Christopher J. Godfrey v. State of Iowa, Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, in His Official Capacity, Brenna Findley, Legal Counsel to the Governor of the State of Iowa, in Her Official Capacity

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–1954

Submitted March 24, 2021—Filed June 30, 2021

Amended September 14, 2021

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY,

Appellee,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, TERRY BRANSTAD, Governor of the State of Iowa, in

His Official Capacity, BRENNA FINDLEY, Legal Counsel to the Governor

of the State of Iowa, in Her Official Capacity,

Appellants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Brad McCall,

Judge.

Defendants appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff on his claims

for sexual-orientation discrimination and retaliation arising under the

Iowa Civil Rights Act and violations of his due process rights under the

Iowa Constitution. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. Appel, J., filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part. McDermott, J., filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Christensen, C.J.,

joined.

Debra Hulett (argued), Frank Harty, Katie Graham, and David

Bower of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

2

Roxanne Conlin (argued), Devin Kelly, and Jean Mauss of Roxanne

Conlin & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

3

McDONALD, Justice.

In November 2010, Republican Terry Branstad defeated incumbent

Democratic Governor Chet Culver. While transitioning into office,

Governor-elect Branstad sent a form letter to thirty executive branch

officers appointed by prior Democratic administrations and requested

each submit a letter of resignation. Iowa Workers’ Compensation

Commissioner Christopher Godfrey received the form letter and refused to

resign. After Godfrey refused to resign, the Governor reduced Godfrey’s

compensation within a range fixed by statute.

Godfrey, who is gay, sued the State, the Governor, the Lieutenant

Governor, members of the Governor’s staff, and other state employees for,

among other things, sexual-orientation discrimination and retaliation

under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code §§ 216.1–.21 (2011), and

violations of Godfrey’s constitutional right to be paid a particular salary.

A jury found in favor of Godfrey. On appeal, the defendants claim they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the defendants

contend they are entitled to a new trial because the district court

committed numerous procedural, evidentiary, and instructional errors.

We need not address the procedural, evidentiary, and instructional errors

because we conclude the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter

of law with respect to all claims notwithstanding any errors.

I.

Terry Branstad was first elected Governor of Iowa in 1982. The

citizens of Iowa reelected him in 1986, 1990, and 1994. Governor

Branstad did not seek reelection in 1998 and decided to retire from public

life. He obtained a position in the private sector as President of Des Moines

University, an osteopathic school of medicine. At the time he was hired,

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Branstad committed to the trustees of the university that he would stay

out of and away from politics while serving in the position.

In January 1999, Governor Branstad was succeeded in office by

Democratic Governor Thomas Vilsack. In 2005, Governor Vilsack’s chief

of staff communicated with relevant stakeholders to find candidates for

the position of workers’ compensation commissioner. The chief of staff

forwarded three names to Governor Vilsack, including Godfrey, who was

advanced and promoted by the Iowa Trial Lawyers Association, an

association of lawyers who primarily represent plaintiffs or claimants. In

forwarding Godfrey’s name to the Governor, the chief of staff noted “the

current commissioner is concerned about [Godfrey’s] ability to be

confirmed.” Despite the reservations, Governor Vilsack nominated

Godfrey to serve as the workers’ compensation commissioner. Governor

Vilsack knew Godfrey was gay and thought the nomination was important

to reflect the diversity in the state.

Governor Vilsack testified the Iowa Association of Business and

Industry (ABI) was opposed to Godfrey’s appointment because of Godfrey’s

lack of administrative experience within the agency and because of its

concern that Godfrey lacked an employer’s perspective. ABI has more than

1000 business members and advocates for positions it believes will

improve the business climate in Iowa and encourage employers to expand

in or move to Iowa. ABI is a “very powerful organization” and regularly

communicates its position on individuals and policies to elected officials.

Governor Vilsack testified he listened to “groups like ABI and consider[ed]

their concerns.” After the administration provided more information to

ABI regarding Godfrey’s experience, ABI moved from opposed to neutral

with respect to Godfrey’s nomination.

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In April 2006, Governor Vilsack withdrew Godfrey’s nomination

when it became apparent Godfrey would not obtain the necessary number

of votes in the Iowa Senate needed for confirmation. Governor Vilsack

then appointed Godfrey to serve as interim commissioner for the

remainder of Godfrey’s predecessor’s term.

After being reelected once, Governor Vilsack decided not to run for

reelection. His second term expired in January 2007, and he was

succeeded in office by Governor Culver. As Governor Vilsack’s second

term was winding down, he asked all executive branch officers he

appointed, including those appointed to a term of years, to submit letters

of resignation so Governor Culver could make his own choices. Governor

Vilsack thought “the new governor could decide for himself who should be

[w]orkers’ [c]ompensation commissioner.” Governor Vilsack sent a letter

to Godfrey requesting Godfrey submit a letter of resignation to the

incoming administration for the purpose of “facilitating a smooth

transition to a new administration.” The chair of Governor-elect Culver’s

transition team sent a similar letter to Godfrey. Godfrey complied with

Governor Vilsack’s and Governor-elect Culver’s requests and submitted

his letter of resignation.

In January 2007, Governor Culver nominated Godfrey for the

position of workers’ compensation commissioner. In April, the senate

confirmed the appointment for the remainder of the prior commissioner’s

term. In February 2009, Governor Culver nominated Godfrey for a new

term as workers’ compensation commissioner. The Iowa Senate

unanimously confirmed the appointment. During the confirmation

process in 2009, Democratic Senator Tom Courtney ran into newly elected

Senator (now Governor) Kim Reynolds in the capitol lobby lounge and

introduced Godfrey and his partner to Reynolds. Pursuant to statute,

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Godfrey’s term was six years, commencing May 1, 2009, and ending April

30, 2015. See Iowa Code § 69.19 (2009); id. § 86.1.

At trial, many witnesses testified that Godfrey was openly gay and

that it was common knowledge Godfrey was openly gay. Governor Vilsack,

Democratic Senator Mike Gronstal, Democratic Senator Courtney, and

Democratic Senator Matt McCoy, among others, testified Godfrey’s sexual

orientation was common knowledge among legislators. Many of the deputy

workers’ compensation commissioners and commission staff testified it

was common knowledge within the workers’ compensation commission

that Godfrey was gay.

Starting in the fall of 2009, a number of people approached Branstad

and asked him to run for governor again. Branstad decided he would

again seek the governorship. He hired Jeff Boeyink to serve as his

campaign manager. During the campaign, Branstad met with thousands

of business owners across the state and a “couple of themes emerged.”

First, was the need for property tax relief. Second, Branstad heard

repeated complaints regarding workers’ compensation and the workers’

compensation commissioner. Branstad heard the commissioner, “in the

way he conducted his office, was anti-employer, was biased against

employers, and that was hurting the ability of some of these businesses to

compete.” Branstad heard similar complaints from ABI, the Iowa Motor

Truck Association, self-insured companies, lawyers representing self-

insured companies, BPI (a large meat processor), and other businesses.

Another issue that arose during the campaign was same-sex

marriage. In 1998, the legislature passed the Defense of Marriage Act

(DOMA). The act provided that “[o]nly a marriage between a male and a

female is valid.” 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1099, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code

§ 595.2 (1999)). The bill was passed by the Iowa Senate by a vote of 40–9.

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Democratic Minority Leader Gronstal and then-Senator Vilsack voted in

favor of DOMA. In April 2009, in the case of Varnum v. Brien, this court

held that “the language in Iowa Code section 595.2 limiting civil marriage

to a man and a woman [is unconstitutional and] must be stricken from the

statute.” 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009). At the time of the Varnum

decision, Governor Culver issued a press release stating he “personally

believe[d] that marriage is between a man and a woman.” However, he

was “reluctant” to support an amendment to the Iowa Constitution that

would define marriage as between one man and one woman and effectively

overrule Varnum. Branstad and Republican Brenna Findley n/k/a Bird,

who was running for the office of attorney general, were, at that time, in

favor of overturning Varnum with a constitutional amendment or at least

in favor of allowing Iowans the opportunity to vote on a proposed

amendment.

Branstad defeated Governor Culver in the 2010 election. In the days

following the election, Governor-elect Branstad announced Boeyink would

serve as his chief of staff and Bird would serve as his legal counsel. Like

Governors Vilsack and Culver, Governor-elect Branstad sought the

resignation of appointed executive branch officers. Boeyink and the

transition team created a list of these officers, including those who served

at the pleasure of the governor and those appointed for fixed terms. On

December 3, 2010, Boeyink sent form letters under the Governor-elect’s

signature to thirty officers, including seven officers appointed to a fixed

term of years, asking for letters of resignation. Godfrey was one of the

thirty who received a resignation request. Although the form letter was

sent to twenty-nine other executive branch officers, Godfrey testified he

believed this letter was sent to him because he was gay.

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Twenty-seven of the thirty officers who received the resignation-

request letters submitted their respective resignation letters. Three

officers sent letters declining to submit a letter of resignation: Godfrey;

David Neil, Labor Commissioner; and Steve Larson, Administrator of the

Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD).

After receiving letters from Godfrey, Neil, and Larson, the Governor-

elect met with Boeyink to discuss options. Boeyink presented the

Governor-elect with several options: accept the refusals and do nothing

further; meet with these individuals, reiterate the resignation request and

discuss the issue further; and publicly raise the issue and be more

aggressive in seeking the resignations.

The Governor-elect decided to meet with the three individuals. The

meetings were scheduled consecutively for thirty minutes each on

December 29. Governor-elect Branstad, then-Lieutenant Governor-elect

Reynolds, and Boeyink attended the meetings. In his meeting with the

Governor-elect, Neil stated he was a “short-termer” because his term

expired in a few months. He requested to stay on and smooth the

transition to the person the Governor-elect wanted to appoint, Michael

Mauro. The Governor-elect agreed. In his meeting with the Governor-

elect, Larson explained that he had cleaned up the ABD and that it was

functioning well. Larson asked the Governor’s Office to confirm the

information with Auditor of State David Vaudt.

In his meeting with the Governor-elect, Godfrey expressed his belief

that he was entitled to serve the remainder of his term. Godfrey discussed

why he should be allowed to serve in the position based on his past job

performance. On the day of the meeting, Mike Ralston, President of ABI,

forwarded to Boeyink an email from John Gilliland, Senior Vice President

of Government Relations at ABI. The email identified four issues ABI had

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with Commissioner Godfrey. Governor-elect Branstad raised these points

during the meeting with Godfrey, and Godfrey responded to each. Godfrey

testified the meeting was very cordial, productive, and went really well.

When Godfrey returned to his office, he thought everything would be fine

and wrote thank you notes. Godfrey’s sexual orientation did not come up

during this meeting. This meeting was the first and only time Governor

Branstad met Godfrey.

Like Governors Vilsack and Culver, Governor Branstad’s personal

beliefs regarding same-sex marriage had no apparent bearing on his

appointment of and employment of gay individuals. In February 2011,

less than two months after meeting with Godfrey, Branstad appointed

Doug Hoelscher, an openly gay man, to serve as the Director of the State–

Federal Relations Office. Branstad spent considerable time with

Hoelscher, attended conferences with Hoelscher, and attended social

events with Hoelscher and his long-time partner.

Between 2003 and 2007, Steve Churchill, who is openly gay, served

with Branstad as the Vice President of Development and Alumni Relations

at Des Moines University. In 2017, Branstad resigned his position as

Governor and began serving as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of

China. Branstad was allowed only to bring one employee with him to

China—a chief of staff. Branstad hired Churchill for the position and

testified Churchill is the person he relies on most. Churchill described his

working relationship with Governor Branstad:

I’ve known him 37 years, worked for him five times. I’ve seen

him in public and in private. I’ve never heard him say

anything derogatory or insensitive or in any way demeaning

to anyone based on their sexual orientation or really any

protected class of individuals. He’s a very thoughtful, caring

individual. If he had done that, I would not be here today. I

would not work for him. I would not work for someone who I

think is intolerant.

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Churchill testified he would never work for someone who discriminated

against others, concluding, “I’m too old, I’m too gray, and I’m too gay to

tolerate anyone who is intolerant. I wouldn’t do it. It just doesn’t make

any sense.”

After the December 29, 2010, meeting, the Governor’s Office did not

discuss the issue of resignations any further and turned its attention to

other matters, including drafting speeches, filling other positions, and

preparing for the legislative session. The Great Financial Crisis left the

state’s budget in bad shape, spurring an unusually busy and long

legislative session that ran until June 30, 2011. The Governor’s Office had

no contact with Godfrey during this time period regarding his position.

However, Boeyink received communications from ABI leadership that

workers’ compensation benefits in Iowa were too generous and making

Iowa uncompetitive. ABI explained multistate employers identified the

costs of workers’ compensation in Iowa compared to other states as a

significant factor when making business decisions.

As the legislative session was winding down, Governor Branstad

returned to the issue of Larson’s and Godfrey’s refusals to resign. In late

June, the Governor held a meeting with Boeyink and Bird. This was Bird’s

first involvement with the issue. Bird took no part in the decision to send

the resignation requests or the December 29 meetings because she was

still transitioning into her role as legal counsel. In the June meeting, the

Governor told Boeyink and Bird he no longer sought the resignation of

Larson; Auditor Vaudt confirmed Larson had made significant

improvements in the finances of ABD. The Governor requested Boeyink

inform Larson. The Governor decided he still sought Godfrey’s resignation.

The Governor requested Bird review some workers’ compensation cases

and prepare legal options with respect to Godfrey’s position.

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Governor Branstad, Boeyink, and Bird reconvened on July 5. Bird

made an oral presentation regarding several workers’ compensation

decisions issued while Godfrey was serving as commissioner. Her

summation of the cases “validated the governor’s previously held belief

about Mr. Godfrey’s anti-employer bias.” Bird reviewed the statutory

grounds authorizing removal from office under Iowa Code section 66.26

(2011), which provides the executive council of the state can remove an

appointed officer upon a majority vote for specific causes. Bird also

reviewed the statute allowing the Governor to set the commissioner’s

salary. See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1191, §§ 13–14. Section 14 of the statute

provided a salary range for the workers’ compensation commissioner

between $73,250 and $112,070. See id. § 14. At the time, Godfrey was

being paid at the top of the statutory salary range.

Governor Branstad was the sole decision-maker regarding the

commissioner’s position and salary, and Branstad made two decisions

relevant to this case. First, the Governor concluded there was no statutory

basis to remove Godfrey from office. Second, based on the complaints he

had received from his constituents regarding Godfrey’s performance, the

Governor decided the commissioner did not deserve to be paid at the top

of the salary range and lowered the commissioner’s salary to the lowest

amount within the statutory range. Governor Branstad directed Boeyink

to set up a meeting with Godfrey to again request his resignation. If

Godfrey did not resign, the Governor directed Boeyink to communicate

that the Governor had decided to lower the commissioner’s salary.

