Case law

West Side Deutscher Frauen Verein v. Tracy

78 Ohio St. 3d 124 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 2, 1997

The issue for our consideration is whether appellant’s building addition which was not licensed by ODH until July 1992 qualifies for a tax exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B) for tax years 1991 and 1992. … Ohio Adm.Code 3701-17-03(E) clearly states that a license to operate a nursing home is valid only for the premises named in the application.

State v. Massien

125 Ohio St. 3d 204 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 5, 2010

agency, and establish an intervention plan for the offender. … individuals who occupy a special relationship of trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship and whose offense relates to that fiduciary relationship prevents the disqualification of persons who are not clearly

State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose

170 Ohio St. 3d 374 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 28, 2022

Standard of review {¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Maras must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondents have a clear legal … In order to fail the rational-basis test, a classification adopted by the General Assembly must be “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”

729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals

2026 Ohio 595 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 25, 2026

Ashcraft, 2022-Ohio-4611, ¶ 7. {¶ 18} Chapter 13 of the Hinckley Township Zoning Resolution established the BZA and created the BZA’s authority, duties, and procedures in accordance … status outside the process outlined in HTZR Section 8.10, the zoning inspector’s “ruling” is nevertheless not a “decision” as contemplated by R.C. 519.14 necessary to invoke the BZA’s appellate jurisdiction. {¶ 25} Clearly

State v. Burgun

56 Ohio St. 2d 354 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 7, 1978

The requirement of some degree of scienter to sustain an obscenity conviction such as those before this court was clearly mandated by Smith v. California (1959), 361 U. S. 147 . … C. 2907.35(C), providing a qualified exemption'for projectionists who have neither a financial interest in, their place of employment nor any managerial responsibilities over its operation, violates the Equal Protection Clause

Davis v. Immediate Med. Serv., Inc.

80 Ohio St. 3d 10 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 8, 1997

It means “a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence” * * *. … Such background testimony was necessary to establish the foundation for his expert opinion on Dr. Guarnieri’s care. Yet Dr.

Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-Ohio (Slip Opinion)

142 Ohio St. 3d 425 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 21, 2014

This list of factors is not exhaustive, however, and an employee may fail to establish one or more of these three factors and still be able to establish the requisite causal connection. … These two oblique references in one paragraph of the entire 34-paragraph appellate opinion clearly demonstrate that the court of appeals was relying on established law rather than plowing new ground.

Sexton v. City of Mason

117 Ohio St. 3d 275 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 6, 2008

In granting summary judgment to the city, the trial court held, inter alia, that the city was entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. … Ill {¶ 54} As noted above, the record establishes that the four-year statute of limitations governing the Sextons’ claims began to run in 1992.

McKnight v. Board of Directors

32 Ohio St. 3d 6 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 5, 1987

Using the traditional meaning of “sale,” the transfer at bar clearly qualifies as such, as discussed supra. … Clearly, these cases do not support the majority’s holding that appellant, First Federal, is a developer under these facts.

State v. Meadows

28 Ohio St. 3d 43 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1986

United States (1919), 249 U.S. 47 , establishing the “clear and present danger” doctrine which renders unprotected, advocacy which incites to violence or illegal conduct; Chaplinsky v. … It is well-established that the states retain broad power to regulate obscenity. Stanley, supra, at 568 .

Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act (Slip Opinion)

149 Ohio St. 3d 250 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 15, 2016

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 57} Clearly, Fifi Harper did not do that. … R.C. 3519.16(F) clearly anticipates a signature shortage.

Paul Cheatham I.R.A. v. Huntington Natl. Bank (Slip Opinion)

2019 Ohio 3342 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 22, 2019

This statement of the familiar ‘shelter’ principle is qualified by the exceptions that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires only that interest, subsection (b), and that a person who does not qualify as a protected purchaser … Ct. 1612 (1975) (“absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees”), but the intent to do so must be clearly indicated, 17 Mile, L.L.C. v. Kruzel, 8th Dist.

Link v. FirstEnergy Corp. (Slip Opinion)

147 Ohio St. 3d 285 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 26, 2016

Legal framework for utility use of public rights-of-way {¶ 23} Since 1847, public utility companies in Ohio have enjoyed a qualified right to place utility poles within the right-of-way of public roads. … Properly understood, the majority opinion holds that the township could have more clearly rescinded permission by an official declaration of public nuisance instead of a letter sent pursuant to the “general agreement” of

State ex rel. Howard v. Shuler

2025 Ohio 4964 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 4, 2025

. {¶ 17} In original actions filed in this court, the Civil Rules apply unless they are clearly inapplicable. S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.01(A)(2)(b). … When records are withheld on the basis of a statutory exemption, “the ‘burden of production’ is on the public office or records custodian to plead and prove facts clearly establishing the applicability of the exemption.”

State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Co.

18 Ohio St. (N.S.) 262 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1868

By tho act of March 1,1834, “to incorporate and establish the city of Cincinnati ” (32 Ohio L. … But this immunity from impeachment for fraudulent motives, or abuse of power, does not attach to all the acts of a city council which may assume the form of an ordinance. Davis v.

Wolf v. Powner

30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 472 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1876

By the verdict of the jury, this issue was found -for the defendants, and judgment was entered establishing the w.ill, *474 and adjudging the costs against the plaintiffs. … -The case is clearly not within the reason of the exclusion declared by section 313; nor do I think it comes within its terms, properly construed.

State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Cooper

97 Ohio St. (N.S.) 86 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 18, 1917

The power of taxation in every form, the power of eminent domain, the power to establish court's of record or conciliation and to define their jurisdiction,' these -may be so employed by chartered cities as to affect only … For instead of granting the general power to levy and collect taxes on all the property therein they qualified that power by the word “lawfully” in the provisions of the charter above named.

State ex rel. Gross v. Industrial Commission

115 Ohio St. 3d 249 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 27, 2007

The appellate court applied a two-part analysis to determine whether an injury qualified for TTD compensation. … Although KFC appears justified in firing Gross for violating workplace rules, the termination letter established that his discharge was related to his industrial injury.

State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Industrial Commission

69 Ohio St. 3d 202 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 4, 1994

Certain qualifying employers, however, may “be granted the privilege to pay individually compensation, and furnish medical, surgical, nursing and hospital services and attention and funeral expenses directly to injured employees … Clearly, once a worker has been declared permanently and totally disabled he or she is incapable of returning to work.

Telegraph Co. v. Griswold

37 Ohio St. (N.S.) 301 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1881

But that telegraph companies exercise a quasi public employment with duties and obligations analogous to those of a common carrier, is a proposition clearly settled. … The cases which' hold that a common carrier may stipulate for immunity from liability for mere negligence, all agree that they are liable for “gi’oss negligence.” But just what this term means is not easily ascertained.