Case law

State, Real Estate Commission v. Cmb III Enterprises, Inc.

734 N.E.2d 653 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 30, 2000

The decision should be reversed only when it is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess … It is well established that “[l]aws which are punitive in nature, and which would deprive an individual of the freedom to exercise the skills of his business or profession, should be construed against the denial of this freedom

Jeremy Ryan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 2015

Concluding that the post-conviction court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, we affirm. … App. 2011) (holding that where the intermediate step is so near the end of the manufacturing process that the final product is present in the chemical compound, that substance qualifies as an “adulterated

Thomas Moriarty, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donna Davis v. West Morgan, LLC (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 8, 2016

[35] Turning to Exhibit I, Moriarty argues the receipts are inadmissible because they do not qualify as business records as defined by Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6). … The Court concluded the vendees’ defeasible title was insufficient to establish color of title.

Sutton v. State

495 N.E.2d 253 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 24, 1986

However, there clearly was sufficient additional evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that she conspired with Officer Jerrell to murder Britton. … Clearly Sutton was not placed in a position of grave peril to which she should not have been subjected.

Rogers v. Municipal City of Elkhart

655 N.E.2d 593 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 26, 1995

Further, this definition would, contrary to the intent of subsection (b), allow annexation of land which is clearly not urban. … On the contrary, to qualify as subdivided, a parcel must meet the requirements of I.C. 36-7-4-700 et. seq.; that is, the parcel must be actually recorded pursuant to a local subdivision control ordinance.

Traylor v. Lafayette National Bank

158 Ind. App. 552 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 26, 1973

The real question is whether the trial judge committed error by refusing the proferred evidence and not permitting PDI to introduce evidence to establish its counterclaim based on the joint venture agreement. … The addendum makes no mention of proposals or offers to substitute collateral and clearly states that Traylor and PDI “. . . may substitute collateral for the stock. . . .”

Yeager v. McManama

874 N.E.2d 629 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 12, 2007

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. The judgment will be reversed if it is clearly erroneous. Id. … Morse and Duran failed to qualify their statements—ie., they remained silent when a duty to speak exists, Rice , 670 N.E.2d at 1284—by advising the Plaintiffs of the actual minimum requirements of the architectural standards

Ty Evans v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 1, 2023

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-220| May 1, 2023 Page 7 of 20 pled guilty to the habitual offender allegation, he did not qualify for the habitual offender enhancement under … “We review the post-conviction court’s factual findings under a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard but do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions.” Stephenson v.

Jeremy K. Blue v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 12, 2014

Blue has not established that he was prejudiced by the manner in which the trial court instructed the jury. II. … “Transactional immunity” by contrast is a prohibition against prosecution for any transaction concerning that to which the witness testifies. Id. Perry was not granted that kind of immunity.

Jill Finfrock a/k/a Jill Bastone v. Mark Finfrock

989 N.E.2d 805 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 29, 2013

Father immediately retained counsel, and on July 15, 2011, filed a motion to set the amount of his child support arrearage and to establish a payment plan. … Mother claims that this finding is clearly erroneous. However, Mother has not provided us with a transcript of the June 20, 2012 hearing.

In the Matter of the Living Trust Agreement of Virgil C. Morningstar and Agnes M. Morningstar, Teresa J. Morningstar v. Nina Fortunka and STAR Financial Bank

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 15, 2019

We will set aside the trial court’s findings and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Id. … We cannot say that the trial court’s conclusion that Morningstar breached her duty to preserve Trust property was clearly erroneous. B.

ATFH Real Property, LLC v. Stewart

879 N.E.2d 1184 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 31, 2008

Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. Id. … As a necessary step in obtaining 1841 North Bolton, the purchase of the tax lien, even though not resulting in immediate possession, clearly qualifies as an act to obtain possession of that property.

In Re the Mental Commitment of M.P.

500 N.E.2d 216 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 18, 1986

Initially, the party seeking the treatment order must establish the patient's incompetency. … As already noted, the fact that the patient has been involuntarily certified for mental health treatment does not by itself establish the patient's incompetency to make treatment decisions.

Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Reyes

659 N.E.2d 158 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 1995

[Reyes] has failed to establish that there is, in his particular case, cireum-stances [sic] showing that an undue hardship would result from enforcement of the IHSAA Eight-Semester Rule. [Reyes! … Application for a hardship exception may be made by any student who believes that he or she may qualify.

G. Kevin Powell v. Estate of Gary Powell

14 N.E.3d 46 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 3, 2014

Clearly there is none. Id. Other courts have also addressed this or a similar situation. In Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98 (D.C. … This, in turn, is sufficient to establish the intent to create an estate in joint tenancy with right of survivorship within the meaning of I.C. § 32-17-2-1(c)(2).

The Indianapolis Museum of Art a/k/a Newfields v. Kathleen Hurley

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 24, 2023

The strategy involves establishing two trusts after one spouse dies. … For example, Section 3.3 provided that if Charles survived Alicia, the trustee would establish a separate fund entitled “Husband’s Trust” in an amount allowing Alicia’s estate to qualify for the maximum

Elijah Roberson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 20, 2016

“An abuse of discretion has occurred when the court’s decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. at 359 (internal quotation omitted). … [6] Roberson qualifies as a violent criminal. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(d)(10).

Lytle v. Ford Motor Co.

696 N.E.2d 465 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1998

Given Marcosky’s credentials, there is no doubt that he qualifies as an expert. … Thus, although Peterson’s pendulum tests are clearly more complex and reliable than Marcosky’s, they serve only to demonstrate that a buckle will inertially release at accelerations of 40-60 g’s when accompanied by low web

Center Townhouse Corp. v. City of Mishawaka

882 N.E.2d 762 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 20, 2008

Stated differently, they constitute property rights of a qualified or restricted nature. Id. II. … Waiver notwithstanding, the City further failed to meet its burden to establish that the trial court’s judgment was clearly erroneous.

In Re Adoption of JDC

751 N.E.2d 747 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 2001

Thus, we review such a decision for an abuse of discretion, which only occurs where the trial court's judgment is clearly against the *749 logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment for relief. … In Robert O., the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the putative father's notice or consent was not needed for the adoption where he failed to avail himself of the methods to qualify for notice until some ten months