Case law

State v. Raglin

83 Ohio St. 3d 253 · Ohio Supreme Court · Sep 30, 1998

However, appellant never claimed that the shot had been accidentally or unintentionally fired, and the evidence clearly establishes that the shooting was not accidental or unintentional. … Testimony established that during appellant’s childhood appellant and his siblings moved with their mother from place to place.

McIntyre v. Hooks (Slip Opinion)

162 Ohio St. 3d 213 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 2, 2020

No. 86 (“H.B. 86”) had been enacted, and it established different maximum penalties for these offenses. … Here, because no de jure punishment had been “already imposed,” McIntyre qualified to be sentenced under H.B. 86.

Northwestern Ohio Building & Construction Trades Council v. Conrad

92 Ohio St. 3d 282 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jul 18, 2001

Moreover, when the General Assembly established the HPP as part of Am.Sub.H.B. … “The recipients of the DWRF subsidy, namely those permanently and totally disabled employees who have previously been awarded workers’ compensation, are clearly members of this designated group.”

State v. Brinkley

105 Ohio St. 3d 231 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 13, 2005

{If 112} Failure to qualify witness as expert. In proposition of law IX, Brinkley argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Dr. … Counsel also were not ineffective by declining to object to the prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that Brinkley fled to Chicago, a fact the evidence clearly established. {¶ 131} Further, counsel made an acceptable

State ex rel. Gemienhardt v. Delaware County Board of Elections

109 Ohio St. 3d 212 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 5, 2006

. {¶ 22} Respondents, the Delaware County Board of Elections and its members, determined that the petition contained more than the legally required number of valid signatures of qualified Berlin Township electors to place … Given the proximity of the May 2 election, Gemienhardt has established that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty.

Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School District

100 Ohio St. 3d 141 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 22, 2003

Proof of Facts 2d 187. {¶ 20} Coolidge is clearly not an employee at will, since R.C. 3319.16 affords her protection against termination without “good and just cause.” … R.C. 3319.16 does not immunize the board from the dictates of state policy, and it certainly does not provide teachers with less protection against wrongful discharges than the common law generally affords to at-will employees

Mominee v. Scherbarth

28 Ohio St. 3d 270 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 22, 1986

In effect, this clearly permits the extinguishment of a cause of action before it even accrues. … In actual effect, this abolition grants the negligent doctor an area of absolute immunity from suit at the expense of the patient’s constitutionally guaranteed right to access to the courts.

Doe v. Ronan

127 Ohio St. 3d 188 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 26, 2010

His life and experiences made him uniquely qualified for his service to the school district. … The contract does not clearly and unambiguously say that Doe would be subject to a background check and that he could be fired based on the result.

Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell (Slip Opinion)

144 Ohio St. 3d 490 · Ohio Supreme Court · Nov 5, 2015

These transactions, often spanning generations, make it difficult to trace the ownership of mineral interests and thus, establish current ownership status. … Petitioners further contend that the lease itself should stop the 20-year clock for the entire term of the lease because it would be “clearly improper” to say that the mineral interests were “abandoned” while subject to an

Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

127 Ohio St. 109 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jun 21, 1933

With the exception of the qualifying shares, all of the common stock of the Ohio Fuel Gas Company is owned by the Columbia Gas & Electric Corporation. … And upon that question the complainant has the burden of proof and the Court may not interfere with the exercise of the State’s authority unless confiscation is. clearly established. ’ ’ The specific question confronting

Yoho v. McGovern

42 Ohio St. (N.S.) 11 · Ohio Supreme Court · Jan 15, 1884

But as it has been shown to be capable of much hardship, the courts have not hesitated, in proper cases, so to qualify it as to avert the harsh or oppressive consequences of its literal and rigid enforcement, where this would … In the present instance, a sufficient excuse appears for the several character of the action heretofore bi-ought against Slyfield, so as clearly not to manifest an election to proceed against him to the discharge of the present

Ladd v. New York Central Rd.

170 Ohio St. (N.S.) 491 · Ohio Supreme Court · Apr 6, 1960

It is also established in the Koppal case, that, where a state requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the plaintiff must establish that fact before he may perfect his suit in the state court. … While those cases are not directly in point here, they clearly sustain the principle, which this court has followed, that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required even though the ultimate administrative decision

Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Findlay (Slip Opinion)

149 Ohio St. 3d 718 · Ohio Supreme Court · May 17, 2017

Mancini found the evidence did not clearly demonstrate Hill had violated the department’s sexual harassment policy and therefore set aside the discharge penalty; however, he concluded that the city had “just cause to impose … Pursuant to Article 46.01 of the CBA, to qualify as an appendix or amendment to the CBA, the matrix had to be signed by both the city and the OPBA.

In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co.

134 Ohio St. 3d 392 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 6, 2012

. {¶ 4} The statute does not provide a detailed mechanism for establishing rates under an ESP. … CSP makes no express argument that R.C. 4928.143(F) qualifies as “an eminent-domain statute.” {¶ 17} Norwood does not require heightened scrutiny here.

Minton v. Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.

80 Ohio St. 3d 62 · Ohio Supreme Court · Oct 15, 1997

. ■ The Act directed the Secretary of Transportation to “establish * * * appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards.” … We also need not address respondents’ claim that the savings clause, § 1397(k), does not permit a manufacturer to use a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state common-law liability.”

Manhattan Insurance v. Ellis

32 Ohio St. (N.S.) 388 · Ohio Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1877

Clearly these are personal duties imposed on the aigent. … Assuming the proper construction of this act to be that each additional agent of the company in any county where one has already been properly appointed and qualified to act, must also file a certificate of his appointment

State v. Perry

101 Ohio St. 3d 118 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 11, 2004

Such charge, or other charge or instruction provided for in this section, when so written and given, shall not be orally qualified, modified, or explained to the jury by the court. … (Emphasis added.) {¶ 8} We conclude that R.C. 2945.10(G) clearly and unambiguously requires the trial court to maintain the written jury instructions with the “papers of the case” and that failure to do so constitutes a “

Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co.

135 Ohio St. 191 · Ohio Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1939

The words "for such death, injuries or occupational disease," clearly refer back to the prior language of the provision, and mean death, injury or occupational disease for which compensation has been provided by statute. … Constrained construction of the statutory exemption of liability would result not only in precluding employees from maintaining damage actions for disease suffered on account of negligence of employers, but immunity of employers

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Austin (Slip Opinion)

2019 Ohio 3325 · Ohio Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2019

The evidence did not establish the existence of a mental disorder that would qualify as a mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. … The board expressly opposes disbarment, concluding that Austin “likely has the ability to establish that she is a proper person to be readmitted to the bar of Ohio in the future.”

McVeigh v. Fetterman

95 Ohio St. (N.S.) 292 · Ohio Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1917

Under the mandatory provisions of this section a will duly probated is thereby fully established; and, under the clear and unequivocal terms of the statute above quoted, it shall be forever binding unless set aside as a result … death by wrongful act, neglect, or default (S. & C. 1139, 1140), which gave a right of action, provided such action should be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person, the proviso is a condition qualifying