Case law

Burk v. Heritage Food Service Equipment, Inc.

737 N.E.2d 803 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 2000

Bowman challenges the trial court’s enforcement of paragraph 2(a)(v) by asserting, in part that: “Tri-State has no patents or secret formulas that qualify as a trade secret.” Appellant’s brief at 27. … But despite this change in the constitutional provision as well as our supreme court’s subsequent, less-restrictive interpretation of Article IV, § 19, we are still obliged to follow the precedent established by our supreme

Sharon Wright and Leslie Wright v. Anthony E. Miller, D.P.M. and Achilles Podiatry Group

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 5, 2012

Jerome Bagner was identified as a potential qualified expert witness on December 17, 2010, and Wright’s counsel submitted the evidentiary material to him for review. Dr. … App. 1993), reh’g denied, trans. denied), dismissal is not clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before the trial court.

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. PSI Energy, Inc.

894 N.E.2d 1055 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 16, 2008

We noted that Ind.Code § 8-1-2-6 is used in rate proceedings to “establish a level of rates and charges sufficient to permit the utility to meet its operating expenses plus a return on investments which will compensate its … The Commission’s findings and conclusions on this issue are not clearly erroneous. IV. The final issue is whether Ind.

Anthony L. Elrod v. Raymond C. Bauman (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 31, 2019

We will not set aside the judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. … Conclusion [42] Elrod has not established that he was denied due process under the United States Constitution or the Indiana Constitution.

Carter v. State

424 N.E.2d 1047 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 20, 1981

Officer Basiger was properly qualified as an expert witness. He was therefore properly permitted to state his opinion of excessive speed. … His opinion clearly represents the minority view of the Supreme Court, and of the Illinois Supreme Court. See, People v.

Turner v. Board of Aviation Commissioners

743 N.E.2d 1153 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2001

The party moving for summary judgment must shoulder the burden of establishing the lack of a material factual issue. Estate of Taylor v. Muncie Med. Investors, L.P., 727 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). … The first statute, Ind.Code § 22-13-2-5, provides, in relevant part: "[aln ordinance or other regulation adopted by a political subdivision that qualifies as a fire safety law or a building law is not effective until it is

Tammy Webber v. Kenneth Kuebler Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 2019

This NORDYNE equipment and/or NORDYNE accessories must be installed by a licensed or otherwise qualified dealer or contractor and must be installed in accordance with NORDYNE’S installation … Challengers must establish that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

Elliott v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

116 Ind. App. 404 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 11, 1946

Lewis and is now the duly qualified and acting administratrix of said estate. That at the time of the death of Brinley W. … We believe that it is clearly apparent from a reading of the foregoing facts as found by the court that the decision of the court was rendered upon the second paragraph of the cross-complaint of appellee administratrix.

Engle v. City of Indianapolis

151 Ind. App. 344 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 15, 1972

the Legislature may set a number of landowners needed to remonstrate before the “primary determinants” can even be considered, and it may logically, by means of Acts 1953, Ch. 160, Sec. 7, determine what signatures are qualified … Remonstrators’ argument is against the established rules of construction of legislative intent.

Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Vester

47 Ind. App. 141 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 15, 1911

To this extent we think the position of appellant’s counsel should be qualified. To apply the principle which we think applicable in such cases, we will take this ease. … "Where answers to interrogatories, fairly put, make such a purpose clearly apparent, there are authorities of great weight which hold it to be the duty of the court to set the verdict aside and award a new trial.

Indianapolis & Greenfield Rapid Transit Co. v. Andis

33 Ind. App. 625 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 11, 1904

Co., 7 Ind. 436 , as establishing the doctrine that a laborer employed by a railroad company in work not connected with the operation of the road is not a co-employe with the servants of the company operating the road. … In that statute the word “railroad” is clearly distinguished from “electric road,” and the legislature must have taken it for granted, by not adding any qualifying word, that the word “railroad” would be understood to mean

Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Cave Stone, Inc.

78 Ind. Dec. 20 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 28, 1980

said: *695 “Exemptions from taxation are not, and ought not to be, especially favored by the courts; and where such an exemption is claimed, the party claiming the same must show a case, by sufficient evidence, which is clearly … And the Department lacks statutory authority to establish rules that add or detract from the Act.” See also Gross Income Tax Division v. Colpaert Realty Corp., (1952) 231 Ind. 463 , 109 N.E.2d 415 ; Mobley v.

Brown v. State

830 N.E.2d 956 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 14, 2005

Specifically, Brown maintains that his motion should have been granted because he established that the judge was prejudiced and biased against him. … Brown asserts that such evidence was relevant and that the offer of proof that he made established that the police officers used unlawful force during the episode.

Paint Shuttle, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.

733 N.E.2d 513 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 11, 2000

Paint Shuttle’s malpractice lawsuit against the law firm clearly constitutes a "claim” under the terms of the policy. 8 . … The law firm clearly failed to fulfill the condition precedent to obtaining coverage under the malpractice policy.

John Kryza v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 30, 2014

Specifically, Kryza maintains that the evidence presented at trial established that Dr. Bederka was qualified to testify about the operation and reliability of the BAC DataMaster test. … In other words, to qualify as an expert, the proponent of the expert must demonstrate that the expert satisfied the criteria for qualifying under Rule 702 (knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education), and will

Citizens Action Coal. v. No. Ind. Pub. Serv.

472 N.E.2d 938 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 1984

If its contention were true, then a rate established in 1941 which was insufficient or caused a loss to the Company, would entitle the Company at this time to have a rate established by which it could recoup such a loss or … Although the investment, expenses and obligations resulting from the projects do not conform to the `used and useful' concept, PP & L contends that they could still qualify for consideration in establishing a rate base if

Tippecanoe Associates II, LLC v. Kimco Lafayette 671, Inc.

811 N.E.2d 438 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 6, 2004

In the event of assignment or sublease, Tenant is hereby put on notice that Landlord prefers a qualified supermarket operator. (Id. at 17.) … To overcome this presumption, the party seeking to disqualify a judge must establish actual personal bias.

Presley Jermaine Brown v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 14, 2020

An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. … was convicted of level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and on appeal he argued that there was insufficient evidence that he had been previously convicted of a qualifying

Douglas C. Holland v. Rising Sun/Ohio County First, Inc., Ohio County, Rising Sun, Quin Min, and Kirk and Michelle Neace

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 15, 2012

The plain language of the trial rule indicates that “first” qualifies “responsive pleading,” it does not mention or make any reference to a party. … We will only set aside a trial court’s findings and conclusions if they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Id.

Janet L. McDaniel v. Mark L. McDaniel (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 2016

Father pointed out that Choi was the children’s therapist and had clearly stated that she would not counsel either parent. … Mother claims that this finding is not supported by the evidence because she believes that the parties’ mediation session was not long enough to qualify as extensive.