Perry County, Indiana v. Keith D. Huck

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 24S-PL-297

Perry County, Indiana; The Board of Commissioners

of the County of Perry (Indiana); Randy Cole; Randy

Kleaving; Rebecca Thorn, FILED

Appellants (Defendants below), Jul 22 2025, 10:10 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

–v– and Tax Court

Keith D. Huck,

Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

Argued: October 31, 2024 | Decided: July 22, 2025

Appeal from the Perry Circuit Court

No. 62C01-2401-PL-31

The Honorable Justin B. Mills, Special Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 24A-PL-418

Opinion by Justice Massa

Justice Slaughter and Justice Molter concur.

Chief Justice Rush concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion.

Massa, Justice.

Indiana law permits public employers to provide their employees with

health insurance. Our law also allows local governmental units to exclude

part-time employees from group health insurance. In this case, the Perry

County Board of Commissioners voted to exclude Keith Huck, an elected

county councilman, from group health insurance coverage, because they

deemed him to be a part-time employee under the relevant statutes. As we

read the statutes, Perry County was permitted to do so. We therefore

reverse the trial court’s ruling to the contrary, vacate the preliminary

injunction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

Prior to January 1, 2024, Perry County provided group health insurance

to its employees, retired employees, and dependent family members.

Keith Huck, an elected member of the Perry County Common Council,

receives a salary for his service and was covered under the group plan. In

2023, he earned an annual salary of $4,783.00, which amounted to

approximately $186.96 per paycheck. All Perry County elected officials are

considered county salaried employees. Huck’s salary is paid by Perry

County through its General Fund and, pursuant to Indiana Code Section

36-2-5-3(a), the amount of a Perry County Council member’s salary is set

by County ordinance. In 2023, Huck and his wife participated in the group

health insurance program offered and paid for by Perry County. The

health insurance plan selected by Huck cost Perry County an additional

$28,863.12 on top of his annual salary.

In 2023, the Perry County Board of Commissioners (Randy Cole, Randy

Kleaving, and Rebecca Thorn) (hereafter “the County”) voted to exclude

part-time employees from health insurance coverage. The County

classified elected officials—along with the commissioners themselves,

other council members, and certain additional elected officials—as part-

time employees, resulting in Huck and his spouse losing health insurance

on January 1, 2024. Huck received notice of his eligibility to apply for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 10

continuation of health coverage through the Consolidated Omnibus

Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Huck also was eligible to purchase

replacement insurance through the health care exchanges under the

Affordable Care Act. He did not, however, obtain any health insurance

through COBRA or otherwise.

Huck instead sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the

County. He asked the court to require the County to provide him with

health insurance coverage because, as an elected county official, he is by

definition a full-time employee regardless of his actual hours worked. The

trial court agreed and granted his request for a preliminary injunction,

ordering the County to immediately reinstate his insurance coverage. The

County then moved for expedited consideration of its interlocutory

appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. In a unanimous published

opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that Huck was an “employee”

under Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-1(1)(A) and that Section 5-10-8-2.6(b)

“confer[s] on local boards the authority to exclude employees from health

insurance coverage based on their status as full-time or part-time

employees, and the statutes neither define full-time or part-time

employees nor exempt elected officials from that consideration.” Perry

Cnty. v. Huck, 232 N.E.3d 141, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). As a result, the

Court of Appeals concluded that “under the plain language of the

statutes, the Board had the authority to discontinue health insurance

coverage for an elected official who was also a part-time employee.” Id.

Huck sought transfer to this Court, which we granted, thereby vacating

the appellate opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of a preliminary injunction decision is ‘limited and

deferential.’” In re Paternity of H.F.D.S., 247 N.E.3d 834, 837 (Ind. Ct. App.

2024) (quoting State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 2011),

reh’g denied). The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the

sound discretion of the trial court, and thus we limit our review to

whether there was an abuse of that discretion. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs.

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Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 2002) (citing Harvest Ins.

