Case law

Savage v. City of Springfield

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2021

Even though the Deputy Fire Chief examination was canceled after the fact, Savage’s score was sufficient to qualify him for a District Chief position (id. at ¶ 44). … Because Plaintiffs could not have received their right-to-sue letters before they were issued, Plaintiffs have clearly met the ninety-day statute of limitations.

In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor

722 F. Supp. 893 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 12, 1989

Whatever the status of the mud flats sediments, the water column itself, clearly not a part of the facility, is a part of the environment. … Both the Senate Report and the remarks of Senator Randolph use the phrase "to qualify for exemption from liability for any federally permitted release_” See S.Rep.

Nicholson v. Promotors on Listings

159 F.R.D. 343 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 9, 1994

A strong argument can be made that an independent contractor who meets the Kassel test qualifies as a “public official.” … Clearly the plaintiff was no naif in these matters and could be expected to understand that the operation of a local auditorium will often draw attention. . See St. Amant v.

In Re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong

939 F. Supp. 934 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 29, 1996

One could conceivably read the clause beginning with “if” as qualifying not just the phrase “any other offense,” but scheduled offenses as well. … They were elaborately structured in ways that were clearly intended to make them untraceable.

RLI INSURANCE COMPANY v. Santos

746 F. Supp. 2d 255 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2010

Question 6 tells the applicant, clearly and directly, to “include drivers with a learners permit.” That statement is not ambiguous as a matter of law. … Together these statements clearly communicate that a false signature would result in a voiding of the policy, fulfilling the second prong of the test.

Sousa v. Reno

135 F. Supp. 2d 75 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 2001

It is therefore important to establish whether this Court has jurisdiction over this matter and, if jurisdiction exits, to clarify the scope of review available. … Review under INA § 242 is further qualified by § 242(a)(2)(C), which reads: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no „ court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable

Sensitech, Inc. v. LimeStone FZE

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 17, 2020

Pro se defendants are not immune from preliminary injunctions, especially where, as here, the court held a hearing on the injunction and gave defendants ample notice of that hearing and … If the party seeking the injunction can establish that the evil that would result from [the offending publication] is both great

Goulet v. Carpenters District Council of Boston & Vicinity

884 F. Supp. 17 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 28, 1994

Under Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Law, G.L. c. 152 § 23, 24, the employer is immune from negligence suits. … Neither have plaintiffs proffered any admissible evidence establishing such citizenship.

In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation

296 F.R.D. 47 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 2013

Adequacy also requires that class counsel be “qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.” Id. at 130 . … Hartman’s but-for generic prices are not clearly lower than the price Good Samaritan actually paid for brand Nexium.” Johnson Rpt. ¶ 37.

Avery v. Heckler

584 F. Supp. 312 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 1984

Its analysis, which encompassed standing, sovereign immunity and exhaustion of remedies, is applicable here. … The substantial hardship requirement is clearly satisfied.

Aduayi v. PHH Mortgage Services

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2024

1363305, at *4 n.2 (determining that two alleged failures to respond were not enough to establish a pattern or practice). … The parties do not dispute that the letters also clearly contained information sufficient for Defendants “to identify[] the name and account of the borrower.”

Duggan v. Martorello

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 21, 2021

However, the Settlement Agreement is silent with respect to the source of the cash that Big Picture Loans and Ascension will use to establish the Settlement Fund. (Def. Ex. 1 at ¶ 10.1). … By establishing a cap on collections, the Settlement Agreement ensures that borrowers will not be required to pay more than 2.5 times the original principal amount of their loans.

Kreisberg ex rel. National Labor Relations Board v. Emerald Green Building Services, LLC

169 F. Supp. 3d 261 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 23, 2015

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success in demonstrating sufficient continuity between the cleaning operations of Peace Plus and defendant such that defendant qualifies as a successor … The mathematics clearly prove[ ] that in each location [it] hired more than 50% of the existing workforce.

Lawless v. Town of Freetown

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 15, 2024

For the following 1 Lawless also sued the members of its Board of Selectmen for violation of her due process rights, but that claim was defeated on grounds of qualified immunity. See Lawless v. … That is because once the constitutional violation is established, nominal damages are “awarded by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages

McCarthy v. Mass General Brigham Incorporated

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2024

MGB argues that “to establish the existence of a ‘physical impairment’ under the ADA, [McCarthy] must show that her symptoms . . . were caused by ‘an underlying physiological disorder or condition.’” … Accordingly, “for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment--and thus a disability—under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition.”

Filler v. Lernout

236 F. Supp. 2d 161 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 2003

Plaintiffs argue that a scheme or course of business under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) can include misleading financial statements that might also qualify as predicates for Rule 10b-5(b). Cf. Peil v. … By establishing reliance, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support transaction and loss causation. See e.g., Newton v.

Ryba v. LaLancette

417 F. Supp. 2d 199 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 2006

, and therefore cannot establish that either defendant was negligent. … The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the doctrine.

Merced v. JLG Industries, Inc.

170 F. Supp. 2d 65 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2001

L & L Fittings has never been registered, licensed or qualified by the Commonwealth to do business in Massachusetts. III. Discussion A. … Although clearly not dis-positive, L & L Fittings also enables its Massachusetts customers to purchase goods on its website and that site is, at least, a potential marketing tool in Massachusetts.

Frankina v. First National Bank of Boston

801 F. Supp. 875 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 1, 1992

The undisputed evidence establishes, however, that the Bank ceased funding this employee organization as part of a widespread economic strategy to reduce costs and discretionary overhead. … As a second exception, Massachusetts courts have imposed liability on an employer for terminating an at-will employee if the method of termination is in violation of a clearly established public policy. See Hobson v.

Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen, & Packers

521 F. Supp. 614 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 13, 1981

The court declared that 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(3) states clearly that dues payable to a local labor organization may be increased only according to the methods provided in Section 411(a)(3)(A), and not by the regular convention … (ii) A member otherwise qualified to run for office must be nominated at the nomination meeting by a member in good standing other than the nominee and seconded by a member in good standing other than the nominee.