Case law

People v. Hatfield

72 Ill. App. 3d 249 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 10, 1979

For a statement to qualify as a spontaneous declaration, three elements must be present: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and … With reference to the third factor listed above, Yuk’s statement, identifying the robbery offender, was clearly related to the circumstances of the occurrence.

Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board

458 Ill. Dec. 769 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 23, 2021

It is not our job to reweigh credibility decisions; we only ask if the “opposite conclusion” is “clearly evident.” Id. The opposite conclusion is not clearly evident here. … should no longer employ a deputy who would leave his gun unsecured in his car while drinking enough beers to be intoxicated, then later brandish that gun, threaten someone’s life with it, and claim an unlimited immunity

Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive Council

Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 1, 1999

Likewise, in the present case we find that simply prefacing a statement with qualifying language such as "I think" or "I believe" does not turn it into protected speech. … The court noted that general purpose public figures always must establish actual malice to prevail in a defamation action.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amato

865 N.E.2d 516 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 23, 2007

"The insurer bears the burden of establishing that a claim falls within a provision that limits or excludes coverage." Sears Roebuck & Co. v. … Clearly, the holding of General does not apply to this case.

AYH Holdings, Inc. v. Avreco, Inc.

Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 31, 2005

First, Gremesco clearly was an agent of AYH's and had authority to appoint a subagent. … Section 2201(b) immunizes an insurance broker from claims based on breach of fiduciary duty.

Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.

46 Ill. App. 3d 781 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 24, 1977

Counsel for the defendant railroad stated he believed the interest of Cravens and the railroad were adverse and that the answers were competent, were qualified under the Evidence Act (111. Rev. … Rather, the evidence established that the defendant had notice of the dangerous condition and the fact of a continued and wilful violation of Illinois Commerce Commission Rule 205.

People v. Trail

197 Ill. App. 3d 742 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 17, 1990

That new section reads as follows: “Witness Competency, (a) Every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter, except as provided in subsection (b). … This case is clearly distinguishable from the authority cited by defendant, People v. Wasson (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 851 , 530 N.E.2d 527 , because Wasson involved a defect in the charging instrument.

People v. Wells

2024 IL App (2d) 230521-U · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 8, 2024

A finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if a conclusion opposite that to the trial court’s is clearly apparent. In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. … Qualifying Offense ¶ 20 Next, we address defendant’s claim that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder.

Weber v. Cueto

209 Ill. App. 3d 936 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 8, 1991

The trial court determined that the Madison County Board is “clearly a quasi-judicial/legislative body” to which an absolute privilege attaches. … Because defendants were required to produce the document, that production maintains absolute immunity.” In Johnson v.

People v. Maberry

193 Ill. App. 3d 250 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 18, 1990

However, the statements qualify as excited utterances or spontaneous declarations and, thus, were admissible. … The defendant clearly had the knife while in the house and held it in a threatening manner on the victim.

In Re Detention of Varner

315 Ill. App. 3d 626 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 9, 2000

The party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing that it is unconstitutional. People v. DePalma, 256 Ill. App. 3d 206, 210 (1994). … Mere speculation is insufficient to establish a counsel’s incompetency. People v. Hills, 78 Ill. 2d 500, 505-06 (1980).

People v. Lewis

2019 IL App (1st) 160864 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 15, 2019

Relying in part on the same report from the NRC, the Supreme Court refuted the respondent’s claim that scientific testing was neutral and reliable, observing that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune … Zielinski was clearly testifying to Ms. Kane’s opinions and conclusions and offering those for the truth of the matter asserted.

Lee v. Naperville Community Unit School District 203

53 N.E.3d 55 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 14, 2015

As explained below, the reasoning in Paszkowski clearly forecloses continued reliance on Bertolis. … The Paszkowski court concluded that the defendant clearly fit the definition of a body politic. Paszkowski, 213 Ill. 2d at 8.

Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n Replaces vacated opinion of 5/23/03

Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 11, 2003

equivalent 4. single-party service or its functional equivalent 5. access to emergency services 6. access to operator services 7. access to interexchange service 8. access to directory assistance 9. toll control services for qualifying … To reverse the Commission’s order, Moultrie must demonstrate that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n , 282 Ill.

People v. Shelton

401 Ill. App. 3d 564 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 14, 2010

The alleged battery also clearly was not the sort of incident that required an engineering explanation in order for the jury to understand the issue. … The decision to qualify a witness as an expert rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, 125 (2009).

Cunningham v. Huffman

223 Ill. App. 3d 878 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 16, 1992

It is alleged that, had Huffman possessed and applied the knowledge, skill, and care of a reasonably well-qualified specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, he would have removed the first IUD before inserting the second … Clearly a single consultation after a decade of nontreatment cannot be construed as a continuous course of treatment. We are not deciding as a matter of law that a continuous course of treatment existed in this case.

People v. Richardson

376 Ill. App. 3d 612 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 21, 2007

We acknowledge that the decision to file a motion to suppress is generally considered to be a matter of trial strategy immune from ineffective assistance claims. People v. Deloney, 359 Ill. … Had the trial court been unable to consider the evidence obtained in the illegal search or consider defendant’s statements, the result of defendant’s trial clearly would have been different.

GPIF Crescent Court Hotel, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Company

2022 IL App (1st) 211335-U · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 20, 2022

“A cause of action should not be dismissed under section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent from the pleadings that no set of facts can be proven that would entitle the plaintiff to recover.” Id. … Both concluded that a COVID-19-related loss of use does not qualify as a physical loss.

People v. Washington

195 Ill. App. 3d 520 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 9, 1990

The State then advised the court that these two prior convictions qualified defendant for mandatory Class X sentencing. … This proceeding clearly lacked the hallmarks of a trial on the punishment (Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439 , 68 L. Ed. 2d at 279 , 101 S. Ct. at 1858 ), and the double jeopardy clause does not apply.

People v. Ordner

2025 IL App (5th) 230216-U · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 30, 2025

The pertinent question, then, is whether Lorazepam qualifies as such a compound. We conclude that it does. … This places defendant alone in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle, and thus clearly in actual physical control of the vehicle.