected by
a qualifying mental disorder which, when active, renders
him a substantial danger to others.”
ANALYSIS
Standard of review. We review agency orders for
errors of law, substantial evidence, and substantial reason.
Walters v. PSRB, 341 Or App 41, 47-48, 574 P3d 49 (2025).
“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact
when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reason-
able person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). And
we have explained that “ ‘[s]ubstantial reason exists where
the agency has articulated a rational connection between
the facts and the legal conclusion that the agency draws
from them.’ ” Walters, 341 Or App at 48 (quoting Rinne v.
PSRB, 326 Or App 777, 781, 533 P3d 802 (2023), rev den, 371
Or 825 (2024)).
The Parties’ Arguments. Petitioner argues that sub-
stantial evidence does not support the PSRB’s determina-
tion that petitioner is “affected by a qualifying mental disor-
der which, when active, renders him a substantial danger to
others.” Petitioner contends that his extended time without
any sign of his bipolar disorder reactivating shows that he is
not a danger to others. Petitioner notes that the evaluator’s
report prepared for the PSRB stated petitioner “presents a
low risk of violence in the community,” that his qualifying
mental disorder is “in full remission,” and his “bipolar symp-
toms are not currently active.” Petitioner points to language
Cite as 344 Or App 617 (2025) 623
in the report that states “if [petitioner]’s qualifying mental
disorder does become active, it may cause him to become a
danger to others, as it would increase his risk for future vio-
lence,” but notes it also states, “[petitioner] has not been on
psychotropic medication in almost ten years, during which
he has not presumably exhibited active manic or psychotic
symptoms.” Petitioner states that previous manic episodes
were exacerbated by marijuana use and substance abuse
which by themselves are not qualifying mental disorders.
Furthermore, a psychiatrist who routinely treated petitioner
during his conditional release stated that his “bipolar disor-
der is in sustained remission without medical intervention,”
and a psychologist had concluded that “petitioner is a low
risk of future violent acts regardless of whether he is under
PSRB supervision.”
The PSRB responds that “petitioner’s behavior that
led to PSRB jurisdiction while his disorder was active was
both random and violent.” The PSRB cites the evaluator’s
conclusion that “if [petitioner]’s qualifying mental disorder
does become active, it may cause him to become a danger to
others, as it would increase his risk for future violence.” The
PSRB further argues that the evaluator’s report shows that
the structure provided by the PSRB’s supervision “likely
buffered the typical stressors that an individual in the com-
munity might otherwise have through having access to and
routine check-ins with his treatment team,” without which
“it is unclear how [petitioner] may respond to the potential
increase in stressors associated with increased indepen-
dence and responsibilities in the community.” Additionally,
the PSRB notes that the evaluator’s report expressed con-
cern over petitioner’s lack of insight into his disorder and
concluded “it is unclear if [petitioner] will obtain appropri-
ate psychiatric and medical services and adhere to recom-
mended medication regimen.” The PSRB asserts that all of
this amounts to substantial evidence to support the PSRB’s
findings.
Analysis. ORS 161.351(1) provides, “Any person
placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board * * * shall be discharged at such time as
the board, upon hearing, finds by a preponderance of the
624 Norgren v. PSRB
evidence that the person is no longer affected by a qualify-
ing mental disorder or, if so affected, no longer presents a
substantial danger to others that requires regular medical
care, medication, supervision or treatment.” Additionally,
ORS 161.351(2) provides:
“a person affected by a qualifying mental disorder in a
state of remission is considered to have a qualifying mental
disorder. A person whose qualifying mental disorder may,
with reasonable medical probability, occasionally become
active and when it becomes active will render the person a
danger to others may not be discharged. The person shall
continue under supervision and treatment necessary to
protect the person and others.”
The “ ‘reasonable medical probability’ language
used in [ORS 161.351(2)] requires expert testimony that,
with reasonable medical probability, an individual’s con-
dition could become active and render him or her danger-
ous.” Beiswenger v. PSRB, 157 Or App 192, 197, 970 P2d 229
(1998) (internal citations omitted). A “reasonable medical
probability” is more than a “mere possibility.” Cochenour v.
PSRB, 47 Or App 1097, 1106, 615 P2d 1155 (1980).
The PSRB has adopted a rule defining “danger” and
“substantial danger” as a “risk that the person will inflict
injury or harm on others.” OAR 859-010-0005(8). Under that
rule, evidence of a danger “may include information about
historical patterns of behavior, recent behavior, or verbal
or physical threats, which have caused injury or harm or
would place a reasonable person in fear of sustaining injury
or harm.” Id. Nevertheless, as we have noted, although “[t]
he actions and statements of a person alleged to be mentally
ill which occur prior to the hearing are, of course, probative
as to the person’s present mental condition,” a “mere rec-
itation of past acts, in the absence of a showing that such
clearly forms the foundation for a prediction of future dan-
gerousness, cannot serve as the basis for a finding that one
is a mentally ill person.” Rolfe v. Psychiatric Security Review
Board, 53 Or App 941, 947, 633 P2d 846, rev den, 292 Or 334
(1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Notably, in ORS 161.351, the “legislature did not
expressly assign the burden of proving the bases for PSRB
Cite as 344 Or App 617 (2025) 625
jurisdiction to either party.” Rinne, 297 Or App at 554 (citing
ORS 161.351). The PSRB, however, has adopted a rule, OAR
859-050-0055, “assigning the burden of proof.” Id. Under
that rule, who has the burden of proof “depends on the type
of hearing.” Id. The parties do not dispute that the state,
not petitioner, bore the burden of proof before the PSRB. See
OAR 859-050-0055.