Boeyink’s assistant emailed Godfrey on July 6 and scheduled a

meeting for July 11. In preparation for the meeting, Bird performed

electronic research regarding Godfrey’s appointment. She wanted to

confirm the dates of appointment and duration of Godfrey’s term. On

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July 8, Bird came across a blog post that indicated Godfrey was gay. Bird

testified the post did not appear particularly reliable. She decided not to

tell the Governor because it was not relevant to the Governor’s decision,

but she did present the information to Boeyink. Boeyink agreed the

information was not relevant because the Governor had already made the

decision. Boeyink chose not to inform the Governor.

On the morning of July 11, Boeyink and Bird met with Godfrey. This

was only the second time Boeyink met Godfrey and was the first and only

time Bird met Godfrey. Prior to the meeting, ABI Senior Vice President

Gilliland sent Boeyink an email regarding Iowa’s workers’ compensation

premiums. Boeyink could not recall if he read the email prior to the

meeting, during the meeting, or after the meeting. At the meeting, the

parties exchanged pleasantries. Boeyink informed Godfrey the Governor

again requested Godfrey’s resignation, and Godfrey refused. Boeyink then

informed Godfrey the Governor had decided to reduce Godfrey’s salary to

the lowest amount within the statutory range effective immediately. The

meeting lasted only a few minutes. Godfrey’s sexual orientation was not

mentioned during the meeting.

Godfrey quickly spread the news of his salary reduction. He tried to

contact the attorney general to see if the Division of Criminal Investigation

would intervene and launch an investigation of Governor Branstad for

blackmail or extortion. Godfrey also contacted multiple legislators the

same day to see if they would intervene. After the meeting with Godfrey,

Boeyink received a phone call from Senator William Dotzler. Dotzler told

Boeyink that “you guys might want to consider the action you’re taking on

Chris Godfrey. He is an openly gay man, and that can be an issue coming

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down the road.” Boeyink told Senator Dotzler, “I appreciate that. I don’t

think I can talk about this. I thank you for the call.”1

Godfrey and people acting on his behalf worked with others to leak

the story of his salary reduction to the press on July 11. The day after

Godfrey leaked the story to the press, Governor Branstad conducted a

radio interview. In response to a caller’s question regarding Godfrey, the

Governor stated he believed the governor should have the ability to choose

his own team to help the state attract more business and jobs and make

the state more competitive. He also stated he, as governor, should be the

one to choose the workers’ compensation commissioner. With respect to

satisfaction with the current commissioner, the Governor said, “Talk to the

Iowa Association of Business and Industry. They are the ones that

encouraged me to make a change there.”

The following day, Godfrey made a public accusation that the

defendants had discriminated against him on the basis of his sexual

orientation. Branstad testified this was the first time he heard Godfrey

was gay.

In January 2012, Godfrey sued the State of Iowa; Governor

Branstad; Lieutenant Governor Reynolds; Boeyink; Bird; Teresa Wahlert,

Director of Iowa Workforce Development, who had supervisory authority

over the Division of Workers’ Compensation; and Tim Albrecht,

Communications Director to the Governor. In Godfrey’s amended petition,

he asserted nineteen different claims against the various defendants,

including claims arising under the ICRA and the Iowa Constitution.

1At trial, Senator Dotzler testified he mentioned Godfrey’s sexual orientation to

Boeyink while the two were attending an event at the Iowa Speedway in the spring of

2011. Boeyink denied Senator Dotzler had raised Godfrey’s sexual orientation at any

point prior to this phone call.

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This case has come before this court on interlocutory appeal on two

occasions. On the first occasion, we addressed the issue of immunity for

state employees under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See Godfrey v. State

(Godfrey I), 847 N.W.2d 578, 582–83 (Iowa 2014). On the second occasion,

we addressed whether Godfrey could sue for monetary damages for

violations of the Iowa Constitution. See Godfrey v. State (Godfrey II), 898

N.W.2d 844, 871–72 (Iowa 2017). A majority of this court held the due

process and equal protection provisions of the Iowa Constitution were self-

executing and a plaintiff could assert a claim for monetary damages for

alleged violations of the same. See id. A different majority of the court

concluded, however, that Godfrey’s claims for alleged violations of his

constitutional rights predicated on sexual-orientation discrimination were

not cognizable because the ICRA provided an adequate remedy. See id. at

880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 882

(Mansfield, J., dissenting). Although this court held Godfrey could assert

a claim for monetary damages for violations of the due process clause of

the Iowa Constitution based on conduct unrelated to sexual-orientation

discrimination, this court did not define the nature, scope, or elements of

any such claim.

Godfrey’s case came on for trial in June 2019. By that time, Godfrey

had already resigned from his position as commissioner. He left the

position in August 2014 and took a position with the Department of Labor

in Washington, D.C. By the time of trial, some of the original defendants

and most of the original claims had been dismissed. The remaining

defendants were the State of Iowa, Governor Branstad, Boeyink, and Bird.

The remaining claims were for sexual-orientation discrimination and

retaliation in violation of the ICRA and claims for violations of Godfrey’s

rights to substantive and procedural due process. With respect to his

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constitutional claims, Godfrey contended he had a “constitutionally

protected property interest in continuing his annual salary at the level it

was at when Defendant Branstad took office as Governor of the State of

Iowa” and the defendants violated that right in reducing his salary within

the statutory range.

A great deal of trial time was spent trying to prove the Republican

Party of Iowa, ABI, and their respective members and employees held

political positions that were “anti-gay.” The district court allowed the

evidence because, if the party were “anti-gay,” then proof of affiliation with

the Republican Party of Iowa would “make it more likely that a particular

action was motivated by anti-gay animus.” The district court reasoned the

defendants’ party affiliation, in and of itself, would show it was “more

probable the employment actions taken against Godfrey were due to his

sexual orientation.” Similarly, the district court reasoned that if ABI were

anti-gay, then it would make it more likely that Governor Branstad was

motivated by discriminatory animus.

The plaintiff’s evidence took several forms. Over the defendants’

objections, the plaintiff was allowed to present or elicit evidence regarding

the defendants’ views, other Republican politicians’ views, and ABI

employee Gilliland’s views on legal and political issues unrelated to the

employment discrimination alleged in this case. The jury heard testimony

regarding the Varnum decision, same-sex marriage, proposed

amendments to the Iowa Constitution, same-sex adoption, anti-bullying

laws, gubernatorial proclamations regarding gay rights, and Governor

Branstad’s failure to send an email to state employees regarding Pride

Month. Gilliland was asked whether he agreed with Varnum, whether he

supported an amendment to the Iowa Constitution, whether his preference

for his own marriage was between a man and a woman, whether he

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supported same-sex adoption, whether he believed “gay marriage has

caused ancient societies to crumble,” and whether he personally knew any

“homosexual couples who are raising children.”

Over the defendants’ objection, the district court allowed Godfrey to

call witnesses to provide lay opinion evidence that the Republican Party

and its members were motivated by anti-gay animus based on events that

occurred years prior to this case, had no connection to any of the

defendants in this case, and had no connection to Godfrey’s employment.

For example, former State Senator McCoy, who came out as gay in 2003,

testified about his experiences in the Iowa Senate during the time period

2000–2008. None of the defendants served in the legislature during that

time period, and none of the defendants were involved in state government

during that time period. McCoy testified about the failed confirmation of

a gay man for the state board of education in 2003–2004, which McCoy

attributed to Republican Party discriminatory animus. Based on that

confirmation episode and the statements of other senators not connected

to this case, McCoy opined the Republican Party was “anti-gay, very anti-

gay.” McCoy also testified those who oppose same-sex marriage are anti-

gay, but he conceded on cross-examination he voted in favor of DOMA.

Other witnesses provided similar opinion testimony.

Godfrey was also allowed to put into evidence what was alleged to

be the Republican Party platform for 2010. Over the defendants’ objection,

the district court allowed a local businessman and columnist—who had

no relation to the case—to lay foundation for the admission of what he

claimed was the 2010 Republican Party platform. The witness testified he

downloaded the document from the Republican Party website. The witness

did not operate the website; did not work for the party; was not a member

of the party; did not participate in drafting the platform; and had no

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personal knowledge regarding who drafted the document, when it was

drafted, whether it was a final or draft version of the platform, or the

party’s policies and practices with respect to archiving official documents.

He read into evidence platform planks dealing with opposition to sexual-

orientation education in public schools, opposition to an anti-bullying law,

support for “traditional, two-parent (one male and one female) marriage-

based families,” support for the repeal of sexual orientation as a protected

status under the ICRA, support for a constitutional amendment to define

marriage as “one natural male and one natural female,” opposition to civil

marriage, opposition to same-sex adoption, and a requirement that duly

nominated candidates agree with 80% of the platform to receive party

funding. The witness was impeached with one of his own columns where

he wrote, “[S]tate political platforms mean absolutely nothing, practical

politicians agree.”

One area in which evidence was excluded related to Godfrey’s claim

for emotional distress damages. Godfrey testified about the emotional

distress he suffered as a result of the defendants’ conduct. He testified it

caused him sleep problems, caused him to pace, caused him to lose faith

in authority figures, impacted his physical health and exercise, and caused

him to start grinding his teeth (bruxism) at night. Godfrey’s partner was

also allowed to testify to the changes in Godfrey’s physical and mental

condition and emotional distress caused by the defendants’ conduct.

The defendants attempted to use Godfrey’s medical records and

information obtained from those records to cross-examine Godfrey. The

defendants wanted to establish a baseline with respect to Godfrey’s mental

condition and emotional distress, establish Godfrey had suffered from and

received treatment for the same issues long prior to even meeting the

defendants, and impeach Godfrey with prior inconsistent statements made

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to his treatment providers. The plaintiffs moved to disallow the

introduction of these medical records and moved to disallow any cross-

examination or impeachment that was based upon information obtained

from the medical records. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion.

In response to the court’s ruling, defense counsel asked for

clarification, “Does that mean[ ] I cannot ask him, for example, if he’s, prior

to meeting Terry Branstad, if he’d ever been prescribed any sort of

medication, like antianxiety medication, Xanax to help him sleep,

Wellbutrin, anything like that?” The district court responded, “That is

correct.” Defense counsel inquired further regarding the scope of the

ruling:

[COUNSEL:] First is emotional distress. Can I ask you,

will you confirm, is it your ruling that I cannot ask

Mr. Godfrey: Did you have prior problems sleeping or falling

asleep prior to your salary being reduced by Governor

Branstad?

THE COURT: That is my ruling.

[COUNSEL]: Is it your ruling that I cannot ask

Mr. Godfrey if he had crying spells before 2011?

THE COURT: That is correct.

[COUNSEL]: And I assume it’s your ruling that I cannot

ask him if he had bouts of depression?

THE COURT: Correct.

[COUNSEL]: Nor can I ask him if he had teeth grinding

prior to –

THE COURT: Correct.

[COUNSEL]: And I cannot ask him if he suffered lack of

motivation to exercise prior to December 3rd of 2010?

THE COURT: That’s correct.

[COUNSEL]: . . . I cannot ask him if he engaged in

pacing before December 3rd of 2010?

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THE COURT: That’s correct.

[COUNSEL]: And I cannot ask him if he had loss of trust

in authority figures before December 3rd, 2010?

THE COURT: That is correct as well.

....

THE COURT: . . . And I would simply verify and confirm

on the record that it is my opinion, when an individual is

simply alleging garden-variety emotional distress damages,

the fact that the individual has experienced similar-type

feelings because of life events that have occurred in the past

is not relevant.

The defendants made an offer of proof. The offer of proof showed

prior to the date Godfrey received the resignation request, he already had

been diagnosed with depression, acute reaction to stress, and anxiety. He

had been prescribed medications for these conditions. The record showed

Godfrey had been receiving mental-health therapy on a weekly or biweekly

basis since 2007—three years prior to any of the events relevant to this

case. For example, the record shows Godfrey was suffering from “acute

reaction to stress with emotional disturbance.” Godfrey had reported

similar symptoms of emotional distress long before ever meeting the

defendants, including: crying spells, grinding his teeth (bruxism), panic

attacks, depression, and insecurity. The jury was not allowed to hear any

of this evidence.

Against this backdrop of effectively unchallenged evidence regarding

Godfrey’s emotional distress, the jury found in favor of Godfrey and

awarded him significant emotional distress damages. The jury awarded

Godfrey $500,000 in emotional distress damages on his claims for sexual-

orientation discrimination and retaliation against the State. The jury also

awarded Godfrey $1,000,000 in emotional distress damages against

Governor Branstad and Bird on Godfrey’s constitutional claims. The jury

20

found Boeyink was entitled to qualified immunity. The State of Iowa,

Governor Branstad, and Bird timely filed this appeal.

II.

The defendants contend the district court erred in denying their

motions for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict (JNOV) because they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Our review of the district court’s rulings are for the correction of errors at

law. See Ferguson v. Exide Techs., Inc., 936 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Iowa 2019)

(per curiam); McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000)

(en banc). In reviewing the jury’s verdict, we “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.” McClure,

613 N.W.2d at 230.

III.

We first address Godfrey’s claims arising under the ICRA. The

defendants contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

because the ICRA is not applicable under the facts and circumstances of

this case and the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence.

A.

The defendants first contend the ICRA is inapplicable here. In their

view, an appointed officer of the state is not an “employee” of the state

within the meaning of the ICRA. See Iowa Code § 216.2(6). Whatever merit

that argument may have in another case, it is too late to raise the

argument in this case.

In the preceding appeal in this case, we considered whether Godfrey

could pursue a sexual-orientation discrimination claim under article I,

section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. See generally Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d

844. The court divided 3–1–3 on the issue. See id. Three justices

concluded that he could pursue such a claim. See id. at 879 (plurality

21

opinion). Three justices concluded that he could not. See id. at 882, 899

(Mansfield, J. dissenting). The middle justice, Chief Justice Cady, found

that Godfrey could not pursue a constitutional claim but only because the

ICRA provided an adequate legal remedy for Godfrey. See id. at 880 (Cady,

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the chief justice

explained, “Godfrey alleges the State discriminated against him on the

basis of his sexual orientation by harassing him and reducing his salary.

These claims are covered by the ICRA.” Id. Given this voting alignment,

the chief justice’s partial concurrence was the “dispositive” or controlling

opinion. See Wagner v. State, 952 N.W.2d 843, 858 (Iowa 2020).

Under the reasoning of the partial concurrence, if Godfrey’s sexual-

orientation discrimination claims had not been covered by the ICRA, the

partial concurrence would have joined the plurality in providing a fourth

vote to find that Godfrey could pursue it under the Iowa Constitution. See

Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d at 880–81. Either way, Godfrey would have had a

legal claim that could go forward if the facts supported it.

Moreover, the defendants advocated for this result in Godfrey II.

