Case law

State v. Van Cleave

674 N.E.2d 1293 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1996

Van Cleave’s intoxication clearly did not preclude him from forming the intent required for felony murder in this case. … We do not, and need not, reweigh this evidence here because even taking it as true Van Cleave would have failed to qualify for the intoxication defense for the reasons we have discussed. 22 .

State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court

239 Ind. 472 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 1, 1959

He was duly commissioned by the governor and qualified according to law. Gosman, claiming the right to hold over until his successor was elected and qualified, refused to surrender the office. … Acts 1907, ch. 207, §1, p. 360, being §4-1401, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, establishes the Marion Superior Court.

Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Moore

197 Ind. 50 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 8, 1925

years, and has not been heard of or seen by any one since then; that he left no will, and thereafter letters *53 of administration on his estate were duly issued to plaintiff by the Lawrence Circuit Court, under which she qualified … would have been embraced within the subject expressed in the title, may be subsequently incorporated into such original act by a supplemental or amendatory act; and this may be done *58 without title, beyond a statement clearly

State v. Davis

898 N.E.2d 281 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 2008

Involuntary commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill is clearly such a deprivation of liberty as can only be accomplished by a state in strict App. 1991) (agreeing with the “implication” of Jackson, “that it would be … Thus, because of credit time, Davis became immune from being sentenced to further confinement as of November 2006 by which time she had been confined for a total of eighteen months.

Wise v. McKeever

184 Ind. 686 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 10, 1916

The complaint alleges, in substance, that in the year 1912, the requisite number of qualified persons petitioned the Board of Commissioners of Huntington County to improve a certain highway in • Dallas Township which passes … S. 1881, clearly applies to save the township’s right to reimbursement in this ease and to compel the city or town to discharge the liability imposed.

Patrick Austin v. State of Indiana

997 N.E.2d 1027 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 2013

his entitlement to relief by showing that the trial court was clearly erroneous. … Certainly this Court has not been immune to using one in lieu of the other—even in the context of Criminal Rule 4 review.

Hunter v. Burnsville Turnpike Co.

56 Ind. 213 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1877

or purchasers “ shall have the right, by such name as he or they may assume, to hold, own and possess the road, or [the] part thereof so purchased, and to have and enjoy all the *219 rights, privileges, franchises, and immunities … The cases cited by the counsel clearly show the power of courts in the correction of errors committed by their clerks in judicial writs.” In Purcell v.

Short v. Texaco, Inc.

273 Ind. 518 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1980

To justify the Courts in declaring an act void, it must be clearly subversive of that instrument. … This statement in context gave support to the court’s ruling that the power of eminent domain cannot serve as a source of immunity from suits for damages for injury to private property.

Stump v. Commercial Union

601 N.E.2d 327 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 19, 1992

Consequently, this court found that the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's claims were precluded by the Worker's Compensation Act was erroneous as the Act clearly was not meant to provide a license to insurance companies … The relationship of the compensation insurance carrier to the employer should not afford it special immunity.

Cash v. State

557 N.E.2d 1023 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 8, 1990

This other evidence may be established by a showing that a defendant touched, disturbed, or even approached valuable property. … In the present case, the information put appellant on sufficient notice of the human habitation element through the qualifier placed after "building and structure," that being "occupied by Kevin Schlatterer and Clyde Hill

Florer v. Sheridan

23 L.R.A. 278 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 13, 1894

It is also claimed, by many, that the taxation of personal property is unjust, in that it discriminates against residents and in favor of nonresidents, and is an inducement to citizens to establish residences abroad. … Exemption is an immunity or privilege — it is freedom from a charge of burden to which others are subject.

Hawkins v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co.

608 N.E.2d 1358 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 11, 1993

We now hold that the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, including the Federal Rules of Evidence and our own legislature, has established a more reasonable rule in this field. … I foresee tort litigants attempting to persuade prosecutors and defense counsel to burden criminal trials with additional testimony, witnesses, and exhibits, so that such evidence may later be presented, possibly immune from

NORTHERN IND. PUBLIC SERV. v. US Steel

907 N.E.2d 1012 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 2009

We therefore apply the established standard of review for judicial review of Commission orders. … Steel counters that though the number is the same for each period, it clearly includes five distinct prices for the Energy Charge, which allows for the plural. (App. at 33-34, Appellee’s Br. at 23.)

City of Terre Haute v. Kersey

159 Ind. 300 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 6, 1902

it deprives them of the free use of their property, and of the free use of the public streets of said city, in contravention of §§1, 21, and 23 of article 1 of the State’s Constitution; (2) that it grants privileges and immunities … When such power is, however, clearly conferred upon such municipalities, courts have generally upheld the proper exercise thereof.

Employers' Liability Assurance Co. v. Indianapolis & Cincinnati Traction Co.

195 Ind. 91 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 19, 1924

And provides that “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” … E. 774 , is clearly distinguishable from the one at bar.

Osborne v. State

754 N.E.2d 916 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 13, 2001

Before claiming that his right to self-representation has been denied, a defendant must timely, clearly, and unequivocally assert that right. Dobbins v. State, 721 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ind.1999); Sherwood v. … The determination of whether a witness qualifies for the exemption found in clause (8) is within the trial court's discretion and is subject to review for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 256-57 .

Shutt v. State

267 Ind. 110 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 21, 1977

Venables, a qualified pathologist, testified that he did an autopsy on the body of the decedent and made several tests, including tests of the blood of the decedent. … It appears very clearly that the decedent had come to the pool hall for the express purpose of having a physical confrontation with the defendant and was not going to be denied.

Cockrum v. State

250 Ind. 366 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 5, 1968

Appellant contends that a proper foundation was not laid for such testimony in that the prior testimony of each witness did not qualify them to give such an opinion. *371 In substance, all three (3) witnesses testified as … It is true that on their face, Instructions No. 21 and No. 25 do not establish the State’s burden of proving the defendant sane at the time of the crime charged. However,.

R.Y. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

904 N.E.2d 1257 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 24, 2009

Discussion I The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. … But Fishel qualified her recommendation.

Gallagher v. State

922 N.E.2d 588 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 23, 2010

During that period of time, however, the defendant was principally engaged in conduct related to unlawful drug activities clearly visible to anyone present, and thus his thirteen and one half mi- nutes in the proscribed zone … does not qualify as "briefly."