Turning back to this case, we have considered
the record and the PSRB’s order in light of our standard
of review, and we conclude that the PSRB’s order was not
supported by substantial evidence. The PSRB’s conclusion
relies on a speculative chain of events. That is to say, the
PSRB determined that if petitioner’s condition were to
become active again it may cause him to be a danger to oth-
ers because it would increase his risk of future violence.
The difficulty with that line of reasoning is that
there is no probative evidence in the record concerning
the likelihood that petitioner’s condition will become active
again.
First, the PSRB noted that the DSM indicates that
“90% of people” who have a mood episode “go onto have a
recurrent mood episode.” That is of no probative value with
regard to whether petitioner’s mental disorder may “become
active” because the DSM does not “specify the timeline at
which future episodes are likely to reoccur.” Put another
way, as we understand the PSRB’s position as reflected in
the order on judicial review, the section of the evaluator’s
report referencing the DSM provides evidence that, because
petitioner had a mood episode that resulted in violence nine
years prior to the evaluator’s report, petitioner has a 90 per-
cent chance of a recurrent mood episode. But that section
does not provide evidence as to the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will have another “mood episode” after having spent
nine years both symptom and medication free. See Haidar
v. PSRB, 324 Or App 129, 135, 524 P3d 986 (2023) (PSRB
order not supported by substantial evidence where “none of
the exhibits cited by PSRB address petitioner’s more recent
physical and mental condition, which significantly changed
in the years leading up to the PSRB hearing”).
626 Norgren v. PSRB
Second, with regard to “stressors,” as noted above,
the evaluator recognized that the “possibility of another mood
episode in the face of * * * stressors that may impact” petitioner
could not be “discounted,” although petitioner had not had
another mood episode when facing stressors such as “incar-
ceration and Covid-19.” But a mere “possibility” that cannot
be “discounted” is insufficient to establish “danger” based on
a mental disorder that is in remission. See Cochenour, 47 Or
App at 1106 (in analyzing a case under ORS 161.351(2), not-
ing “[t]he most that can be said from the evidence is that there
is a possibility that petitioner’s mental illness may become
active at some time in the future, and that if it does, it is pos-
sible that he may become dangerous,” but that “[w]e construe
the act to require that those conclusions be based upon a rea-
sonable medical probability not a mere possibility.”).
Third, with regard to the PSRB relying on the “ame-
liorating influence [of the PSRB’s supervision] * * * in [peti-
tioner’s] psychiatric stability,” and that petitioner has been
successful while under the PSRB’s jurisdiction, that is not
evidence that his mental disorder will become active if not
under the PSRB’s jurisdiction. That is, we do not see how
that aspect of the PSRB’s rationale could provide a reason
to deny petitioner discharge from the PSRB’s supervision;
under that rationale, the PSRB would be able to keep peti-
tioner under their supervision indefinitely, merely because
he has been successful while under their supervision. That
is not a proper way for PSRB to consider whether to dis-
charge someone who has been successful while in treatment.
Moreover, in our view, the record lacks substantial
evidence that if petitioner has another mood episode, he
will be a danger to others. In reaching the conclusion that
he would, the PSRB relied heavily on a single incident of
violence by petitioner that occurred in October 2013 when
petitioner was experiencing “mania and psychosis.” But the
PSRB does not explain how that evidence is probative of the
risk that, should petitioner have another “mood episode,” it
will similarly result in “mania and psychosis” as opposed to
manifesting in some other manner.
In contrast to the speculative evidence of risk due
to petitioner’s bipolar disorder, it is not speculative that
Cite as 344 Or App 617 (2025) 627
petitioner has gone over nine years without his mental dis-
order manifesting or engaging in violence, despite that he
has not taken any medication to control his mental disor-
der during that time (and, thus, there is no danger he stops
taking medication if discharged from the PSRB’s jurisdic-
tion due to his “lack of insight”). During those nine years,
according to the evaluator retained by the PSRB, petitioner
has “successfully navigated subsequent stressful life events
without the reemergence of psychiatric symptoms, such
as incarceration and Covid-19.” Additionally, he has taken
numerous actions to care for various aspects of his health,
he is employed, and he has healthy relationships with fam-
ily members, and he has a support network.
Petitioner is presently in “in full remission,” and his
“bipolar symptoms are not currently active.” And as noted, a
psychologist opined in an evaluation prepared in 2020 that
petitioner is “considered to be at low risk of future violent
acts in the community regardless of whether he is under
PSRB supervision.” And the evaluator retained by the PSRB
noted that petitioner “presents a low risk of violence in the
community.”
We conclude that the state did not meet its burden
before the PSRB, and the PSRB erred.3
Reversed and remanded.
3
Although we have considered the board’s order in this case as being pre-
mised on ORS 161.351(2), we would reach the same conclusion had the board’s
order been relying directly on ORS 161.351(1). That is, there is not substantial
evidence in the record that petitioner presents “a substantial danger to others” as
set forth in ORS 161.351(1).