They argued that even if direct claims could be brought under the Iowa

Constitution, Godfrey’s discrimination claims were “preempted” by the

ICRA because the ICRA provides the exclusive remedy for conduct that it

prohibits. Appellees’ Final Brief and Argument at 9, Godfrey II, 898

N.W.2d 844 (No. 15–0695), 2015 WL 9582398. The first substantive

header in the defendants’ brief in Godfrey II was “PLAINTIFF’S STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE PREEMPTED BY CHAPTER 216.” Id. The

defendants declared that “[i]t is well settled that Chapter 216 provides the

exclusive remedy for conduct prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act

(‘ICRA’).” Id. at 10 (second emphasis added). A majority of the court

accepted these arguments and concluded the ICRA remedy was available

22

to Godfrey. See Godfrey II, 898 N.W.2d at 880; id. at 892–93 (Mansfield,

J., dissenting) (“[T]he [ICRA] provides Godfrey with an adequate statutory

remedy.”).

The “law of the case” doctrine prevents us from reexamining

decisions we have made in a prior appeal of the same case. See Freer v.

DAC, Inc., 951 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam); Lee v. State, 874

N.W.2d 631, 646 (Iowa 2016).

Under the law of the case doctrine, “the legal principles

announced and the views expressed by a reviewing court in

an opinion, right or wrong, are binding throughout further

progress of the case upon the litigants, the trial court and this

court in later appeals.”

State v. Ragland, 812 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v.

Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1987)). “It is a familiar legal

principle that an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is

controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same

case.” United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa

2000) (en banc).

In addition, the rule of “judicial estoppel” prevents a party from

changing its position after it has successfully urged a different position to

obtain a certain litigation outcome. See Wellmark, Inc. v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,

890 N.W.2d 636, 645 n.5 (Iowa 2017); Lee v. State, 844 N.W.2d 668, 683

(Iowa 2014). The doctrine is “designed to protect the integrity of the

judicial process.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund, 740 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa

2007) (quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814

(Iowa 1987)). In Winnebago Industries, Inc. v. Haverly, we discussed

judicial estoppel at length, finding that it barred an employer from taking

inconsistent positions at different stages of the same proceeding. See 727

N.W.2d 567, 573–75 (Iowa 2006). Because the doctrine primarily is

23

intended to protect the integrity of the legal process, an appellate court

may raise judicial estoppel on its own motion. See State v. Duncan, 710

N.W.2d 34, 43–44 (Iowa 2006).

Both of these rules apply here. We decided in Godfrey II that the

ICRA afforded a remedy to Godfrey for discrimination based on sexual

orientation. 898 N.W.2d at 880 (Cady, C.J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part); id. at 882 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Moreover, the

defendants sought that outcome to fend off potentially broader liability

under article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. If our court had taken

the view in 2017 that Godfrey did not have a remedy for sexual-orientation

discrimination under the ICRA, he undoubtedly would have been

authorized by a majority of the court to go forward with the same claim

under article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. The ICRA thus applies

here.2

B.

The defendants contend there was insufficient evidence to establish

Governor Branstad, the sole decision-maker in this case, knew Godfrey

was gay prior to the time he reduced Godfrey’s compensation. The

defendants thus contend Godfrey’s discrimination claim relating to events

up to and including the salary reduction fails as a matter of law. In

2Justice McDermott’s concurrence in part and dissent in part, joined by Chief

Justice Christensen, concludes the ICRA is inapplicable here because Godfrey was an

officer and not an employee of the State of Iowa. In reaching the merits of the defendants’

argument, the dissent in part misapplies the doctrines of law of the case and judicial

estoppel. If the dissent in part were correct, this matter would necessarily have to be

remanded for retrial on Godfrey’s constitutional claims for sexual-orientation

discrimination because it would be unfair and prejudicial to the administration of justice

for this court in one appeal to deny Godfrey the right to pursue constitutional claims for

sexual-orientation discrimination because he had statutory claims and then in a

subsequent appeal to deny Godfrey’s statutory claims because he should have pursued

constitutional claims this court said he could not pursue. We reject the dissent in part’s

approach and reject that opinion’s unstated but necessary conclusion that Godfrey may

now pursue a constitutional claim for sexual-orientation discrimination.

24

denying the defendants’ motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the district

court concluded there was substantial evidence Governor Branstad knew

Godfrey was gay: Godfrey’s sexual orientation was well known among the

members of the legislature; members of ABI were aware of and discussed

Godfrey’s sexual orientation; and “[a]bundant evidence was presented to

establish the Republican Party was ‘anti-gay’ in its policies and platform

planks.” We conclude the district court erred in denying the defendants’

motions for judgment as a matter of law.

As relevant here, the ICRA makes it unlawful for an employer to

discriminate against a person in employment “because of” the person’s

“sexual orientation.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). Our cases have held that

to prove an employment decision was “because of” an employee’s protected

status, the plaintiff must prove the protected status was a “motivating

factor” in the employer’s decision. See Hawkins v. Grinnell Reg’l Med. Ctr.,

929 N.W.2d 261, 272 (Iowa 2019) (“Therefore, in discrimination and

retaliation cases under ICRA, we apply the . . . motivating-factor standard

in instructing the jury . . . .”); DeBoom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1,

13–14 (Iowa 2009) (adopting motivating-factor standard for discrimination

claims). But see Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d

553, 582 (Iowa 2017) (distinguishing between significant-factor standard

applied to retaliation claims and motivating-factor standard applied to

discrimination claims).

To prove discrimination was because of an employee’s membership

in a protected class, the plaintiff must prove the decision-maker knew of

the employee’s membership in the protected class. It would be “counter-

intuitive to infer that the employer discriminated on the basis of a

condition of which it was wholly ignorant.” Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l.,

Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996). “[I]n the vast majority of

25

discrimination cases, the plaintiff’s membership is either patent (race or

gender), or is documented on the employee’s personnel record (age). This

case, however, is different.” Id. Godfrey’s sexual orientation is not patent

or documented in any personnel record. In this type of case, “involving

personal attributes not obvious to the employer, courts have regularly held

that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination

unless he or she proves that the employer knew about the plaintiff’s

particular personal characteristic.” Id.; see also Prebilich-Holland v.

Gaylord Ent. Co., 297 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that to

establish the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the

challenged decision, the employee must show the decision-maker had

“actual knowledge” of the protected characteristic).

There is no evidence Governor Branstad, the sole decision-maker in

this case, had actual knowledge of Godfrey’s sexual orientation at any time

prior to seeking Godfrey’s resignation or reducing his salary within the

statutory range. Governor Branstad left office in 1999, entered the private

sector, and stayed out of politics. More than six years after Governor

Branstad left office, Governor Vilsack appointed Godfrey interim

commissioner. In 2007 and 2009, Governor Culver appointed Godfrey

commissioner. There is no evidence Governor Branstad was at the capitol

around the time of the confirmation hearings. There is no evidence

Branstad spoke with any legislators around the time of the confirmation

hearings. There is no evidence any legislator communicated to Branstad

any information about Godfrey. There is no evidence Governor Branstad

knew of or followed Godfrey’s confirmation. Governor Branstad denied any

knowledge of Godfrey’s sexual orientation until Godfrey’s public

statements after Branstad had already implemented the salary reduction.

There was no testimony from any witness that any person—whether an

26

elected official, member of Branstad’s staff, representative from ABI, or any

other person—told Governor Branstad Godfrey was gay, heard Governor

Branstad make a comment regarding Godfrey’s sexual orientation, or

heard Governor Branstad even inquire about Godfrey’s sexual orientation

any time prior to the salary reduction.

In the absence of any direct evidence Governor Branstad had actual

knowledge of Godfrey’s sexual orientation, Godfrey relies on circumstantial

evidence. Of course, “[c]ircumstantial and direct evidence are equally

probative.” Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984).

However, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a fact only

where the evidence has sufficient force to allow a factfinder to draw a

legitimate inference from the evidence presented. See id. A legitimate

inference drawn from circumstantial evidence must be “rational,

reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive

law.” McIlravy v. N. River Ins., 653 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Iowa 2002) (quoting

Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)).

An inference is not legitimate if it is based upon suspicion, speculation,

conjecture, surmise, or fallacious reasoning. See Holiday Wholesale

Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271 (N.D. Ga.

2002) (“[A]n inference would be unreasonable if it is reached through

fallacious reasoning.”), aff’d sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris

USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C.,

910 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2018); Willey v. Riley, 541 N.W.2d 521, 527

(Iowa 1995) (“Circumstances are not sufficient when the conclusion in

question is based on surmise, speculation or conjecture.” (quoting Harsha,

346 N.W.2d at 800)). “Under our law it is just as pernicious to submit a

case to a jury and permit the jury to speculate with the rights of citizens

when no question for the jury is involved, as it is to deny to a citizen his

27

trial by jury when he has the right.” Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 6

(Iowa 2008) (quoting True v. Larimore, 255 Iowa 451, 460, 123 N.W.2d 5,

10 (1963)).

Numerous other courts have addressed the sufficiency of evidence

to establish a decision-maker knew a plaintiff’s sexual orientation prior to

making an employment decision. In Hung Nguyen v. Regents of the

University of California, an associate professor sued his university and the

relevant decision-makers after he was denied tenure. See generally 8:17-

cv-00423-JVS-KES, 2018 WL 5886018 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018), aff’d,

823 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2020). The defendants denied knowledge of the

plaintiff’s sexual orientation. See id. at *8. The plaintiff argued the

“[d]efendants had knowledge of his sexual orientation based on

circumstantial evidence.” Id. at *7. The plaintiff contended the defendants

must have known his sexual orientation because the plaintiff was openly

gay, many people in the department where he worked knew his sexual

orientation, and he hosted dinner parties and social events. See id. at *8.

The court held the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. See id. at *9. Evidence that people other than the decision-makers

were aware of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation was insufficient to create a

fact issue for the jury where the decision-makers denied knowledge of the

plaintiff’s orientation and there was “no evidence that any of the

individuals who affirmatively knew [the plaintiff] was gay communicated

that information to” the decision-makers. Id. at *8.

In Nealis v. Molecular Health, Inc., the Massachusetts Appeals Court

held evidence the plaintiff was openly gay and many people knew the

plaintiff was gay was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of sexual-

orientation discrimination where there was no evidence the decision-

maker was aware of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation:

28

First, we agree with the judge that Nealis failed to raise a

triable issue of fact that Salyani knew Nealis’s sexual

orientation during the period Nealis alleges he was

discriminated against. Salyani testified in his deposition that

he first learned of Nealis’s sexual orientation when he was

informed that Nealis had lodged a discrimination complaint

against him and that an investigation was forthcoming. To

counter this testimony, Nealis offered evidence that he was

“openly gay” at Molecular in that he “did not hide” his sexual

orientation, which was “well-known” within the company. He

also offered evidence that many Molecular employees learned

that Nealis was gay during company “roundtable”

discussions, which Nealis described as “casual social

meetings.” However, it is undisputed that Salyani did not

attend these roundtable discussions, and otherwise spent

approximately forty percent of his working time in the Boston

office. And Nealis admitted, “I can’t speak to the remote

workers. I can’t speak to [whether] Mr. Salyani [knew I was

gay].”

20-P-159, 2021 WL 1811730, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. May 6, 2021)

(alterations in original).

In Epstein v City of New York, the district court granted the

employer’s motion for summary judgment where there was no evidence the

decision-makers knew he was gay. See No. 06 Civ. 3788(TPG), 2009 WL

2431489, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009). The plaintiff contended there

was a triable issue of fact because there was generalized evidence that

some of his coworkers knew his sexual orientation. See id. at *5. The

court held that it was pure conjecture to conclude the decision-makers

knew he was gay. See id.

Godfrey contends there was evidence from which the jury could have

inferred that those close to Governor Branstad may have known Godfrey’s

sexual orientation. Democratic Senator Courtney testified Godfrey

brought his partner to his confirmation hearing and met then-Senator

Reynolds. Democratic Senator Dotzler testified he told Boeyink that

Godfrey was gay in the spring of 2011—after Branstad sent the resignation

request but before Branstad reduced Godfrey’s salary. And Boeyink and

29

Bird testified that they learned Godfrey might have been gay several days

after Branstad decided to reduce Godfrey’s salary. But this evidence does

not change the equation. None of these people informed Governor

Branstad of Godfrey’s sexual orientation. On this record, any inference to

the contrary is pure speculation. “Speculation . . . is not evidence and a

case should not be submitted to a jury for deliberation when no evidence

has been presented.” Willey, 541 N.W.2d at 527.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached

a similar conclusion in Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial &

Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2021). There, the court

held the plaintiff’s claim for sexual-orientation discrimination failed as a

matter of law because the plaintiff “did not present evidence that [the

decision-maker] even knew he was gay.” Id. at 959 n.5. The court rejected

the plaintiff’s contention that he created a triable issue of fact because

someone “very close” to the decision-maker knew the plaintiff’s sexual

orientation. Id. The court explained while the plaintiff was entitled “to all

reasonable inferences in [his] favor, ‘inferences that are supported by only

speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.’ ”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc.,

742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014)).

Similarly, in Andrade v. Lego Systems, Inc., the plaintiff sued his

employer for sexual-orientation discrimination, and the court held the

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 205 A.3d

807, 810 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (per curiam). The decision-maker “testified

in her affidavit that (1) she never knew that the plaintiff was gay; (2) neither

the plaintiff nor anyone else told her he was gay; and (3) the plaintiff never

did or said anything that led her to believe he was gay.” Id. at 816. The

plaintiff conceded this but contended there was a triable issue of fact

30

because he once referred to “his partner” when speaking with the decision-

maker. See id. The court rejected the argument as mere speculation.

Such speculation is particularly troubling here when the

plaintiff admits that there is absolutely no other evidence to

support the inference the plaintiff suggests. The plaintiff has

not offered the testimony of a former coworker or anyone else

to suggest that there was reason . . . to believe that [the

decision-maker] knew that the plaintiff was gay.

Id.

The evidence presented in this case is far weaker than that

presented in the above-discussed cases. In those cases, the plaintiff and

the defendants worked for the same employer and were familiar with each

other. Here, Governor Branstad sent a form letter to thirty appointed

officials, including Godfrey, prior to ever meeting Godfrey. Branstad was

not involved in government at the time of Godfrey’s appointment, had

never worked a single day with Godfrey, and had never worked a single

day with any of Godfrey’s coworkers. Even after they met for the first and

only time, Godfrey and Governor Branstad worked in separate buildings

and had no further communication or contact with each other.

We reject as illogical and fallacious the district court’s conclusion

that a jury could infer Governor Branstad knew Godfrey was gay because

there was “[a]bundant evidence . . . presented to establish the Republican

Party was ‘anti-gay’ in its policies and platform planks.”3 The district

court’s reasoning fails at several levels. First, it does not logically follow

that the Republican Party’s political position on issues related to sexual

orientation, such as same-sex marriage or adoption, means that the party

is “anti-gay” in the sense that it is opposed to the rights of gay persons to

3The defendants have appealed the district court’s evidentiary rulings admitting

much of this evidence. We need not resolve the admissibility issue because the evidence

does not create a jury question on whether Governor Branstad knew Godfrey was gay.

