Case law

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  • Andsu, Inc. v. City of Kokomo (In re Sassi Corp.)

    51 B.R. 534 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 1983

    This is clearly not the law. In LHD, a debtor-in-possession and a creditors’ committee filed a complaint to modify or set aside a mortgagee’s lease. … Kokomo’s intent that Andsu act on Koko-mo’s representation and concealment of facts is established by its own conduct in allowing Andsu to be substituted for Sassi under the contract.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company

    272 F. Supp. 332 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 12, 1967

    The Iowa Law Review Note, at page 797, states: “ * * * Clearly the sex-discrimination problem is a unique area,' requiring an approach which considers this factor. … If the job applied for requires this type of activity, the prospective employee, although qualified in every other respect, may be objected to because sex becomes an occupational qualification.” Id. at 796.

    Modified on other grounds by Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (1969)Cited 64 timesPublished
  • ATKINS v. SHARPE

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 3, 2021

    In addition, Section 144 requires a showing of actual bias (as opposed to an appearance of bias); "only personal animus or malice on the part of the judge can establish actual bias." Id. … Claims are factually frivolous when they are "clearly baseless," "fanciful," "fantastic," "delusional," "irrational," or "wholly incredible." Felton v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Rush v. McDonald's Corp.

    760 F. Supp. 1349 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 12, 1991

    The showing a plaintiff must make to establish a prima facie case was set forth in Yarbrough v. … Evidence developed during discovery establishes that Rush's ERISA claim is best brought as a Section 510 claim ...

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • MILLS v. SPEEDWAY POST OFFICE

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 29, 2024

    Fekkes qualified immunity stripped for personal liability in this suit for a 1983 deprivation of rights defamation, intimidation, harassment, unlawful trespass & failure to provide public service under color of law … It is "well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules." Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc.

    78 F. Supp. 2d 845 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 8, 1999

    The “subgroup” solution to that oversight problem merely acknowledges the problem while clearly evading application of the statutory standard: which person or group of persons who can effectively oversee the case “has the … As for the error in the date of one listed purchase by L.A.L.W., the court notes that neither counsel for the Desrosiers Group nor the court has been immune from occasional typographical errors.

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson

    327 F. Supp. 3d 1139 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 8, 2018

    Granting a preliminary injunction is "an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Roland Mach. Co. v. … The Defendants assert that Indiana has gone to great lengths to ensure that it is both actively and justifiably *1148 removing those from its rolls who are no longer qualified to vote.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Apex Biotechnology Corp.

    455 F. Supp. 2d 840 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 26, 2005

    Roche would construe the term as: a module containing memory that is “pluggable” (i.e., capable of repeatedly establishing and breaking electrical contact by insertion and removal). Roche Br. at 36. … See id. at 704-05 (discussing a term “detector” without the qualifier “means” after it). Here, Roche contends that “processor” has a well-known meaning in the art, which rebuts the presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • NORTH SHORE CO-OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 12, 2021

    Nationwide argues that North Shore "has failed to establish the requirements for admissibility under Rule 702" as it relates to Lampman's purported testimony. [Filing No. 122, at ECF p. 17.] … As reflected in the adopted Case Management Plan, Nationwide clearly stated that its initial disclosures would serve as its initial witness list during the initial pretrial conference. [Filing No. 43.]

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • CHICAGO WINE COMPANY v. HOLCOMB

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 30, 2021

    The Plaintiffs allege these code provisions violate the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. … Plaintiffs argue that Chicago Wine cannot establish and maintain a physical presence in Indiana for the purpose of delivering wine to Indiana consumers because such a physical presence would be economically unfeasible.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • SKAGGS v. United States

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 30, 2025

    Because the documentary evidence (i.e., the timecards) show that Counselor Byler was on vacation from his work duties on January 9 and 10, he clearly could not have accepted Mr. … Skaggs's own statements make clear that he did not pursue his rights with the requisite diligence to qualify him for equitable tolling.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • ZHENG v. AUSTIN

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 12, 2023

    Zheng has not met her burden of establishing that she is likely to succeed on the merits because she has not set forth any evidence supporting her claims, that she has not established that she is likely to suffer irreparable … Zheng "clear evidence of experience qualifying [her] for hire into several open(ing) positions." [Filing No. 104 at 23.] Mr. Glick and Ms. Vigil subjected Ms.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • American Family Mutual Insurance v. C.M.A. Mortgage, Inc.

    682 F. Supp. 2d 879 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 12, 2010

    Instead, Liberty Mutual relied on Metzler’s criminal conviction to conclusively establish that Metzler had acted intentionally. Id. at 902. … Accordingly, the Court found that, assuming Metzler qualified as an insured, Liberty Mutual was collaterally estoppel from challenging the judgment against him. Id. Liberty Mutual overstates its case.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • RUGGLES v. HAMILTON COUNTY

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 17, 2025

    follows: [A]n individual employed by an employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified … When, however, the duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined by statute, "a factual analysis of the [individual's] actual job duties" is necessary.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Holtz v. Hilliard

    1 F. Supp. 2d 887 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 23, 1998

    The signature card very clearly explained the nature of the joint account. … Balser’s affidavit, based as it is upon his experience in the trust department of an Evansville bank, does not establish that he is qualified to opine on the business practices of national mutual fund organizations that manage

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • WATKINS

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 24, 2026

    Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … Watkins, therefore, has not alleged facts to establish that his procedural due process rights have been violated in connection with being removed from a program or programs that could have resulted in extra credit time.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • BONDS v. HOLLYWOOD CASINO AND HOTEL

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 29, 2024

    It does not, however, qualify as an evidentiary summary-judgment affidavit because it gives no indication that Mr. Bonds "[swore] to the content in the presence of someone authorized to administer oaths." Owens v. … Bonds cannot establish the third element—the making or enforcing of a contract—since Mr. Bonds left the Casino on his own accord. Dkt. 72 at 21. Mr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • THE ESTATE OF JOSHUA E. EBINGER v. A.J. SMITH

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 18, 2025

    Ebinger and that the force used by Defendants Bastin and Smith was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and, in any event, that they are all entitled to qualified immunity. … Here, the undisputed facts establish that, at the time Trooper Bastin fired his weapon, he knew that Mr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • AUGUST MACK ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. v. TRESCHOW

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 14, 2023

    And "[a] preliminary injunction is 'an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.'" Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Orr v. … In so holding, the court rejected the idea that "employees' violations of restrictive covenants[] invariably qualify as irreparable harm to the former employer." Id. at 618.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Ind. State Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. Lawson

    326 F. Supp. 3d 646 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 8, 2018

    Granting a preliminary injunction is "an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Roland Mach. Co. v. … The Defendants assert that Indiana has gone to great lengths to ensure that it is both actively and justifiably removing those from its rolls who are no longer qualified to vote.

    Cited 5 timesPublished

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