Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation

    222 F.R.D. 29 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 27, 2004

    Clearly, this would have been a red flag for KMPG to try to find out more information, as any accounting firm would do when performing an audit and learning that information being given to it by the client was untrue. … In sum, the Court holds that KMPG has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the 15 e-mails were prepared in anticipation of litigation as that term has been construed in the Adlman case, a construction which has

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Peabody Essex Museum, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance

    623 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2009

    The court explained that it meant to "borrow from the law in the employment discrimination field ... and establish a two-stage order of proof.” Id. at *4-5 (citing Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. … The "how” — whether "sudden and accidental” or gradual — is clearly U.S. Fire's burden under Polaroid .

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • I v. Services of America, Inc. v. Inn Development & Management, Inc.

    7 F. Supp. 2d 79 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 13, 1998

    IDM’s self-funded Plan provided medical benefits to all qualified IDM employees. (Gilley Aff., Attach. A.) … This well established practice has it roots in the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 . Id.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Germoso

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2026

    The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she (1) was disabled within the meaning of Chapter 151B, (2) was “nonetheless qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without … Laws ch. 175M, § 9 Defendant argues that the Complaint “establishes a clearly legitimate reason for Ms.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp.

    311 F. Supp. 2d 212 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2004

    While Bally focuses this Court’s attention on the words “absent congressional expressions to the contrary,” the text that immediately follows that phrase clearly limits its application to statutes which “define[] ‘costs’ … Thus, entry of the merits judgment in Foley did not “unconditionally establish” a right to attorney’s fees.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Ellis v. Ford Motor Co.

    628 F. Supp. 849 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 1986

    Parker sought to establish that he had been wearing the belt on the evening of the accident, but that it had broken on impact, causing him to strike his head on the windshield or dashboard. … The sale of the van involved in the accident, a 1966 Econoline, was clearly made before 1971. The Parkers did not own the van at the time of the accident.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Iantosca v. Benistar Admin Services, Inc.

    738 F. Supp. 2d 212 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 12, 2010

    Certain Underwrites maintain that, to establish such a claim, Bursey must prove that the center of gravity of the circumstances that give rise to the claim [occurred] primarily and substantially within the Commonwealth [of … His counterclaims are cursory and do not clearly support the characterization that they are meant to bring claims for general CUTPA violations independent of alleged insurance wrongs in violation of CUIPA.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Nna v. American Standard, Inc.

    630 F. Supp. 2d 115 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 1, 2009

    First, as a large — scale operator of outdoor commuter vehicles in Massachusetts, the MBTA was clearly aware of the cold and snowy conditions that accompany winters in New England. … It is well-established, however, that parties are permitted to argue mutually exclusive alternative theories of defense.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Firenze v. National Labor Relations Board

    993 F. Supp. 2d 40 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 27, 2014

    It is firmly established that the Government may not impair its employees’ right to speak as citizens on matters of public concern. U.S. v. … If the potential speech addressed a matter of public interest at all, that issue was less clearly a matter of public concern.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Tarbell v. Rocky's Ace Hardware

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 7, 2018

    continued the litigation after it clearly became so.” … This court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of any new position at Rocky’s after May 14, 2012 through the date of his termination.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Nesbitt v. Wellpath

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 2, 2022

    While a condition such as a skin rash may not ordinarily qualify as objectively serious, it may become serious after substantial delay. See Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497-98. … Public employees, however, are immune from liability under the MTCA for negligent acts when acting within the scope of their employment. Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

    308 F.R.D. 39 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 15, 2015

    Although the interest requirement has eluded precise definition, the First Circuit has established some guidelines. … However, merely speculating about this possibility does not establish inadequacy.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • McInnis v. Weinberger

    388 F. Supp. 381 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 10, 1975

    S.S.I. recipients could now participate in the food stamp program so long as they qualified under that program's standards. … The classification in the instant case clearly meets the Dandridge test.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc.

    604 F. Supp. 2d 288 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 11, 2009

    Id. at 801, 840 N.E.2d 526 . 13 Furthermore, the Hershenow court expressly rejected the proposition, suggested by some language in Aspinall, that a misrepresentation can qualify as an “injury” to consumers who are influenced … Adopting the pleading rule established by the Supreme Court for federal courts in Bell Atl. Corp. v.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • United States v. Malouf

    377 F. Supp. 2d 315 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 14, 2005

    Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Breyer, interpreted § 924(c)(1)(A) as establishing a single offense, with “brandishing” a firearm a sentencing factor akin to “traditional” sentencing factors … The qualifying charge was the defendant’s 1997 conviction in Norfolk Superior Court, Docket Number 101631, for Trafficking in Cocaine. 4 .

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Insulet Corporation v. EOFlow, Co. Ltd.

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 24, 2025

    The jury, therefore, reasonably concluded that the DHF qualified as a trade secret. … Plaintiff was not required to present more detailed evidence, as the evidence presented satisfied its burden to establish its damages.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Change the Climate, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

    214 F. Supp. 2d 125 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2002

    SCHWARTZ: I don’t know that this witness is qualified to compare the cost of transportation systems. … In the Order below, the court invites submissions from the parties by August 30, 2002, regarding the establishment and composition of such a board. F.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Smith & Croyle, LLC v. Ridgewood Power Corp.

    111 F. Supp. 2d 77 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 24, 2000

    The Letter Agreement between Ridgewood and Smith & Croyle clearly contemplated the establishment of a joint venture. See Defendants’ Exhibit Book I, Ex. … B, at 2 (“All rights and assets necessary for the construction and operation of the Project will be assigned to and held by a newly created entity which qualifies as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes [“Newco”].

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • McCarthy v. Commerce Group, Inc.

    831 F. Supp. 2d 459 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 16, 2011

    The Incentive Plan, on the other hand, clearly identifies the Compensation Committee as “plan administrator.” … It is unclear whether either description qualifies as “official.”

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Galli

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 17, 2026

    Pursuant to this unambiguous definition, DemandScience clearly qualifies as a “person” under Section 304(4)(a)(I). … This argument distorts the fact that those other provisions qualify the term “commercial” with more specific descriptors. See Colo. Rev.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown

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