Case law

Mataraza v. City of Euclid

193 Ohio App. 3d 479 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Jun 9, 2011

Again, the presence of these risk factors do not establish that James had atherosclerosis in 1991 when he was hired. … These expert opinions do not establish the existence of a preexisting disease, as the presence of risk factors alone is insufficient to establish, as matter of law, that James had preexisting cardiovascular disease.

Franck v. Franck, 10-07-22 (2-19-2008)

2008 Ohio 624 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 19, 2008

the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party; (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified … The magistrate clearly considered all of the statutory factors for awarding spousal support. The trial court also reviewed the factors and found that spousal support should not be exchanged.

In re A.P.D.

2014 Ohio 1632 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Apr 17, 2014

Father learned that A.P.D. had received a flu immunization without his knowledge or authorization. … Mother admitted, however, to securing a flu immunization and allergy testing for A.P.D. without authorization to do so.

State v. Cook

11 Ohio App. 3d 237 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 18, 1983

Clearly, as a foundation for establishing contradictory statements, the state would seek to introduce appellee’s March 3 testimony. … The availability and vitality of the privilege in the grand jury setting is well-established. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892), 142 U.S. 547 .

Board of Trustees v. Kriemer

72 Ohio App. 3d 608 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Feb 25, 1991

Although Crowder failed to renew his license in 1984 and Batchler failed to obtain a license after Crowder’s death, the evidence clearly indicates that they continued to use the property as a junkyard. … To qualify and to continue as a nonconforming use, the use must have been lawful at the time it was established and the zoning ordinance was enacted. Pschesang v.

Rock City Church v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

2023 Ohio 1339 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Apr 25, 2023

Rock City asserts it acquired the property in 2016 and that the property qualified for CAUV No. 22AP-372 2 status at the … Land must qualify to be valued according to its agricultural use, and if a CAUV parcel, or any portion thereof, is converted to another use or no longer satisfies the CAUV requirements,

Johnson v. American Family Insurance

160 Ohio App. 3d 392 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Apr 15, 2005

. {¶ 3} The trial court ultimately denied appellant’s summary-judgment motion but granted summary judgment to AFI, determining that although AFI had not definitively established that Salmanpoor was not a relative under the … Therefore, since Salmanpoor was not listed as a named insured on the declarations page, was not a “relative,” and did not otherwise qualify, she is not a an “insured” under the policy.

Cleveland v. Pate

2013 Ohio 5571 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Dec 19, 2013

In some instances, certain facts can only be established by circumstantial evidence. … Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, the Ohio Supreme Court established the proper analysis for determining whether offenses qualify as allied offenses subject to merger pursuant to R.C. 2941.25

Depugh v. Mead Corp.

79 Ohio App. 3d 503 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 1992

An “interest in land” within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds is any right, privilege, power or immunity, or combination thereof, which is an interest in land under the law of property and is not “goods” within the Uniform … However, the letter clearly does not state all of the agreement’s essential terms with reasonable certainty.

Lager v. Pittman

140 Ohio App. 3d 227 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 2000

Such a procedure would assist a public defender in distinguishing between the individuals who might qualify for subsequent representation and those who clearly will not. … However, it is clearly within relator’s discretion to decide if the performance of such an interview during the initial appearance should continue.

In re A.C.

2021 Ohio 2116 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Jun 24, 2021

Bates was an expert in psychiatry, and he was qualified to offer his opinion regarding appellant's mental health and whether she is subject to court-ordered hospitalization. {¶ 6} On January 15, 2020, the magistrate … Bates did not express a similar lack of confidence in his opinion that appellant qualifies as a mentally ill person subject to court-ordered hospitalization under the criteria set forth in R.C. 5122.01(B)(4).

Cattrill v. Wayne Mutual, Unpublished Decision (9-21-2005)

2005 Ohio 4937 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Sep 21, 2005

In granting summary judgment, the court stated the issue clearly: "Therefore, [it is undisputed that] the City and the tortfeasor police officer fall within the purview of O.R.C. § 3937.18 (B)(5), which defines an `uninsured … government compelled charity: Wayne Mutual has money so it should have to pay the Cottrills, who want money. {¶ 13} Of course, the Cottrills ignore the basic premise of contract law, which allows two independent parties to establish

Whitaker v. Advantage RN, L.L.C.

2012 Ohio 5959 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Dec 17, 2012

Whether they believe it was a pass/fail test, it obviously would qualify as such a test in the Court's opinion. … The magistrate denied the motion to vacate on the ground appellant did not and could not establish the existence of a genuine triable issue.

Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., Unpublished Decision (11-22-2006)

2006 Ohio 6168 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2006

Finally, the trial court found that the qualified and/or absolute immunity claim failed. … We also find the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the qualified nuisance claim.

Ehemann Real Estate, Ltd. v. Anderson Twp. Zoning Comm.

2020 Ohio 1091 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Mar 25, 2020

“To establish a taking, a landowner must demonstrate a substantial or unreasonable interference with a property right.” State ex rel. Hilltop Res. v. … Lamar contends that the trial court’s finding that the 2012 PUD was contrary to law established that the decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. This argument is without merit.

Nielsen v. Andersons, Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006)

2006 Ohio 5118 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Sep 29, 2006

In so doing, the trial court held that: (1) appellee was entitled to immunity from appellants' claims of negligence, malice, violating R.C. 4101.11 , and loss of consortium and (2) appellants had not established an intentional … Appellants herein claim that appellee has provided no evidence that it contributed directly or indirectly to the workers' compensation fund on Nielsen's behalf and thereby failed to establish its immunity. {¶ 13} "Where an

State v. Doane

69 Ohio App. 3d 638 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Oct 1, 1990

Thus, appellant has established a prima facie violation of the statute as to the four misdemeanor charges, since the ninety-day limit was exceeded by twenty days. … This argument is based upon appellant’s assertion that she was not qualified to act as her own counsel and, thus, was unable to competently protect her rights during the trial.

State v. Stewart

2023 Ohio 1494 · Ohio Court of Appeals · May 4, 2023

amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. … A.A. qualified as a “family or 2 The parties stipulated that, as alleged in the indictment, Rigsbee had previously been convicted of first- degree misdemeanor criminal mischief and fourth-degree felony attempted child

Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein

2020 Ohio 5080 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 2020

evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. … We agree that husband established by a preponderance of the evidence that the IRA was his separate property.

Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City Board of Education

181 Ohio App. 3d 764 · Ohio Court of Appeals · Apr 10, 2009

The Board shall offer a retirement incentive to all qualifying unit members. {¶ 7} “2. … At this latter time, Carter and Toney were “retirees” and did not qualify as “employees” or “unit members” under the CBA.