JOHNSON v. MCGILL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

WENDELL JOHNSON, :

: Case No. 24-6910 (BRM)(JRA)

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : OPINION

:

PATRICIA MCGILL, et. al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Wendell Johnson’s (“Plaintiff”) amended civil rights

complaint (“Amended Complaint”), filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 4.)

On June 26, 2024, after granting Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the

Court screened Plaintiff’s initial complaint for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See

ECF No. 3.) The Court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice because it was illegible.

(See id.) The Court permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. (Id.)

On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 4.) At this time, the

Court must review the Amended Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), to determine

whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes the Amended Complaint should

be dismissed in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court construes the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true for the purposes of

this Opinion. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff is a

prisoner currently housed at Northern State Prison, in Newark, New Jersey. He brings this civil

rights action, pursuant to 24 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants (1) Patricia McGill (“McGill”), (2)

P. Rex (“Rex”), (3) Mario Viera (“Viera”), (4) John Pomponio (“Pomponio”), and (5) John/Jane

Doe SID Officers. (ECF No. 4 at 1.)

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that on February 3, 2023, he was isolated in

detention and Defendant Rex confiscated Plaintiff’s “legal briefs that [were] prepared for the

courts filing” and confiscated Plaintiff’s “religious bible.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff submits that

Defendant Rex took Plaintiff’s food and toilet paper for twenty-one days. (Id.) The Amended

Complaint states that Defendant McGill failed to respond to three grievances regarding Defendant

Rex’s wrong-doing and Plaintiff’s request for medical attention from mold exposure and a slip and

fall. (Id. at 5–6.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress

against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with

respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte

dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because

Plaintiff is a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers

‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To

survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient

factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.

2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed,

“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DECISION

A. Failure to State a Claim

1. Defendant McGill - Supervisory Liability

The Amended Complaint asserts a supervisory liability claim against Defendant McGill.

(ECF No. 4 at 5-6.) The Amended Complaint states that Defendant McGill failed to respond to

three grievances regarding Defendant Rex’s wrong-doing and Plaintiff’s request for medical

attention from mold exposure and a slip and fall. (Id.)

[T]o hold a supervisor liable because his policies or practices led to

[a constitutional] violation, the plaintiff must identify a specific

policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ and show that:

(1) the exiting policy or practice created an unreasonable risk of that

[constitutional] injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the

unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to

that risk; and (4) the injury results from the policy or practice.

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d

1099, 1118 (1989)). The Amended Complaint submits only that Defendant McGill, as the

Administrator of Northern State Prison, failed to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances. (ECF No. 4 at

5–6.) The Amended Complaint does not assert that Defendant McGill implemented a policy or

custom regarding the confiscation of Plaintiff’s materials, nor does it claim there was policy

regarding Plaintiff receiving medical attention. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a plausible claim for

relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

While Plaintiff alleges that he filed three grievances, that type of allegation—i.e., a claim

that grievances were sent to a warden or other administrator—are generally insufficient to establish

supervisory liability, absent a plausible allegation that the supervisor had contemporaneous

knowledge of the incident and either directed or acquiesced in it. See, e.g., Folk v. Prime Care

Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of claims against warden and others,

based on allegation they had received grievances; “Although some of these defendants were

apparently involved in responding to some of Folk’s prison grievances, there are no allegations

linking them to the underlying incidents and thus no basis for liability based on those later

grievance reviews.”); Butler v. Penchishen, No. 22-CV-3252, 2022 WL 4473590, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 26, 2022) (“To the extent Butler is attempting to connect any of the individual Defendants

to these events based on his allegation that he either filed grievances or wrote them letters, such

allegations are unclear and, in any event, would not establish the requisite personal involvement

to establish liability.”). In short, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to allow this claim to

proceed at this time and his claim against Defendant McGill is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2. Defendant Rex - First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to Courts

The Court liberally construes the Amended Complaint as raising a First and Fourteenth

Amendment access to courts claim. (See ECF No. 4 at 5.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

claims that on February 3, 2023, he was isolated in detention and Defendant Rex confiscated

Plaintiff’s “legal briefs that [were] prepared for the courts filing.” (Id.)

“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the

courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). “Where prisoners assert that

defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show

(1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’—that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or

‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as

recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. (quoting

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “[T]he underlying cause of action, . . . is an

element that must be described in the complaint.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.

