Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

2,460 results

1.31s

  • Issar v. Robertson

    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 6, 2025

    In Maryland, a conveyance to a “husband and wife, without restrictive or qualifying words, creates a tenancy by the entirety.” O’Brien v. Bank of Am., N.A., 214 Md. App. 51, 88 (2013) (cleaned up). … It held that the subdivision plat did establish an express easement despite the absence of a deed. Id. at 167.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lampton v. LaHood

    94 Md. App. 461 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 8, 1993

    Indeed, Maryland provides, as many states do not, that the “written statement” be “verified.” 3 This is clearly an indication that the General Assembly did not contemplate that oral statements of claims could satisfy the … Lampton relies upon two statutes, Est. & Trusts Art. §§ 7-101(a) and 8-109(a), as establishing LaHood’s personal liability to her.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Angulo-Gil v. State

    198 Md. App. 124 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 31, 2011

    As the State notes, this statement did not reflect any agreement of confidentiality. *146 Rather, it was an equivocal response that was designed, not to establish a confidential relationship, but to deflect appellant’s suggestion … State, 178 Md.App. 428, 442 , 941 A.2d 1238 (2008) (“[T]he owner of personal property is presumptively qualified to testify about the value of his goods.”)

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Handy v. State

    201 Md. App. 521 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 26, 2011

    Rule 4-326(d) and clearly extended the scope of the Rule to apply to *548 all jury-to-court communications. … In Perez and Canela , the jury, in several of the notes, was clearly seeking advice from the court; in this case the jury was seeking an answer from a witness then on the stand.

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Miller v. State

    196 Md. App. 658 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Dec 29, 2010

    This Case Was Not On Direct Review This variety of quasi-retroactivity would clearly not apply to the appellant’s June 1, 1999 guilty plea. … This bare allegation is not sufficient, however, to establish prejudice under Strickland. ... [A] defendant’s lack of knowledge of those collateral consequences cannot affect the voluntariness of the plea.

    Vacated on other grounds by Miller v. State, 423 Md. 474 (2011)Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Small MS4 Coalition v. Dept. of Environment

    250 Md. App. 388 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 29, 2021

    Thus, assent to the County’s request in this regard is clearly above our pay grade. … The Department concluded that this “clearly demonstrates” that the mapping requirement is not beyond MEP.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Beretta U.S.A. Corp. v. Santos

    122 Md. App. 168 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jun 25, 1998

    Clearly, such an award exceeds the express limitation contained in Art. 49B, § 11(e). In reaching our conclusion, Sitnick, 254 Md. at 303 , 255 A.2d 376 , is instructive. … One conflict involved a City ordinance that established a minimum wage of $1.25 per hour and a State law that established a minimum wage of $1.00 per hour.

    Reversed on other grounds by Prince George's County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166 (2000)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Williams v. State

    152 Md. App. 190 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 4, 2003

    Scientific evidence established that the cartridge casings found at the crime scene did not have appellant's fingerprints on them. … In this case, Assistant State's Attorney Stewart was clearly aware of Williams's past criminal record, and she disclosed that record to appellant's trial counsel.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Magee v. Dansources Technical Services, Inc.

    137 Md. App. 527 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 28, 2001

    Magee itemized a long list of incidents and behavior that clearly could support a finding of either severe or pervasive sexual harassment, or both. … A jury might conclude that this was sufficient to establish an abusive environment that altered the conditions of employment.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • McCree v. State

    214 Md. App. 238 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 24, 2013

    The last witness to testily for the State was Dennis Supik, an investigator with the Content Protection Office of the Motion Picture Association of America, who was qualified as *250 an expert in the field of identification … The terms “trademark,” “service mark,” and “trade name” are legal terms of art with clearly-established meanings. 5 “La *256 bel,” “device,” and “design” are everyday concepts whose meanings can readily be determined by reference

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Demby v. SECRETARY, DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERV.

    163 Md. App. 47 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 1, 2005

    We observed, however, that [t]he DOC established double celling as a special project under the authority of section 3-707 [of the Correctional Services Article]. … With this opinion, we do not suggest that once double-celling credits are established they must remain unchanged and available to all inmates in perpetuity.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • John Crane, Inc. v. Puller

    169 Md. App. 1 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 31, 2006

    Scribner, 369 Md. at 394 , 800 A.2d 727 , modifies the noun “dispute” with the qualifying adjective “genuine.” … Scribner clearly states that it may sometimes be so ruled. Id.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Demby v. Secretary, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services

    163 Md. App. 47 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 1, 2005

    The Court of Appeals has explained that whether an administrative provision qualifies as a “law” for ex post facto purposes depends in large part on the manner and extent that it limits an agency’s discretion. … With this opinion, we do not suggest that once doublecelling credits are established they must remain unchanged and available to all inmates in perpetuity.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Board

    188 Md. App. 455 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 28, 2009

    possession of a dangerous weapon is equivalent to the Maryland crime of wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor which is punishable in Maryland by imprisonment of up to three years, and, for that reason, is clearly … Section 922(g) does not establish any sort of right to possess a firearm; it simply prohibits firearm possession by certain persons.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Browne v. State

    215 Md. App. 51 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 6, 2013

    It is now established law that obtaining a buccal swab DNA sample from a person under arrest for a violent crime is not a violation of that person’s Fourth Amendment rights. … We shall uphold the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 647, 57 A.3d 484 .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Dixon v. Process Corp.

    46 Md. App. 198 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jul 10, 1980

    truth. 3 In order to reverse the trial court’s finding of facts, we would be required to find in our review of the record that the trial court was clearly erroneous in reaching its conclusions. … Initially, we do not believe that the institution or prosecution of the original suit would qualify under any of the three grounds above recited.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • McKinney v. State

    239 Md. App. 297 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 8, 2018

    If he means, as he clearly seems to say, that one cannot commit an act (the act that is the violation) at a time that has not yet come to pass, he is simply stating a truism. A tautology! … Even assuming, arguendo, every word of that proposition to be true, it would classically, under well-established Rule 4–345(a) principles, be a mere procedural illegality that would not be an inherent illegality in the

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Height v. State

    185 Md. App. 317 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 6, 2009

    Thus, the matter was never presented to the trial court and clearly is not preserved.”). Moreover, in Grier v. … To secure a reversal based on an opening statement the accused is usually required to establish bad faith on the part of the prosecutor in the statement of what the prosecutor expects to prove or establish substantial prejudice

    Reversed on other grounds by Height v. State, 411 Md. 662 (2009)Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Wildewood Operations v. WRV Holdings

    Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 30, 2023

    Wildewood Operating also informed First Indemnity that Wildewood Operating had sold the property to Wildewood Owner; Wildewood Operating had entered into the Work Agreement; Wildewood Operating had established a letter … “The form was developed to define clearly the scope and extent of the surety’s liability, the ‘trigger’ of the surety’s obligation to perform, the options available to the surety in satisfying its bond obligations, and

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc.

    21 Md. App. 307 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 21, 1974

    Thus, by its enactment, the General Assembly established a policy in favor of the settlement of disputes through the arbitration process and ended the ambivalence of courts under the common law. … Even before the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act in Maryland, the Court of Appeals in enforcing an arbitrator’s award found that a broad arbitration clause clearly required arbitration of the question of fraud in the

    Reversed on other grounds by Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307 (1975)Cited 61 timesPublished

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