Lucien-Calixte v. David

United States District Court

District of Massachusetts

)

Sandra Lucien Calixte, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

) 17-11312-NMG

Neal David and Town of )

Stoughton, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, J.

This case involves claims by Sandra Lucien Calixte

(“plaintiff” or “Calixte”) that defendant Officer Neal David

(“David”) and defendant Town of Stoughton (“Stoughton”)

(together, “defendants”) wrongly caused her arrest and

prosecution.1 Plaintiff asserts violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and M.G.L. c. 12, § 11l, as well as a claim of malicious

prosecution. Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings.

I. Background

Plaintiff avers that she lived with her aunt, Marie

Belfort-Bois (“Belfort-Bois”). Belfort-Bois suffered a stroke

1 Plaintiff mistakenly refers to “Neil” David and the “City” of

Stoughton throughout her complaint.

on January 22, 2013, and she subsequently entered Good Samaritan

Hospital (“the Hospital”), where she was hospitalized until

March, 2013. While at the Hospital, Belfort Bois suffered from

severe bed sores and low body temperature. She was fed

intravenously. From March, 2013, until June, 2013, Belfort-Bois

was in hospice care, after which she was discharged and returned

to plaintiff’s residence.

The complaint alleges Belfort-Bois required “round the

clock care for her basic needs.” Calixte, a registered nurse

and trained pulmonary therapist, handled the majority of

Belfort-Bois’s care after June, 2013. Plaintiff and her family

set up a makeshift hospital room in the unfinished basement of

her home. The room had a twin bed with a table, a small

television and another table with medication.

On February 16, 2014, plaintiff summoned emergency medical

help for Belfort-Bois. A first responder found Belfort-Bois to

be dehydrated and to be suffering from low oxygen saturation.

Belfort-Bois was re-admitted to the Hospital, and a nurse there

called the Stoughton Police to report “stuff that was very

troubling.” The nurse observed that Belfort-Bois had serious

bed sores, low body temperature, a soiled diaper, a dirty

feeding tube and other issues.

Officer David responded to the call, arrested the plaintiff

and filed an undisclosed charge against her. Plaintiff

contends she was arrested and that Officer David lied to a Grand

Jury as part of a malicious prosecution. She states David

claimed to a Grand Jury, that: 1) the basement in which

plaintiff cared for Belfort-Bois was half-finished, 2) Belfort-

Bois’ bed sores had been treated while she was at hospice care

and 3) a doctor told David that Belfort-Bois’s care was

definitely a case of neglect.

In July, 2014, Calixte was charged and arraigned in

Superior Court. She was tried and acquitted in 2017. She now

claims that during the prosecution Officer David admitted that

he may have become too emotionally invested in the prosecution

due to a death in his own family.

Calixte alleges she spent approximately $50,000 in legal

fees to defend herself in Superior Court. She seeks damages for

all of her legal fees as well as lost income as a result of her

damaged reputation as a registered nurse, and emotional

distress. She seeks punitive damages and equitable relief from

this Court to enjoin Officer David from filing false reports and

ordering him to submit to further police training.

The complaint specifically alleges that (1) defendants

deprived plaintiff of clearly established and well-settled

constitutional rights while acting under color of law in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) the Town of Stoughton

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by maintaining improper policies for

its law enforcement officers, (3) Officer David violated the

Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 12 § 11I and (4) he

maliciously prosecuted plaintiff, which act constituted false

imprisonment.

Pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Neal

David and the Town of Stoughton for judgment on the pleadings.

IV. Motion for judgement on the pleadings

Although a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the

pleadings considers the factual allegations in both the

complaint and the answer, it is governed by the same standard as

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Perez–Acevedo v. Rivero–

Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). To survive such a

motion, the subject pleading must contain sufficient factual

matter to state a claim for relief that is actionable as a

matter of law and “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). For a claim to be facially

plausible, the pleadings must show “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A

plaintiff cannot merely restate the defendant's potential

liability. Id.

In considering the merits of such a motion, the Court must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. R.G. Fin.

