Case law

Snow v. Harnischfeger Corp.

823 F. Supp. 22 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 20, 1993

As to this crane, uncontradicted record evidence establishes it was designed and fitted to meet the specific requirements of the RESCO plant, as noted above. … Parent, 408 Mass. at 111 , 556 N.E.2d 1009 (engineering company which installed electrical distribution panel within statute’s grant of immunity from suit); McDonough, 412 Mass. at 644 , 591 N.E.2d 1079 (supplier which “designed

Branch v. Federal Deposit Insurance

833 F. Supp. 56 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 10, 1993

receivership’s assets, the law has also traditionally demanded a correspondingly greater punctiliousness from claimants asserting federal tort claims under the FTCA since such claims are litigated in the shadow of sovereign immunity … Therefore, in consideration of FIR-REA’s policy objectives and by comparison to analogous eases under the FTCA, and in light of “the established rule of statutory construction that enactments limiting federal court jurisdiction

Glass Dimensions, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.

285 F.R.D. 169 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 2012

The record clearly demonstrates that the structure of the fee split was common across all of the lending funds. Accordingly, Plaintiff has presented sufficient common issues to meet the commonality prong of Rule 23(a). … As discussed above, Plaintiff presents the same claims as the rest of the proposed class, and is not subject to any unique defense. 79 Plaintiffs chosen counsel is qualified, experienced, and able to vigorously conduct the

Celester v. Rodriguez

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 24, 2023

Against the backdrop of the foregoing cases, the Appeals Court’s decision does not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. … For this reason, it simply cannot be held that the Appeals Court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.

Omosefunmi v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COM. OF MASS.

152 F. Supp. 2d 42 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 31, 2001

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), qualifies as clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court. See Phoenix v. Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Williams v. … The SJC’s decision was neither “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.

Lucien-Calixte v. David

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 1, 2018

The complaint specifically alleges that (1) defendants deprived plaintiff of clearly established and well-settled constitutional rights while acting under color of law in violation … Here, the defendants rely on grand jury immunity and insufficient factual allegations in the complaint.

Nuzzo v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

887 F. Supp. 28 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 23, 1995

Instead, the nonmoving party must adduce specific, provable facts which establish that there is a triable issue. Id. … At least with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court’s reasoning was sweeping: in the Court’s view, the origin and history of the Fourth Amendment “clearly show[ed] that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities

United States v. Turner

793 F. Supp. 2d 495 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 28, 2011

. § 2255 claiming that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his criminal trial, and (2) he does not qualify for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a). … If his argument is credited, his total number of predicate convictions would be reduced to two, and he would no longer qualify as an Armed Career Criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1).

Monahan Corp. N v. v. Whitty

319 F. Supp. 2d 227 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 1, 2004

They later say that they are entitled to the same relief under Rule 11 on even a lesser showing — i.e., they do not even have to establish bad faith. Defendants’ Memorandum, p. 16-17. … That, in turn, represents a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent that such fees are extracted from the public fisc. That, of course, presents special concerns.

Mayburg v. Heckler

574 F. Supp. 922 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 9, 1983

The propriety of defining a class so as to include persons who do not now but will in the future meet the requirements of the class definition is clearly established by precedent. E.g., Johnson v. … The Social Security Act should be broadly construed, so as to effectuate Congress’ intent to provide medical expense coverage for all qualifying individuals. Rodriguez v.

State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.

874 F. Supp. 451 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 11, 1995

Oivned Property Exclusion The insurer argues that it had no duty to defend the action arising out of that occurrence because the allegations clearly fell within the scope of the “owned property” exclusion. … Thus, even if there is sufficient daily involvement in management decisions to qualify as an operator for CERCLA pur *458 poses, this may well be insufficient to establish “control.”

BASF Corp. v. Sublime Restorations, Inc.

880 F. Supp. 2d 205 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 26, 2012

Based on his knowledge, skill, experience and training, Miller qualifies as an expert witness. … Plaintiff, however, fails to establish the amount of the contract fulfillment consideration payment as a matter of law.

Hines v. Hervey

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 26, 2018

sources of information, and (ii) those facts suffice to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.” … Hines clearly states that he asserts claims against the City Defendants in their official capacities only. (Docket #2 at ¶¶ 4-6).

McKee v. Cosby

236 F. Supp. 3d 427 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 16, 2017

“Thus, the speaker can immunize his statement from defamation liability by fully disclosing the non-defamatory facts on which his opinion is based.” … The First Circuit, however, did not consider whether the plaintiffs qualified as "public officials under the First Amendment." Id. at 775 n.3; cf.

Bean v. NICE Systems, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 30, 2025

qualify as “New Business.” … Bean argues that temporal proximity alone establishes the required casual connection—though this argument is not clearly briefed in his opposition—“consistent objections voiced throughout the year,” Opp. at 5, are not sufficiently

Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services

609 F. Supp. 2d 135 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 13, 2009

evenhandedly,” the court conducts the “Pike balancing test.” 72 According to the Pike balancing test, if the burden on interstate commerce is incidental, the state law “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly … As explained below, REBA’s argument would fail even under the second tier of *146 the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the burden on interstate commerce would be "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

Wade v. Clayton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 26, 2018

They were prepared “because of existing litigation” and, thus, qualify as work-product. … Finally, the defendants have not established a substantial need for the documents. The deposition of Mr.

Weichel v. Walsh

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 18, 2025

motions to dismiss for statute of limitations grounds and based on qualified immunity, except that the court granted dismissal on qualified immunity grounds as to the claim for failure to intervene. … None of these cases sheds any light on whether Boston may be deemed to have established a policy here.

Sylvia's Haven, Inc. v. Massachusetts Development Finance Agency

397 F. Supp. 2d 202 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 26, 2005

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the -deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. … The plaintiff asserts that nevertheless it cannot be said under the motion to dismiss standard that it will not be able to establish them.

Beausoleil v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

138 F. Supp. 2d 189 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2001

Under Massachusetts law, it is a crime to be on railroad tracks except at an established crossing. … As discussed below, cases decided by the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts confirm rather than qualify this conclusion.