The Amended Complaint asserts only that Defendant Rex confiscated legal briefs that were

prepared for a court filing. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) Plaintiff fails to present facts that he lost a chance to

pursue any claim in court. See Presbury v. Wetzel, 789 F. App’x 294, 295 (3d Cir. 2020) (per

curiam) (affirming the dismissal of access to courts claim based on the CERT team’s loss of

plaintiff’s legal property where plaintiff “did not allege any facts about the merits of his underlying

claim” and did not “demonstrate that the loss of his legal materials, while unfortunate and

inconvenient, has rendered him unable to seek the District Attorney’s review”); Monroe, 536 F.3d

at 206 (plaintiffs’ allegations that “defendants confiscated their legal materials” and that “they lost

the opportunity to pursue attacks of their convictions and civil rights claims” without “specify[ing]

facts demonstrating that the claims were nonfrivolous” did not state a claim). The Amended

Complaint fails to state an access to courts claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to this claim.

3. Defendant Rex - First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion

Plaintiff appears to be raising a First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion claim.

(ECF No. 4 at 5.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Rex confiscated his “religious bible.” (Id.)

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

348 (1987) (citations omitted). “Nevertheless, the fact of incarceration and the valid penological

objectives of deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify

limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates.” DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51

(3d Cir. 2000). Only beliefs which are (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature are entitled to

constitutional protection. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1972); DeHart, 227 F.3d

at 51. Once a prisoner-plaintiff has established that they have a sincerely held religious belief, they

must demonstrate that the challenged prison practice or policy (which allegedly infringes on that

religious belief) is not reasonably related to penological interests under the factors set forth in

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. The Turner analysis aims to

balance the constitutional rights of prisoners with the “security, rehabilitation, and administrative

concerns” of prisons. See id.

The Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts regarding Plaintiff’s sincerely held

religious beliefs. As such, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he holds a sincere religious belief.

Plaintiff has not alleged that a prison practice or policy impermissibly infringed on his religious

beliefs, as he has not alleged that the confiscation of his bible was not reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.

4. Defendant Rex - Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff raises an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendant

Rex. (ECF No. 4 at 5–6.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that on February 3, 2023, he

was isolated in detention and Defendant Rex confiscated Plaintiff’s “religious bible.” (ECF No. 4

at 5.) Plaintiff submits that Defendant Rex took Plaintiff’s food and toilet paper for twenty-one

days. (Id.)

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of

confinement. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010); see also

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “For the conditions of confinement to rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation, they must deny the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.’” Betts, 621 F.3d at 256 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). Thus, “prison officials

violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights when they deprive her of a single identifiable human

need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226

(3d Cir. 2015); see also Betts, 621 F.3d at 256 (inmates must receive “adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care,” and prison officials must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of inmates”).

Additionally, placing an inmate in restricted housing does not violate the Eighth

Amendment “as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without

penological justification.” See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992). Conditions of

confinement are unconstitutional where a prisoner is denied the “minimal civilized measure of

life's necessities” through prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a condition posing a

substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981)). Only “extreme deprivations” meet this standard. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 9 (1992).

Even liberally construing the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient

facts to show an Eighth Amendment deprivation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff submits

that Defendant Rex confiscated Plaintiff’s religious bible. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Rex

confiscated his toilet paper and food for twenty-one days. Plaintiff fails to provide facts for the

Court to determine how long Plaintiff’s bible was confiscated for or if Plaintiff had access to other

religious materials. Plaintiff also fails to provide facts to show the severity of this deprivation

regarding toilet paper and food. Plaintiff does not provide facts to show whether Defendant Rex

confiscated only the food from his cell or if Plaintiff had no access to food for twenty-one days.

Additionally, the Complaint does not state whether Plaintiff had access to other forms of paper for

bathroom usage. As such, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as

to this claim.

4. Defendants Viera, Pomponio, and John and Jane Doe - Personal Involvement

The Complaint names Defendants Viera, Pomponio, and John and Jane Doe SID Officers

as Defendants. (ECF No. 4 at 1.) However, these Defendants are not named in the body of the

Complaint. Plaintiff fails to include any allegations against Defendants Viera, Pomponio, and John

and Jane Doe SID Officers. (See generally ECF No. 4.)

For liability under § 1983 to attach, a defendant must have personal involvement in a

constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to

. . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.). Plaintiff has failed to allege

personal involvement by Defendants Viera, Pomponio, and John and Jane Doe SID Officers.

Therefore, any claims against Defendants Viera, Pomponio, and John and Jane Doe SID Officers

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a matter of law for lack of personal involvement.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to file a second amended complaint if he chooses to

cure the deficiencies discussed above. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: October 16, 2024

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti

HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE