Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Freeby v. Hoodoo Ski Bowl Developers, Inc.

    344 Or. App. 216 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 15, 2025

    The appeal presents a single question: Does a ski area operator qualify for recre- ational use immunity despite charging a fee to use its ski lifts? … We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Washington law, and that case is not analogous to this one: an inner tube clearly would not qualify as “real property” under our defi- nition of “land.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • McCormick v. State

    293 Or. App. 197 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 1, 2018

    Under such circumstances, recreational immunity does not apply. … But below and in its primary brief on appeal, the state did not contend that it had the authority to completely disallow recreational use; its argument, as we understand it, was simply that it qualified for recreational immunity

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Franson v. Radich

    84 Or. App. 715 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 15, 1987

    They also knew, or should have known, that plaintiffs sought the advice of their doctors and other qualified professionals and that plaintiffs acted in reliance thereon as to what was the appropriate care for their infant … The federal statute provides that, in order for a state to qualify for funding, it shall “have in effect a State child abuse and neglect law which shall include provisions for immunity for persons reporting instances of child

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Nancy Doty, Inc. v. Wildcat Haven, Inc.

    297 Or. App. 95 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 17, 2019

    qualifies the person for exemption under this section ." … qualifies the person for exemption under this section."

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • State v. Goacher

    303 Or. App. 783 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 29, 2020

    It does qualify, and could be charged as, second-degree sexual abuse, contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, or sexual misconduct. … That is so regardless of whether the group qualifies as a “true class,” an issue we need not, and do not, reach.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Conant v. Stroup

    183 Or. App. 270 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 14, 2002

    The phrasing of the statute clearly suggests that the legislature contemplated that the sort of permission that triggers statutory immunity is permission to the public to use private land for recreational purposes. … The purpose of the Oregon statute is clearly stated.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Baker v. State Board of Higher Education

    20 Or. App. 277 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 10, 1975

    “It is well established that actionable negligence arises only from the breach of a duty owed by one person to another, and that to state a canse of action for negligence the complaint must state the duty imposed or facts … Cooper, supra, 256 Or at 506 ); as such it was a decision which a judge or a jury—lacking the expertise to weigh relevant political as well as technical considerations—is not qualified to review.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Pendergrass v. State

    74 Or. App. 209 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 3, 1985

    ORS 482.260 is not self-executing; MVD can fulfill the statute’s requirements only if it establishes procedures to do so. … Although the question is closer, we also conclude that paragraph h does not allege conduct that comes within defendants’ discretionary acts immunity.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Clardy v. Gangitano

    Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 7, 2024

    His declaration clearly establishes his actions as alleged in plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint were not outside the scope of his employment. … Gangitano stated that plaintiff’s property qualified as “abandoned” under the rule and was disposed of for that reason on May 1, 2020.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sande v. City of Portland

    185 Or. App. 262 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 11, 2002

    Hawaii T & S Enterprises, Inc., 179 Or App 416, 419 , 39 P3d 931 (2002), there are “three criteria that a government function or duty must meet in order to qualify for discretionary immunity. … As noted, summary judgment in the city’s favor on discretionary immunity grounds was proper only if it established all of the elements of discretionary immunity.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Byrd v. Oregon State Police

    236 Or. App. 555 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 11, 2010

    It contends that Alden establishes that a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity against being sued in its own courts on an FLSA claim must meet the Eleventh Amendment standard for waiver, which is a stringent one. … In its view, the state’s enactment of the OTCA does not meet that standard, because it does not expressly and unequivocally establish that the state has waived its sovereign immunity against being sued in state court on FLSA

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Gast v. State, by and Through Stevenson

    36 Or. App. 441 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 2, 1978

    Suffice it to say Chapter 330 regulates "fringe benefit” programs established by employers of labor organizations that provide medical and disability benefits and thus clearly comes within the broad definition of "employee … "(b) No State may establish or enforce any law which prevents a health maintenance organization for which a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee was made under this subchapter or which is a qualified health maintenance

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Brewer v. Department of Fish & Wildlife

    167 Or. App. 173 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · May 10, 2000

    , and ORS 105.682, which provides recreational land immunity to the state, as well as to other qualified landowners. … However, as applied to state defendants, neither statute bestows any immunity that the state otherwise would not have because no affirmative act of the legislature is necessary to establish the state’s sovereign immunity.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • State v. Bounds

    71 Or. App. 744 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jan 23, 1985

    The victim’s statements clearly were offered as evidence of a material fact. … Although incompetency due to age is not expressly listed as a situation of unavailability, we think that it qualifies.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Jones-Clark v. Severe

    118 Or. App. 270 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 17, 1993

    The burden is on a defendant to establish immunity. Little v. Wimmer, 303 Or 580, 588 , 739 P2d 564 (1987). … for acts performed under a court order or directive, two criteria must be established.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Lyons v. Walsh & Sons Trucking Co., Ltd.

    183 Or. App. 76 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 31, 2002

    Plaintiffs reasoned as follows: (1) Under ORS 656.018(1), which establishes workers’ compensation exclusivity, Rector and the State of Oregon were immune from civil liability. (2) ORS 18.470 precludes “comparison of fault … ” with immune persons unless the injury is the “sole and exclusive fault” of the immune person.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Dykeman v. State

    39 Or. App. 629 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 23, 1979

    Ward is the duly appointed, qualified and acting inspector of buildings for the State of Oregon in the City of Coos Bay. "in "That by provision of the Building Code of the State of Oregon, said James E. … "V "That on presentation of said application and plans to the said inspector of buildings of said state, at its regular established office, Plaintiff delivered *632 $99.00 which was the amount of the fee required for the

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Ackerman v. OHSU MEDICAL GROUP

    233 Or. App. 511 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 10, 2010

    Regarding the legislature’s limitation of the individual employees’ liability, however, the court concluded that, because the employees would not have qualified for sovereign immunity at common law, the plaintiffs remedy … Plaintiff’s remedy against West West, as an employee of OHSU and Medical Group, clearly falls within the scope of the substitution and cap statutes.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Christensen v. Epley

    36 Or. App. 535 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Oct 16, 1978

    Therefore, we hold that plaintiff has alleged facts which establish the requisite legal duty. B. … not qualified for such an assignment.

    Reversed in part, on other grounds by Christensen v. Epley, 287 Or. 539 (1979)Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Martelli v. RA Chambers and Associates

    99 Or. App. 524 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 6, 1989

    Plaintiffs essential argument is that defendant is not his employer and, therefore, does not qualify for statutory immunity. … Defendant had the burden to establish that summary judgment was appropriate because there is no issue as to a material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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