Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Spanos v. TJX Companies, Inc.

    220 F. Supp. 2d 67 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 19, 2002

    (R. 164)(emphasis in original) Benefits are payable in the second phase, beyond 24 months, if the employee is “unable to work at any occupation, [he is] or could reasonably become qualified to do by education, training or … That is, the First Circuit “has interpreted the Firestone rule ‘to mean that a benefits plan must clearly grant discretionary authority to the administrator before decisions will be accorded the deferential, arbitrary and

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Joyce v. John Hancock Financial Services, Inc.

    462 F. Supp. 2d 192 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 22, 2006

    See, e.g., Bellino, 944 F.2d at 31 (stating that “[fjederal courts have established no hard and fast rule that an individual must suffer a period of unemployment to qualify for severance benefits under ERISA”). … When plan administrators are transparent and adhere to clearly established guidelines, they can go a long way in assuring plan beneficiaries that the plan is being carried out competently and fairly.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Omniglow Corp. v. Unique Industries, Inc.

    184 F. Supp. 2d 105 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 2002

    Similarly, Omniglow’s application amendment states clearly that “one specific fluorescer, i.e. … However, it is unclear whether Ning, who is the general manager of Tianjin Dragon, is qualified to testify with regard to this information.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Ruthardt v. United States

    164 F. Supp. 2d 232 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2001

    The general principle expressed in Sum-merlin is well-established. See, e.g., Bresson v. … The court there explained: If the Insurance Commissioner were required to accept claims against the liquidated PCFA indefinitely that would clearly contravene the legitimate legislative goal of finality, and could well delay

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Bay Club Members, LLC v. Selective Insurance Company of America

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 27, 2023

    The party seeking joinder bears the burden of establishing that joinder is warranted. Roy v FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:17030116-KAR, 2020 WL 3799203, at *2 (D. Mass. … Regarding Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), courts have held that proceeds from insurance coverage qualify as the sort of interest that may appropriately underlie a motion for joinder.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • United States v. Bouthot

    685 F. Supp. 286 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 8, 1988

    It appeared to Wenner that Carr’s record might not qualify him for Armed Career Criminal treatment. … The Supreme Court, however, has stated that, “the rule clearly is limited to post-arrest situations.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319 , 92 S.Ct. 455, 463 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • In Re Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation

    245 F. Supp. 2d 280 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 19, 2003

    While plaintiffs assert that personal jurisdiction is properly based on the federal RICO statute, Takeda argues that RICO authorizes nationwide, rather than worldwide, service of process, and that it is immune from effective … Although in the possessive plural, in context this reference is clearly to TAP and not to TAP and Takeda. 33 .

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Latimore v. Suffolk County House of Correction

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 2023

    The plaintiff must establish an “identity of entities and circumstances to a high degree.” Rectrix Aerodrome Ctrs., 610 F.3d at 16. See also Freeman, 714 F.3d at 38 (quoting Cordi-Allen v. … For this reason as well, Latimore has not met his burden of proving any violation of his equal protection rights.8 8 In light of this Court’s conclusion, it will not reach the Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • In Re Grand Jury Proceedings

    158 F. Supp. 2d 96 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 2001

    It is clearly desirable that federal and state authorities cooperate ... in organized crime ... investigations .... … Metropolitan Police officer qualified as “government personnel” under (A)(ii). McRae, 580 F.Supp. at 1562-63 .

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.

    494 F. Supp. 2d 34 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 29, 2007

    However, the presumption that words are given their ordinary meaning may be overcome if the patent specification or prosecution history “clearly and deliberately set[s] forth” a different meaning. K-2 Corp. v. … See, e.g., Chart 1 — Eligibility for the Self-Correction Program (“SCP”) Qualified Plans and 403(b) Plans, http://www. irs.govlpub/irs-tege/scp-.qual- 403b-flow-chart.pdf (last visited June 14, 2007). 14 .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Filler v. Lernout

    230 F. Supp. 2d 152 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 19, 2002

    On May 8, McLamb sent Van Aerde a memo noting several respects in which L & H had failed to establish and follow formal written accounting procedures. (¶ 294). … from being held liable for misstatements of their agents since “[a] corporation can only act through its employees and agents .... an allegation that a particular agent may have doctored or conveyed the report will not immunize

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Borker v. Warden Bowers

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 15, 2024

    otherwise—that is, postponing eligibility for FSA time credits for a person in Borker’s position until after their transfer to the facility at which they will serve their sentence—“contravene[d] the intent of Congress as clearly … More importantly, the respondent’s own submissions establish that, once the BOP has completed its FSA risk-and- 4 If that were where the BOP drew the line, the respondent’s position in this case might be rational.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • C.A.I., Inc. v. Vitex Packaging Group, Inc.

    115 F. Supp. 3d 168 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 17, 2015

    “The legal effect of such an agreement is, of course, qualified by other provisions” of the Code. Id. Section 2-207 of the UCC governs “Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.” … As JOM clearly instructs, under these - circumstances, Vitex bears the burden of *180 establishing that at the time it entered into the consignment arrangement with CAI, it would have objected to the terms in the invoice.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bezdek v. Vibram USA Inc.

    79 F. Supp. 3d 324 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 16, 2015

    Second, the plaintiffs must show “that counsel chosen by the representative party is qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.” Id. … members, each of whom have small individual claims that may not be worth pursuing independently, “a class action is the only feasible mechanism for resolving the dispute efficiently,” M3 Power Razor, 270 F.R.D. at 56 , and is clearly

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • United States v. Footman

    66 F. Supp. 2d 83 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 1, 1999

    In my judgment, after hearing the trial testimony, and reviewing the government’s most recent submissions, the Footman operation does not qualify. … Clearly, the tapes reflect a concern about the federal charges, and an effort to orchestrate the response to them.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co.

    42 F.2d 886 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 4, 1930

    Feldman, a lawyer of this eity, were thereupon appointed receivers, and subsequently qualified as such. … Upon default the bondholders have clearly the right of sale of the properties mortgaged, as provided by statute, and, as said in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (D.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • J.E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc.

    365 F. Supp. 2d 119 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2005

    Opp’n at 7-14; (2) even if it did violate that law, that violation alone is *136 insufficient to establish liability under Chapter 93A, § 11, Id. at 5-7; and finally, (3) that the Independent Pharmacies have not established … Such a reality is immune from our manipulation and dictates the boundaries of our life.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Levine v. Maplebear, Inc.

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 2022

    In fact, the First Circuit clearly distinguished its reasoning in Waithaka from that which applied in Cunningham and, by extension, here. … The First Circuit has clearly established a framework for examining issues of the type discussed here. See Cunningham, 17 F.4th at 249-53; Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 20-26. Interlocutory review is therefore unnecessary.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Carriere, Jr v. Medeiros

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 5, 2018

    Therefore, Carriere has not established that the SJC’s decision is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. … Therefore the SJC’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 2.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Boston Harbor Marina Co.

    159 B.R. 616 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 30, 1993

    Legal Reasoning The factual determinations of the Bankruptcy Court are binding unless clearly erroneous, but its conclusions of law are to be reviewed de novo. In re LaRoche, 969 F.2d 1299, 1301 (1st Cir.1992); Robb v. … Issue Presented The central issue in this analysis, is whether Prudential had sufficient security interest in the rents for them to qualify as cash collateral.

    Cited 11 timesPublished

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