Case law

DAVENPORT v. NEW JERSEY BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 23, 2022

(dismissing NJLAD claim against supervisor at New Jersey Department of Corrections (“DOC”) after determining that DOC qualified as an “arm of the state” for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity). … Here, where the NJBPU is immune from suit, “it would be impossible to establish that the alleged aiders and abetters, .. . are liable because a predicate finding that the [NJBPU] is liable cannot be made.” See id.

Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital

645 F. Supp. 1217 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 2, 1986

Nanavati, in making the statements, abused his qualified privilege. e. Entire Controversy Doctrine Dr. … As such, the full publication clearly suggests that the statements are opinion.

JOHNSON v. MCGILL

District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 16, 2024

the requisite personal involvement to establish liability.”). … “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v.

T. I. McCormack Trucking Co. v. United States

298 F. Supp. 39 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 26, 1969

Regarding this it stated: “As previously indicated, a qualifying phrase is to be applied to the word or phrase immediately preceding rather than to more remote words or phrases, unless such extension is clearly required by … Y. * * * ” phrase were technical words of art but does say and has established that “Collectively the words have a definite and distinctive meaning in the context here considered.”

Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding, Inc.

641 F. Supp. 1359 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 18, 1986

System is not and has never been licensed, registered or qualified to conduct or transact business in New Jersey. Id., 114. … Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that “immunity from antitrust laws ‘is not lightly implied.’ ” United States v.

Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.

419 F. Supp. 770 · District Court, D. New Jersey · May 28, 1976

Dictum by the Ninth Circuit expresses agreement with Judge Hunter’s majority opinion, but disposes of the case on the ground that there was no state agency in California which qualified under § 633(b). Curry v. … A procedural requirement of the Act, of doubtful meaning in a given case, should not be interpreted to deny an employee a claim for relief unless to do so would clearly further some substantial goal of the Act.

GABROS, M.D. v. SHORE MEDICAL CENTER

District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 14, 2020

This lack of transparency and absolute immunity is as likely to cause false reports as it is to foster candor. … Nor does the relevant statute create such an absolute private world immune from outside scrutiny.

Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp.

825 F. Supp. 1216 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jun 15, 1993

Cases such as Pennwalt and its progeny, which establish a per se rule that venue is appropriate in the judicial district in which an alleged infringer receives a cease-and-desist letter, establish venue without regard to … and would improperly establish venue in this judicial district.

Murphy v. Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency

32 F. Supp. 2d 753 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 27, 1999

In considering these prima facie elements, “an ‘inference of discrimination’ arises when an employer fails to [hire, promote, or otherwise provide equitable compensation to] a qualified member of a protected class.” … For example, in paragraph 20 of Murphy’s amended certification, Murphy states that “Glowacki is clearly biased against [him] in light of [Glowacki’s] claim ...

WAGNER

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 28, 2026

This Court rejected Defendants Simpkins and Henry’s arguments that they were entitled to qualified immunity, as well as their claims that they were entitled to good faith immunity and the application of the sudden emergency … Second, as discussed below, because Plaintiff’s remaining claims do not establish a basis for liability, it follows that the WDA claim also fails.

Tormo v. Yormark

398 F. Supp. 1159 · District Court, D. New Jersey · May 12, 1975

At that time, moreover, Devlin allegedly stated that Yormark was a “good well-qualified lawyer.” Wendel Deposition at 55-56. … The bank knew that Yormark was an attorney and that he had established separate “personal” and “trustee” accounts under its auspices.

Gurtman v. United States

237 F. Supp. 533 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 19, 1965

The other officers thereof are respectively his wife, and the secretary employed in his law office, holding qualifying shares only. Taxpayer has and has had the sole power to sign corporate checks. … The evidence clearly indicates that the $1,000 payment was made early in the corporation’s 1958 tax year (fiscal *538 1958) but still in calendar year 1957, the plaintiffs’ 1957 tax year.

CAPPS v. DIXON

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 13, 2022

Plaintiffs Have Stated Plausible Claims Against Chief Farabella Chief Farabella argues that this Court was required to find that he is entitled to qualified immunity when considering his prior Motion to Dismiss Capps … The Court is also not persuaded by Orndorf’s other arguments—that placing his knee on Capps’s back is not objectively unreasonable nor is it a clearly established violation of law for him to do so when effectuating an arrest

Microsoft Corp. v. CMOS Technologies, Inc.

872 F. Supp. 1329 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Oct 24, 1994

In this case, the record clearly supports a finding that defendants infringement was deliberate and with the intent to deceive the public. … Systems, and not a corporate entity, the *1340 evidence clearly supports a finding that she acted intentionally in the sale of counterfeit Microsoft products.

United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters

731 F. Supp. 1206 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Jan 18, 1990

But as we see time and time again, a democratic election does not establish a democracy. As I noted in my November 28,1988 letter to Mr. … I also note that under sovereign-immunity principles, see, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 , 106 S.Ct. 2957 , 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); United States v.

In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litigation

213 F.R.D. 180 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Feb 19, 2003

That is clearly not the situation before the Court, however. On fun-gibility, Dr. … This may involve amending the class, establishing sub-classes, or even de-certification for damages purposes. See Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 456 . Common liability issues clearly predominate.

John T. Dyer Quarry Co. v. Schuylkill Stone Co.

185 F. 557 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Mar 6, 1911

Dyer established a stone quarry outside but within a mile of Birdsboro, Berks County, Pennsylvania, and there carried on the business of quarrying and crushing stone and selling the same. … When taken together the three words are a combination of a geographical term and a geological term, the former qualifying the latter and together with the latter expressing the true descriptive name of the rock in question

ROCKEMORE v. CITY OF CAMDEN

District Court, D. New Jersey · Jul 26, 2023

P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.”); WHEREAS, on June 30, 2023, Defendant advised of its intention to file a Motion to Dismiss and requested … attacked on July 19, 2019, that “the city police department, the prosecutor[‘]s office & court system failed to protect [his] person, liberty & property as a citizen, tax payer, elderly & a qualified

Waters v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

158 F. Supp. 2d 415 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 14, 2001

It also found she had failed to establish a physical injury as required by Article 17 and thus could not recover under Article 17. … Waters, a qualified individual with a disability.” Compl. at ¶ 82.

Judge v. United States

119 F. Supp. 3d 270 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Aug 11, 2015

The clear and unambiguous text of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) clearly establishes that Congress intended punishment under § 924(c) and § 924(j) to be subject to separate punishment in addition to any punishment imposed on the underlying … Because Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to the sentences on counts one, two, and four pursuant to the concurrent sentence doctrine, and because the plain text of § 924 clearly establishes a congressional intent