Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
5,442 results
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R & R Marketing, L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp.
307 N.J. Super. 474 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 27, 1998
Prom Wassner’s notes, it is apparent that Sapienza opined that if there were a “change in control” of a wholesaler, the statutory protection would continue, but if a new entity was established, the new entity would “probably … The surviving corporation thus succeeds to "all the rights, privileges, powers, immunities, purposes and franchises, both public and private” of the merging corporations. N.J.S.A. 14A:10-6(c).
Reversed by R & R Marketing, L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170 (1999)Cited 3 timesPublishedNoah Mosley v. State of New Jersey
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 2, 2025
In the letter, counsel asked the judge to issue "an updated [j]udgment of [c]onviction that more clearly reflects the outcome of this complicated situation." … X on statute-of-limitations grounds, which we already have addressed, and because "[p]laintiff ha[d] not offered evidence that would indicate that the [d]efendants in any way colluded or agreed in a manner that would establish
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedGlowacki v. Underwood Memorial Hosp.
270 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 10, 1994
Defendant's argument that the court erred in denying its motion to limit its liability to $10,000 pursuant to the charitable immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, is also clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). … back sprain" is not worth $908,000 not only misstates the issue, it also is an inappropriate test of excessiveness because it ignores the principle that consequential damages in personal injury cases are not gauged by any established
Cited 17 timesPublishedIn re the Civil Commitment of U.C.
423 N.J. Super. 601 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 20, 2012
Consequently, most residential placements are made from waiting lists established under the rules set forth in *610 N.J. … The DDD determined in its May 5, 2010 letter to U.C. that he was “homeless” because I.C. could no longer care for him at home and that he thus qualified for an emergency placement.
Cited 3 timesPublishedOcean Medical Imaging Associates v. New Jersey Department of Health & Senior Services
396 N.J. Super. 477 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 13, 2007
The assessment established in this subsection shall not apply to an ambulatory care facility that is licensed to a hospital in this State as an off-site ambulatory care service facility. … “Gross receipts” is neither qualified nor limited.
Cited 0 timesPublished380 N.J. Super. 159 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 8, 2005
The law clearly gave Community an opportunity, even in the very last days before entry of judgment, to move to intervene in order to exercise its claimed right of redemption. … by the Foreclosure Unit, based upon the information it had at the time, were clearly made in good faith.
Cited 30 timesPublished352 N.J. Super. 369 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 27, 2002
“The present rule in New Jersey is that to qualify as fresh complaint [evidence], the victim’s statements to someone she would ordinarily turn to for support must have been made within a reasonable time after the alleged … The other arguments defendant advances in this appeal are clearly without merit and do not warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed.
Cited 33 timesPublishedQuail v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc.
455 N.J. Super. 118 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 4, 2018
Delamotte , 231 N.J. 373 , 392-93, 175 A.3d 953 (2018) (hearsay opinion by non-testifying doctor concerning plaintiff's spinal problems) . *132 As the motion judge recognized, the Certificate of Death on its face qualifies … The "whys and wherefores" supporting the death certificate's opinions about decedent's cause of death are clearly absent from the document.
Cited 19 timesPublishedCologna v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement Sytem
430 N.J. Super. 362 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 1, 2013
The two-year reactivation deadline set forth in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-3(3) is qualified by the statutory provision at the crux of the present appeal, N.J.S.A 43:16A-3(5). … The conditional veto message clearly reflects that the Governor was concerned about increased costs that the State would likely incur were the bill to become law without revision.
Cited 6 timesPublishedRepair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro
352 N.J. Super. 1 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 3, 2002
Regulating the hours of operation of retail establishments of any nature other than pharmacies or restaurants, Quick Chek Food Stores v. … Subsection (b) permits moratoria only "where the municipality demonstrates on the basis of a written opinion by a qualified health professional that a clear imminent danger to the health of inhabitants of the municipality
Cited 5 timesPublishedD'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.
206 N.J. Super. 11 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 21, 1985
While the term "consumer" is not defined within the act the definition of "person" includes a corporation, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(d), therefore we need not labor as to whether the corporate plaintiff may qualify as a consumer. [ … The Court referred to "unconscionability" as an "amorphus concept obviously designed to establish a broad business ethic." Id. at 543 .
Cited 66 timesPublished168 N.J. Super. 333 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 4, 1979
The party invoking the rule has two years after the date of discovery to bring the action unless the defendant can establish that (1) the lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the actionable event and the … The testimony clearly supports the trial judge's finding that by December 1972 he was well aware of all the implications of his condition and of defendant's possible medical dereliction in not obtaining a biopsy following
Cited 17 timesPublishedThomas Demarco v. Sean Robert Stoddard, D.P.M.
434 N.J. Super. 352 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 22, 2014
The JUA is required to provide coverage to qualified Rhode Island doctors. … Their interests in application of New Jersey laws clearly predominate over those of the JUA in application of Rhode Island laws. (4) The interests of judicial administration.
Reversed on other grounds by Thomas Demarco v. Sean Robert Stoddard, D.P.m(073949), 223 N.J. 363 (2015)Cited 3 timesPublishedPiscitelli v. CLASSIC RESIDENCE
408 N.J. Super. 83 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 26, 2009
A review of the legislative history unquestionably establishes that IRCA was enacted to control the flow of illegal immigration by establishing a system which would reduce the ready availability of employment *959 for illegal … IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y. 3d 338 , 812 N.Y.S. 2d 416 , 845 N.E. 2d 1246, 1255-56 (2006) (holding New York Scaffold law permits compensation to all workers in qualifying employment situations-regardless of immigration status)
Cited 20 timesPublishedFmba v. N. Hudson Reg. Fire & Rescue
340 N.J. Super. 577 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 15, 2001
Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, supra ( 133 N.J. at 493 , 628 A. 2d 288 )), "[a] statute must `clearly and irremediably violate[ ]' the ban on special legislation to be invalidated." … It stated only that "[i]f the organizational precepts of the particular association call for two or more delegates, every person who is an authorized delegate qualifies for the privileges granted by the statute."
Cited 6 timesPublishedJames v. Arms Technology, Inc.
359 N.J. Super. 291 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 11, 2003
The pleadings clearly implicate the concept of "unreasonableness." … Further, there is no basis for manufacturers, or any particular type of manufacturers, to claim immunity.
Cited 34 timesPublished74 N.J. Super. 275 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 25, 1962
A single event will suffice if its effects within the state are substantial enough to qualify under Rule Three. (2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from, the activities of the defendant within … A comparison of the facts in Dowd with those in the instant case clearly shows how different they are. There is no need for me to review them again.
Cited 6 timesPublishedAviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co.
335 N.J. Super. 591 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 21, 2000
The pilot here had fewer than 5,000 hours of flight time, but qualified in all other respects under the policy. … Clearly, that is not the case here. The insured does not seek to expand coverage beyond that provided by the policy.
Cited 9 timesPublishedAMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren
207 N.J. Super. 388 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 16, 1984
“Covered employment” *408 refers to all those private sector jobs qualifying for unemployment compensation. … That amendment purports to establish two high density zones (R-20th and R-20tha) consisting of three parcels.
Cited 9 timesPublishedMatter of Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co.
258 N.J. Super. 356 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jul 8, 1992
The purposes of the Uniform Act and of our own statute clearly require that broad and expansive powers be granted the Commissioner and the trial court. Indeed, the plain language of the Act so provides. … We have considered the remainder of appellants' arguments and find them to be clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.
Cited 7 timesPublished
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