Agency, Inc. v. Inter–Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind. 1986)). In

determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we consider

whether the evidence supports the trial court’s special findings of fact and

whether the findings support the judgment. Hannum Wagle & Cline Eng’g,

Inc. v. Am. Consulting, Inc., 64 N.E.3d 863, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We will

reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it is clearly erroneous, and a

judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with

a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Gleeson v. Preferred

Sourcing, LLC, 883 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

Discussion and Decision

The standard for granting preliminary injunctions is high. A

preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary equitable remedy that should

be granted with caution.” Combs v. Daniels, 853 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006). We have reiterated that a preliminary injunction is not a final

judgment and “should be granted only in ‘rare instances.’” Econ. Freedom

Fund, 959 N.E.2d at 801 (quoting Gary Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Eldridge, 774

N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). In order to obtain a

preliminary injunction, the moving party must show by a preponderance

of the evidence that (1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success at trial, (2)

its remedies at law are inadequate and it is at risk of irreparable harm

unless an injunction is issued, (3) its threatened injury outweighs the

potential harm of granting the injunction, and (4) the public interest

would not be disserved. Id. at 803. If the movant fails to satisfy any one of

these four requirements, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in

denying injunctive relief. Great Lakes Anesthesia, P.C. v. O'Bryan, 99 N.E.3d

260, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Zimmer, Inc. v. Davis, 922 N.E.2d 68, 74

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

This case turns on the first element—whether Huck has proven that he

is likely to succeed on the merits by showing that he is not a part-time

employee under the relevant statutes. Based on a plain reading of the

statute, we find that Huck has not established his burden of proof as to

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this element. Huck is employed by a local unit public employer; therefore,

he is a local unit public employee and, as such, the County reserves the

right to classify him as a part-time local elected official. Given that local

unit public employers may provide or exclude part-time employees from

group insurance coverage, the County was within its power to do so.

Because we find that Huck failed to establish one of the required

elements for a preliminary injunction, we need not address the others. Id.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing

the injunction. Walgreen, 769 N.E.2d at 161.

Huck does not have a reasonable probability of

success on the merits.

The question before the Court is whether local elected officials may be

designated as part-time employees, which would therefore permit the

County to exclude them from group health insurance. The answer, as

found in the statutes, is yes.

When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give

effect to the Legislature’s intent. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.

2012). The best evidence of that intent is the statute’s language. Id.

“When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in their plain

and ordinary meaning, taking into account ‘the structure of the statute as

a whole.’” Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (quoting

ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind.

2016)). It is important that meaning be given to each and every word used

in a statute. We do not presume that the Legislature intended to enact a

statutory provision that is superfluous, meaningless, or a nullity. SAC Fin.,

Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 894 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. T.C. 2008).

When conducting statutory interpretation, “we are mindful ‘of what the

statute says and what it doesn’t say’ and ‘avoid interpretations that

depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational

and disharmonizing results.’” Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind.

2024) (quoting Town of Linden, 204 N.E.3d at 237). Finally, and

importantly, “when a statute contains both a specific provision and a

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general one, the specific provision will control; the general provision will

be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not

within the provisions of the particular provision.” SAC Fin., 894 N.E.2d at

1120; see also State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022) (citing Grether

v. Ind. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 159 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind. 1959)) (“As a

matter of interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes.”).

Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-2.6(b), which applies to local unit public

employers and employees, specifies that “a public employer may provide

programs of group insurance for its employees . . . . The public employer

may, however, exclude part-time employees . . . from any group

insurance coverage that the public employer provides to the employer’s

full-time employees.” (Emphasis added). The parties agree, as do we, that

the County is a local unit public employer. Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-

1(5) provides that a “local unit” includes a city, town, county, township,

public library, municipal corporation, school corporation, or charter

school. Subsection 1(7) defines a “public employer” as the “state or local

unit, including any board, commission, department, division, authority,

institution, establishment, facility, or governmental unit under the

supervision of either, having a payroll in relation to persons it

immediately employs, even if it is not a separate taxing unit.” Thus, the

County “may provide programs of group health insurance for its

employees” and may also “exclude part-time employees” from its group

plan. I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(b).

The statute defines an “employee” eligible for health insurance,

though it does not define “part-time employee” specifically. Section 5-10-

8-1(1) defines an “employee” as:

(A) an elected or appointed officer or official, or a full-time

employee;

(B) if the individual is employed by a school corporation, a full-

time or part-time employee;

(C) for a local unit public employer, a full-time or part-time

employee or a person who provides personal services to the

unit under contract during the contract period; or

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(D) a senior judge appointed under IC 33-24-3-7;

whose services have continued without interruption at least

thirty (30) days.