Corp. v. Vergara–Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). The

Court may also consider documents if 1) the parties do not

dispute their authenticity, 2) they are “central to the

plaintiffs' claim” or 3) they are “sufficiently referred to in

the complaint.” Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.

2007) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.

1993)).

a. Count I – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Officer

David

Defendant submits that Officer David is entitled to

absolute immunity and that plaintiff has not stated a claim

against the Town of Stoughton because the allegations arise from

his grand jury testimony.

Grand jury witnesses, including law enforcement officers,

are absolutely immune from § 1983 claims based upon grand jury

testimony. Rehrberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012).

Plaintiff’s claim is based on the allegation that “David

repeatedly provided false information to the jury.”

Accordingly, Officer David has absolute immunity against

§ 1983 claims arising from his grand jury testimony and his

motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with respect to Count

I, be allowed.

b. Count II – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Town

of Stoughton

The Town submits that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient

facts to support her claim that it had a policy amounting to

deliberate indifference to her rights under § 1983.

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for

constitutional violations if the execution of a municipality’s

“official policy [serves] as the moving force of the

constitutional violation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The complaint

alleges no facts pertaining to any official policy of the Town

of Stoughton besides the conclusory charges that Stoughton had a

policy or custom of deliberate indifference to misconduct

by police officers [and a] policy or custom of tolerating a

code of silence.

It is unlikely that either allegation sufficiently “serves as

the moving force” of the constitutional violations in this case.

In any event, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are

insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555).

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with

respect to Count II, be allowed.

c. Count III – Violation of the Massachusetts Civil

Rights Act

Notwithstanding certain exceptions that do not bear on the

present case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“the

SJC”) interprets MCRA “to provide a remedy under M.G.L. c. 12 §

11I, coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Duarte v. Healy, 405

Mass. 43, 47 (1989). Because, as explained above, no cause of

action may arise from grand jury testimony, plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Cf. Seelig v.

Harvard Co-op. Soc., 355 Mass. 532, 538 (1969) (holding that

pertinent statements made in the course of judicial proceedings

are absolutely privileged in action alleging slander and libel).

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with

respect to Count III, be allowed.

d. Count IV – Malicious Prosecution

The absolute immunity that applies to statements made in

judicial proceedings applies to all theories of tort. Correllas

v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991). Similarly, the

Massachusetts Tort Claims Act prohibits municipal liability from

attaching in “any claim arising out an intentional tort,

including . . . malicious prosecution[.]” M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c);

Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (2012)

(“The Act expressly exempts intentional torts from its

provisions, and therefore a public employer cannot be sued for

the intentionally tortious conduct of its employee.”). Thus,

Calixte fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution upon

which relief can be granted.

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with

respect to Count IV, be allowed.

V. Leave to amend

Plaintiff submits that, should the Court allow the motion

for judgment on the pleadings, she should be provided a

reasonable period in which to file a motion to amend her

complaint, which she will support with additional factual

allegations.

A district court “should freely give leave [to amend] when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where a movant

evinces futility, bad faith, undue delay, or a dilatory motive,

amendment is not warranted. See Grant v. News Group Boston,

Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). Amending a complaint is

futile if the amended complaint “could not withstand a 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss.” Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their

Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Rose v.

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.

2000)).

Here, the defendants rely on grand jury immunity and

insufficient factual allegations in the complaint. Plaintiff

maintains that the added allegations will establish that Officer

David committed actions prior to his grand jury testimony

sufficient to state the alleged claims. With the exception of

the malicious prosecution claim against the Town of Stoughton,

which will be dismissed with prejudice, the Court concludes that

amendment of the pleadings would not be futile. Accordingly,

the Court will allow plaintiff to amend her complaint.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendants Neal

David and the Town of Stoughton for judgment on the pleadings

(Docket No. 18) is ALLOWED. Count IV is, with respect to the

Town of Stoughton, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is

permitted to file an amended complaint, if any, on or before

Wednesday, August 22, 2018.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____

Nathaniel M. Gorton

United States District Judge

Dated August 1, 2018