“The phrase ‘prior restraint’ is not a self-wielding sword.”
How later courts described this case
- “The phrase ‘prior restraint’ is not a self-wielding sword.”
- vacating a preliminary injunction entered against a pro se litigant because the court, without providing notice to the litigant that an injunction could be entered against him, had sua sponte enjoined the litigant from filing any pro se actions in the district court
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
___________________________________
)
Sensitech Inc., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No.
) 20-11043-NMG
LimeStone FZE and Samer Alwash )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________)
Memorandum & Order
GORTON, J.
In June, 2020, this Court entered a preliminary injunction
against LimeStone FZE (“LimeStone”), Samer Alwash (“Mr. Alwash”)
and LinkedIn Corporation (“LinkedIn”) (collectively
“defendants”) in response to allegations of plaintiff Sensitech,
Inc. (“Sensitech” or “plaintiff”) that LimeStone and Mr. Alwash
have engaged in a variety of activities designed solely to harm
Sensitech’s business. Soon thereafter, LinkedIn was voluntarily
dismissed from the case. The preliminary injunction requires
defendants to comply with eight conditions. The two most
pertinent to the pending motion can be summarized as requiring
defendants:
to refrain from posting (or assisting others in
posting) on any social media, including but not
limited to LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram, and
Facebook, any matters that refer in any way to
Sensitech, Carrier and/or any of their employees,
representatives, affiliates, or agents.
Preliminary Injunction, ¶¶ 7 and 8.
In response to the entry of the preliminary injunction,
defendants have filed a motion to dissolve or modify the
original order (Docket No. 41). Defendants assert that: 1) the
injunction was entered against unrepresented parties, 2) the
injunction did not include findings of fact and conclusions of
law required of interlocutory orders and 3) it contains a broad
prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment, i.e.,
particularly the provisions of Paragraphs 7 and 8. The Court
held a hearing on the motion on September 16, 2020.
II. Background
Sensitech is a Delaware corporation that manufactures and
sells products and services to monitor the quality, integrity
and security of its customers’ products during their transport
across a state or around the world. Mr. Alwash is an individual
who resides in Amsterdam, Netherlands and who is the Managing
Director, owner and sole-decision-maker of LimeStone. LimeStone
is a Dubai-based company that assists customers in the Middle
East by providing them with various devices to monitor their
products while they are being shipped.
In or about 2015, Sensitech and LimeStone executed a
Distributor Agreement (“the Agreement”), pursuant to which
LimeStone would buy products from Sensitech on credit, re-sell
them to end-users and then reimburse Sensitech. During the
business relationship, Sensitech submits that it disclosed
confidential information to LimeStone, including customer-
specific pricing, price lists, product development roadmaps and
Professional Services trade secrets, plans and documents.
The business relationship was terminated by Sensitech in
2018. It alleges that, at that time, LimeStone owed it
approximately $115,000 for products LimeStone had purchased on
credit. Sensitech contends that LimeStone has failed to pay its
debt or return the confidential information of Sensitech that
remains in the possession, custody or control of LimeStone.
In May, 2020, Sensitech brought an action in the
Massachusetts Superior Court to collect the debt and have its
confidential information returned. It also sought to enjoin
LimeStone from continuing to represent that LimeStone was an
authorized distributor of Sensitech’s products after the
Agreement expired and from attempting to sell Sensitech’s
products to end-users.
Sensitech alleged that Mr. Alwash and LimeStone engaged in
a variety of other activities designed solely to harm
Sensitech’s business. For example, Mr. Alwash allegedly posted
on LinkedIn a secretly recorded dinner conversation with a
Sensitech representative during which a variety of Sensitech’s
confidential information was discussed. Sensitech also asserts
that since it filed the action, Mr. Alwash published at least
three additional posts to his LinkedIn page stating that
Sensitech and its parent, Carrier, “is a criminal organization.”
Sensitech contends that the alleged conduct constitutes:
Breach of Contract by Limestone (Count I); Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing by LimeStone (Count II);
Conversion (Count III); Violation of the Massachusetts Trade
Secrets Act M.G.L. Ch. 93 § 42A (Count IV); Tortious
Interference (Count V); Common Law Misappropriation (Count VI);
Violation of M.G.L. Ch. 93A (Count VII); and Defamation (Count
VIII).
The case was removed to this Court on diversity grounds in
late May, 2020.
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
In June, 2020, Sensitech moved this Court to enter a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction
to prevent defendants Limestone and Mr. Alwash from 1) using or
disclosing any of Sensitech’s confidential information,
2) representing that either LimeStone or Mr. Alwash is an
authorized distributor of Sensitech’s products, or 3) attempting
to sell any Sensitech products; and to direct LimeStone and Mr.
