Lawrence v. Dejoy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

JOAN LAWRENCE,

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Plaintiff,

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v. Civil Action No. 24-11326-BEM

)

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LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General, U.S.

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Postal Service,

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Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO AMEND

MURPHY, J.

This matter is before the Court on the motion by defendant Louis DeJoy (“Defendant”) to

dismiss the complaint (“Defendant’s Motion”) and the motion by plaintiff Joan Lawrence

(“Plaintiff”) to amend her complaint (“Plaintiff’s Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint alleging that the U.S. Postal Service

discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Massachusetts’s antidiscrimination law

(Chapter 151B). Dkt. No. 1. On January 24, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 14. On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition

to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 18, and a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint, Dkt. No. 17. Defendant opposed the motion for leave to file an amended complaint on

February 25, 2025. Dkt. No. 21. On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s

opposition.1 Dkt. No. 22.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A defendant may move to dismiss an action based on lack of federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the

Court has jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). “The First Circuit has

held that the proponent must clearly indicate the grounds upon which the Court may properly

exercise jurisdiction over the matter presented.” Excel Home Care, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &

Hum. Servs., 316 B.R. 565, 567 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus Telecomms.,

Inc., 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is black-letter law that jurisdiction must be apparent

from the face of the plaintiffs’ pleading.”))).

B. Motion to Amend

“A motion to amend a complaint will be treated differently depending on its timing and the

context in which it is filed.” Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2004).

Prior to the filing of a responsive pleading by the defendant, a plaintiff is permitted to amend a

complaint once as a matter of right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Thereafter, the permission of the court

or the consent of the opposing party is required.” Steir, 383 F.3d at 12. “The default rule mandates

that leave to amend is to be ‘freely given when justice so requires’ . . . unless the amendment

‘would be futile, or reward, inter alia, undue or intended delay.’” Id. (citations omitted); see also

1 The Court cautions Plaintiff that replies are not permitted without leave of the Court.

L.R., D. Mass. 7.1(b)(3).

Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a district court may deny

leave to amend when the request is characterized by “undue delay, bad faith, futility, [or] the

absence of due diligence on the movant’s part”).2

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) sovereign

immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims of state law violations and (2) Plaintiff may not assert state law

claims where Title VII provides the exclusive remedy.3 Dkt. 15 at 2–4. “It is ‘elementary’ that the

United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it has consented to be sued.” Skwira v.

United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,

538 (1980)); see also FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012) (“[A] waiver of sovereign immunity

must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.”). Chapter 151B contains no such waiver of

sovereign immunity by the federal government. See generally M.G.L. c. 151B. Further, Title VII

“provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.”

Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Plaintiff, as a former “federal employee,” “may not

bring state-law claims for retaliation and discrimination against a federal employer.” Young v.

Brennan, No. 16-cv-12001-FDS, 2017 WL 1843696, at *6 (D. Mass. May 8, 2017); see also

Pereira v. DeJoy, No. 23-cv-12133-RGS, 2024 WL 1676850, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2024)

2 Where a motion to amend is “made in derogation of a scheduling order, . . . Rule 16(b)’s

more stringent good cause standard” applies. U.S. ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 802 F.3d 188,

194 (1st Cir. 2015). Here, no scheduling order specified a deadline for amending the pleadings,

and thus Rule 15(a) governs.

3 Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiff had properly pled claims under Title VII, her

claims would fail because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. No. 15 at 5–6. In

opposition, Plaintiff argues that she exhausted her administrative remedies, attaching a copy of the

EEO dismissal. Dkt. Nos. 18, 19. The Court will address this argument infra with regards to

Plaintiff’s Motion.

(dismissing portions of claim “to the extent it alleges a retaliation claim under Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 151B”).

Plaintiff concedes these arguments in her opposition to Defendant’s Motion by seeking to

amend her complaint to assert only Title VII claims rather than state law claims. Dkt. 18. As such,

the Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s initial complaint. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States,

740 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims against the United

States unless the government has waived its sovereign immunity.”).

B. Motion to Amend

To oppose Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to add

Title VII claims and an additional defendant, the National Association of Letter Carrier, AFL-CIO

(the “Union”). Dkt. Nos. 17, 18. In determining whether to grant a motion to amend, the Court

must “examine the totality of the circumstances and . . . exercise its informed discretion in

constructing a balance of pertinent considerations.” Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30–31. “The default rule

mandates that leave to amend is to be ‘freely given when justice so requires’ . . . unless the

amendment ‘would be futile, or reward, inter alia, undue or intended delay.’” Steir, 383 F.3d at

12 (citations omitted). “Whether a proposed amendment is futile is gauged by reference to the

liberal criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Amyndas Pharms., S.A. v. Zealand

Pharma A/S, 48 F.4th 18, 40 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). As such, “the amended

complaint [must] contain[] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face . . . and contain[] no other fatal defects.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted). The Court must afford all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2013).

Defendant argues that amending the complaint is futile because Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as required under Title VII. Dkt. No. 21 at 2. “Title VII requires

exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit in federal district court.”

Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir. 1990). “An aggrieved person must initiate contact

with [an EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.”

29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1); see also Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 55 n.6 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[A]n

individual wishing to initiate a complaint against a federal agency . . . must contact an EEO

counselor within forty-five days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.”); Velazquez-Rivera

v. Danzig, 234 F.3d 790, 794 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that “administrative remedies had not been

exhausted, since there had been no contact with an [EEO] counselor within 45 days”). While

courts have recognized that some circumstances may permit equitable tolling of the forty-five-day

requirement, “[t]he First Circuit has taken a ‘narrow view’ of exhaustion requirements and

equitable tolling is not intended to protect a plaintiff who fails to exercise due diligence.” Bangura

v. Shulkin, 334 F. Supp. 3d 443, 457 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Frederique-Alexandre v. Dep’t of

Natural & Env’t. Res., 478 F.3d 433, 440 (1st Cir. 2007)). As such, “[e]quitable tolling requires

exceptional circumstances and a ‘heavy burden of proving entitlement to equitable relief lies with

the complainant.’” Id. (quoting Bartlett v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 749 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014)).

Plaintiff first argues that the time limit should not apply because she has not yet been

terminated. Dkt. No. 22 at 1–2. However, the trigger of the limitations period is the alleged

adverse employment action, which need not necessarily include termination. See, e.g., Velazquez-

Rivera, 234 F.3d at 794 (claim of harassment barred because plaintiff “fail[ed] to contact an EEOC

counselor within the limitations period”). Both Plaintiff’s original complaint and proposed

amended complaint describe receiving a notice of removal4 as part of the basis for her allegations.

Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 18; Dkt. No. 17-1 at ¶ 18. As the latest-in-time basis of her complaint, the notice

of removal is subject to the EEO requirement. See Ayala, 780 F.3d at 56 (alleged adverse

employment action triggers start of limitations period).

Plaintiff also appears to seek equitable tolling of the deadline, arguing that she was not

informed of the deadline when she met with her union representative on May 20, 2022, and that

she filed her EEO complaint promptly upon learning of the requirement. Dkt. No. 22 at 1–2.

However, “ordinarily there cannot be equitable tolling based on excusable ignorance if the plaintiff

had either actual or constructive knowledge of her statutory rights.” Bangura, 334 F. Supp. 3d at

457 (quoting Bartlett, 749 F.3d at 11). Here, Plaintiff had at least constructive knowledge of the

requirements. Dkt. No. 195 at 3 (“[T]he record contains an affidavit attesting to the fact that the

EEO poster is appropriately displayed at your facility. Additionally, the EEO Dispute Resolution

Specialist’s Inquiry Report contains a statement to that effect. Poster 72 informs employees or

applicant[s] for employment to contact the EEO office within 45 calendar days of the date of the

alleged discriminatory action or, if a personnel action is involved, within 45 calendar days of the

effective date of action.”); see also Bartlett, 749 F.3d at 11 (constructive notice where agency

4 Whether a notice of removal constitutes termination does not matter for the purposes of

assessing Plaintiff’s compliance with the limitations period.

5 While generally, “a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the

complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for

summary judgment,” Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33

(1st Cir. 2001), the Court may consider exhibits to a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment “for documents the authenticity of

which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs’

claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint,” see, e.g., Stanley v. American

Economy Insurance Co., No. 24-cv-10622-DJC, 2025 WL 509498, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2025);

Costa v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 24-cv-10961-DJC, 2024 WL 5057723, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 10,

2024); Evans v. Thompson, No. 14-13024-JGD, 2017 WL 1224538, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2017).

complied with posting requirements that detailed EEO filing requirements). Plaintiff does not

provide any facts to refute the claim that EEO requirements posted properly, and thus cannot meet

the “heavy burden of proving entitlement to equitable” tolling. See Bartlett, 749 F.3d at 10–11

(internal quotations and parentheses omitted) (party’s failure to refute claim that EEO requirements

posted properly fails to meet “burden of showing a lack of constructive knowledge of the filing

requirements”). Because Plaintiff failed to contact an EEO Counselor within the requisite period,

she did not exhaust her administrative remedies and any attempt to amend her complaint to allege

violations of Title VII against Defendant would be futile. See, e.g., Choroszy v. Wilkie, 544 F.

Supp. 3d 134, 138 (D. Mass. 2021); Velazquez-Rivera, 234 F.3d at 794.

Plaintiff’s Motion also seeks to add the Union as an additional defendant in this case. But

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local Rule 15.1(b) bars any attempt to add a new defendant. See

L.R. 15.1(b) (requiring 14 days’ notice to new defendant prior to motion to amend); see also Ortiz

v. Mara, 435 F. Supp. 3d 330, 332 (D. Mass. 2020) (“[Plaintiff] has not complied

with Local Rule 15.1 and for that reason alone, his motion to amend must be denied.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Motion (Dkt. No. 17) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Brian E. Murphy

Brian E. Murphy

Dated: March 14, 2025 Judge, United States District Court