Huck argues the County, in withholding healthcare coverage from him,

violated this statutory scheme. Under Huck’s reading of Section 5-10-8-

1(1)(A), the use of a comma and the word “or” creates five classes of

employees: “elected officers,” “elected officials,” “appointed officers,”

“appointed officials,” and “full-time employees.” He argues he is an

“employee” eligible for healthcare coverage because the statute defines

“employee” to include “an elected or appointed officer or official,” and he

is an elected official. And because he is an “employee” given his status as

an elected official, he asserts he cannot be a “part-time employee”

excluded from healthcare coverage under Subsection 5-10-8-2.6(b). Put

differently, Huck argues that an “elected official,” for the purposes of

defining an employee, does not have to be a full-time employee but

nonetheless enjoys the same status for coverage purposes.

We agree with Huck that he is a county “employee,” but not for the

reason he asserts. As the County notes, Subsection 1(1)(A) broadly applies

to any type of “elected or appointed officer or official,” whereas

Subsection 1(1)(C) is a more specific statute that applies only to a “local

unit” like the County. “For a local unit public employer, [employee

means] a full-time or part-time employee or a person who provides

personal services to the unit under contract during the contract period.”

I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(C). As the more specific provision dealing with local

units, Subsection 1(1)(C) applies here, not Subsection 1(1)(A), a general

provision that does not reference local units. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 155;

SAC Fin., Inc., 894 N.E.2d at 1120. And under Subsection 1(1)(C), it does

not matter that Huck is an elected official. He is an “employee” and thus

eligible for health insurance so long as the County classifies his position as

either full- or part-time. Huck acknowledges that Subsection 1(1)(C) might

also apply here but nonetheless insists we should apply Subsection

(1)(1)(A). But this reading asks us to engage in selective reading of

individual words, which would lead to disharmonizing results. Spells, 225

N.E.3d at 772. All local elected or appointed officers or officials paid under

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the County’s salary ordinance are included under Subsection 1(1)(C),

giving the County the flexibility to treat elected officials as part-time

employees if it so chooses. Therefore, under Section 5-10-8-2.6(b), the

County may deny him group health insurance.

While Huck’s reading of the statute may be accurate for state elected

officials, it overlooks a crucial distinction as Subsection 1(1)(C) acts as a

qualifier for all local unit public employees. Indeed, the rest of Chapter 8

confirms our conclusion that 1(1)(C) refers to all employees of a local unit

public employer, elected or otherwise. Within Chapter 8, there are specific

rules for state-level elected officials, but not local-unit elected officials.

Subsection 5-10-8-7(b), for example, specifically governs state-level

“employees who hold elected offices.” Thus, the Chapter as a whole

confirms that Subsection 1(1)(A)’s reference to elected officials relates to

state-level elected officials, not local-level elected officials.

As a result, while local unit public employers are not required to do so,

they may categorize their locally elected officials as full-time or part-time

employees. Thus, local unit public employers may exclude group health

insurance for those they designate as part-time employees. I.C. § 5-10-8-

2.6(b) (emphasis added). We read the statute as the Legislature

distinguishing local unit public employees from other employees. By

doing this, we find that the Legislature intended for local unit public

employers to retain discretion in the classification of their employees as

full-time or part-time. This reading then correlates with the discretion the

Legislature has given to local unit public employers in Subsection 5-10-8-

2.6(b), allowing them to provide or exclude group health insurance for

those deemed part-time.

Huck contends that even if Subsection 1(1)(C) governs exclusively, he

cannot be a part-time employee and thus cannot be excluded from health

insurance. This argument rests on Indiana Code Section 36-2-5-13(b)

(“Compensation Statute”), which specifies that “[a]n elected county officer

is not required to report hours worked and may not be compensated

based on the number of hours worked.” The statute defines

“compensation,” in turn, to include “health insurance” benefits. I.C. § 36-

2-5-13(a). Thus, he says, the County may not classify Huck’s position as

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part-time because doing so would mean the County was compensating

him “based on the number of hours worked.”

