Case law

Evansville Garage Builders v. Shrode

720 N.E.2d 1273 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 1999

Upon learning of the suit, Defibaugh attempted to contact Garage Builders to establish the status of the suit. … The Shrodes do not dispute that Garage Builders was entitled to three days notice of an application for default judgment — it clearly was so entitled.

Cutter v. Herbst

945 N.E.2d 240 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 7, 2011

Mirro] is qualified to provide this court with expert testimony regarding [Herbst’s] probable prognosis at the time of his hospitalization on March 6, 2002. 7. The expert evidence of Dr. … Mirro establishes that [Herbst] had a less than 20% chance of surviving discharge from hospital. Dr.

Scott v. State

883 N.E.2d 147 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 24, 2008

The plain language of Indiana Code section 35-33-5-2 requires that the affidavit be filed with the judge, and that requirement was clearly met here. … Deputy Saltzman apparently personally handed the affidavit to Judge Almon, and we believe that hand-delivery to the actual person specified by the statute easily qualifies as filing.

State of Indiana v. Kenneth R. Trisler (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2016

[Trisler] was defined by this law as a “serious sex offender” by reason of his conviction for a qualifying sex offense in February 2010. … We are aided by the principle that every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until that presumption is clearly overcome by a contrary showing. State v.

Ross v. State

835 N.E.2d 1090 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 26, 2005

An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law. State v. … The court also determined that the "facts and cireumstances of this offense" qualified as an aggravator. Tr. pp. 54-56.

Wallace v. State

836 N.E.2d 985 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 8, 2005

The testimony at trial established that Wrice was shot six times. Dr. … Wallace has not provided us with any authority that clearly supports his position.

T.W. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 6, 2018

2018, 5:51 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing … An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court’s action is “clearly erroneous” and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

Burrell v. Lewis

743 N.E.2d 1207 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 28, 2001

Applying a less stringent standard of review with respect to showings of reversible error, we may reverse the lower court if the appellant can establish prima facie error. Fisher v. Board of Sch. … We noted in that case the trial court "clearly had jurisdiction over the visitation issue" despite the father's pending bankruptey. Reich, 605 N.E.2d at 1183 .

Dowdell v. City of Jeffersonville

907 N.E.2d 559 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 9, 2009

The "Sex Offender" shall provide proof that he or she has a [qualify ing family member]. This proof shall include their age, sex and relationship to the "Sex Offender". … Thus, this first factor clearly favors treating the effects of the Ordinance as punitive when applied to Dowdell. 6 2.

Behavioral Health and Human Services Licensing Board, Kimble L. Richardson, George Brenner, Andrew Harner, Geneva Osawe, Rex Stockton, Carla Gaff-Clark, and The State of Indiana v. Elaine Williams

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 18, 2014

See Tr. p. 59 (“As I read the record and from my finding[s] it’s obvious I mean I, I thought there was evidence from which boundaries violations could clearly be established. … The record herein established that Patient A suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Depression, and Schizophrenia.

Decker v. State

426 N.E.2d 151 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1981

We believe it is this most recent, specific expression of the Legislature’s intent which is controlling in the instant case, and that such expression clearly anticipates that any condemnor, including the State, must make … the issue, if raised, of whether a good faith offer was made may customarily be disposed of by the State by a request for summary judgment accompanied by an affidavit representing the offer was based on an appraisal by a qualified

Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hospital

461 N.E.2d 1134 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 11, 1984

Upon the facts of this case, the actions of the hospital clearly were not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Good reason for the termination of hospital privileges clearly was shown. Further, Dr. … It constitutes a virtual monopoly in the area in which it functions and it is in no position to claim immunity from public supervision and control because of its allegedly private nature.

Paternity of C.S.: M.R. v. R.S.

964 N.E.2d 879 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 19, 2012

Also, as the trial court concludes, such a change is clearly in C.S.’s best interests. 2. … Some states have explicitly stated this qualifier. See e.g., Ga.

New Welton Homes v. Eckman

786 N.E.2d 1172 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 24, 2003

Further, it is well-established in Indiana that, while not favored, contractual limitations shortening the time to com-menee suit are valid, at least so long as a reasonable time is afforded. See Summers v. … propounded by the California Court of Appeals in Moreno, "[if a legislated limitations period must yield to a judicially created delayed discovery rule, how can it be argued a contractually agreed limitations period is immune

Mid America Homes, Inc. v. Horn

377 N.E.2d 657 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 1978

As a lien claimant, Mid America had the burden of proof to establish that its claim met the statutory requirements, including proper notice. Hough v. Zehrner (1973), 158 Ind. App. 409 , 302 N.E.2d 881 . … Therefore, if the transaction qualified as a "consumer credit transaction," Mid America would have been required to make certain disclosures to the Horns.

Hoover v. State

582 N.E.2d 403 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 1991

The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in Stone . … In order to qualify as an evidentia-ry harpoon, it must be shown that there was a deliberate use of improper evidence calculated to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Keller v.

Connie Duty, Coleen Grayson, and Frank Riffert v. The Estate of Hazel A. Geiselman (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 2016

relating to their motions to consolidate and for emergency relief in the Amended Notice of 2 The trial court’s orders on Appellants’ motions to consolidate and for emergency relief did not qualify … As such, we conclude that Appellants have failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to correct error. IV.

Fulton County Commissioners v. Miller

788 N.E.2d 1284 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 30, 2003

Reversal of the trial court's ruling is warranted only when the court has abused its discretion, and its action is clearly erroneous and against the facts and cireumstances before it. Id. … Thus, the County is correct that the Manual does not establish the standard of care in this case.

Estate of Hutchinson v. Lehr

135 Ind. App. 137 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 13, 1963

“the facts assumed are clearly so exaggerated as to impair the opinion of the witness.” 2. “the assumptions are misleading, confusing, and outside of the evidence or fair inference from the evidence.” 3. … “the witness has not been properly qualified to give an opinion on the subject matter covered 6. “the question assumes a multitude of facts which have no proper bearing upon a per-hour basis.”

Berman v. Cannon

878 N.E.2d 836 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 26, 2007

Berman’s absence from the trial does not qualify under any of the three exceptions in Rule 606(b). Consequently, the juror’s statement is not evidence that we may consider. See, e.g., Evans v. … “We cannot invade the province of the jury to decide the facts and cannot reverse unless the verdict is clearly erroneous.” Id.