Case law

State v. Glasby

185 N.W.2d 726 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 9, 1971

Appellant challenges admission of the exhibit on the ground that the “witness is not qualified as an expert, no proper foundation and exhibit ‘A’ has not been shown as a regular part of the regular records of the school.” … being offered as evidence df the truth of the contents of reports contained in the folder without producing the persons from whom the evidence originated for cross-examination, the material was hearsay and was not shown to qualify

Stout v. City Fire Insurance Co. of New Haven

12 Iowa 371 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 4, 1861

The testimony clearly shows that the plaintiff, as assignee, held the policy by virtue of said assignment, and as collateral security for an indebtedness of Longhurst to plaintiff. … After an examination of those cited in the briefs, so far as we have been able to refer to them, we come to the conclusion that where there are no qualifying circumstances controlling the same, the weight of authority supports

Second Injury Fund Of Iowa Vs. Nancy M. Kratzer

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 29, 2010

The interpretation of the workers’ compensation statute has not been clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the commissioner. Finch v. … a first qualifying injury.

State of Iowa v. Eddie Tipton

897 N.W.2d 653 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 23, 2017

In addition, the minutes reveal the State attempted to work out an immunity agreement with Johnston. … “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’”

Montanick Ex Rel. Montanick v. McMillin

225 Iowa 442 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 21, 1938

If it did, then, clearly, MeMillin did not maintain the proper lookout, for he himself testified that he did not see the boys. … Clearly, the question of whether he maintained a proper lookout was one for the jury to pass upon. III.

C. R. & M. R. R. v. Herring

52 Iowa 687 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 15, 1879

Clearly the state did not have the power without the assent of congress to grant the lands in aid of the longer to the shorter road. … We think the words “ per mile” are words of limitation, and control, qualify and restrain the words “same lands” and “ same amount of lands,” and that the clause in question should be read and construed as if it had been

Burgmaier v. Iowa Department of Human Services

570 N.W.2d 109 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 22, 1997

,]” and the inquiry “focuses on whether the agency has made a decision clearly against reason and evidence.” Frank v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 386 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 1986). III. Analysis. … This statutory scheme therefore strongly suggests that a terminated parent does not qualify as a parent under the confidentiality statute, and this is supported by our common law.

Walker v. Mlakar

489 N.W.2d 401 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 22, 1992

Although an employer is always immune from common law tort liability, an injured worker may maintain a common law tort action against a coemployee to recover for injuries only if the employee can establish that his or her … In exchange, the employer and coemployees are given immunity from common law tort liability.

Evans v. Howard R. Green Co.

231 N.W.2d 907 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 31, 1975

The city was dismissed as a defendant under the theory of governmental immunity. Green’s special appearance seeking dismissal under the governmental immunity theory was overruled. … The question of Green’s right to indemnity against Dory was a matter of construction and clearly one which should have been decided by the court and not submitted to the jury. V.

Clear Lake Co-Operative Live Stock Shippers' Ass'n v. Weir

200 Iowa 1293 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 15, 1925

It is permissive in character, and clearly additional tc the usual remedies provided by law. … It has been repeatedly held by this court that, in order to make the .remedy exclusive, the intention to do so must clearly^appear. Hefner v. Haynes, 89 Iowa 616 ; Hallowell v.

Smith v. Thompson

219 Iowa 888 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 11, 1934

The constitution clearly contemplates more than a single or “last reading” of the bill but makes no specific provision therefor. … The motive of the legislature is thus clearly expressed. The measure was deemed essential under prevailing conditions.

Hutchins v. City of Des Moines

176 Iowa 189 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 6, 1916

In some statutes adopted prior to Section 1089, Code, 1897, the distinction is not so clearly observed as in those subsequently adopted. … The remaining three sections relate to salaries, terms of office, and the establishment of judicial districts.

Papadakis v. Iowa State University of Science & Technology

574 N.W.2d 258 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 18, 1997

evaluation process and delineated in Jerry Jenison’s memo dated July 8, 1991, there is a great deal of importance placed on researchers generating outside support for their work since funding from state appropriations is clearly … Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Iowa 1973) (state by entering into contract agrees to be answerable for its breach and waives its immunity from suit to that extent).

Duhaime v. Rowe

179 Iowa 541 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 12, 1917

court of Monona County, and letters of administration were issued to him by the clerk of said court, and he duly qualified and gave bond. … In some cases, it is suggested that a man's residence is a matter to be determined by his own intention; but it clearly appears that when one has a fixed residence at a particular place, a residence where he abides with his

Royal Indemnity Co. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co.

786 N.W.2d 839 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 11, 2010

These are clearly different inspections. … Pro Tanto Issue and Iowa’s Immunity Statute. FM contends that Iowa’s inspection immunity statute, Iowa Code section 517.5, *853 bars Royal’s contract and negligence claims.

Christopher J. Godfrey v. State of Iowa, Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, in His Official Capacity, Brenna Findley, Legal Counsel to the Governor of the State of Iowa, in Her Official Capacity

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 30, 2021

The jury  20 found Boeyink was entitled to qualified immunity. The State of Iowa, Governor Branstad, and Bird timely filed this appeal. … The State of Iowa qualifies as an “employer.” Id. § 216.2(7).

Nishnabotna Valley Rural Electric Cooperative v. Iowa Power & Light Co.

161 N.W.2d 348 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 17, 1968

Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity. “3. In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. “4. … The legislature clearly prohibited commission regulation of cooperative rates. 2 The direct prohibition cannot be avoided by indirection.

Sioux City Community School District v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction

402 N.W.2d 739 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 18, 1987

That authority is clearly granted by sections 50SA.1 and 279.12. The issue is whether there is any limitation on that authority once the decision to provide insurance has been made. … Since commencement of this appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that WEAIT does not qualify as an employee welfare benefit plan under section 3(1) of ERISA.

Iowa State Education Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Board

369 N.W.2d 793 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 19, 1985

As part of its responsibility to administer the PER Act, PERB maintains lists of qualified persons to serve as mediators, fact finders, and arbitrators under the impasse procedures for public employee bargaining contained … Such a recommendation runs counter to the purposes of mandatory public employee bargaining which the PER Act establishes.

Brooke v. American Savings Bank

207 Iowa 668 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 15, 1927

The burden is upon the appellant to show that there is a valid release of Moore and Kingsbury, before it has established the facts upholding its contention that the bond signed by it is a “substitute bond.” … must be strictly pursued; otherwise the new bond is merely cumulative, and the old sureties, remain bound. ’ ’ The court in said-case further said, with reference to the tailing of the successive bonds: “* * * they are clearly