In our view, Huck overreads the Compensation Statute. While the

Compensation Statute bars local unit public employers from paying its

elected officials at an hourly rate, it does not prevent local public

employers from classifying an elected official as being part-time or full-

time. The opening sentence to Subsection 13(b) requires a local unit to pay

its elected officials “using an annual, monthly, or biweekly salary

schedule.” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(b). And the next sentence, the one Huck relies

on, bars local units from compensating their elected officials based on the

number of hours worked. Read in full, Subsection 13(b) compels

the County to pay its elected officials a salary and not an hourly wage; but

it does not compel the County to pay or treat its elected officials as full-

time employees. Put differently, the statute does not provide the necessary

link that Huck is relying on, nor does it define or use the terminology

“part-time” or “full-time.” Even though elected officials can be paid only a

salary, and thus need not report their hours worked, that does not

automatically mean they cannot be part-time.

It is true that in certain roles, people may be paid a salary regardless of

hours worked or the amount of work completed. Elected officials’ hours

ebb and flow with demand, which the Compensation Statute recognizes.

But this does not mean that by virtue of being paid a salary, local elected

officials cannot also be considered part-time employees. Therefore, we

read Section 36-2-5-13(b) as only requiring Huck’s compensation to be on

a salary schedule. And while Huck is correct that the County cannot

compensate him based on the number of hours worked, nor are they

required to ask him to report his hours worked, the statute does not

prevent the County from identifying his role as part-time. For this reason,

we do not find any relief for Huck in the Compensation Statute.

Conclusion

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary equitable remedy that

should be granted with caution,” Combs, 853 N.E.2d at 160, and thus an

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injunction should be issued only where the moving party has shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that it has a reasonable likelihood of

success at trial. Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood

Great Nw., Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind. 2023).

Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-1 enables local unit public employers to

classify their employees and deny insurance benefits to part-time

employees. The County was within its power to first designate Huck as a

part-time employee and subsequently exclude him from group health

insurance. For these reasons, Huck has not shown by a preponderance of

the evidence that he is likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court,

therefore, abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. Great

Lakes Anesthesia, P.C., 99 N.E.3d at 268. We therefore reverse the trial court,

vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. If we are mistaken in our interpretation, the

General Assembly remains free to revise its statutes to provide more

clarity.

Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur.

Rush C.J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Anthony W. Overholt

Maggie L. Smith

Alexander P. Will

Frost Brown Todd, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Keith W. Vonderahe

Robert L. Burkart

Dirck H. Stahl

Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP

Evansville, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 10 of 10

Rush, C.J., concurring in the judgment.

The Court concludes that Perry County may classify Keith Huck, an

elected official, as a part-time employee and exclude him from the

county’s group insurance plan on that basis. Accordingly, the Court

vacates the preliminary injunction in Huck’s favor. I agree with this

outcome but for different reasons. The statute on group plans for local-

unit public employees does not cover elected officials. And even if it does,

Huck demonstrated only financial harm for which the remedy is damages.

Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must make four

showings by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) they have a reasonable

likelihood of success at trial; (2) they face irreparable harm pending

resolution of the case; (3) this harm outweighs any harm to the

nonmovant from granting an injunction; and (4) the requested injunction

will not disserve the public interest. Leone v. Comm’r, Ind. Bureau of Motor

Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ind. 2010). Huck failed to meet his burden

of proof on the first two requirements.

I. Huck failed to show a reasonable likelihood of

success at trial because he is not an “employee” for

purposes of the statute on local-unit group plans.

The merits of Huck’s claim rest on three statutes. He asserts he is Perry

County’s “employee” because Indiana Code section 5-10-8-1(1)(A) defines

that term as “an elected or appointed officer or official, or a full-time

employee,” and he is an elected official. Ind. Code § 5-10-8-1(1)(A). Next,

he maintains he is not a part-time employee because, under Section 36-2-5-

13(b), county elected officials are “not required to report hours worked

and may not be compensated based on the number of hours worked.” Id.

§ 36-2-5-13(b). And finally, while acknowledging he is one of the

“employees” for whom Perry County may provide a group plan under

Section 5-10-8-2.6, he contends he is not one of the “part-time employees”

whom the county may “exclude” from its plan. Id. § 5-10-8-2.6(b).