Alwash 4) to return to Sensitech any of the company’s
confidential information in their control and 5) to remove any
postings of a recorded conversation involving a representative
of Sensitech on LimeStone’s LinkedIn page.
This Court held a hearing on Sensitech’s motion on June 4,
2020 (“the June hearing”). At that hearing, Mr. Alwash appeared
without counsel and presented no rebuttal in opposition to
Sensitech’s allegations or to the entry of a preliminary
injunction. He simply declared that this Court did not have
personal jurisdiction over him. After considering the written
and oral arguments, the Court found that 1) Sensitech had shown
a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims,
2) Sensitech will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of injunctive relief, 3) the balancing of the harms weighs in
its favor and 4) a preliminary injunction would not have a
detrimental effect on the public interest, citing Jean v. Mass.
State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2007). The Court
thereafter entered the preliminary injunction against
defendants.
III. Defendant’s Motion to Dissolve or Modify the Preliminary
Injunction Order
Defendants assert three grounds for vacating or modifying
the preliminary injunction entered against them: 1) the
injunction did not include findings of fact and conclusions of
law required of interlocutory orders, 2) the injunction was
entered against unrepresented parties and 3) it contains a broad
prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment.
1. The Court’s Factual Findings
The Court agrees with defendants that, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)(2), the order allowing the preliminary injunction
should more definitively spell out the reasons for its entry in
the first place. Accordingly, the Court adopts the
uncontradicted reasoning provided by Sensitech in its supporting
papers filed with its original motion, namely that it has shown
a likelihood that it can prove that defendants have:
1) breached the Distributor Agreement by
misappropriating Sensitech’s confidential
information, disclosing it publicly and refusing to
return it to Sensitech,
2) continued to represent to the public in the Middle
East that LimeStone was an authorized distributor of
Sensitech’s products after the expiration of their
Distributor Agreement,
3) posted on LimeStone’s LinkedIn page a
surreptitiously recorded conversation containing
confidential information of Sensitech and
4) published, or caused to be published, additional
posts on LinkedIn calling Sensitech “a criminal
organization” in an attempt to harass, defame and
tortuously interfere with Sensitech’s business.
The Court also concludes that Sensitech has demonstrated
that if LimeStone and Mr. Alwash are not enjoined, they would be
free to continue to use and disseminate Sensitech’s confidential
information and post clearly untruthful and defamatory
statements relating to Sensitech, making manifest and
significant the risk of irreparable harm to Sensitech if no
injunction is entered.
Finally, the Court agrees with Sensitech’s unrebutted claim
that LimeStone would not suffer any irreparable harm if enjoined
because the requested injunction simply prevents it from
wrongfully using or disseminating Sensitech’s confidential
information.
2. Unrepresented Parties
With respect to defendants’ argument that this Court should
dissolve the preliminary injunction on the ground that it was
issued against unrepresented parties, the Court is underwhelmed.
Pro se defendants are not immune from preliminary injunctions,
especially where, as here, the court held a hearing on the
injunction and gave defendants ample notice of that hearing and
an opportunity to be heard. Cf. Cok v. Family Court of Rhode
Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993) (vacating a preliminary
injunction entered against a pro se litigant because the court,
without providing notice to the litigant that an injunction
could be entered against him, had sua sponte enjoined the
litigant from filing any pro se actions in the district court).
3. Prior Restraints on Speech
Although there is a “strong presumption that prior
restraints on speech are unconstitutional,” a prior restraint
may be imposed when it furthers “the essential needs of the
public order.” Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 31-32 (1st
Cir. 2018) (quoting Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)); see Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957) (“The phrase ‘prior restraint’
is not a self-wielding sword.”).
To further the essential needs of the public, the prior
restraint must be “precisely tailored both to meet the
exigencies of the particular case and to avoid censoring
protected speech.” Id. at 32. If the party seeking the
injunction can establish that
the evil that would result from [the offending
publication] is both great and certain and cannot be
mitigated by less intrusive measures,
a prior restraint may be imposed. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S.
1315, 1317 (1994); see Sindi, 896 F.3d at 32.
To correct any undue censorship imposed upon defendants by
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original preliminary injunction and
yet maintain protection of Sensitech from irreparable harm, the
Court will modify those paragraphs to restrain the defendants
from posting on social media matters that
are clearly false, defamatory or designed to inflict
harm on Sensitech, including statements that
represent Limestone as an authorized distributor of
Sensitech’s products, that imply Sensitech is a
“criminal organization” and/or that disclose any
confidential information of Sensitech or Carrier.
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion to
dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction order (Docket No.
41) is ALLOWED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
The preliminary injunction entered by the Court on June 5,
2020, (Docket No. 23) is hereby vacated and replaced by the
“Amended Preliminary Injunction” entered this date.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated September 17, 2020