Case law

Hoglund v. State

945 N.E.2d 166 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 22, 2011

Clearly inappropriate in the situation, that's for the fact finder to decide, not for this lady to make an opinion. [Prosecutor]: I would agree Your Honor— [Hoglund's Counsel]: It's a legal conclusion. … Again, I would object to any response on her part, she is not qualified to determine whether or not this girl is telling the truth. Court: Would you ask the question again [State] and then I'll rule.

In Re Infant Girl W.

845 N.E.2d 229 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 13, 2006

Adoption establishes a family unit, "`sever[ing] the child entirely from its own family tree and engraft[ing] it upon that of another.'" … The statute clearly does not contemplate an adoption with two adoptive fathers or two adoptive mothers.

United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lowe

583 N.E.2d 164 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 23, 1991

The notice from Farm Bureau to its policyholders clearly stated that current policies, which included uninsured motorist coverage, would be revised and amended, effective January 1, 1988, to provide both uninsured and underinsured … Certainly, if the legislative intent was to exclude all renewed policies, there would be no need for such qualifying language in the statute.

Rodney Melton v. State of Indiana

993 N.E.2d 253 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 21, 2013

This Court observed that the decision in Riffel was “clearly based upon the fact that Riffel’s conduct occurred in a private forum, rather than a public forum” and held: Low correctly points out that if the statute … (2) that the matter was disseminated or displayed to or that the performance was performed before the recipient by a bona fide school, museum, or public library that qualifies

Grzan v. Charter Hospital of Northwest Indiana

702 N.E.2d 786 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 1998

For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that both Charter and Greer, as an employee of Charter, are qualified health care providers. See Ind.Code § 27-12-2-14. … Further, it is well established that our notice pleading rules do not require that the complaint state all the elements of a cause of action. Id.; see also State v.

In re E.I.

653 N.E.2d 503 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 21, 1995

Appellants argue that the guardian ad litem failed to establish the requisite elements for joinder of parties pursuant to T.R. 19(A)(1). … The scheme clearly reflects a legislative determination that CHINS eases are best handled at the county level on a county-by-county basis.

Yingst, Spec. Admin. v. Pratt

139 Ind. App. 695 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 6, 1966

Such privilege, excuse or justification can be found in the authorities under self-defense and under the heading of necessity but the underlying principle most frequently fathering the immunity is that where the defendant … The Helms case is clearly distinguishable from the one presently before us.

Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. NJK Farms, Inc.

921 N.E.2d 834 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 18, 2010

First, the court noted that the AOPA "establishes the exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action." Id. at 474 (citing Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-1). … Clearly, it is better for such issues to be presented in the typical administrative review process prior to consideration by the trial court.

Earl Parsons v. Danielle Benjamin

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 2026

In response, Glycerin Traders’ counsel sent a letter to Crum & Forster asserting the Parsons’ claims qualified for CGL coverage. … A divided Court held the pollution exclusion did not preclude coverage, reasoning, Clearly, this clause cannot be read literally as it would negate virtually all coverage.

Employers' Fire Insurance v. Consolidated Garage & Sales Co.

85 Ind. App. 674 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 11, 1927

Nevertheless, when the proof establishes that a stored car, while in charge of the garage keeper, has been taken out and used by an employee of the latter, without the knowledge or consent of the owner, and has been damaged … The complaint clearly and sufficiently alleges, and the evidence without any doubt shows, an unlawful taking of the automobile as defined by this section of the statute.

Shawn E. Voorhies v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 2013

Voorhies has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it considered the severity of Partin’s injuries as an aggravator. … However, the impact on others may qualify as an aggravator in certain cases but, in order to qualify as such, the defendant’s actions must have had an impact on other persons of a destructive nature that is not normally

John S. Paniaguas, Kathy R. Paniaguas, Woodrow Cornett, III, and Kristine E. Cornett v. Endor, Inc.

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 20, 2013

Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. … Findings are clearly erroneous if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them, whereas a judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been

Lee Yoder v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 15, 2013

These statements were not clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. … This evidence is sufficient to establish that the building was a “dwelling” for purposes of the arson statute. See Byers v.

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.T., Minor Child, T.T., Father v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 20, 2013

S.T. also has significant dental needs and will require braces, and may also have some type of “auto immune disorder.” … We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in Paragraph 10. 2.

Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of: D.C., M.H., A.J., D.J., & J.J. (Minor Children), and M.H. (Mother) v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 15, 2013

TACDCS also learned that the three youngest children were behind in their immunizations, and there were no immunization records for the two older children. … In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

In the Matter of the Estate of Margaret S. Jones, John A. Jones, Jr., Personal Representative v. Joyce E. Schaefer, Beneficiary, and Suzanne D. VanGombos (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 21, 2017

, is clearly erroneous. … [36] Clearly, the administration of Decedent’s estate was contentious.

Westwood Veterinary Clinic LLC v. Amber Blackburn

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 31, 2025

Westwood argues that Blackburn’s verified counterclaim did not qualify as an affidavit and, thus, was not properly designated under Trial Rule 56. … “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law.” Id.

Howard Jackson v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 23, 2015

At the time of his arrest, he was in possession of a large amount of heroin—eight to eleven times the statutory weight necessary to qualify as a Class A felony—and a considerable stash of cash. … His criminal history clearly indicates that while his last conviction dates from 1998, he has had several run-ins with the authorities since his release from incarceration.

Ryan Michael Dudley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 2019

“To demonstrate two offenses are the same, the appellant must show a reasonable possibility that the facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of one offense were also used to establish … This evidence does not qualify as a prohibited bad act or bad character such that it should be excluded under Evidence Rule 404(b).

FLM, LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 2014

Skiles further qualified any agreement on his part “as long as it has no prejudicial effect on Cincinnati.” Mr. Skiles’ statements do not constitute an agreement to FLM’s tendered order following remand. … If it applies to Brandy’s slip, fall, and drowning, however, it is not clear that the drowning was clearly unexpected and unintentional.