Case law

Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services

609 F. Supp. 2d 135 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 13, 2009

evenhandedly,” the court conducts the “Pike balancing test.” 72 According to the Pike balancing test, if the burden on interstate commerce is incidental, the state law “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly … As explained below, REBA’s argument would fail even under the second tier of *146 the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the burden on interstate commerce would be "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

Beausoleil v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

138 F. Supp. 2d 189 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2001

Under Massachusetts law, it is a crime to be on railroad tracks except at an established crossing. … As discussed below, cases decided by the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts confirm rather than qualify this conclusion.

Massachusetts v. E Trade Access, Inc.

464 F. Supp. 2d 52 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 21, 2006

In sum, relevant regulations and guidelines issued by the DOJ and the Access Board seem clearly to establish that built-in ATMs are facilities covered by the new construction mandate. … New York University, 1997 WL 249970 (S.D.N.Y.1997)(identifying qualified sign language interpreters); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F.Supp. 1160 (E.D.Mich.1994)(identifying interpreter for deaf patient); Bunjer v.

Duguay v. Spencer

765 F. Supp. 2d 90 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 22, 2011

In Massachusetts, however, polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible unless the reliability of the theory underlying polygraph testing is established by proof in a given case that a qualified tester who conducted the test … Johnson, testified that he had conducted over 5,000 polygraph examinations and that he was qualified as a polygraph expert in a large number of courts.

Bradley v. City of Lynn

443 F. Supp. 2d 145 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 8, 2006

City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650 , 656-57 (1st Cir.1985) (finding aggregation across years clearly erroneous where examinations were sufficiently different). … Landy states that the “scientific literature clearly illustrates the efficacy of such an approach” (Ex. 1, at 71-74), and Dr.

Thinking MacHines Corp. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department

211 B.R. 426 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 22, 1997

Determining which sales of services qualify for this out-of-state exemption is by no means a simple proposition. … This Court holds that the Bankruptcy Court’s adoption of this model was clearly erroneous.

Lawrence v. Dejoy

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 2025

P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). … Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012) (“[A] waiver of sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.”). Chapter 151B contains no such waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government.

Seaboard Surety Co. v. Town of Greenfield Ex Rel. Greenfield Middle School Building Committee

266 F. Supp. 2d 189 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2003

To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party must establish a trial-worthy issue by presenting enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the non-moving party.” … Under the Bond, Greenfield was clearly required to let Seaboard attempt to complete the Project, regardless of any questions it may have had about the surety’s time frame for completion.

Grafton and Upton R. Co. v. Town of Milford

337 F. Supp. 2d 233 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2004

Congress originally enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 1887 to establish a statutory scheme for regulating the nation’s railroads. … In the context of railroad regulation, in the CSX Transportation case, supra, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia explicitly granted jurisdiction to the STB and noted that it is “uniquely qualified to

Sullivan v. United States

113 F. Supp. 749 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 20, 1953

Their purpose is clearly to define the time within which certain preliminary action must be taken and thereafter the time within which an action must be commenced to recover a claimed tax refund. … The argument against the allowance is that the bequest to the church under clause 29 of decedent’s will does not qualify as a charitable bequest under § 812 (d) since it was conditional and not definitely ascertainable at

Powell v. Tompkins

926 F. Supp. 2d 367 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 28, 2013

A state court’s decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the … “Because the Strickland test qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ ” Williams v.

Papadopoulos v. Hartford Life Insurance

379 F. Supp. 2d 117 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 2005

“Disability” is defined as “any accidental bodily injury, sickness or pregnancy”. *121 Thus, the Plan establishes a two-period system. … Restitution is equitable in cases “where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession”. Id.

S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v. City of Springfield

318 F.R.D. 210 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 16, 2016

The FAPE requirement “establishes a basic floor of education.” Id. … In addition, counsel for the class must also demonstrate they are qualified and capable of representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).

Student Doe v. Perille

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 6, 2018

Privileges and Immunities Clause The “Privileges and Immunities Clause gives constitutional assurance that [t]he [c]itizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of … However, even assuming that Doe followed the procedures for homeless students set forth in BPS’s residency policy, it is unlikely that he qualifies as homeless under the McKinney-Vento Act.

Phonedoctorx, LLC v. Healthbridge Management, Inc.

58 F. Supp. 3d 152 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 7, 2014

Similarly, here, defendants’ alleged attorney’s fees qualify as damages under chapter 93A. … The provision that "[c]alls from a facility over 90 shall be charged at a fair market rate of ninety dollars ($90.00) per call” clearly refers to the prior sentence, which states "[i]n consideration of ... timely access to

Baxter v. Minter

378 F. Supp. 1213 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 1974

The Complaint alleges that a class of persons does exist which would qualify under Federal Rule 23. … The plaintiff argues that this language indicates a Congressional intent to establish a federal standard of need at least above the AFDC level.

Carye v. Long Beach Mortgage Co.

470 F. Supp. 2d 3 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 22, 2007

Long Beach contends that the language the plaintiffs point to is qualified by the list of appliances and goods that follow, all of which it contends are fixtures. Def.’s Mot. at 8. … The creditor must clearly disclose this rescission right to the debtor. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (b)(1).

Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine v. ImStem Biotechnology, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2018

“Conception is complete when‘the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.’” … Thus,the Court finds that, on this sparse record, Plaintiffs have not established that Dr.

Hed v. Murphy

518 B.R. 169 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 2014

I find that Hed has failed to establish that the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Further, I find that the Bankruptcy Court committed no errors of law. … Bankruptcy Court Erred By Approving the Trustee Commission Hed asserted below that Murphy’s trustee commission under 11 U.S.C. § 326 was improperly calculated because the commission was based on an amount that included non-qualifying

Raso v. Lago

958 F. Supp. 686 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 6, 1997

Of these 308, 152 former West End residents have represented that they qualify for the 58 low-income units, 100 that they qualify for the 48 moderate-income units, and 56 that they can afford the 77 market-rate units. … Massachusetts law requires three elements to create an express trust: an intent to create a trust; a clearly *700 identifiable trust res; and identifiable beneficiaries. Curran v.