Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
2,879 results
1.43s
In Re the Closing of Jamesburg High School
83 N.J. 540 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 25, 1980
The desirability of such a provision is clearly for the legislature and not the courts to determine. [ Id. at 333-34 .] … Clearly, such power is not conferred by the express terms of N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6.1.
Cited 143 timesPublished62 N.J. 547 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 9, 1973
Section 41(c) in proscribing possession of a “dangerous knife” does not define those words but it is significant that the generic term “knife” is qualified by the word “dangerous.” 2 In State v. Horton, 98 N. J. … such thought, reflection or deliberation, in connection with the contents of a presentence report, must exclude any inference of guilt to be drawn from an arrest not followed by conviction; that type of consideration is clearly
Overruled on other grounds by State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015)Cited 137 timesPublished120 N.J. 378 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 12, 1990
Defendant argues that counsel could have asked more questions of FitzPatrick, Bucs, and Rucker “to attempt to establish reasonable doubt.” … The prosecutor’s statement was clearly and unmistakably improper.
Cited 74 timesPublished200 N.J. 129 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 30, 2009
The panel reviewed the record and concluded that the trial court's findings were clearly mistaken and that the interests of justice demanded intervention and correction. … A trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken `that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'
Cited 116 timesPublishedOwens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance
138 N.J. 437 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 22, 1994
period.” 2 For example, the United policy, after reciting that the *465 company would pay “all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay * * * as damages because of personal injury or property damage,” qualified … In such a case both policies clearly cover the entire loss. [TJhere are three general types of “other insurance” clauses — excess, pro rata and escape.
Disagreed with by Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance v. Borough of Bellmawr, 172 N.J. 409 (2002)Cited 157 timesPublishedLamanna v. Proformance Insurance
184 N.J. 214 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 14, 2005
After liability was established in arbitration proceedings, the issue of damages was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court charged the eight person jury on the law. … Despite that language, the majority concludes that parties to a litigated civil case are authorized to decide between themselves on the number of jurors that will qualify as a majority for rendering a verdict.
Cited 15 timesPublishedState v. Habeeb Robinson(078900) (Essex County and Statewide)
229 N.J. 44 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 10, 2017
Section 25 establishes a Pretrial Services Program. … When a defendant is detained, the State must obtain an indictment within 90 days 33 or qualify for an extension of time under the new speedy trial provision.
Cited 69 timesPublishedFischer v. Johns-Manville Corp.
103 N.J. 643 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 31, 1986
Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982) (New Jersey law clearly allows recovery of punitive damages in strict products liability cases). Nor will we dictate trial tactics for the plaintiffs' bar. … A step in this direction is the establishment of the Asbestos Claims Facility pursuant to the Wellington Agreement, an organization whose purpose is to establish expeditious and uniform settlement, payment, or defense of
Cited 88 timesPublishedIn Re Opinion No. 735 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics
Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 22, 2025
The Court also holds that purchasing the proper name of an attorney or a law firm as competitive keywords does not violate RPC 8.4(c), which establishes that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct … Contrary to the ACPE’s position, the NJCJI asserts that displaying the lawyer’s own website in the search results qualifies as a “communication” subject to RPC 7.1. 18
Cited 0 timesPublishedState v. Kassey Benjamin(076612)
Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 5, 2017
The court identified the “clearly significant mitigating factors here,” such as defendant’s family status, young age, and lack of a prior criminal record. … Yet, the majority denies defendants the very information necessary to establish discriminatory or unequal treatment -- access to the reasons given for the grant or denial of Graves Act waivers in other cases.
Cited 0 timesPublishedState v. Kassey Benjamin(076612)
228 N.J. 358 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Apr 5, 2017
The court identified the “clearly significant mitigating factors here,” such as defendant’s family status, young age, and lack of a prior criminal record. … Yet, the majority denies defendants the very information necessary to establish discriminatory or unequal treatment -- access to the reasons given for the grant or denial of Graves Act waivers in other cases.
Cited 29 timesPublishedOakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison
72 N.J. 481 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jan 26, 1977
In particular, plaintiffs argued that the grounds offered to justify the variance did not qualify as "special reasons" under existing legislation. … Of these municipalities a goodly number must surely qualify albeit reluctantly as "developing." Their land use plans are therefore required to meet the test of Mt. Laurel.
Cited 71 timesPublishedAuto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini Ford, Inc.
181 N.J. 245 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 16, 2004
Other customers, whose salaries were inadequate to qualify for credit, had falsified pay stubs submitted by facsimile to Auto Lenders. … We, therefore, will not adhere to the text’s literal limitation because to do so here would nearly vitiate the coverage that both parties clearly contemplated.
Cited 46 timesPublishedSupreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 2, 2023
The Court establishes some specific limits to help in that regard. … We find that the error in this case was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” Ibid.
Cited 0 timesPublishedState v. Jose Carrion (084390) (Essex County and Statewide)
Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 27, 2021
“‘made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” … Although the clerk’s certificate would qualify as an official record under respondent’s definition -- it was prepared by a public officer in the regular course of his official duties --
Cited 0 timesPublishedJ.H. and A.R. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC (081128)(Hudson County and Statewide)
Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jul 31, 2019
“Clearly,” the expert opined, “with temperatures above 200° in a radiator[,] contact with its cast iron surface would be unbearably hot.” … Courts construe statutes narrowly if they are in derogation of the common law, especially when a statute grants immunity from tort liability. Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 37 (2006).
Cited 0 timesPublished55 N.J. 128 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 16, 1969
We found no error in the finding of guilt but, after examining the trial record and the presentence report, concluded that his sentence was clearly excessive. … Clearly, if this occurs, the fear of Mr. Roche that informational sources will dry up, is well justified.
Cited 73 timesPublished165 N.J. 235 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Aug 2, 2000
Thus, the jury concluded that Downie had established the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors. … CONCLUSION Defendant does not meet his burden of establishing that his death sentence is disproportionate.
Cited 15 timesPublishedState v. Quinnizel J. Clark (085271) (Burlington County & Statewide)
Supreme Court of New Jersey · Jun 29, 2022
Under that standard, an unchallenged error constitutes plain error if it was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” Ibid. … Given the State’s circumstantial case, allowing all that to go before the jury was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
Cited 0 timesPublished17 N.J.L. 191 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Sep 15, 1839
Shelley has been overruled, and the doctrine sought to be established by it, completely put down. … most clearly the former • and yet, in what does that differ from the transfer and indorsement of a note ?
Cited 0 timesPublished
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