These arguments misconstrue the statutory scheme. The four

definitions of “employee” in Section 5-10-8-1(1) apply throughout Chapter

5-10-8. Id. § -1. Two of those definitions are relevant here. Subsection

(1)(A), on which Huck relies, defines an “employee” as “an elected or

appointed officer or official, or a full-time employee.” Id. § -1(1)(A).

Subsection (1)(C), however, defines “employee” specifically “for a local

unit public employer” as “a full-time or part-time employee or a person

who provides personal services to the unit under contract during the

contract period.” Id. § -1(1)(C). So while this definition aligns with

Subsection (1)(A) with respect to full-time employees, it omits elected and

appointed officials. These definitions therefore conflict. And Subsection

(1)(C), the more specific definition, controls in the local-unit context. See

State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022) (“As a matter of

interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes.”). As an

elected official, Huck falls outside Subsection (1)(C). And accordingly, he

is not Perry County’s “employee” for purposes of Section 5-10-8-2.6,

because that statute “applies only to local unit public employers and their

employees.” I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(a).

This conclusion is bolstered by reviewing the related statutes in

Chapter 5-10-8 on group plans for both local-unit and state-level

employees. The local-unit public employee statute tellingly mentions all

three categories of employees from Subsection (1)(C) but, like that

provision, omits elected or appointed officials. Id. § -2.6(b). Indeed, the

statute imposes no restrictions on a local-unit public employer’s treatment

of elected officials. It simply provides that such an employer “may”

provide group plans for employees and that, if it does provide a plan for

full-time employees, it may exclude part-time employees and persons

working under contract. Id. Meanwhile, the statute on group plans for

state-level public employees specifically mentions “employees who hold

elected offices.” Id. § -7(d). Thus, a review of the chapter as a whole

indicates that the definition of “employee” in Subsection (1)(A) applies at

the state level but not at the local level. In sum, these statutes do not

prevent Perry County from excluding elected officials from its group plan.

The Court ultimately reaches the same conclusion, reasoning that

local-unit public employers may “categorize their locally elected officials

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 4

as full-time or part-time employees” and thus exclude part-time elected

officials from a group plan. Ante, at 8. But the problem with that approach

is that it may violate a statute that precludes counties from compensating

an “elected county officer . . . based on the number of hours worked.” I.C.

§ 36-2-5-13(b). Though the Court concludes this statute merely prohibits a

local-unit public employer from paying an elected official “at an hourly

rate,” ante at 9, the statute also includes “health insurance” benefits within

the scope of “compensation,” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(a). Section 36-2-5-13

therefore corroborates the conclusion that elected officials are neither full-

time nor part-time employees for purposes of local-unit group plans.

For these reasons, Huck failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood

of prevailing on his claim. But even if he had made that showing, he

would still not be entitled to a preliminary injunction because he did not

provide evidence that he faces a risk of irreparable harm.

II. Huck failed to demonstrate that losing insurance

benefits posed a risk of irreparable harm.

Turning to the irreparable-harm element, we have recognized that a

“party suffering mere economic injury is not entitled to injunctive relief

because damages are sufficient to make the party whole.” Ind. Fam. & Soc.

Servs. Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 2002). At its core,

the loss of health-related benefits is an economic injury because it shifts

the burden of securing insurance or paying for medical care directly to the

individual. Tilley v. Roberson, 725 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Thus, courts typically enter injunctions only when a loss of health

insurance produces an appreciable risk of harm to health. 1

1See Avemco Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. McCarty, 812 N.E.2d 108, 111–13, 120–21, 126 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004) (affirming injunction where payments were not being made on care for high-risk

individuals with life-threatening diseases); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 488 (3d

Cir. 2000) (concluding some plaintiffs failed to show “such financial straits that they would be

forced to choose between medical care and other necessities”); Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x

804, 813 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming injunction where plaintiffs likely faced “significant

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Here, Huck has not shown harm beyond economic injury. He

presented no evidence that he was unable to obtain other insurance, faced

difficulty affording medical care, lost access to existing providers, or

encountered any risk to his or his wife’s health. While Huck argues he was

ineligible for COBRA and lost continuous coverage, nothing in the record

indicates he cannot obtain equivalent coverage. Accordingly, he did not

prove a risk of irreparable harm.