31

a workplace free from sexual-orientation discrimination. Indeed, the

record in this case disproves the inference. Governor Vilsack voted in favor

of DOMA, but he appointed Godfrey to the position of commissioner.

Governor Culver stated that he “personally believe[d] that marriage is

between a man and a woman,” but he appointed Godfrey to the position of

commissioner twice. Governor Branstad, in the election of 2010,

expressed his view that the citizens of Iowa should be allowed to vote on a

marriage amendment to the Iowa Constitution, but several months after

the election he appointed an openly gay man to serve as Director of the

State–Federal Relations Office. Even Godfrey testified that an individual’s

party affiliation and views on “gay issues” are not necessarily correlated.

Second, even if we assume the evidence established the Republican

Party was “anti-gay” in the sense the party was opposed to the rights of

gay persons to a workplace free from sexual-orientation discrimination,

the evidence does not support a logical inference that Governor Branstad

was anti-gay. The district court committed the fallacy of division in

concluding that what is true of the party must also be true of each of its

individual members. See Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 949 n.5

(2018) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)

(discussing the fallacy of division); Christian v. Generation Mortg. Co.,

No. 12 C 5336, 2013 WL 2151681, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2013) (“ ‘[T]he

fallacy of division’ [is] the deductive error inherent in substituting evidence

of the general for evidence of the particular.”); Adrian Vermeule, Foreword:

System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (2009) (defining

fallacy of division as “the assumption that what is true of the aggregate

must be true of the members”). The evidence admitted to establish the

Republican Party was anti-gay is not relevant to the question of whether

32

Governor Branstad had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexual

orientation.

Third, even if we assume this evidence would support an inference

that Governor Branstad was anti-gay, that inference would only support a

further inference that Governor Branstad was motivated by discriminatory

animus if there was evidence he had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s

sexual orientation. There was no evidence Governor Branstad had actual

knowledge of Godfrey’s sexual orientation prior to reducing Godfrey’s

salary within the statutory range.

Finally, Godfrey testified it was his personal belief that Governor

Branstad knew he was gay and discriminated against him because he was

gay, but there was no evidence to support Godfrey’s personal belief.

Godfrey’s personal, conclusory beliefs are insufficient as a matter of law to

generate a fact question for the jury. See, e.g., Kazar v. Slippery Rock Univ.

of Pa., Civil No. 13-60, 2016 WL 1247233, at *4 n.10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30,

2016) (holding “bald conclusory statement that [decision-makers] knew or

should have known [plaintiff’s] sexual orientation” and rumors regarding

plaintiff’s sexual orientation were insufficient as a matter of law to

establish decision-makers knew plaintiff’s sexual orientation), aff’d, 679

F. App’x 156 (3d Cir. 2017); Etheredge v. Henry, 95 F. Supp. 3d 793, 806

n.13 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that mere assertions that defendants “all

knew plaintiff was gay” was insufficient to create a fact issue for the jury);

Taylor v. Polygram Recs., No. 94 CIV. 7689(CSH), 1999 WL 124456, at *16

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999) (plaintiff’s “belief, based on no evidence other than

gut instinct, that [her supervisor] treated her with hostility because of her

race, cannot justifiably support an inference of discrimination” when not

supported by other evidence (emphasis omitted)).

33

After reviewing the relevant case law and evidence in the light most

favorable to Godfrey, we conclude Godfrey failed to present sufficient

evidence to establish Governor Branstad knew Godfrey’s sexual

orientation at the time Branstad requested Godfrey’s resignation or

reduced his salary. In the absence of such evidence, Godfrey failed to

prove the defendants’ actions were taken because of Godfrey’s sexual

orientation. The defendants are entitled to judgment on Godfrey’s sexual-

orientation discrimination claim arising under the ICRA with respect to all

allegations of discrimination prior to and including the salary reduction.

See, e.g., Fry v. Ascension Health Ministry Servs., Case No. 18-CV-1573,

2021 WL 1733397, at *7 (E.D. Wis. May 3, 2021) (granting summary

judgment where decision-makers were not even aware of the plaintiff’s

sexual orientation until after his employment ended); Thomas v. Coleman

Enters., No. C6-99-1327, 2000 WL 385479, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18,

2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff failed to make

a prima facie case because “appellant presented no evidence establishing

[the decision-maker] was even aware of appellant’s sexual orientation”).

C.

We next address Godfrey’s retaliation claim arising under the ICRA

as it relates to events up to and including the salary reduction. The

defendants contend they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

this claim because Godfrey did not engage in statutorily protected activity

prior to the time Governor Branstad reduced his salary within the

statutory range. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for

directed verdict and JNOV, concluding that Godfrey’s mere refusal to

resign constituted statutorily protected activity. We conclude the district

court erred in denying the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter

of law.

34

The ICRA provides it shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice

for

[a]ny person to discriminate or retaliate against another

person in any of the rights protected against discrimination

by this chapter because such person has lawfully opposed any

practice forbidden under this chapter, obeys the provisions of

this chapter, or has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in

any proceeding under this chapter.

Iowa Code § 216.11(2). To prevail on a statutory retaliation claim, the

plaintiff must show “(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected

activities; (2) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her;

and (3) a causal connection exists between the two events.” Sellers v.

Deere & Co., 23 F. Supp. 3d 968, 986 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (quoting Stewart v.

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)), aff’d, 791

F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Haskenhoff, 897 N.W.2d at 582

(discussing retaliation claim). To establish a causal connection, the

plaintiff must show the plaintiff’s protected activity was a motivating factor

in the employer’s subsequent adverse employment action. See Hawkins,

929 N.W.2d at 272.

At issue here is the opposition clause of the ICRA and whether

Godfrey’s mere refusal to resign constituted lawful opposition to a practice

forbidden by the ICRA. See Iowa Code § 216.11(2). We have not previously

interpreted this clause of the ICRA. However, the question has been

addressed by federal courts interpreting the parallel provision of Title VII,

and we take guidance from those interpretations. See Hawkins, 929

N.W.2d at 269 (“In interpreting our civil rights statute, we have looked at

the similarities between the language used in the federal and our civil

rights acts.”). The United States Supreme Court explained:

The opposition clause makes it “unlawful . . . for an

employer to discriminate against any . . . employe[e] . . .

because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful . . .

35

by this subchapter.” § 2000e–3(a). The term “oppose,” being

left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning:

“[t]o resist or antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront;

resist; withstand,” Webster’s New International Dictionary

1710 (2d ed.1957).

Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276, 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009)

(alterations and omissions in original) (citation omitted). Under the

opposition clause, an employee engages in statutorily protected activity

where the employee opposes conduct he reasonably believes constitutes

unlawful discrimination. See Brown v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 406 F.

App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Although “[m]agic words are

not required, . . . protected opposition must at least alert an employer to

the employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.”

Id.; see also Okoli v. City of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 224 (4th Cir. 2011)

(stating that protected activity was shown when the plaintiff complained

of “harassment” and described some of the particular acts of harassment

but did not use the term “sexual harassment”); Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc.,

214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the jury reasonably

concluded the plaintiff engaged in opposition activity when the plaintiff

told the defendant “to stop his offensive behavior”).

There is no evidence here to show Godfrey engaged in protected

activity before Governor Branstad reduced his salary within the statutory

range. On December 3, 2010, Governor Branstad sent Godfrey a

resignation request. On December 6, Godfrey sent a letter to the Governor-

elect declining the request. The letter provided:

I have received your December 3, 2010 correspondence

requesting a letter of resignation prior to December 15, 2010.

I was nominated for the position of Iowa Workers’

Compensation Commissioner in February 2009. I was

confirmed by the Iowa Senate on March 30, 2009. Iowa Code

section 86.1 sets the term of the workers’ compensation

commissioner as 6 years beginning and ending as provided in

Iowa Code section 69.19. Iowa code section 69.19 states that

36

the term of appointment confirmed by the senate shall begin

at 12:01 a.m. on May in the year of appointment and expire

at 12:00 midnight on April 30 in the year of expiration.

Therefore my current term commenced on May 1, 2009 and

will not expire until April 30, 2015. As I plan to fulfill my term

in office, I respectfully decline your request for a letter of

resignation.

There is nothing in the letter that would have alerted the defendants that

unlawful discrimination was at issue.

Likewise, there is no evidence that Godfrey engaged in protected

activity in the two meetings he had with the defendants. On December 29,

Godfrey met with Branstad, Reynolds, and Boeyink. The Governor asked

for Godfrey’s resignation, and Godfrey refused. In the remainder of the

meeting, Godfrey explained his reasons for wanting to serve out the

remainder of his term. Godfrey testified the meeting was very cordial,

productive, and went really well. The July 11, 2011, meeting lasted only

a few minutes. Boeyink requested Godfrey’s resignation, and Godfrey

refused. Boeyink then communicated the salary reduction. Godfrey’s

sexual orientation was not raised in either meeting. Godfrey did not say

or do anything that would have alerted the defendants Godfrey was making

a complaint about or opposing unlawful discrimination.

Godfrey’s mere refusal to resign, without more, does not constitute

protected activity. See Ideyi v. State Univ. of N.Y. Downstate Med. Ctr., No.

09–CV–1490 (ENV)(RML), 2010 WL 3938411, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2010) (holding the mere “refusal to resign” was not protected activity). As

one court explained, no case law supports the proposition that the mere

refusal to resign constitutes a protected complaint or protected opposition:

[The plaintiff] asserts that his refusal to retire when he was

demoted constituted the requisite opposition to an unlawful

practice. [He] asserts that his supervisors retaliated against

him following his refusal to resign by transferring him to

distant locations and by refusing his own request for transfer

back to Dulles. However, this Court can find no case law

37

which suggests that protected “opposition” extends . . . to the

sort of stoic, silent endurance plaintiff alleges here.

Beeck v. Fed. Express Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 48, 55 (D.D.C. 2000). This

conclusion is compelled both by the text of the statute and its underlying

purpose. The purpose of the retaliation provision “is to let employees feel

free to express condemnation of discrimination . . . . That purpose is

hardly served by imposing sanctions upon employers who take action

against employees who never communicate their concern about unlawful

discrimination.” Zokari v. Gates, 561 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir.

2002)).

In the absence of evidence that the basis for refusal is grounded in

opposition to an alleged discriminatory action, as is the case here, the

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to all

allegations of retaliation prior to and including the salary reduction. See

Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 289 (Iowa 2000) (en

banc) (“Of course, if the employer has no knowledge the employee engaged

in the protected activity, causation cannot be established.”); see also

Blackmon v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 568 F. App’x 848, 850 (11th Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff’s refusal to accept a work assignment,

without more, was not protected activity); Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff’s

refusal to accept new position was not protected activity where the plaintiff

made only a “vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful

employment practice under Title VII”); Zokari, 561 F.3d at 1082 (“Although

Mr. Zokari may have refused the English class because he felt that the

request was discriminatory, he has not presented evidence that he made

this basis of his refusal known to his supervisors. He never told them of

38

his belief that their request constituted improper discrimination based on

his race or national origin.”); Skaggs v. Van Alstyne Indep. Sch. Dist., CIVIL

ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-00227-CAN, 2017 WL 77825, at *17 (E.D. Tex.

Jan. 9, 2017) (“Here, Plaintiff alleges her refusal to retire from

teaching . . . constitutes a protected activity . . . . Plaintiff’s testimony

reveals, however, that she merely rebuffed Coleman any time the topic

arose, never alerting him to any belief that his suggestions (or any other

behavior) constituted unlawful discrimination . . . .”); Lard v. Ala. Alcoholic

Beverage Control Bd., Civil Action No. 2:12–cv–452–WHA, 2012 WL

5966617, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 28, 2012) (holding that “refusal to resign

when ordered to do so” was not an act of opposition that constituted

protected activity where employee did not communicate anti-

discriminatory basis for refusal); Finlay v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc.,

Civil Action No. 10 C 5622, 2012 WL 1952642, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30,

2012) (holding the refusal to sign witness statement was not protected

activity where plaintiff offered other reasons for refusing to sign that had

nothing to do with discrimination); Bryant v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 550

F. Supp. 2d 513, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It is undisputed that Plaintiff never

complained about race or gender discrimination to anyone at Verizon.

Plaintiff’s refusal to accept a transfer cannot be construed as a

‘protest . . . oppos[ing] statutorily prohibited discrimination’ on the

undisputed facts of this case.” (alteration and omission in original)).

D.

After Governor Branstad reduced Godfrey’s salary within the

statutory range, Godfrey continued to serve as the workers’ compensation

commissioner for another three years until August 2014, when Godfrey

left for a different position with the Federal Department of Labor. The core

of Godfrey’s claims against the defendants related to the Governor’s

39

request for Godfrey’s resignation and the Governor’s decision to reduce

Godfrey’s salary, which, as discussed above, fail as a matter of law.

However, Godfrey contends the defendants discriminated against him and

retaliated against him between July 2011, when Godfrey first made an

accusation of sexual-orientation discrimination, and August 2014, when

Godfrey resigned his position. Godfrey identifies several acts of alleged

discrimination and retaliation that occurred during this three-year period.

The defendants contend the specified acts are insufficient, as a matter of

law, to establish actionable adverse action. We agree.

To establish a claim for unlawful discrimination or retaliation, the

plaintiff must show his employer took adverse action against him. With

respect to discrimination claims, the plaintiff must show the defendants

took adverse action that detrimentally affected the material terms,

conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s employment. See Channon v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 862 (Iowa 2001). Adverse

employment actions can include a loss of title, demotion, and termination.

See Haskenhoff, 897 N.W.2d at 587. With respect to retaliation claims,

the adverse action does not need to be employment-related to be unlawful.

See id. at 587–88. However, the adverse action must still be material. See

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405,

2415 (2006). That is, the adverse action must produce an actual “injury

or harm” to the plaintiff. See id. at 67, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. And the actual

injury or harm must be sufficiently severe such that it would “dissuade a

reasonable person from making or supporting an allegation of

discrimination or harassment.” Haskenhoff, 897 N.W.2d at 588–89; see

also Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. An “action is not

adverse merely because the employee does not like it or disagrees with it.”

40

Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 742

(Iowa 2003).

In determining whether the defendants’ conduct was materially

adverse, Godfrey contends this court should look at the cumulative effect

of isolated incidents. We disagree. In a claim for discrimination or

retaliation, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act or event is separately

actionable.” Id. at 741. In contrast, “claims of hostile work environment

are fundamentally different. Unlike discrete acts of discrimination, they

involve repeated conduct and are based on the cumulative impact of

separate acts.” Id. Similarly, “[a] plaintiff may bring a ‘special type of

retaliation claim based on a “hostile work environment” ’ by alleging a

series of ‘individual acts that may not be actionable on [their] own but

become actionable due to their cumulative effect.’ ” Menoken v. Dhillon,

975 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Here, Godfrey

dismissed his hostile work environment claims and pursued only discrete

discrimination and retaliation claims. Under these circumstances, we look

at each of the discrete acts in isolation. See Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 860

N.W.2d 557, 571 (Iowa 2015) (“[I]n Farmland Foods, we aligned ourselves

with the unanimous view of the Supreme Court . . . that the continuing

violation doctrine does not apply to cases involving discrete discriminatory

acts, as opposed to hostile work environment claims.”).

