Case law
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741 N.E.2d 697 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 29, 2000
Applying the two-part IAC test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the U.S. … Rather, it enters into the determination of whether the likelihood of a different outcome qualifies as prejudice in the Strickland sense. Id.
Cited 46 timesPublishedMarquise Lee v. State of Indiana
30 N.E.3d 719 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 14, 2015
The “inherent” and “factual” inclusion tests we established in Wright v. … distinguishing [the two offenses] is that a lesser culpability is required to establish the commission of the lesser offense.”
Cited 27 timesPublished694 N.E.2d 701 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 1, 1998
However, another form of relationship would later become established. Respondent began an intermittent sexual relationship with Ms. Neal in early 1992. … This evidence does not clearly and convincingly support a finding of a breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct as to this particular count.
Cited 21 timesPublished40 Ind. 49 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1872
The jury were better qualified to judge of the amount of damages than we are. … The court say: “ The law as to the limit of time within which a tenant is allowed to sever from the freehold the fixtures which are usually called ‘tenant’s fixtures/ is by no means clearly settled.
Cited 13 timesPublished51 N.E.3d 150 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 22, 2016
We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Menard, Inc. v. Dage–MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied (citation omitted). … “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996).
Cited 48 timesPublished949 N.E.2d 327 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 22, 2011
Lastly, the waiver section does not clearly indicate that both the juvenile and the parent are required to waive the juvenile‟s rights. … But the form could more clearly indicate the parent‟s role.
Cited 2 timesPublishedGarvin, Rec. v. Chadwick Realty Corp.
212 Ind. 499 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1937
Garvin, receiver of said bank to liquidate the assets and adjust the affairs thereof and said appellant is now the duly appointed, qualified, and acting receiver of said insolvent. … The Act clearly applies either when a bank has been adjudicated insolvent, when it suspends business, or when it is in the course of liquidation.
Cited 11 timesPublishedLoparex, LLC v. MPI Release Technologies, LLC
964 N.E.2d 806 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 21, 2012
Section 22-5-3-1 addresses criminal penalties, provides qualified civil immunity for employers who disclose information about former employees unless that information was known to be false, and requires prospective employers … Whether the specific subject is expressed as ―protection of former employees,‖ or ―prevention of blacklisting,‖ or something else, the provisions are clearly related in their general purpose and for purposes of efficient
Cited 34 timesPublished433 N.E.2d 745 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 1, 1982
His decision will not be reversed unless prejudicial error is clearly shown. Smith v. Midwest Insurance Co., (1972) Ind.App., 289 N.E.2d 788 . … The defendants by stipulation at the pretrial conference admitted two of the paragraphs but qualified their admission of three others, and the only inconvenience which Cua asserts in the failure of the court to strike the
Cited 25 timesPublished690 N.E.2d 162 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1997
However, the court clearly explored, with an unfavorable result, the character and condition of the defendant. … On appeal, Williams contends that these opinions were speculative and that neither Fabian nor Smiley was qualified as an expert to offer such an opinion. Williams does not cite any Rule or other authority.
Cited 69 timesPublishedIndiana Supreme Court · Jun 25, 2013
In 1996, the Johnsons established the Barbara A. Johnson Living Trust and deeded the property to the Trust. They lived in the home continually, with William Johnson doing most renovation work that arose. … Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 766 (Ind. 2009) (actual knowledge of falsity vitiates qualified privilege for communicating with law enforcement in defamation action); Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v.
Cited 0 timesPublished486 N.E.2d 469 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1985
However, in the case at bar, the fact that the witness had conducted studies concerning the plea of insanity was used to qualify the witness as an expert in this field. … He argues that by improperly defining the term, as it was to be used in conjunction with his insanity defense, the court confused the jury and might have lead the jury to apply the more stringent but clearly defined standard
Cited 9 timesPublishedSupreme Sitting of the Order of the Iron Hall v. Baker
20 L.R.A. 210 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 26, 1893
a court of equity will exercise such power, except when the exigencies of the case clearly warrant it; but, we think, under our statute, the court has such power when it is clearly made to appear that the exigencies of the … And whenever such a state of affairs exists, as that the corporation has proper officers qualified, and the funds of the corporation and its proper application secured, it will be the duty of the court to restore the property
Cited 38 timesPublishedMcGraw-Edison Co. v. Northeastern Rural Electric Membership Corp.
678 N.E.2d 1120 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 22, 1997
It is clearly based on § 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second. Indiana was among the early jurisdictions to adopt § 402A, at least as Indiana law was predicted by its federal bench. … This record does not establish even a conspicuous and explicit provision barring strict liability claims.
Cited 4 timesPublished903 N.E.2d 946 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 7, 2009
The defendant has not established reversible error in the trial court's modification of the format for questioning potential jurors in this case. 4. … The trial court's factual determinations, however, will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id.
Cited 27 timesPublishedRobinson v. State, ex rel. Martin
60 Ind. 26 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1877
. *28 It is alleged, generally, that, on the 13th day of Octooer, 1874, the said Robinson was elected trustee of said township for the term of two years, and that, on the 27th ■day of the same month, he duly qualified as … As both the civil and school townships have only limited powers as regards the incurring of pecuniary liabilities, we think there was an additional reason why the facts relied on as establishing set-offs in favor of Robinson
Cited 10 timesPublishedNorthern Indiana Commuter Transportation District v. Chicago Southshore & South Bend Railroad
685 N.E.2d 680 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 8, 1997
As Justice Cardozo succinctly summarized in Herndon : “The settled doctrine is that when a constitutional privilege or immunity has been denied for the first time by a ruling made upon appeal, a litigant thus surprised may … Indeed, this case illustrates what can happen when the established rules on full faith and credit are not respected.
Cited 36 timesPublishedWainwright v. P. H. & F. M. Roots Co.
176 Ind. 682 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1912
alleged m the cross-complaint are not germane, is correct, and the pleading is not good as a counterclaim in recoupment. *694 What appellant did in the performance of his duties as superintendent of appellee’s manufacturing establishment … Hedrick, supra, is clearly distinguishable from this one.
Cited 41 timesPublishedTerre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad v. State ex rel. Ketcham
159 Ind. 438 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 25, 1902
And said new company is authorized to construct a railroad, in the general direction of the National road, from Indianapolis to the east line of the State, “and shall possess the same rights, privi *474 leges and immunities … To the contrary, the conferring upon the Indiana Central Railway Company, the same rights, privileges, and immunities, and the same restrictions and liabilities as were then possessed and resting upon the Terre Haute & Richmond
Reversed on other grounds by Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad v. Indiana Ex Rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579 (1904)Cited 24 timesPublished479 N.E.2d 1264 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1985
Godfrey does not, as Appellant suggests, hold that multiple murders committed as they were in Godfrey can never be punished by death regardless of the aggravating circumstances used to qualify them for a possible death sentence … All of this evidence clearly established that Appellant had the ability and a timely opportunity to ascertain that his vietim was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his duty.
Cited 24 timesPublished
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