Because I conclude the trial court erred for reasons different from those

relied on by the Court, I concur only in the judgment.

interference in care”); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 563, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (entering

injunction where many plaintiffs could not afford individual plans and would consequently

forego care); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.

Exide Corp., 688 F. Supp. 174, 187 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 857 F.2d 1464 (3d Cir. 1988) (entering

injunction to avert “substantial risk” that workers would “forego necessary medical treatment

or diagnosis because of their inability to pay their share of the costs”); Cabral v. Olsten Corp.,

843 F. Supp. 701, 703–04 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (entering injunction where uninsurable cancer

patient lost coverage).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 4 of 4

Goff, J., dissenting.

Keith Huck is an elected member of the Perry County Common

Council. Perry County (or the County), as a local unit public employer,

provides and pays in part group health-insurance coverage for employees,

retired employees, and their dependent family members. In June 2023, the

Perry County Board of Commissioners publicly voted to discontinue

health-insurance coverage for its part-time employees effective January

2024. See Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6(b). Because Huck only worked an average

of nine hours per month as a councilman, Perry County concluded that he

was a part-time employee, and he and his wife lost health-insurance

coverage. Huck sought a preliminary injunction against Perry County,

arguing that if the County is going to provide health insurance to its

employees, it must do the same for him because, as an elected official, he

is an “employee,” no matter how many hours he works. See I.C. § 5-10-8-

1(1). The trial court agreed and granted the preliminary injunction. In

reversing, this Court concludes that the County has the statutory

authority to identify Huck’s role as part-time and to exclude him from

coverage. Ante, at 2.

I disagree. As an elected official, Huck is an “employee,” not a “part-

time” employee that the County may exclude from group health

insurance. See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1). And Huck’s compensation, which

includes health insurance, cannot be reduced based on hours worked. See

I.C. §§ 36-2-5-13(a), (b).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when

it granted Huck’s preliminary injunction.

Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies “within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d

794, 799 (Ind. 2011) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, we review a

trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.

Members of Med. Licensing Bd. v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Alaska,

Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind. 2023). An abuse of discretion

occurs when “the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 1 of 8

of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has

misinterpreted the law.” Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165,

167 (Ind. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To the

extent this Court’s analysis of the reasonable-likelihood-of-success

requirement turns on the trial court’s interpretation of purely legal issues,

this Court reviews the issues de novo. Med. Licensing Bd., 211 N.E.3d at

965.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the moving party has a reasonable

likelihood of success at trial, (2) the remedies at law are inadequate and

irreparable harm will occur while the case is pending, (3) the threatened

injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving

party from the granting of an injunction, and (4) the public interest would

not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. Thind v. Delaware

Cnty., 207 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); Vickery v. Ardagh Glass Inc.,

85 N.E.3d 852, 859–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

I. Huck has a reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits because he’s not a part-time employee

and the County cannot exclude him from group

health insurance based on hours worked.

When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine the legislature’s

intent. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. State, 181 N.E.3d 960, 968 (Ind. 2022). We

will first “give [the statute’s] words their plain meaning and consider the

structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police

Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). We read the statutory language

“logically and consistently with the statute’s underlying policy and goals,”

and to avoid conflicts with other statutes. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Ind.

Educ. Emp. Rels. Bd., 174 N.E.3d 601, 604–05 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 392 (Ind.

2025). We can also turn to legislative history to “offer analytical support,

facilitating our process—and ultimate goal—of uncovering and giving

proper effect to the legislature’s intent.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 388.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 8

Indiana Code chapter 5-10-8 addresses legislative mandates for

“Group Insurance for Public Employees.” For purposes of group

insurance, “employee” is defined in pertinent part as “an elected or

appointed officer or official, or a full-time employee,” or, “for a local unit

public employer, a full-time or part-time employee or a person who

provides personal services to the unit under contract during the contract

period” and “whose services have continued without interruption at least

thirty (30) days.” I.C. §§ 5-10-8-1(1)(A), (C) (emphases added). If a local

unit public employer, such as a county, chooses to provide group

insurance, it may “exclude part-time employees” from coverage. See I.C.

