Case law

Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. RIEDER & SONS BUILDING AND DEV. CO.

151 N.J. Super. 502 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 29, 1977

An addendum to the mortgage note limited plaintiff's recourse, in the event of a default in its payment, to the mortgaged land itself, immunizing the principals of the defendant mortgagor from any liability thereon. … However, we reject the view that imposes upon the beneficiary the burden of establishing justification for enforcement of the clause. * * * Instead, we would burden the trustor with the responsibility * * * A lender has the

Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR TOWNSHIP OF CHATHAM

202 N.J. Super. 312 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 26, 1985

No residential uses are permitted in the business district zone except those in connection with qualified conditional uses permitted under the ordinance. … In the present matter the Zoning Board found that special reasons had not been established.

Prunetti v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders

350 N.J. Super. 72 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 13, 2001

The doctrine of preemption is well established in New Jersey law. … Bay, 77 N.J. 439, 450 , 390 A. 2d 1177 (1978).) ] In the case at bar, N.J.S.A. 22A:4-17.2 clearly preempts Section 2.03.050.

Kronisch v. Howard Savings Institution

154 N.J. Super. 576 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Oct 21, 1977

The cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their theory that the banking relation itself established a trust also disclose a pattern in which the money posted by the depositors was clearly and intentionally segregated from … established.

Housel v. Theodoridis

314 N.J. Super. 597 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 4, 1998

The consequence of defendants' failure to dispute any of the assertions in plaintiffs' statement of material facts is clearly prescribed by the rule. They "will be deemed admitted." R. 4:46-2(b). … The trial court's error in this regard may be established substantively, as well as procedurally.

K.A.F. v. D.L.M.

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 6, 2014

stated that establishing psychological parenthood is "not an easy task[.]" V.C., supra, 163 N.J. at 230. … While the cause of action brought by D.M. is not "immune to the summary judgment procedure," A.F. v. D.L.P., 339 N.J. Super. 312, 320 (App. Div. 2001), it is nonetheless clear that D.M.

State v. Berezansky

386 N.J. Super. 84 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 7, 2006

The State clearly failed here to meet the standards established in Simbara for admission of a drug test certificate. … IV Defendant argues that it was error to admit the lab certificate into evidence when the State failed to establish the chain of custody.

O'Brien Cogeneration, Inc. v. Ascoa

361 N.J. Super. 264 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jun 24, 2003

Rather, the agreement stated that all qualifying events had to have been "unforeseeable" and "beyond the reasonable control of and without the fault or negligence of [plaintiff]." … In fact, the contract language leads us to conclude that it was not possible to determine whether a particular fire was a force majeure until the cause of the catastrophe was established.

American Fire & Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Division of Taxation

375 N.J. Super. 434 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 9, 2005

Further, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, is inapplicable, because corporations are not held to be “persons” to which that clause applies. See Hemphill v. … In this context, our long-established jurisprudence requires us to defer to a legislature’s judgment if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.

State v. Spann

236 N.J. Super. 13 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Aug 9, 1989

The other issues raised by defendant under Points II and III, supra, are clearly without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). … NOTES [1] Clearly, defendant also had A28 in common with the child. Dr.

Commerce Bancorp v. Interarch, Inc.

417 N.J. Super. 329 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 16, 2010

Clause (a) establishes the qualifications for a corporate agent to obtain indemnity in any proceeding in which he or she is involved by reason of his or her agency. … Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601, 606 , 174 A. 2d 481 (1961) ("When the Legislature has clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by that definition."); Nebinger v. Md. Cas.

Lawes v. Lynch

7 N.J. Super. 584 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 28, 1950

Jones, dated September 17, 1898, was admitted to probate and his widow Mabel was appointed and qualified as executrix thereof. … Nor has waiver been established against the widow.

In the Matter of the Competitive Solar Incentive

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 2024

The qualifiers, "until," "after," and "unless" relate to preconditions for the waiver process itself, which does not apply to the county limit. … N.J.S.A. 48:3-119(f) employs the "unpreserved" qualifier for the county limit only, whereas the Statewide limit does not.

Reiser v. Pension Commission of the Employees Retirement System

147 N.J. Super. 168 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 7, 1976

When statutes relating to the same subject matter are repugnant or inconsistent, and the latter statute is clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case, it will be construed as repealing the earlier … Plaintiff contends that this hodge-podge, crazy-quilt of varied distinctions in the class of widows who can qualify for pension benefits is completely without rhyme or reason; that the classifications are established by the

Morgan v. Air Brook Limousine, Inc.

211 N.J. Super. 84 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 17, 1986

Indeed the Appellate Division, recognizing the scope of the Act and its well-defined terms, recently concluded that a business entity is a "person" under § 1 of the Act and "may qualify as a consumer" for purposes of the … Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 (1978), which eliminated interspousal immunity as a defense.

DCPP VS. E.E., T.B., SR., AND J.E., IN THE MATTER OF T.B., JR., L.B., P.B., AND P.O.P.L. (FN-03-0017-17, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 13, 2019

It did not seek to qualify Maringanti as an expert, but instead offered her lay testimony as the children's treating dentist. … Thus, the trial court was permitted to rely upon the testimony of Maringanti, the children's treating dentist, without qualifying her as an expert.

Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout

29 N.J. Super. 361 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 6, 1954

It "may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in the prior art or one which is merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make. … An express agreement on the part of an employee to observe secrecy is not necessary to the establishment of a confidential relationship.

Reese Cadillac Corp. v. Glens Falls Insur. Co.

59 N.J. Super. 118 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 12, 1960

The court went on to say: "So the qualifying word `conclusive,' as used in the statute, supra, is not to be regarded in a sense that imports to it a quality that will not tolerate challenge or contradiction; but rather in … To be sure, the fact that the shortages were caused by the dishonesty of plaintiff's employee or employees may be established by circumstantial evidence, but the evidence to establish that fact must be of such a nature that

College of Medicine, NJ v. Morrison

141 N.J. Super. 104 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · May 3, 1976

Morrison qualified as a veteran within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 38:16-1 by reason of her tour of duty with the United States Public Health Service during the Korean War. Cf. Miele v. McGuire, 53 N.J. … The College was established under the Medical and Dental Education Act of 1970, which became effective on July 1, 1970. N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-2.

Newell v. Hudson

376 N.J. Super. 29 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 16, 2005

Here, [Hudson] clearly, and it couldn't be more clear, set forth her understanding of the agreement and clearly satisfied Judge Locascio on her understanding of the agreement. … These cases, however, do not bestow special protection or immunity from the doctrine of judicial estoppel on a litigant such as Hudson who claims to have perjured herself to obtain judicial approval of her marital settlement