Federal circuit courts have adopted the same approach. As the

Eighth Circuit explained:

Finally, Liles repeatedly criticizes the district court for

“evaluating Plaintiff’s claims of discriminatory and hostile acts

as discrete acts rather than an ongoing series of

discriminatory acts.” To that end, Liles cites National Railroad

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S. Ct.

2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), and a handful of other cases

41

for the proposition that “[t]he ‘unlawful employment practice’

therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It

occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct

contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not

be actionable on its own.” What Liles fails to acknowledge is

that these comments apply to hostile work environment

claims which are, by their very nature, “based on the

cumulative effect of individual acts.” Id. In the retaliation

context, however, “[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure

to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to

identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory

adverse employment decision constitutes a separate

actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ ” Id. at 114, 122

S. Ct. 2061.

Liles v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 851 F.3d 810, 820–21 (8th Cir. 2017)

(alterations in original); see also Salemi v. Colo. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 747

F. App’x 675, 689 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ase law makes clear that the

continuing violation theory is not available in the context of a Title VII

claim based on discrete incidents of discrimination or retaliation . . . .”);

Birch v. City of New York, 675 F. App’x 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding

alleged acts of retaliation were discrete acts separately actionable); Taylor

v. Donahoe, 452 F. App’x 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2011) (analyzing separately

“discrete acts of alleged retaliation (or discrimination)”).

Godfrey first challenges the Governor’s political speech. Godfrey

contends Governor Branstad acted illegally in making public statements

critical of Godfrey’s job performance. In our view, the Governor’s public

statements regarding his perception of Godfrey’s job performance do not

rise to the level of adverse action. See, e.g., Marchuk v. Faruqi & Faruqi,

LLP, 100 F. Supp. 3d 302, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that defendants’

counterclaims and corresponding press release made in response to

discrimination plaintiff’s attraction of media attention were not actionable

as a matter of law). This general proposition applies with particular force

here because the Governor is an elected official responding to a public

accusation of unlawful conduct.

42

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the same

issue regarding the statements of elected officials in Bain v. City of

Springfield, 678 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1997). In that case, an employee of the

city sued the city for sex discrimination and retaliation. See id. at 157.

The local newspaper published the charges against the city and the mayor,

and the mayor responded with public statements that the complaint was

baseless and that the plaintiff was trying to manipulate the system for

personal gain. See id. at 157–58. The Bain court rejected the plaintiff’s

argument that the mayor’s public comments could support a claim for

retaliation:

What we most emphatically cannot countenance as an

instance of retaliation is the mayor’s response in the local

newspaper to the charges against him. The newspaper quoted

Bain’s serious and damaging charges against the mayor, an

elected official. He was entitled to respond in the same forum,

to defend himself and to state what political judgments

seemed appropriate so long as they were not defamatory—

which these were not. . . . Although the commission’s

interpretations of the antidiscrimination laws are entitled to

deference, its interpretations are subject to constitutional

guarantees of freedom of speech. The interest in remedying

discrimination is weighty but not so weighty as to justify what

amounts to a restriction on core political speech.

Id. at 161. We agree with the Bain court. In this context, the Governor’s

public statements made in response to the charge of unlawful conduct are

not actionable under the ICRA as a matter of law.

Godfrey also challenges the Governor’s Office’s failure to speak. By

way of background, in November 2011 Godfrey was selected for

membership on the board of directors of the National Academy of Social

Insurance. Godfrey, or the public information officer at Iowa Workforce

Development (of which the Iowa Division of Workers’ Compensation is a

part), wrote a press release praising Godfrey for the selection and

forwarded the press release in an email to Albrecht, the Governor’s

43

communications director, with the question, “Thoughts?” Albrecht could

not recall whether he responded to the email, but he testified agency public

information officers were generally allowed to issue press releases without

permission from the Governor’s Office. Ultimately, the press release was

not issued by anyone.

We conclude the failure to issue a positive press release is not a

material adverse action. See, e.g., AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638,

645 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating the failure to “adequately laud” the plaintiff’s

job performance was not unlawful retaliation); Crudder v. Peoria Unified

Sch. Dist. No. 11, 468 F. App’x 781, 784 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding the

employer’s “failure to publish a press release announcing” the plaintiff’s

job promotion was not sufficient adverse action to support a retaliation

claim); Leatherbury v. C & H Sugar Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 872, 882 (N.D.

Cal. 2012) (withholding praise was not actionable adverse action), aff’d,

607 F. App’x 676 (9th Cir. 2015). Godfrey concedes as much in his brief,

stating “this incident is likely not an adverse employment action all by

itself.”

Godfrey also claims Governor Branstad and his appointees acted

unlawfully in exercising budgetary authority over the Division of Workers’

Compensation. Specifically, Godfrey challenges the oversight of his budget

by the director of workforce development. Second, Godfrey challenges the

reversion of unused funds from the Division of Workers’ Compensation

back to the Department of Iowa Workforce Development. Third, Godfrey

challenges the Governor’s line-item veto of funds earmarked to the

Division of Workers’ Compensation for a new deputy director position.

We hold none of these acts of alleged discrimination or retaliation

constitute actionable adverse action. First, the Governor’s management

of the budget of a department of the executive branch and the exercise of

44

the line-item veto are constitutional powers to be exercised wholly at the

discretion of the governor and cannot serve as grounds for a claim under

the ICRA. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 16 (setting forth veto power); id. art.

IV, § 1 (vesting the supreme executive power of this state in the governor).

Second, the director of workforce development has statutory authority to

“prepare, administer, and control the budget of the department and its

divisions,” which includes the Division of Workers’ Compensation. Iowa

Code § 84A.1(3)(a). The director of workforce development’s oversight of

the Division of Workers’ Compensation is thus not unlawful; it is

statutorily required. Godfrey’s contention that the director exercised

undue scrutiny of the division’s budget does not rise to the level of adverse

action. See also Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(stating aggressive supervision did not support a claim for retaliation);

Davis v. Verizon Wireless, 389 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)

(“Moreover, increased scrutiny or general monitoring does not rise to the

level of an adverse employment action.”). Third, the reduction in the

budget of a government agency or the denial of additional financial support

to a government agency, generally, is harm or injury to the agency and not

the plaintiff managing the agency. In the absence of a showing of harm or

injury to the plaintiff, the conduct does not rise to the level of an adverse

action. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. Thus, the

denial of funding or additional support to a government agency “cannot be

the basis for a retaliation claim.” Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d 124, 145

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 76

(D.D.C. 2007)). “To hold otherwise would give every overworked

[government] employee in an understaffed office fodder for a

[discrimination] claim.” Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 76; see also Warner

v. Vance-Cooks, 956 F. Supp. 2d 129, 170 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that

45

elimination of staff positions in government office plaintiff supervised was

not a materially adverse action).

Finally, Godfrey argues the defendants failed to conduct a formal

performance evaluation and failed to invite him to a leadership retreat in

October 2011. The retreat was held for certain state officers and

employees the Governor deemed part of his team. Neither of these

omissions rises to the level of an adverse action. See, e.g., Drielak v. Pruitt,

890 F.3d 297, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding exclusion from a meeting was

not materially adverse); Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2007)

(“Dillon’s exclusion from certain meetings did not constitute adverse

employment actions.”); Clegg v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d 922, 929 (8th

Cir. 2007) (holding the following did not amount to retaliation as a matter

of law: the “failure to provide training and orientation, denying her access

to needed employment tools, failure to reinstate her to her prior position,

interfering with her authority, unfairly adding negative reports and

reprimands to her personnel file, treating her differently than her

coworkers, excluding her from meetings, giving her a negative evaluation,

denying her training, and adding days to a training assignment at a

different unit”); Watson v. City of Cleveland, 202 F. App’x 844, 855 (6th

Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case for

retaliation because “exclu[sion] from some meetings” did not constitute

adverse action); Kavanaugh v. Miami-Dade County, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1361,

1369 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (missing one meeting was not an adverse action as

a matter of law); Montalvo Rios v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 743 F. Supp.

2d 62, 71 (D.P.R. 2010) (“For purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim,

menacing looks, name calling, exclusion from meetings, or being shunned

by co-workers does not constitute an adverse employment action.”),

reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, Civil No. 10–1293 (SEC),

46

2011 WL 1258618 (D.P.R. Mar. 24, 2011); Riley v. Honeywell Tech. Sols.,

Inc., Civil No. BEL-05-2426, 2008 WL 11444189, at *13 (D. Md. Apr. 16,

2008) (holding the failure to conduct or complete performance evaluations

and exclusion from meetings did not rise to the level of adverse action to

support retaliation claim), aff’d, 323 F. App’x 276 (4th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam); Davis, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 476, 478 (holding “exclusion from

meetings” was not adverse action); Marshall v. State of N.Y. Div. of State

Police, 18 F. Supp. 2d 194, 203 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding “fact that

[p]laintiff was displeased when not asked to attend meetings” was not an

adverse action).

E.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court erred in denying

the defendants’ motions for directed verdict and for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict with respect to Godfrey’s claims arising under

the ICRA.

IV.

We lastly address Godfrey’s constitutional claims. In Godfrey II, this

court held the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution was self-

executing and Godfrey could pursue a claim for monetary damages for

violations of the due process clause based on conduct unrelated to sexual-

orientation discrimination. See 898 N.W.2d at 871–72 (plurality opinion).

However, the court did not define the nature, scope, or elements of any

such claim and took no view on the merits of the claim. See id. at 876

(“Nonetheless, the question of the merits of Godfrey’s property claim

cannot be resolved at this time. It goes without saying, of course, that we

take no view on the merits of any due process claim raised in this case.”).

The parties had the opportunity to develop the nature, scope, and elements

of the claim at trial. Godfrey claimed, and the jury was instructed, he had

47

a “constitutionally protected property interest in continuing his annual

salary at the level it was at when Defendant Branstad took office as

Governor of the State of Iowa” unless Governor Branstad lowered Godfrey’s

salary in accord with 2008 Iowa Acts chapter 1191, section 13. The jury

found in favor of Godfrey on this constitutional claim. The defendants

contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

A.

The defendants first request this court reconsider its decision in

Godfrey II that the equal protection and due process clauses of the Iowa

Constitution are self-executing and a plaintiff can assert a claim for

monetary damages for alleged violations of the same. The defendants

argue we should reconsider our constitutional tort jurisprudence. We

decline to reconsider our constitutional tort jurisprudence in this case

because it is the law of the case. See Ragland, 812 N.W.2d at 658.

B.

The defendants next contend Godfrey has no constitutionally

protected property interest in continuing his annual salary in a particular

amount or in a particular process to determine his annual salary. For the

reasons set forth below, we agree.

“Before a deprivation of due process can be claimed, a person must

demonstrate entitlement to a . . . property interest that has been violated.”

Notelzah, Inc. v. Destival, 537 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 1995). Protected

“property interests ‘are created and their dimensions are defined’ not by

the Constitution but by an independent source such as state law.” Movers

Warehouse, Inc. v. City of Little Canada, 71 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1987)); see also

Simonson v. Iowa State Univ., 603 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1999) (“A

property interest typically arises from contractual or statutory limitations

48

on the employer’s ability to terminate an employee or can also be created

by implied contract, arising out of customs, practices, and de facto

policies.”). The claimed property interest must be “premised on more than

a unilateral expectation of ownership in the property.” Notelzah, 537

N.W.2d at 691.

A statute “can create a constitutionally protected property interest,

first, when it contains particularized substantive standards that guide a

decision maker and, second, when it limits the decision maker’s discretion

by using mandatory language (both requirements are necessary).”

Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999). The statute must

limit the decision-maker’s discretion such that the statute “mandat[es] the

outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been

met.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462, 109 S. Ct. 1904,

1909 (1989). Where the relevant statutory scheme “places no substantive

limitations on the discretion” of the decision-maker there is no

constitutionally “protected property interest.” Movers Warehouse, 71 F.3d

at 720.

The statute at issue here does not provide particularized substantive

standards or limit the Governor’s discretion in setting Godfrey’s salary but

instead provides the Governor with unfettered discretion. The statute

provides:

The governor shall establish a salary for appointed nonelected

persons in the executive branch of state government holding

a position enumerated in the section of this division of this

Act that addresses the salary ranges of state officers within

the range provided, by considering, among other items, the

experience of the individual in the position, changes in the

duties of the position, the incumbent’s performance of

assigned duties, and subordinates’ salaries.

2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1191, § 13. The statute provides only that the governor

“shall establish a salary” within a particular salary range. Id. The statute

49

does not require an increase nor does it prohibit a decrease. The statute

provides the governor may consider certain items in establishing the

appointed officer’s salary, but the list of items is nonexhaustive and allows

the governor to consider any “other items.” Id. The statute does not

identify any criteria for setting a particular salary, does not specify the

weight given to or importance of any item, and does not provide a grounds

for review. See id. The balancing of any “other items” is wholly at the

governor’s discretion.

To appreciate the discretion afforded under the statute, consider the

facts of this case. Candidate and Governor Branstad heard repeated

complaints regarding the commissioner’s anti-employer bias from ABI, the

Iowa Motor Truck Association, self-insured companies, lawyers

representing self-insured companies, BPI (a large meat processor), and

other businesses. The plaintiff tried to prove his performance as

commissioner was excellent and these complaints and perceptions were

unfounded. The plaintiff spent many days of trial having witnesses parse

through workers’ compensation cases decided during Godfrey’s term and

opine on whether the cases were rightly or wrongly decided and whether

the cases were claimant- or employer-oriented. None of this evidence was

relevant because it was undisputed that these industry associations,

lawyers, and businesses did, in fact, voice complaints, whether founded or

not, about the workers’ compensation commission under Godfrey’s

leadership. Under the statute, the Governor was entitled to consider

industry’s perception of the workers’ compensation system under

Godfrey’s leadership, whether correct or not, and how that perception

would impact Iowa’s economy. Further, under the statute, the Governor

was entitled to make that consideration the single most important item in

setting the commissioner’s salary within the statutory range.

50

Notably, Godfrey did not claim a violation of the salary statute per

se. Rather, he alleged his constitutional rights had been violated. The

threshold for proving a constitutional violation based on an alleged

violation of a statute is higher than that for proving a violation of the

statute. See Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 568 (Iowa

2019) (explaining that a statutory violation does not automatically convert

to a due process violation).