§§ 5-10-8-2.6(a), (b); I.C. § 5-10-8-1(5). An insurance contract for local

employees “may not be canceled by the public employer during the policy

term of the contract.” I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(d).

The Court concludes that Perry County can exclude Huck from

coverage because the County categorized him as a “part-time” employee. I

disagree. As I explain further below, Huck is not a “part-time” employee,

and his compensation cannot be reduced based on hours worked.

A. The text of the statute is ambiguous as to whether

elected officials can be categorized as “part-time”

employees.

Huck reads subsection 5-10-8-1(1)(A) as creating the following categories

of employees: elected officers or officials, appointed officers or officials, and

full-time employees. See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(A). He then reads subsection 1(C)

as creating additional categories of employees for local unit public

employers: full-time, part-time, and contract employees. See I.C. § 5-10-8-

1(1)(C). Under Huck’s reading, “elected officials” like him are a category of

employees separate from “full-time” and “part-time” employees. And

because he’s neither a part-time employee nor a full-time employee, Huck

submits, he’s simply an employee. Thus, Huck concludes, Perry County

cannot exclude him from health-insurance coverage using Indiana Code

subsection 5-10-8-2.6(b).

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For its part, Perry County argues that for local governments, all

employees, including elected officials, fall into three categories: “full-time,”

“part-time,” or “a person who provides personal services to the unit under

contract during the contract period.” See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(C). Perry County

acknowledges a conflict between the two subsections: whereas subsection

1(A) broadly defines an employee to include an elected official, subsection

1(C) defines employee more narrowly as full-time employees, part-time

employees, or persons who provide personal services under contract. But,

Perry County contends, citing our canons of construction, subsection 1(C)

applies here—to local unit public employers—as the more specific

definition. Appellant’s Br. at 24 (citing State v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 223

N.E.3d 1148, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). If Huck needs to be categorized as

either a full-time, part-time, or contract employee, the County contends, it

can categorize him as part-time because he works only nine hours per

month. And as a part-time employee, the County can exclude Huck from

health insurance.

Given these reasonable competing interpretations of the statute, we can

conclude that its text is ambiguous. See Loomis v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 244

N.E.3d 908, 922 (Ind. 2024). To resolve this ambiguity and discern the

legislature’s intent, we can look to the statute’s legislative history and its

interaction with other statutes.

B. The legislature intended elected officials to be their

own category of employees, separate from part-time

employees, and an elected official’s health insurance

cannot be discontinued based on the number of hours

worked.

The legislature intended local elected officials to be “employees” for

health-insurance purposes, regardless of the number of hours they work.

In 1957, legislation was enacted to empower public employers to contract

for insurance coverage for their employees. Act of Mar. 14, 1957, ch. 296,

1957 Ind. Acts 769, 769. The statute defined “employee” as a “full-time

employee whose services have continued uninterruptedly for a period of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 4 of 8

at least thirty (30) days.” Id. Later that year, the Attorney General issued

an advisory opinion interpreting the statute to conclude that elected

officials do not qualify as “employees” for purposes of coverage. 1957 Ind.

Op. Atty. Gen. No. 21 at 88 (1957). In response, the legislature in 1961

amended the statute to include “elected” officials. Act of Mar. 4, 1961, ch.

98, 1961 Ind. Acts 199, 200. And in 1978, the Attorney General issued an

advisory opinion commensurate with this change, concluding that a

school-board member (an elected official) was entitled to participate in

their employer’s group-health insurance plan. 1978 Ind. Op. Atty. Gen.

No. 20 at 60 (1978). In short, the legislative changes to the definition of

“employee” to specifically include elected officials—a definition

recodified in 1980—shows the legislature’s intent to include them in

group-health insurance plans. See Pub. L. No. 8-1980, § 41, 1980 Ind. Acts

31, 67.

Next, Indiana Code section 36-2-5-13 (or the Compensation Statute)

shows that elected officials are a separate category of employees from “part-

time” and “full-time” employees. The Compensation Statute states in

pertinent part that “[a]n elected county officer is not required to report hours

worked and may not be compensated based on the number of hours

worked.” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(b) (emphasis added). The statute expressly

includes “health insurance” benefits within the scope of “compensation.”

