Case law
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819 N.E.2d 393 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 13, 2004
In interpreting the above rule, this court recently reaffirmed the notion that an expert must be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Messer v. … Thus, the prejudicial impact clearly outweighs any probative value of the evidence. See Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 134 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); trans. denied.
Cited 22 timesPublished991 N.E.2d 565 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 12, 2013
Because there was no schedule established in this case, there is no evidence that Mooney failed to comply with a submission schedule. … But Young had not qualified her agreement in those terms, and the context of the correspondence among the parties shows otherwise.
Cited 6 timesPublishedBarbara Laskowski v. Amer Kazi, M.D.
Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 16, 2013
Generally, in order to establish a claim of medical malpractice, the plaintiff must establish by expert medical testimony (1) the applicable standard of care required by Indiana law, (2) how the defendant … There, we noted that, under Rule 702, a witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and only one of these characteristics is necessary to qualify an individual
Cited 0 timesUnpublished716 N.E.2d 566 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 24, 1999
In Mays , the court upheld a jury instruction that failure to use a seatbelt established the defense of contributory negligence. … Allowing evidence of Hopper’s failure to wear a seatbelt to establish contributory negligence would do just that. 3.
Cited 21 timesPublishedIndiana Court of Appeals · Mar 13, 2018
Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 13 … The language of the release document signed by Victor and Lynell and Methodist clearly sets forth their intent that the settlement meet the statutory minimum and allow Victor and Lynell to proceed
Cited 0 timesPublishedCharles D. Burrage v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 9, 2018
FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 09 2018, 6:16 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing … Burrage waived his right to further proceed with the jury trial and admitted to a prior qualifying felony required to prove he was a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm.
Cited 0 timesPublishedSamuel E. Pentecost Construction Co. v. O'Donnell
112 Ind. App. 47 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 6, 1942
It is clearly negligence on the part of any one, whether stranger, invitor, or employer, with knowledge of what is to be done, to maintain a place which is not reasonably safe, in view of the activities and operations therein … In considering the question as to whether or not the verdict of the jury is sustained by sufficient evidence, we are guided by the' established rule that only the evidence favorable to appellee will be considered.
Cited 21 timesPublished559 N.E.2d 1205 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 1990
The power of a court to issue a mandatory injunction as a means of enforcing restrictive covenants is well established. Highland v. Williams (1975), 166 Ind.App. 492 , 336 N.E.2d 846, 847 . … Even though the Watsons have prosecuted their appeal pro se, that is, on their own without being represented by counsel, they must comply with all the rules of appellate procedure just the same as a qualified attorney is
Cited 34 timesPublishedYoung v. General Acceptance Corp.
738 N.E.2d 1079 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2000
The Stockholders’ Agreement was entered into for the purpose of establishing the composition of GAC’s Board of Directors, limiting the manner by which the Algood defendants’ stock could be transferred, and establishing the … Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370 , 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977), to establish the exclusive remedy only for mergers with a “valid purpose.”
Reversed in part, on other grounds by Young v. General Acceptance Corp., 2002 Ind. LEXIS 517 (2002)Cited 6 timesPublishedAnthony A. Parish v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 2020
Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 09 2020, 8:47 am court except for the purpose of establishing … Appellate assistance will be considered deficient, however, if the omitted issue was clearly stronger than the issues presented. Bieghler v.
Cited 0 timesPublishedHundt v. LaCrosse Grain Co., Inc.
425 N.E.2d 687 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 21, 1981
the same reason, we similarly cannot agree with Lacrosse’s contention that the regulations in question should have been listed as exhibits in the trial court’s pre-trial order, and that Goodwin should have been properly qualified … The instant instruction is clearly nonmandatory since it does not “attempt to set forth specific facts such that the jury is required to reach a certain result upon a finding of those facts,” Kroger v.
Reversed on other grounds by Hundt v. La Crosse Grain Co., Inc., 1983 Ind. LEXIS 785 (1983)Cited 10 timesPublishedDaniel P. Wahl v. State of Indiana
36 N.E.3d 1163 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2015
We will first establish whether Wahl has met his initial two-part inquiry of prejudice. A. … A trial court abuses its discretion if its “decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before’ it” or if it “misinterprets or misapplies the law.”"
Cited 2 timesPublishedCity of Gary v. Enterprise Trucking & Waste Hauling
846 N.E.2d 234 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 12, 2006
Plaintiff's contract to perform C & D hauling and disposal services was the result of a public bid process which invited other qualified companies to bid on the C & D work, as well as, the hauling and disposal of concrete … Normally, when the appellee does not file a brief, we apply a less stringent standard of review and may reverse the trial court when the appellant establishes prima facie error. Id.
Cited 4 timesPublishedKenneth M. Jordan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2017
He argues that State’s Exhibit 1 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 44A03-1603-CR-503 | February 14, 2017 Page 7 of 30 was hearsay, and therefore should not have qualified for admission under … Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. 2015), a Fourth Amendment case, our supreme court very broadly held that probationers “who have consented or been clearly informed that the conditions of their probation
Cited 0 timesPublished747 N.E.2d 1159 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 15, 2001
Lu-chins qualified as an expert witness and stated an admissible expert opinion under Evidence Rule 702 based on his review of Meyer's medical records and a personal examination of Meyer. R. at 2456. … The trial court's decision will not be reversed unless prejudicial error is clearly shown. Id. at 999-1000 . We agree with the trial court that the affidavit was admissible under Rule 702. See generally Rogers ex rel.
Cited 14 timesPublishedJackson v. Luellen Farms, Inc.
877 N.E.2d 848 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 12, 2007
Jackson did not qualify his signature as President of Hartford Packing Company, Inc. [[Image here]] 31. … Although Jackson clearly had some motive to sign the Note, the Note was not supported by consideration. See Brown, 114 Ind.App. at 408 , 52 N.E.2d at 641 .
Cited 16 timesPublishedCitizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Southern Indiana Gas and Electricity Company
70 N.E.3d 429 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2017
Intervenors have failed to establish that the IURC abused the broad discretion granted it. … While it sets out the requirements of such a petition, 170 I.A.C. 1- 1.1-22 does not establish a standard of review.
Cited 6 timesPublishedIndiana Court of Appeals · Oct 5, 2017
engaging in any other business or venture, whether or not competitive, 1 The Operating Agreement distinguishes between “Managers” and “Members,” though each of the three doctors in this case qualify … Joshi first argues that the trial court erred by finding that Apollo established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCity of Hammond v. Board of Zoning Appeals
152 Ind. App. 480 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 1972
But when the Legislature has not made that authorization, courts should not be asked to do so by changing the long established and generally understood meaning of ‘aggrieved’ in order to attain a result the Legislature has … We hold that the City’s complaint did not demonstrate a'personal or pecuniary interest which would qualify it as an “aggrieved” party within the meaning of the statute. *490 *489 V.
Cited 30 timesPublishedIndiana Court of Appeals · Aug 28, 2019
The parties disagree as to whether Lawrenceburg’s argument that the Agreement is void by statute qualifies as the affirmative defense of illegality. … [31] Second, not only can this result not be what the legislature intended, but it is clearly not what Lawrenceburg intended, either.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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