A salary statute, like the one at issue here, that does not prohibit a

salary reduction and that vests the decision-maker with discretion is

insufficiently concrete to create a constitutionally protected interest in a

particular salary. See McKinney v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 915 F.3d 956, 961

(3d Cir. 2019) (stating when there is ambiguity as to whether an employee’s

salary can be reduced, there is no property interest in the salary and citing

cases); McLemore v. City of Trenton, No. 05–4631FLW, 2007 WL 2112341,

at *5 (D.N.J. July 19, 2007) (“Clearly, substantive due process is not

implicated in this case. Plaintiff has failed to show how an alleged

deprivation of a salary increase amounts to a fundamental right under the

Constitution.”); Anderson v. Colo. State Dep’t of Pers., 756 P.2d 969, 976

(Colo. 1988) (en banc) (“The hearing examiners have not cited any decision

of any jurisdiction supporting the proposition that public employees have

a general property right to receipt of a particular salary.”); Scutt v. LaSalle

Cnty. Bd., 423 N.E.2d 213, 217–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“Under the settled

law in this state, a public employee has no property interest in the

continuation of any specific rate or method of compensation. . . . With no

constitutional right to employment nor property interest in the

continuation of a rate of compensation, we find no due process denial here

present.”); Warren Cnty. Vocational–Tech. Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Warren Cnty.

Vocational–Tech. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 726 A.2d 939, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

51

Div. 1999) (holding the right to a certain salary level for a public employee

is not a protected property right and thus cannot form the basis for a due

process claim where the decision-maker possessed unfettered authority to

set the salary).

Our conclusion that Godfrey has no property interest in a particular

salary is bolstered by a further consideration. Godfrey is not an employee

of the State of Iowa; he is an appointed officer of the State of Iowa. This

court has long held that public officers of the state have no property

interest in their compensation:

A public office has in it no element of property, but it is

rather a personal public trust, created for the benefit of the

state, and not for the benefit of the individual citizens thereof.

Nor are the prospective emoluments of a public office property

in any sense, for the salary or other perquisites may be

reduced or otherwise regulated by law at all times, unless

such change is forbidden by the Constitution.

Clark v. Herring, 221 Iowa 1224, 1230, 260 N.W. 436, 439 (1935) (quoting

Shaw v. City Council of Marshalltown, 131 Iowa 128, 134, 104 N.W. 1121,

1124 (1905)). In Clark v. Herring, we explained even where there are

restrictions that may “forbid the legislature from abolishing a public office

or diminishing the salary thereof during the term of the incumbent,” those

restrictions do not “change its character or make it property.” Id. (quoting

Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577, 20 S. Ct. 890, 900–01 (1900)). “In

short, generally speaking, the nature of the relation of a public officer to

the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right.” Id. at

1231, 260 N.W. at 439 (quoting Taylor, 178 U.S. at 577, 20 S. Ct. at 901).

We also reject Godfrey’s contention that he had a constitutionally

cognizable property interest in having the Governor set his salary

according to a particular process. While a plaintiff may have a protected

property interest in a thing protected by a particular statute or statutory

52

regime, a plaintiff has no protected property interest in the procedure

itself. Justice Souter explained the distinction in Town of Castle Rock v.

Gonzales:

But Gonzales claims a property interest in a state-mandated

process in and of itself. This argument is at odds with the rule

that “[p]rocess is not an end in itself. Its constitutional

purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the

individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d

813 (1983); see also Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861,

868 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (per curiam); Doe v. Milwaukee County,

903 F.2d 499, 502–03 (C.A.7 1990). In putting to rest the

notion that the scope of an otherwise discernible property

interest could be limited by related state-law procedures, this

Court observed that “[t]he categories of substance and

procedure are distinct . . . . ‘Property’ cannot be defined by

the procedures provided for its deprivation.” Cleveland Bd. of

Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84

L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Just as a State cannot diminish a

property right, once conferred, by attaching less than

generous procedure to its deprivation, ibid., neither does a

State create a property right merely by ordaining beneficial

procedure unconnected to some articulable substantive

guarantee. This is not to say that state rules of executive

procedure may not provide significant reasons to infer an

articulable property right meant to be protected; but it is to

say that we have not identified property with procedure as

such. State rules of executive procedure, however important,

may be nothing more than rules of executive procedure.

545 U.S. 748, 771–72, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2812 (2005) (Souter, J.,

concurring) (alterations and omission in original).

Godfrey has no procedural or substantive due process right under

the Iowa Constitution in continuing his salary at a particular level or in

having his salary set within a statutory range according to a particular

process. Godfrey’s claim thus fails as a matter of law. See Gray v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. Sys., 150 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The

success of due process arguments depends upon the finding of a

constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of continued

53

employment or of a liberty interest having been infringed upon by the

State; absent such interest, no due process protections attach.”).

V.

For these reasons, we conclude the defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law with respect to all claims. We reverse the

judgment of the district court and remand this matter for the entry of

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., join this opinion. Appel, J.,

files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. McDermott, J.,

files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which

Christensen, C.J., joins.

54

#19–1954, Godfrey v. State

APPEL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I. Introduction.

At the outset, it is important to point out what this case is about and not

about.

First, the case is not about whether the court believes the testimony

of any particular witness who testified at trial. Instead, it is about the

respective roles of the jury and a reviewing court. Determining whom to

believe is a classic function for the jury. See Est. of Todd v. Todd, 585

N.W.2d 273, 278 (Iowa 1998) (holding that when an action is tried at law,

and in front of a jury, the court is “in no position to weigh the evidence as

if the case were on de novo review”); Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall,

551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996) (“Our task is not to weigh the evidence

or the credibility of the witnesses.”). Under Iowa law, this court is required

to permit the jury to completely disregard the testimony of witnesses

which, given the verdict, they apparently did. See Banwart v. 50th St.

Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 551 (Iowa 2018) (“The jury is free to

disbelieve [a witness’s] testimony . . . .”); State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d

670, 673 (Iowa 1993) (“The jury is free to believe or disbelieve any

testimony as it chooses and to give weight to the evidence as in its

judgment such evidence should receive.”); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d

329, 332 (Iowa 1992) (“Assessment of a witness’s credibility is uniquely

within a lay jury’s common understanding.”).

Second, the question is also not whether there was substantial

evidence in the record to suggest that factors other than sexual orientation

or retaliatory motive were at work in the decision to reduce Godfrey’s salary

and to engage in other actions related to Godfrey. In other words, there

55

was substantial evidence in the record which would have permitted the

jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendants.

But it is up to the jury to decide whether to credit the defendant’s

defense or the plaintiff’s claims based on the evidence presented at trial.

As we have stated, “[i]t is not necessary in a civil case that circumstantial

evidence be so clear as to exclude every other possible theory.” State v.

Williams, 179 N.W.2d 756, 760 (Iowa 1970). In most litigation, there are

competing narratives, both of which are supported by at least some

evidence. What weight to give to competing evidence is at the heart of the

jury’s role in our system of justice. See, e.g., Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d

1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993) (“What weight to give competing testimony is a

credibility issue, one properly left to the fact-finder.”); State v. Goodson,

958 N.W.2d 791, 801–02 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the competing narratives

of defendant and victim and the jury’s role in determining credibility). As

noted in McGlade v. City of Waterloo, when considering a directed verdict,

appellate review

must not be so applied as to deprive the jury of its function to

ascertain the facts upon a fair dispute in the testimony, . . . if

at the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony there is enough to

take the case to a jury, a defendant cannot, after introducing

his evidence, claim that there is nothing for a jury to

determine.

178 Iowa 11, 13, 156 N.W. 680, 681 (1916).

Of course, there are occasions where a case should not be submitted

to a jury. As noted in McGlade,

if the testimony offered by the party having the burden is in

conflict with undisputed facts, and especially with physical

facts which are a verity, or is such that under all the

circumstances it cannot in the nature of things be true, or is

such as that it is entirely and wholly inconsistent with any

other theory than that the witnesses must have been

mistaken, the trial court is justified [in directing] and it is its

duty to direct a verdict for the other party.

56

Id. at 14, 156 N.W. 680. But such occasions should be rare.

Third, the precise legal questions in this case are not impacted by

Governor Branstad’s reelection. An election does not ratify allegedly illegal

conduct of a public officer toward a third party, a notion that is only a

slight variant of the doctrine that the King can do no wrong. The focus in

this case must be on the facts and law surrounding the claims, and not

on a process of claimed political ratification. We should keep in mind the

words of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who declared:

The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury

in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and

corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of

the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343, 99 S. Ct. 645, 657–58

(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). “[A] key purpose behind the right of a

jury trial was to protect against government encroachment upon the rights

of citizens in civil . . . actions.” Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference,

55 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 440–41 (2014) [hereinafter Pollis]; see also Akhil Reed

Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991)

(stating that the jury’s function is “to protect ordinary individuals against

governmental overreaching”).

Fourth, in cases under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) there is

generally no requirement that there be direct evidence of a defendant’s

discriminatory motive. We long ago rejected the formalism of valuing

direct over indirect evidence. State v. O’Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 205

(Iowa 1979) (en banc). More recently, we have empowered our juries with

a judicial exclamation point by rejecting the notion that a fact finder

cannot engage in reasoning that requires a series or “stacking” of

inferences. State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 58–60 (Iowa 2021). Our

decision in State v. Ernst was a major step in reinforcing the primary fact-

57

finding role of the jury and restricting the role of judges in evaluating the

validity of verdicts upon judicial review. See generally Pollis, 55 B.C. L.

Rev. 435 (arguing that appellate courts have invaded the role of the jury

by limiting the historic role of the jury to draw inferences from

circumstantial evidence).

Fifth, the role of circumstantial evidence is particularly important in

a discrimination case, where there is rarely direct evidence of motivation.

See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716,

103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983) (“There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony

as to the employer’s mental processes.”); Blare v. Husky Injection Molding

Sys. Bos., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Mass. 1995) (“The ultimate question

of the defendants’ state of mind is elusive and rarely is established by other

than circumstantial evidence . . . .”). No one, or at least very few people,

announce an intention to discriminate. There is a body of caselaw

supporting civil rights verdicts based upon circumstantial evidence. See,

e.g., Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1045–48

(7th Cir. 2000); Bodaghi v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 995 P.2d 288, 296, 303 (Colo.

2000) (en banc) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence is often particularly helpful

when, as here, a case turns on vacillating issues such as motive or

intent.”); Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 895 (Iowa

1990).

Sixth, the standard of relevance for the admission of evidence

generally is not a high bar. Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 (“Evidence is relevant if:

a. It has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would

be without the evidence; and b. The fact is of consequence in determining

the action.”); Smith v. Pine, 234 Iowa 256, 265, 12 N.W.2d 236, 242 (1943)

(“The test for determining its admissibility is that the offered proof must

lead to a reasonable inference and not a mere suspicion of the existence of

58

the fact sought to be proven.”); see also Nw. Mut. Life Ins. v. Johnson, 275

F. 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1921) (“The law is well settled that, when a plaintiff

in a case has to rely solely upon circumstantial evidence that it is very

liberal in admitting any evidence which will aid in establishing the facts

necessary to a recovery. Evidence of this nature is always admissible to

show intent.”). In a civil rights case involving discriminatory motive, the

courts have been generous in the admission of circumstantial evidence.

See, e.g., Iowa City Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. Roadway Express, Inc., 397

N.W.2d 508, 511–12 (Iowa 1986); see also Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207

F.3d 176, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing cases holding that evidence of a

defendant’s prior discrimination of other employees is relevant and

admissible); Jones v. Cargill, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985–86 (N.D. Iowa

2007) (allowing evidence of stray racist remarks by non-decision-makers).

Seventh, in considering the admissibility of circumstantial evidence,

the district court under our caselaw has broad discretion. Pine, 234 Iowa

at 265, 12 N.W.2d at 242 (“[W]ide latitude is generally allowed in admitting

[circumstantial evidence] especially where direct evidence is lacking.”);

Hayes v. Stunkard, 233 Iowa 582, 590, 10 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1943) (“Great

latitude should be allowed in the reception of circumstantial evidence

where a party must rely on that form of evidence to prove his theory.”). So,

our generous evidence law is double-barreled: it establishes a low

threshold for admissibility and vests the district court with broad

discretion in applying that low threshold.

Eighth, the essential question on judicial review under our

traditional caselaw is limited to whether the record is so devoid that the

jury has no role to play in finding the facts. Graham v. Chi. & N.W. Ry.,

143 Iowa 604, 615, 119 N.W. 708, 711 (1909) (“This court has gone its full

length to protect the right of jury trial against encroachment by the courts

59

under any guise, and one of the rights of jury trial is the right to have the

credibility of the witness determined by the jury.”), supplemented on reh’g,

143 Iowa 604, 122 N.W. 573. There are only very narrow exceptions. “The

testimony of a witness may be so impossible and absurd and self-

contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by the court.” Id.; see

also State ex rel. Mochnick v. Andrioli, 216 Iowa 451, 453, 249 N.W. 379,

380 (1933) (“The rule that it is for the jury to reconcile the conflicting

testimony of a witness does not apply where the only evidence in support

of a controlling fact is that of a witness who so contradicts himself as to

render finding of facts thereon a mere guess. We may concede that,

ordinarily, contradictory statements of a witness do not make an issue of

fact; and that such situation may deprive the testimony of all probative

force.”).

In engaging in judicial review of jury verdicts, we must remember

that the tyranny that juries were designed to prevent includes “the tyranny

of potential elitism or aristocratic decision making by the judicial officers

of the government itself.” R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Judicial Nullification of the

Right to Trial by Jury by “Evolving” Standards of Appellate Review, 60

Baylor L. Rev. 337, 342 (2008) [hereinafter Ayres]. As noted by the United

States Supreme Court, “[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate

control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to

ensure their control in the judiciary.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296, 306, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004). It would be an act of

constitutional irony for the judicial branch to limit the scope of the fact-

finding power of the very institution that was explicitly designed to control

the power of the judiciary.

In conclusion, the jury is a foundational institution in our system of

government. It is constitutionally established, just like the courts, the

60

legislature, and the chief magistrate. As a general proposition, judges

should be extremely cautious before substituting their own views for that

of the jury. See State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2009) (“[A]

court must be careful not to usurp the role of a jury by making credibility

determinations that are outside the proper scope of the judicial role.”);

State v. Sauls, 356 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 1984) (en banc) (Carter, J.,

dissenting) (“Given the role of the jury in our system of justice, we must

accept the ability of that institution to resolve the difficult issues of

credibility which are presented.”); see also Hasham, 200 F.3d at 1047

(“[W]e will not second-guess a jury on credibility issues. While this court’s

review is confined to the ‘cold pages’ of an appellate transcript, the jury

had an opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the

witnesses, including the subject’s reactions and responses to the

interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye

contact, posture and body movements.” (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996))).

II. Discrimination Claim Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

A. Introduction. Godfrey claims that Governor Branstad’s

decision to ask for his resignation and reduce his salary by 35% if he

refused was “motivated in part” by Godfrey’s sexual orientation. He also

claims other acts of discrimination based on sexual orientation. But

Governor Branstad denies that he knew anything about Godfrey’s sexual

orientation at the time he decided to reduce Godfrey’s salary. Further, the

defendants deny that any adverse action was taken against Godfrey based

on his sexual orientation. In light of the lack of direct evidence of the state

61

of mind of the defendants, the plaintiff must prove his case, if he can, by

use of circumstantial evidence.4

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. In order to

bring claims under the ICRA, a party must first exhaust administrative

remedies before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC). Ackelson v.

