Case law

A.Z. v. NIELSEN

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 23, 2018

To qualify as final, the action “must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and either determine rights or obligations or trigger legal consequences. U.S. … The APA does not permit this Court to circumvent this established agency process and review a nonfinal decision. IV.

Cutting v. United States

204 F. Supp. 2d 216 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 11, 2002

It is well established under the law that the United States, as an entity, may be sued only to the extent, and in the manner, that it consents to being sued. … In other words, all the plaintiffs clearly had “knowledge of the injury” more than two years before they filed their claims.

Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc.

150 F. Supp. 3d 53 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 9, 2015

For present purposes, it is enough to note that published billing rates are of little aid to a court in establishing the actual market for the legal services provided here. McDonough v. … As cases transferred by the Panel to a •remote court count as case filings in the transferee court, they tend to immunize that court against the potential loss of a judgeship.

TurboCare Division of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Electric Co.

45 F. Supp. 2d 110 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 1999

(“Indeed, new prior art not before the PTO may so clearly invalidate a patent that the burden [of demonstrating invalidity] is fully sustained merely by proving its existence and applying the proper law.”). 3. … contract or law to assign, grant, convey or license, any rights in the invention to any person who could not be classified as an independent inventor if that person had made the invention, or to any concern who would not qualify

KPM Analytics North America Corporation v. Blue Sun Scientific, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 10, 2024

KPM established at trial that it owned three species of trade secrets. … Clearly, Gajewski actually knew about the probable consequences of his trade secret misappropriation and was trying to ensure that he evaded detection.

Perna v. Martinez

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2021

The court granted the Massachusetts Trial Court Department and the New Hampshire Department of Corrections’ motions to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. See Order [#68]. … Servs., 974 F.3d 1012, 1024 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The right under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from sexual harassment by public officials in the workplace and school contexts is clearly established by our prior case

Thomas v. Town of Salisbury

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 3, 2018

This court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count I on the basis that the letter was not protected speech, and that even if it was, Harrington was entitled to qualified immunity. … A most liberal reading of the record establishes that Harrington may have wanted Thomas gone, and may have encouraged St.

Marshall F. Newman v. Santander Bank, N.A.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 9, 2023

And Santander certainly qualifies as a “person in possession” of property subject to levy. See id. (bank accounts included among property subject to levy). … Although no First Circuit precedent establishes the burden of proof in a wrongful levy suit, other circuits have adopted the following approach: “(1) the plaintiff must show that the IRS filed a levy against property in

Querido v. Barnhart

344 F. Supp. 2d 236 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 10, 2004

Though Querido has regularly complained of “panic attacks,” there is little in the record to indicate whether any of these alleged attacks qualifies as an episode of decompensation. Although Dr. … Although Querido testified that she had not sought counseling because no one had ever suggested it and she had “never thought of it,” id. at 405, the record clearly shows that both Ms. Lipstock and Dr.

ARK National Holdings LLC v. WeCampaign LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 15, 2021

Further, the recitation of the elements of a claim, “supported by mere conclusory statements,” is insufficient to establish facial plausibility. Id. … Moreover, the SAC clearly asserts that at the time Youssefian, as WeCampaign’s principal, made the allegedly fraudulent statement, he had “no intention of following through on” his commitment and was in fact

Teague v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

708 F. Supp. 1344 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 21, 1989

Indeed, Buell , which seems clearly to contemplate recovery for at least some negligent inflictions of emotional distress, is irreconcilable with this view. … Three attacks might be mounted. .First, although courts recognize that the FELA extends at least to some intentional torts, some courts have limited which intentional torts qualify.

Stagnone

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 10, 2026

Massachusetts recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination where an at-will employee is discharged in violation of a clearly established public policy. See Butler v. … The complaint does not identify a clearly established public policy supporting such a claim. See id. The substance of Count 14 instead alleges statutory discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and Chapter 151B.

Brodbeck v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 23, 2021

Superior Court dismissed Brodbeck’s state law discrimination claims on statute of limitations grounds and dismissed Brodbeck’s Americans with Disabilities Act claims (“ADA”) claims for monetary relief on sovereign immunity … Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a prima facie case for discrimination for disparate treatment involves: “(1) the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class; (2) she must be qualified for her job; (3) she must

Lerner v. Colman

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2020

This is not so long a period of time so as to automatically qualify as “continuous.” Cf. Fleet Credit Corp. v. … The ur-example of a single scheme that would qualify comes from H.J.

Kelly v. Riverside Partners, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 25, 2019

This chain of command establishes Mr. … As noted, only Riverside has established actual damages. A.

Doe v. UMass - Amherst

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 1, 2023

Ward was not qualified to supervise Plaintiff and the arrangement was for the two to be paired. (Id. ¶ 51.) … Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of defamation based on the DUA letter is clearly untimely. See id.; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4.

Rivera v. Altranais Home Care LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 18, 2022

To establish a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate, “a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that (1) [s]he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) [s]he was a qualified … Santiago clearly communicating that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety and depression and had asked for an accommodation in the workplace.

Isabella v. Town of Seekonk

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 15, 2024

“[T]o establish a procedural due process claim under section 1983, a plaintiff ‘must allege first that [he] has a property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the defendants, acting under color of state … immunity shields defendants).

Michalski v. MIB Group Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 14, 2025

The Court reasoned that any potential harm would be the risk of future harm, which “standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm — at least unless the exposure to the risk of future harm itself causes a separate concrete … Section 1681g(a)(2) provides that a CRA upon request must “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer. . .

Rossman v. Nashoba Regional School District

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 28, 2024

Defendants argue that these facts are insufficient to establish that the entirety of the CBA was applicable to Plaintiff’s employment and note that Plaintiff has failed to identify any documents or conversations establishing … Ct. 2018), is not instructive, as the sole issue before the court was whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s MCRA claim. Id. at 304. in Count VII for retaliation.