Case law

Schwartz v. Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary of New York

657 F. Supp. 29 · District Court, S.D. New York · Oct 14, 1986

To establish a denial of a federal right to due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a life, liberty, or property interest is implicated. See Board of Regents v. … Section 124 of the Family Court Act sets forth the clearly discretionary standards: “[T]he Mayor ... shall select persons who are especially qualified for the court’s work by reason of their character, personality, tact,

Grubbs v. Ngbodi, R.N., F.N.P.

District Court, S.D. New York · Sep 2, 2022

Qualified Immunity Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff states a claim, they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Br. at 7–8.) … As such, “qualified immunity shields both state and federal officials from suit unless [1] the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that [2] was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct

Sunoco Overseas, Inc. v. Texaco International Trader, Inc.

69 F. Supp. 2d 502 · District Court, S.D. New York · Oct 5, 1999

Morelite, 748 F.2d at 88 (“For to disqualify any arbitrator who had professional dealings with one of the parties... .would make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator at all”). … This is so because each portion of a contract is qualified by other portions which are relevant thereto, and has no separate existence apart from them. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 386 (1991).

Lanier v. Bats Exchange, Inc.

105 F. Supp. 3d 353 · District Court, S.D. New York · Apr 28, 2015

Under the regulatory framework established by Congress, Lanier’s claims must be adjudicated in the first instance by the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and not this Court. I. … Courts in this *367 Circuit “apply a functional test to determine whether an SRO is entitled to immunity,” under which SROs are absolutely immune from suit where the alleged misconduct concerns, inter alia, "the enforcement

Rabin v. Fivzar Associates

801 F. Supp. 1045 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jul 10, 1992

To qualify for purely prospective application under the Chevron/ Welch I test, Ceres “ ‘must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, ... or by deciding … Nevertheless, the defendants contend that the one-year/three-year limitation established in Ceres was “clearly foreshadowed” in July of 1990 when Rabin filed the Complaint by the ruling in Data Access and speculation by two

Traynor v. Walters

606 F. Supp. 391 · District Court, S.D. New York · Apr 4, 1985

Clearly, the former is classified as a disability caused by a veteran’s own willful misconduct; the latter is not. … New York University is whether the plaintiff is “otherwise qualified” for the benefits program from which he has been excluded.

Jenkins v. New York City Department of Homeless Services

643 F. Supp. 2d 507 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jul 7, 2009

The Defendant is “clearly correct” and “the overwhelming body of authority holds that [a city agency] is not a suable entity”. Renelique v. Doe, No. 99 Civ. 10425, 2003 WL 23023771 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. … Given Jenkins’ classification by medical professionals as a schizophrenic, he was not qualified for the less restrictive housing assignment he sought.

Lawrence v. Schaefer

368 F. Supp. 840 · District Court, S.D. New York · Dec 31, 1973

In every § 1983 case of which we are aware, there was present either conduct which clearly violated constitutional rights, as in Monroe v. … Consequently, here there is no judicial determination, nor are there factual allegations, establishing that his constitutional rights were violated.

C.A.U.T.I.O.N., Ltd. v. City of New York

898 F. Supp. 1065 · District Court, S.D. New York · Sep 15, 1995

Defendants next argue that the complaint must satisfy a more stringent standard in order to state a claim against the former officials sued in their individual capacities, who might assert a qualified immunity defense. … However, the issue has been left open by the Supreme Court, see Leatherman, 507 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1162 , and the theory that the complaint must plead facts sufficient to disprove qualified immunity has been rejected

In Re Doyle

42 F.2d 686 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jun 9, 1930

The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this ease falls within it. The decree of the Court below is therefore affirmed.” In Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. … I do not think that these cases go far enough to establish the government’s contention.

Blommer Chocolate Co. v. Nosira Sharon Ltd.

776 F. Supp. 760 · District Court, S.D. New York · Oct 4, 1991

But contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, neither the exhibits nor Minogue’s testimony establish that La-morte Burns qualifies as a “managing or general agent,” or that it was “authorized by appointment or by law [on behalf … The facts already establish that Nosira qualifies as a COGSA “carrier,” and thus bears responsibility for stowage and handling of the cargo for the duration of Nosira’s custody, i.e., from the time when the stow was loaded

ACLI International Commodity Services, Inc. v. Suisse

110 F.R.D. 278 · District Court, S.D. New York · Apr 15, 1986

If Nahas testifies, under a grant to [sic] immunity, his testimony may be used against him civilly by the CFTC and eventually by the plaintiffs. … A witness may be compelled to testify if it clearly appears that his claim of privilege is advanced as a subterfuge. See Camelot Group, Ltd. v. W.A. Krueger Co., 486 F.Supp. 1221, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.1980).

United States Steel International, Inc. v. Granheim

540 F. Supp. 1326 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jun 16, 1982

Clearly, these results are outside of the seven-unit reproducibility range, even if it did apply to these disparate samples. … This argument, of course, assumes that USS established a prima facie case.

Bell v. New York

506 F. Supp. 590 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jan 28, 1981

interpreting the terms “substantial federal question”/“substantial constitutional claim”, states that the question or claim presented is not substantial for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction if ‘its unsoundness so clearly … Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds: (1) that the State of New York is immune from suit; (2) that plaintiff has no standing; and (3) that the Younger doctrine of abstention (Younger v.

Ghose v. Century 21, Inc.

108 F. Supp. 2d 373 · District Court, S.D. New York · Aug 18, 2000

This Court finds that Ghose has failed to established this requisite. In opposition to the motion, Ghose asserts that he has “clearly established” a prima facie case, yet offers little evidence to support such a claim. … To establish a prima facie case for a disparate treatment claim under Title VII requires that plaintiff was both qualified for the job and satisfied his employer’s normal requirements in his work. See Carter v.

United States v. Hoffa

156 F. Supp. 495 · District Court, S.D. New York · Nov 6, 1957

Hoffa’s attorney relies “on some general observation without the qualifying illumination of the literary and factual context of what he quoted from the opinion in that case.” … The record shows clearly that he was not tricked nor imposed upon nor misled.

Royal Bank & Trust Co. v. Pereira (In Re Lady Madonna Industries, Inc.)

99 B.R. 536 · District Court, S.D. New York · May 2, 1989

A hypothetical prospective creditor would clearly envision such. … In the aforementioned cases, however, no single document qualified as a security agreement.

In re Re-Bo Mfg. Co.

90 F. Supp. 388 · District Court, S.D. New York · May 20, 1950

The owner of an article being valued should certainly be allowed to estimate its worth; he is as competent to testify and perhaps more qualified to give value than one not as familiar with the article; the weight of his testimony … The District Judge in reviewing the acts of the Referee should not substitute his own judgment for that of the Referee who heard the evidence unless his conclusions are clearly erroneous, or his findings are based on incompetent

Talk to Me Products, Inc. v. Larami Corp.

804 F. Supp. 555 · District Court, S.D. New York · Oct 21, 1992

As the Supreme Court stated, "it is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part … I have reviewed the legislative history of the Trademark Law Revision Act and find no such “clearly expressed intention.”

Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P.

104 F. Supp. 2d 279 · District Court, S.D. New York · Jul 10, 2000

After several decades of divergent lower court opinions, the Supreme Court in 1945 attempted to define the doctrine more clearly in International Shoe v. … venue as to any other defendant who knowingly participated in the scheme-even if such defendant did not perform any independent venue-establishing act or transaction in the district.”). 46 .