Case law

State Ex Rel. Woodford v. Marion Superior Court

655 N.E.2d 63 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 7, 1995

Woodford's petition *66 clearly comes within the scope of this rule. … This deprivation was consistent with the promise of remedy by due course of law, art. 1, § 12, Indiana Constitution, and the promise of equal privileges and immunities to all citizens, art. 1, § 23, because this Court granted

Gary Community School Corp. v. Powell

906 N.E.2d 823 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 19, 2009

either position alone does not qualify. … The statute clearly permits all three, and GCSC has identified no demonstrable duplication in the award. We therefore cannot say the trial court’s award is clearly erroneous. 3.

Walker v. Rinck

604 N.E.2d 591 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1992

Clearly, the parents' conduct in conceiving children when knowledge of the Rh sensitization was an intervening, superseding cause of Nathan and Kathy's problems. 566 N.E.2d at 1090 (footnote omitted). … (Alleged failure of physicians to test mother for rubella and to immunize her against rubella prior to conception which caused injury to later-conceived child.)

Neidefer v. Chastain

71 Ind. 363 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1880

Birt, 4 Ind. 566 , this answer was clearly bad, if for no other reason than that it failed to show the article to be valueless. … Murray , if given effect, would break down the long and well established rule, that, if a party gets all he knowingly contracts for, he will not be allowed to plead that he got no consideration. Baker v.

Giovanoni v. INDIANA DEPT. OF WRKFRC. DEVT.

927 N.E.2d 906 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 1, 2010

Disqualification is inappropriate if the totality of the circumstances establishes that a claimant is unemployed through no fault of his own. … These recent changes clearly express the legislature's intention to include within “Discharge for just cause” a discharge for a knowing violation of a proper attendance rule that includes application to absences without employee

Stroud v. State

257 Ind. 204 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 15, 1971

The Roth decision clearly answers the question presented here. … From Officer Broeking’s testimony there was clearly sufficient evidence to *211 support the conclusion by the trial court that there was a sale.

Brown v. State

275 Ind. 441 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 12, 1981

It is not clear from the record before us whether or not defendant’s request that a trial date be set actually qualifies as a motion for a speedy trial. In any event, defendant’s argument must fail on other grounds. … He argues that there was not a proper foundation or a complete chain of custody established prior to its admission. We do not agree.

Crider v. State

258 Ind. 541 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 31, 1972

The compensation was not fixed by the “administrative authority in *548 control of the operation” as required by the statute but was established by the Town Board as a whole. … The argument goes that if qualified members of the bar cannot agree that the actions in question constitute an offense then how can a person of ordinary intelligence decide. The fallacy of this argument is self-evident.

Suits v. Murdock

63 Ind. 73 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1878

feet wide ; and file their report, which is in the words and figures following, to wit: “ ‘ We, the undersigned reviewers, appointed by your honorable body, at your June session, 1875, beg leave to report that, after being qualified … full description of such location, change or vacation, by routes and bounds and by its course and distance, except that in case of the vacation of a road, or any part thereof, such description only as will designate it clearly

Kraus v. Lehman

170 Ind. 408 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 18, 1908

Eight were the names of persons who were dead at the time of the presentation of said petition, and 131 were names of signers who were not resident freeholders of Miami county, Indiana, at said time, leaving but 398 qualified … Appellees allege that there is no error, consequently the burden is cast upon appellant to establish by the record the error which he has assigned.

Marty J Wilson v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 2026

Under that amendment, a trial court would determine at sentencing whether the person was an SVP based on the commission of a qualifying offense or, if no such qualifying offense applied, based on consultation with experts … Under this test, we first determine whether the legislature intended for the statute to impose punishment or whether it merely intended to establish a non- punitive regulatory scheme. Id.

City of Aurora v. West

9 Ind. 74 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 26, 1857

It would hardly be said, that cities were created simply to establish and enforce police regulations — to maintain order amongst the citizens. … See the distinctions touching this subject clearly drawn in The People v. The Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 419.

Perry County, Indiana v. Keith D. Huck

Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 22, 2025

A person qualifies for temporary health insurance under COBRA after a “qualifying event” occurs. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. … But Huck does not qualify for COBRA because no qualifying event—such as termination or reduced hours— occurred here. See id. § 1163(2).

Spaulding v. State

268 Ind. 23 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 9, 1978

.” *26 *25 Although the defendant correctly contends that the State must establish that the act was done against the will of the *26 victim, Shephard v. … Their testimony together is clearly sufficient evidence for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was placed in fear of her life and that the act was done against her will.

Newcomb v. City of Indianapolis

28 L.R.A. 732 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 28, 1895

‘ascertaining the comparative fitness of applicants for employment, and of selecting and appointing those found to be best fitted, without regard to political opinions or services,’the board of examiners will designate qualified … The principle involved by the manner in which the power granted by section 45, supra, was exercised, by and through the means and agency provided by the rules and regulations in controversy, is admirably and clearly stated

Simington v. State

5 Ind. 479 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 6, 1854

R. 44; and it was held, that esquires, and other persons of higher degree, were not qualified under that act, although the son of such esquire, or other person of higher degree, was. … We are clearly of opinion that they will not.

Indiana Department of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC

907 N.E.2d 997 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 17, 2009

Thus, the burden was on Kitchin to establish its entitlement to the exemption. Id. … Where it appears that the Legislature amends a statute to express its original intention more clearly, the normal presumption that an amendment changes a statute's meaning does not apply. See Ind.

Davison v. Williams

251 Ind. 448 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1968

So while this legislative minimum is conclusive criminally it need not be conclusive of liability or immunity in a civil case because a reasonable man might do more or less in the circumstances. … Its application would .clearly allow proof of excuse or justification in statutory negligence cases without pleading those matters specially.

Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co.

50 L.R.A. 768 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 28, 1900

The acts of 1891 and 1893 are an express recognition by the legislature of the qualified ownership of the common owners in the gas in the common reservoir, and any act therein forbidden may be, according to the circumstances … It does not appear from the complaint that there has been unreasonable delay on the part of the appellants in.seeking relief, and it is clearly shown that they have a special interest in the gas in the ground, and a right

Bedenarzik v. State

204 Ind. 517 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 28, 1933

His testimony that he heard evidence which he believed established probable cause added nothing to the showing made by the warrant itself. … Under neither section is oral evidence necessary, and under the latter section, which is the one involved in the case at bar, it is clearly not contemplated.