I.C. § 36-2-5-13(a). Because hours worked is the method for distinguishing

part-time from full-time employees, the legislature, by specifying that

elected officials cannot be compensated based on hours worked, intended

for elected officials to be a category separate from full-time and part-time

employees. As the trial court recognized, elected officials do “a lot of work

that goes on behind the scenes, day-to-day, night-in, night-out, that isn’t in a

meeting or isn’t documented in minutes somewhere.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 16.

Because there is no way to distinguish “full-time” and “part-time” elected

officials for insurance purposes without violating the Compensation Statute,

the legislature intended elected officials to be their own category of

employees.

But the Court’s conclusion that Huck can be categorized as a “part-time

employee” and excluded from health insurance conflicts with the

Compensation Statute. Because Perry County cannot reduce an elected

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 5 of 8

official’s compensation based on hours worked, and compensation

includes health insurance, Perry County cannot end Huck’s health

insurance simply because he only works nine hours per month. The

legislature intended elected officials to be eligible for health insurance

regardless of the number of hours they work.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding Huck faces irreparable harm.

The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show injury

beyond a pure economic injury. See Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v.

Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ind. 2002). Here, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that the loss of health-insurance

coverage is an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060,

1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding a “threatened termination of benefits such

as medical coverage for workers and their families obviously raised the

spectre of irreparable injury”); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F.Supp. 563,

577 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (“To presume that one not able to afford health

insurance coverage is harmed only in a monetary sense is to ignore the

realities of the situation.”). Because the loss of health-insurance coverage

can impact health, a harm beyond economics, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in concluding Huck faced irreparable harm.

The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

health insurance through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act (COBRA) or the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is an

inadequate substitute for the insurance Huck and his wife lost. A person

qualifies for temporary health insurance under COBRA after a “qualifying

event” occurs. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. But Huck does not qualify for COBRA

because no qualifying event—such as termination or reduced hours—

occurred here. See id. § 1163(2). And even if Huck could have obtained

health insurance through the ACA, the trial court concluded that it may

not be realistic to obtain or provide him with the same level of coverage.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 6 of 8

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the threatened injury to Huck

outweighs the potential harm to Perry County

from granting the injunction.

The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show that the

threatened injury to the moving party (if the injunction is not granted)

outweighs the potential injury to the non-moving party (if the injunction

is granted). Vickery, 85 N.E.3d at 859. In its order, the trial court concluded

that the injury to Huck from loss of health-insurance coverage outweighed

the potential harm to the County by requiring it to provide coverage. The

County did not argue on appeal the trial court abused its discretion when

weighing the harms, thus arguably waiving the issue. See French v. State,

778 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind. 2002). Potential waiver aside, considering the

deferential standard of review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the harm Huck faces from losing

health insurance outweighs the additional costs to the County in

providing health insurance.

IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that granting the injunction does not

disserve the public interest.

The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show that

granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Vickery, 85

N.E.3d at 860. Perry County argues that the cost associated with granting

Huck’s preliminary injunction disserves the public because it paid

$28,863.12 towards his health insurance—more than six times his annual

salary of $4,783—for just nine hours of work per month. Perry County has

also spent $200,000 more than anticipated on insurance for its employees

and expended twenty-five percent of its reserve funds to pay those

insurance costs. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 30, 31, 37. Granting Huck’s

preliminary injunction, the County contends, could place a significant

financial burden on small counties with limited resources.

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But not providing insurance may also disserve the public because

quality candidates might not run for office. During a board meeting, one

County commissioner commented that Perry County is one of the lowest

paid counties, and providing insurance can help attract good quality

leaders. Considering the deferential standard of review, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in concluding that the preliminary injunction

would not disserve the public interest. The trial court could have

reasonably concluded that, despite the cost to the taxpayers, the injunction

would keep quality leaders in elected positions which ultimately benefits

the public.

Conclusion

From my reading of the relevant statutes, the legislature intended local

elected officials to be a separate category of employees from part-time and

full-time employees for health-insurance purposes, regardless of the

number of hours they work. Therefore, the County cannot exclude Huck

from health insurance because he only works nine hours per month.

Ultimately, the issue of health-insurance coverage for local elected officials

is an important policy issue best left for the legislature to address, and I

welcome further clarification.

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