Manley Toy Direct L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 680 n.1 (Iowa 2013) (discussing

Iowa Code § 216.16(1)). The defendants claim that Godfrey failed to timely

file claims with the ICRC of retaliation related to the May 2012 item veto

and the reversion of unspent funds at the end of the year.

Godfrey responds that he timely filed three separate charges with

the ICRC, that he is not required to file a new claim with each continuing

incident, and that claims that reasonably relate to reported claims are

proper. The key case cited by Godfrey is Lynch v. City of Des Moines. 454

N.W.2d 827, 832–33 (Iowa 1990). In Lynch, the question was whether the

ongoing adverse actions “reasonably relate” to the administratively

exhausted claims. Id.

Godfrey filed three complaints with the ICRC. His original

August 22, 2011, complaint alleged retaliation based on the salary cut and

statements to the press made shortly thereafter. His subsequent April 12,

2012, complaint asserted that the defendants retaliated against him by

“discrimination, harassment, retaliation, isolation, and ostracism.” The

April 12 complaint specifically asserted retaliation based upon the lack of

invitation to a retreat on October 11, 2011, the refusal to publish a

favorable press release, and ostracism by others. His third complaint, filed

4There is a threshold question of whether the ICRA provides coverage for Godfrey

as an appointed official. For the reasons expressed by the majority, I conclude that the

defendants are precluded from raising the issue at this stage of the litigation by law of

the case and judicial estoppel.

62

on December 28, 2012, again alleged, “I have continued to be subjected to

discrimination, harassment, retaliation, isolation, and ostracism.”

None of the three complaints specifically mentions the loss of funds

through reversion or the item veto of an appropriation for a chief deputy

position as retaliatory acts. The question is whether the claimed

retaliation based on these budgetary matters is reasonably related to the

retaliation claims made in the three complaints.

In Hulme v. Barrett, we considered a case where the plaintiff

complained to the ICRC that she was a victim of age discrimination

because her work hours were reduced. 449 N.W.2d 629, 630–31 (Iowa

1989). She was discharged from employment after she filed her complaint.

Id. at 631. The plaintiff obtained a right to sue letter and filed an action

claiming, among other things, that her firing was discriminatory and that

she was discharged in retaliation for filing her complaint. Id. The district

court held that while the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint

charging that the reduction of her work hours was a discriminatory act,

the plaintiff did not file a claim related to her subsequent termination and

therefore did not exhaust administrative remedies. Id.

In Hulme, we reversed the district court. Id. at 633. We stated that

“[t]o force a plaintiff to file a new administrative charge with each

continuing incident of discrimination would create needless procedural

barriers.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d

145 (8th Cir. 1986)). We held that the district court had jurisdiction over

the claims related to termination because they reasonably related to the

first claim which was properly before the court. Id.

In Lynch, we considered whether the plaintiff’s original claim of

hostile environment and retaliation concerning the reassignment of her

patrol area was sufficient exhaustion of other acts of retaliatory conduct.

63

454 N.W.2d at 829–30. We held that that the other acts of retaliatory

conduct were “reasonably related” to Lynch’s other claims and that to

require an additional administrative proceeding “would be to erect a

needless procedural barrier to hearing the merits of Lynch’s case.” Id. at

833.

On this point, I agree with Godfrey. Hulme and Lynch stand for the

proposition that a person claiming retaliation does not need to file a new

administrative complaint with each successive act of retaliation as long as

the actions are reasonably related to the underlying complaint. Although

the budget matters were never specifically raised in an administrative

complaint, the acts as alleged were certainly “reasonably related” as that

term is used in Hulme and Lynch. See Clockedile v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr.,

245 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001); Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d

828, 832–33 (6th Cir. 1999); Ang v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540,

546–47 (6th Cir. 1991).

C. Questions of Admissibility of Evidence on Discrimination

Claim.

1. Introduction. The defendants claim that Godfrey introduced

evidence that was far afield from the question of whether the defendants

engaged in discriminatory conduct toward Godfrey as a result of his sexual

orientation. Godfrey maintains that the evidence was relevant to show

discriminatory intent or animus. Most of the evidentiary challenges raise

questions of relevance under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.401 (relevancy) and

admissibility under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 (balancing relevancy and

prejudice). One claim, however, asserts admission in violation of Iowa Rule

of Evidence 5.802 (hearsay).

The standard for reviewing admission of evidence alleged to be

hearsay is to correct errors at law. Hawkins v. Grinnell Reg. Med. Ctr., 929

64

N.W.2d 261, 265 (Iowa 2019). The standard for review of admission of

evidence on relevance grounds is for abuse of discretion. Graber v. City of

Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). In order to be

relevant, evidence need not prove a proposition or inference but must only

have a tendency to show that a particular fact is more likely than not. See

Spahr v. Kriegel, 617 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Iowa 2000) (en banc); see also

Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A] piece of evidence

does not need to carry a party’s evidentiary burden in order to be relevant;

it simply has to advance the ball.”); United States v. Leon-Gonzalez, 24 F.

App’x 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although an argument can certainly be

made that the testimony may have been remote, that is an issue going to

the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.”). As noted earlier, the

district courts are entitled to “great latitude” in their application of the

“very liberal” rule of relevancy.

2. Discussion. I begin with the easier issues. In my view, the

evidence regarding the off-hand comment by Senator Dearden is

admissible. The anecdote is offered not to show the truth of the matter

asserted but merely the notion that the fact of Godfrey’s sexual orientation

may have swirled around the capitol rotunda and became common

knowledge in political circles.

The admission of evidence regarding the reversion of funds and the

Governor’s item veto of an appropriation for a chief deputy to show an

adverse action was not an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff is entitled to

attempt to prove his case that the defendants discriminated or retaliated

against him based on sexual orientation. The fact that the acts allegedly

used to retaliate were within the constitutional power of the defendants

does not require exclusion of evidence in a civil rights case.

65

The admissibility of evidence regarding positions of Governor

Branstad and his supporters on issues related to sexual orientation raises

a different issue. We want our judicial system to make decisions based

upon facts and law and not party politics. That said, the substantive

political affiliations may be germane in civil litigation under some

circumstances. As noted in one case, social media posts by a politician’s

constituency may demonstrate the politician’s intent to engage in a

particular act. Stout v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988, 1006–

08 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing evidence of social media statements made by private

individuals used to determine intent of public officials).

The essential problem in this type of case is that direct evidence of

intent to discriminate is almost never available. See, e.g., Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Employment

discrimination cases inevitably present difficult problems of proof,

precisely because we cannot peer into the minds of decision-makers to

determine their true motivations.”); Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr.

3d 654, 666 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting that “smoking gun” evidence of

discrimination is rarely found). It certainly was not available in this case.

As a result, in my view, parties seeking to show intentional discrimination

should have some leeway in offering evidence to make the case. See Ortiz

v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (“True, some

cases permit easy inferences, such as the fabled employer who admits to

firing an employee because of race. But even then fact finders must ask

themselves what the admission means. Few discrimination cases are so

straightforward—indeed they are often factually complex and require

sifting through ambiguous pieces of evidence. And the direct-and-indirect

framework does nothing to simplify the analysis.”); Becker, 207 F.3d at

66

194 n.8 (citing cases holding that evidence of a defendant’s prior

discrimination of other employees is relevant and admissible); Roadway

Express, 397 N.W.2d at 512 (“[C]omparative employment data constitutes

probative evidence from which discriminatory intent may be inferred.”);

Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment

Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 149, 192–96

(2012) (arguing for liberal admissibility of stray remarks by employers);

Kristin M. Bovalino, Note, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His

Odds of Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 1117, 1136 (2003)

(“Circumstantial evidentiary analysis is particularly useful where the

reliability of direct evidence is questionable, and circumstantial evidence

may sufficiently establish plaintiff’s prima facie case.”).

Here, the admissibility of evidence that, for example, the Republican

Party of Iowa in its platform declined to support giving gay people the same

right to marry as opposite sex couples does not prove discriminatory intent

based on sexual orientation in the employment context. Many public

figures, including President Barack Obama, Senator Hillary Clinton, and

Governor Thomas Vilsack, have opposed gay marriage at some time in

their political careers. Surely we can all agree that opposing gay marriage

does not necessarily mean that one discriminates against gay people in

the workplace.

But, the fact that the Republican Party sought to oppose gay

marriage, gay adoption, and eliminate employment protections based on

sexual orientation in its 2010 platform has at least some relevance on the

cultural and political climate in which Governor Branstad operated and

has some bearing on the issues in this case. Robert Belton, Causation and

Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:

Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1359, 1387

67

n.179 (1990) (“Sufficiency and admissibility of evidence are two distinct

issues. Evidence can be admissible but not sufficient to sustain a party’s

burden of proof on a particular issue.”).

In my view, the evidence offered by the plaintiff related to the

attitudes of the defendants and the persons and organizations involved in

the decision to take action against Godfrey is admissible in this case under

the low bar of relevance established in our caselaw.

As to the position of the Republican Party with respect to gay rights,

there was testimony that Governor Branstad was a consummate politician,

a pro’s pro, as one witness stated, and a jury arguably could infer that he

would have his ear to the ground on political issues affecting the

Republican Party. The fact that substantial elements in the rank and file

of the Republican Party sought to remove the provision of the ICRA

outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is something

arguably part of the mosaic of facts that a jury was entitled to know.

On the other hand, Governor Branstad left office and was President

of Des Moines University in the years prior to his election in November of

2010. He asserted that he promised to stay out of politics as President of

Des Moines University. He told the jury he had never read the Republican

Party platform in 2010. So his ear might have been further from the

political ground than Godfrey claims. The testimony of former State

Senator Matt McCoy about Republican senators in the time period between

2000 and 2008 is some distance in time and place from the events that

occurred in July 2011.

The question of whether this evidence should have been admitted

can be disputed. On balance, however, I cannot say it was an abuse of

discretion for the district court to admit the evidence. Circumstantial

cases are often put together in small pieces. The nature of the political

68

environment and the attitude of the Governor’s political party to gay rights

questions is not wholly irrelevant to a Governor who is sensitive to political

atmospherics. I am not prepared to say that the district court abused its

great latitude of discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible

and that any prejudice arising from the evidence did not substantially

outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Adverse Action to Support

Discrimination Claim.

1. Introduction. A civil rights plaintiff must demonstrate that he or

she has suffered “adverse action” as a result of discrimination. Channon

v. UPS, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861–62 (Iowa 2001). Generally, “adverse

action” for purposes of making a discrimination claim requires a tangible

change in terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. See, e.g., Thomas

v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 528–29 (8th Cir. 2007); Channon, 629 N.W.2d at

862.

A question that arises in the caselaw is what is sufficiently injurious

and concrete to meet the adverse action requirement for establishing a

discrimination claim. For purposes of Godfrey’s discrimination claim,

there is no doubt that the reduction of his salary on July 11, 2011, by 35%

was adverse action. The question is whether there are any other adverse

actions for which the plaintiff might be entitled to a remedy through a

claim of discrimination under the ICRA.

2. Discussion. I agree with the majority that prior to July 11

Godfrey suffered no adverse action under the ICRA for purposes of a

discrimination claim. As the majority correctly points out, a spurned

request for a resignation, without more, is not adverse action. After the

December 29, 2010, meeting, Godfrey was permitted to continue on the

job without intervention by the defendants until July 11, 2011. Thus,

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during the time period up to July 11, I agree that there was no adverse

action taken by the defendants against Godfrey and he has no

discrimination claim as a matter of law arising during that time frame.

The situation changes, as the defendants recognize, on July 11. A

day or two after his salary was reduced, Godfrey’s lawyer called Brenna

Findley about the Governor’s action. At that point, it certainly became

clear to the defendants that Godfrey was opposing conduct which he

believed violated the ICRA. Further, press reports circulated making it

clear to the defendants that Godfrey asserted the defendant’s violated the

ICRA.

In any event, after July 11, the defendants do not claim on appeal

that they did not know Godfrey was making a claim of discrimination

based on sexual orientation and opposed allegedly illegal acts. Apparently,

either Godfrey’s statements to the press or his attorney’s phone call took

care of that.5 So the question arises whether Godfrey suffered adverse

action after these two events for purposes of a claim of intentional

discrimination.

At this point, it is important to point out the difference between

adverse action for purposes of a discrimination claim and adverse action

for purposes of a claim of unlawful retaliation for opposing allegedly

unlawful actions. As noted above, adverse employment action for a

discrimination claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act has generally been

held to mean tangible change in employment terms, conditions, or

benefits. Thomas, 483 F.3d at 528–29.

5Neither

party specifically references the call in their briefing. But the defendants

do not claim that the plaintiff failed to show opposition after July 11 regardless of the

theory.

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But, in 2006, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White,

the Supreme Court determined that under the Federal Civil Rights Act “the

antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive [discrimination] provision,

is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions

of employment.” 548 U.S. 53, 64, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412–13 (2006).

Instead, an employment action will be adverse when the action “well might

have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge

of discrimination.’ ” Id. at 68, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v.

Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). In light of Burlington

Northern, we must pursue two tracks when considering whether adverse

action is present in this case. Whether adverse action is present for a

discrimination claim requires a showing that action has a material

consequence to the employee.

Based on my review of the record, I do not find that Godfrey has

established that the post-July 11 actions are sufficient to establish an

independent claim of discrimination based upon sexual orientation. In the

post-July 11 period, the defendants plainly knew that Godfrey was gay

and that he claimed to be opposing illegal conduct. But the actions taken

by the defendants in the post-July 11 period, even construed in a light

most favorable to the plaintiff, do not arise to an adverse action that

impacts the terms and conditions of employment. The post-July 11 events

did not objectively alter Godfrey’s job in any material way. His job really

remained pretty much the same and he was able to carry on much as he

did before. He claimed he received treatment from the director of Iowa

Workforce Development that he thought was rude and micromanaging. He

had budget issues, including reversion of funds that he thought he should

be able to keep, and did not get an additional position for a chief deputy

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after the Governor item vetoed the provision. He was not invited to a

meeting with executives in the administration.

But I do not find the post-July 11 acts sufficient to give rise to a

material change in terms, conditions, or benefits of the job. As a result,

based on my review of the record, I conclude that the only adverse action

against Godfrey with respect to a claim of discrimination based on sexual

orientation was the 35% reduction of his salary on July 11. The

conclusion that there was no adverse action beyond the 35% pay cut for

purposes of making a discrimination claim, however, does not mean that

there was no adverse action for purposes of a separate retaliation claim

arising out of conduct in the post-July 11 period. That question is

discussed below under the analysis of Godfrey’s retaliation claim.

E. Validity of Jury Verdict on Issue of Knowledge of Godfrey’s

Sexual Orientation.

1. Introduction. With respect to the claims under the ICRA, a party

must show that the defendant knew that a person was within a protected

class. The ICRA expressly provides that “sexual orientation” is protected

under the statute. But the question arises whether the defendants knew

that Godfrey was gay at the time they took adverse action against him.

2. Position of State defendants. The State defendants assert that

there is no evidence that Governor Branstad knew that Godfrey was gay

at the time he made his decision to reduce his salary on July 5, 2011.

Governor Branstad testified that at the time he made the decision to

reduce Godfrey’s salary, he was not aware of his sexual orientation. While

chief of staff Jeffrey Boeyink and legal counsel Brenna Findley testified

that they talked about Godfrey’s sexual orientation on July 8 after Findley

discovered the possibility that Godfrey was gay from a website, they

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testified that they decided not to bring the matter to the attention of

Governor Branstad.

3. Position of Godfrey. Like most civil rights cases, Godfrey has no

direct evidence showing that Governor Branstad knew Godfrey was gay

prior to the July 11 reduction in salary. There are no declarations by

Governor Branstad or troublesome personnel records with questionable

observations. But Godfrey claims that it may be inferred from

circumstantial evidence that Governor Branstad must have known about

Godfrey’s sexual orientation when Godfrey’s salary was reduced.

First, Godfrey points out matters related to sexual orientation were

an important part of the Iowa political scene for some time. Godfrey points

out that this court in 2009 decided Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa

2009), three justices were not retained largely as a result of that decision,

and that the question of gay rights generally figured prominently in the

2010 campaign for governor. He notes that the Republican Party, and

Governor Branstad as a candidate, opposed gay marriage in very strong

terms. So the broad question of the rights of persons based on sexual

orientation was certainly a feature of the political environment in 2010.

Second, Godfrey points out that he had publically embraced his

sexual orientation and that his sexual orientation was widely known in

political circles at the time he sought confirmation. He was not confirmed

in 2006 but, after serving on an interim basis, was confirmed to serve the

remainder of a term in 2007. He was again before the senate in 2009 and

confirmed for a full term as commissioner. During these confirmation

events, Godfrey was openly gay. Thus, in political circles, Godfrey claims

his sexual orientation was common knowledge.

Third, Godfrey points to evidence that three of Governor Branstad’s

top advisors knew about his sexual orientation prior to July 11, 2011.

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Godfrey offered evidence that then Lieutenant Governor Kim Reynolds was

introduced to Godfrey’s partner on the floor of the senate during the

confirmation process, that State Senator Bill Dotzler told defendant

Boeyink that Godfrey was gay some time before racing season opened at

the Newton Speedway in 2011, and that Brenna Findley claimed that she

saw a website on July 8 suggesting that Godfrey might be gay when she

was on the internet trying to determine Godfrey’s term of office.

4. Discussion. When analyzing sufficiency of the evidence in

discrimination cases, judges must be careful not to allow their own opinion

of the facts take place of the role of the jury. Cf. Theresa M. Beiner, Let

the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People

Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 791, 846 (2002) (“Courts

often judge harassment incorrectly, granting summary judgment or

judgment as a matter of law in questionable cases, given what social

science tells about people’s perceptions of harassment.”); Suja A. Thomas,

Summary Judgment and the Reasonable Jury Standard: A Proxy for a

Judge’s Own View of the Sufficiency of the Evidence?, 97 Judicature 222,

227 (2014) (“[J]udges may fall prey to their own opinions of evidence upon

motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment as a

matter of law.”). As noted above, the determination of the weight of the

evidence and what inferences may be drawn from the evidence is a jury

function.

One of the issues in this case is the degree to which the jury may

infer Governor Branstad had knowledge of Godfrey’s sexual orientation

because of the knowledge of others. But under some circumstances, at

least, a fact finder is permitted to make such an inference. See United

States v. Marek, 548 F.3d 147, 152–54 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that the

knowledge of an audit was widely known among circle of friends that

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included defendant). And, knowledge of individuals with a close working

relationship, even when contradicted by affidavits or testimony, has been

held to be the basis of a permissible inference that others had the same

knowledge as well. Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 970 F. Supp.

2d 1039, 1062 (D. Or. 2013) (noting it is reasonable to infer decision-

maker had knowledge when close associates had knowledge); McCauley v.

ASML US, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1153–54 (D. Or. 2013) (holding that

there was a genuine dispute of fact regarding decision-maker’s knowledge

despite uncontradicted testimony that he lacked knowledge because of

interaction with managers who did have knowledge); Day v. UPS, 829 F.

Supp. 2d 969, 974 (D. Or. 2011) (same).

The majority cites a number of cases where courts have found that

the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support the inference that

an actor knew an employee was a member of a protected class under civil

rights statutes. A review of the cases reveals the nature of the problem.

In Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Inc., the court held that a pregnant

employee did not establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination

when it was undisputed that management made the decision to lay her off

before the plaintiff herself knew she was pregnant. 82 F.3d 578, 580–82

(3d Cir. 1996). The fact that she later told six coworkers of her pregnancy

but asked them to remain quiet was of no consequence. Id. at 580. The

court decided that when it is undisputed that the decision to terminate the

employee was made prior to the plaintiff herself knowing she was

pregnant, there cannot possibly be an act of discrimination by the

employer based on the unknown condition. Id. at 581. The facts in Geraci

are thus plainly distinguishable from this case.

Another pregnancy discrimination case cited by the majority is

Prebilich-Holland v. Gaylord Entertainment Co. 297 F.3d 438 (6th Cir.

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2002). In Prebilich-Holland, the plaintiff who claimed pregnancy

discrimination told two coworkers of her pregnancy, but no one else. Id.

at 441. Like Geraci, the plaintiff offered no circumstantial evidence that

the decision-maker knew the plaintiff was pregnant when the termination

was initiated four days before the decision-maker learned of the plaintiff’s

condition. Id. at 444. The plaintiff admitted that there was no reason to

believe that the decision-maker knew of her pregnancy at the time the

decision was made to discharge her from employment. Id. Summary

judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed. Id. Because the plaintiff

in Prebilich-Holland conceded that there was no reason to believe that the

decision-maker learned of her pregnancy at the time of the decision to

terminate, there were no facts from which a jury could infer knowledge.

A somewhat different scenario was presented in the unreported case

of Nealis v. Molecular Health, Inc., 20-P-159, 2021 WL 1811730 (Mass.

App. Ct. May 6, 2021). In Nealis, a plaintiff claimed he was “openly gay”

and “did not hide” his sexual orientation at the workplace. Id. at *4. But

the decision-maker spent most of his time out of the Boston office where

the plaintiff was employed. Id. Further, the company was undergoing a

dramatic downsizing due to economic factors and was left with only five

remaining employees in the United States. Id. at *5. With only five

employees, there was no need for an IT officer in the company. Id.

Summary judgment in favor of the company was affirmed. Id. at *7. While

Nealis is in some ways closer to the present case than Geraci and Prebilich-

Holland, the ultimate result was supported by the dramatic downsizing of

the company and the utter lack of need for IT personnel.

In Epstein v. City of New York, a gay law enforcement officer in New

York claimed he was disciplined because of his sexual orientation. No. 06

Civ. 3788(TPG), 2009 WL 2431489, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009). He did

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not reveal his sexual orientation to anyone in the NYPD. Id. at *5. He

asserted that he bumped into another officer at a club from time to time

and that he participated in a gay festival where he was seen by other police

officers. Id. Finally, he filed an Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) complaint. Id. The decision-maker claimed he did

not know that the plaintiff was gay and did not know about the EEOC

complaint when the plaintiff was disciplined. Id. Summary judgment was

granted to the defendants. Id. at *6. Unlike here, in Epstein the plaintiff

kept his sexual orientation quiet. There was no evidence that management

personnel close to the decision-maker and engaged in the decision-making

process knew of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.

Another case cited by the majority is Igasaki v. Illinois Department of

Financial & Professional Regulation. 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2021). In

Igasaki, a gay employee claimed he was terminated from employment

based on sexual orientation. Id. at 954. In footnote 5, the court noted

that the plaintiff did not prove that the decision-maker knew that the

plaintiff was gay. Id. at 959 n.5. The plaintiff asserted that “it’s reasonable

to believe [the decision-maker] knew because [another male colleague] was

very close to her and he asked me if I was gay, and I acknowledged it to

him, and because there was also personal data information that would

have telegraphed to her that I was gay.” Id. (second alteration in original).

There was no evidence, however, that the employee who was “close” to the

decision-maker played any role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s

employment.

In another case, Andrade v. Lego Systems, Inc., the plaintiff claimed

he had been terminated based on sexual orientation. 205 A.3d 807, 809

(Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (per curiam). The plaintiff admitted that the only

evidence that the decision-maker knew the plaintiff was gay was a brief

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conversation where the supervisor asked the plaintiff who took care of his

dogs when he was at work. Id. at 811. The plaintiff replied that his

“partner” did. Id. The plaintiff claimed that this exchange was sufficient

to infer that the supervisor knew that he was gay. Id. at 816. The Andrade

court rejected the argument as speculative. Id.

Similarly, in Thomas v. Coleman Enterprises, the only evidence

offered to support knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation was an

ambiguous question posed to the plaintiff as to “whether she was ‘still

going out with Theresa.’ ” No. C6-99-1327, 2000 WL 385479, at *1 (Minn.

Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2000). The district court concluded that a single, isolated

comment was insufficient to establish knowledge of the decision-maker.

Id. at *6.

The published employment case that seems most analogous to this

case supports Godfrey. In H.S. v. Board of Regents, Southeast Missouri

State University, a college administrator who had HIV was terminated from

employment. 967 S.W.2d 665, 668–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The question

arose whether the decision-maker, a recently arrived interim president,

knew that the plaintiff had HIV when the interim president made the

decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. Id. at 670–71. The

interim president denied such knowledge, as did an administrator who

reported to the president and who had handled personnel matters with the

plaintiff also denied such knowledge. Id. at 671.

The H.S. court affirmed a $600,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Id. at 668, 672. On the issue of knowledge, the H.S. court noted that the

administrator who reported to the interim president had in the past called

the campus health department and spoke about the possibility that the

plaintiff had HIV. Id. at 671–72. According to the H.S. court, it was

reasonable to infer that if the administrator was concerned enough to call

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the health department about the plaintiff’s condition, the administrator

would also have informed the interim president, particularly when she

knew that disciplinary action was imminent. Id. at 671. In short, the H.S.

court found permissible the inference by the fact finder that the

administrator who had knowledge about the plaintiff’s HIV symptoms

must have told the interim president, even though both denied it. Id. The

H.S. court further noted the interim president’s own actions, including

cursory investigation and extremely disproportionate discipline, make it

permissible for the fact finder to infer knowledge of the plaintiff’s HIV

condition and that he acted upon it. Id. at 672. The decision in H.S.

stands for the proposition that where an advisor to a decision-maker

knows that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, a reasonable fact

finder could infer that the advisor informed the decision-maker of that fact

before taking an important employment action against the plaintiff.

The cases cited by the majority do not provide a compelling body of

law to be applied in this case. Here, the facts are different. The plaintiff

is a public figure who has been before the Iowa Senate on three occasions

as an openly gay nominee. There was evidence that he and his partner

were introduced to the senators during the confirmation process. There

was evidence that the Dearden misstep (“You’re not gay, are you?”) spread

through the capitol rotunda. The fact that Godfrey was gay was no doubt

magnified in the political community after this court decided Varnum and

three justices were not retained by the voters in 2010.

There was evidence that persons in leadership of the business

community who were critical of his performance in office knew that he was

gay during the relevant time period. ABI board member Dennis Murdoch

testified that during confirmation battles, he thought there was an

“elephant in the room” when the Godfrey nomination was discussed at an

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ABI meeting because it just did not make sense that some at ABI were

opposing the nomination. When he asked a senior lawyer sitting next to

him at a meeting what was going on, the lawyer told Murdoch that Godfrey

was gay. The main lobbyist for ABI, who sought to encourage Governor

Branstad to remove Godfrey, knew he was gay. Other representatives in

the business community knew he was gay.

The people at Iowa Workforce Development where Godfrey worked

knew was gay. He did not hide it. Iowa Workforce Development Director

Theresa Wahlert knew he was gay. His colleague whose office was next to

him, Iowa Labor Commissioner Michael Mauro, testified it was common

knowledge that Godfrey was gay.

And there was evidence that those close to the Governor who were

involved in the decision-making regarding Godfrey’s employment knew he

was gay. Although his testimony was not always clear and was

contradicted by another witness, Senator Dotzler testified that he told

Branstad’s chief of staff Boeyink that Godfrey was gay sometime in the

spring of 2011. Senator Courtney testified that he introduced Godfrey and

his partner to then Senator Reynolds during the confirmation battles prior

to 2010. Brenna Findley testified that she discovered Godfrey might be

gay on July 8, 2011, when she was searching on the internet to find out

the length of Godfrey’s term when the information “popped up” on the

screen. Findley, as the Governor’s lawyer, testified that she told Boeyink

of the discovery, but decided not to tell the Governor.

So the question is, given the record in this case, should this court

permit the jury to infer from the evidence that Governor Branstad knew

Godfrey was gay when he made the decision to slash Godfrey’s salary. Or,

should this court, on appeal, refuse to permit the jury to engage in its

classic fact-finding function.

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It must be emphasized, in the strongest way possible, that the

question is not who we believe. It is whether the jury has acted within the

boundaries of its broad authority. The issue is sometimes framed as

whether the evidence was “too speculative” to support the verdict or

whether the jury has made permissible inferences, and even inferences

upon inferences, based on the evidence.

In making this judgment, we must recognize that there is rarely

overwhelming proof of knowledge or intent. And, the burden in a civil case

is not whether there is mathematical proof of what the defendants knew,

but is instead whether the jury, a storied institution which occupies an

exalted place in our legal system, must be told by this court that its

collective judgment, that it is more likely than not that the defendants

knew that Godfrey was gay, cannot be permitted. Judges who have

studied a case for a few hours or a few days risk invading the province of

the jury when they tell jurors, based on our elite legal training, the

diplomas on our walls, our insightful perspectives on human relations,

and our general wisdom, that they will not be permitted to determine what

inferences may be drawn from the evidence. My sense of judicial restraint

and respect for the role of the jury prevents me from taking this issue away

from the jury in this case.

F. Validity of Jury Verdict on Question of Discriminatory

Intent. The defendants in the alternative assert that even if Governor

Branstad knew that Godfrey was gay, Godfrey failed to show evidence of

discriminatory intent on the part of the defendants. The parties in their

briefing cite no authorities, but simply argue that the facts either support,

or do not support, the proposition of antigay animus.

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I would not decide this important and delicate question without

supplemental briefing from the parties. Although the issue has likely been

preserved by the one-page long discussion in the defendants’ appellate

brief, no caselaw at all has been cited by either party on the question. A

number of issues and subissues lurk behind the question of whether the

jury’s determination of intent should be affirmed or reversed on appeal.

The parties do not tell us what the proper framework of analysis is for the

consideration of the question of whether the plaintiff has carried the day

in proving discriminatory intent in the context of a motion for a directed

verdict or motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. They do not

provide us with th

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