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203 Ill. App. 3d 271 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 18, 1990
Clearly, no person would pay off on a machine’s accumulated points where those points cannot be erased after a payoff. … or establishing any similarity to those owned by Gotsch.
Cited 1 timesPublishedAppellate Court of Illinois · Apr 25, 2008
Under sections 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and 170(h) of the Code, a person who contributes a "qualified real property interest" to a "qualified organization" exclusively for a "conservation purpose" can claim an income tax charitable … Section 23(d) clearly provides that the easement may be amended. The fourth reference to "in perpetuity" occurs in section 16.
Cited 0 timesPublishedTedrowe v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
158 Ill. App. 3d 438 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 20, 1987
Plaintiff contends, however, that the burden was on the defendant to establish that the Westmont crossing met all ICC specifications in order to qualify for the exemption from the duty to sound a warning. … App. 2d 132 , 201 N.E.2d 167 (trial court acted within its discretion in excluding posed photograph of boiling pit when it was not established that the railing in photograph was in existence at the time of the accident).
Cited 29 timesPublished297 Ill. App. 3d 972 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 30, 1998
App. 1990) (expert testimony established that there is a possibility of scar formation after tattoo removal); Stephenson v. … Defendant argues that the trial court neither established what type of tattoos would qualify as “gang related” tattoos nor did the court ever indicate that defendant’s tattoos, if there were any, had any connection to the
Cited 12 timesPublished2016 IL App (1st) 130988 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 30, 2016
Yet, Culverson initially denied having been shot, even though he clearly had been. … This testimony failed to establish Spalliero did, in fact, tell Culverson he was going to die soon.
Cited 13 timesPublishedBremen Community High School District No. 228 v. The Cook County Comm'n on Human Rights
981 N.E.2d 369 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 8, 2012
The court continued: “THE COURT: [Mandamus] clearly is not the proper vehicle here. As the Court said in Daley v. Laurie, mandamus is not the proper vehicle. … They argue that they qualify as both agents of the state and a municipality and that, therefore, they do not qualify as “employers.” Accordingly, they argue, the Ordinance does not apply to them.
Cited 13 timesPublishedHawthorne Race Course Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board
Appellate Court of Illinois · May 19, 2006
[The] Executive Director *** decided to be a nice guy and look the other way and give you the recapture in that year although it was clearly [denied in the staff's recommendation] correctly in the … The statutory formula again established an amount of recapture for Sportsman's Park.
Cited 0 timesPublished2017 IL App (1st) 143183 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 18, 2017
This does not qualify as scientific evidence. See People v. … claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant’s argument would still fail because, under the facts of the case, counsel’s decision not to request specific verdict forms was likely a strategic decision immune
Cited 23 timesPublishedMcHenry County Sheriff v. McHenry County Department of Health
2020 IL App (2d) 200339 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 23, 2020
In March 2020, the World Health Organization announced that the spread of COVID-19 qualified as a global pandemic. … Finally, because plaintiffs could not establish the necessary elements, they were in no way entitled to the entry of the temporary restraining order.
Cited 7 timesPublishedBarnard v. City of Chicago Heights
295 Ill. App. 3d 514 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 4, 1998
employment; (3) defendants were not vicariously liable for Pavesich’s alleged sexual assault; (4) plaintiff was unable to prove the requisite notice element for all of her claims against defendants; (5) defendants were immune … The Maksimovic court determined that the plaintiffs claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment “clearly,” under the Geise standard, were not inextricably linked to her claim of sexual harassment; rather, “[t]he sexual
Cited 4 timesPublished2025 IL App (1st) 231683 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 3, 2025
¶ 33 Knowledge, however, is not sufficient to establish constructive possession. … In order to overcome this presumption, “the party challenging the statute must clearly establish its 17 No. 1-23-1683 invalidity.”
Cited 19 timesPublished332 Ill. App. 3d 1070 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 30, 2002
In his highly qualified statement in his affidavit, Russell merely stated that he “never received any notification that he [Magee] did not understand the agreement to be stated above.” … Defense counsel argued that the parties had an enforceable settlement agreement when the undisputed facts clearly revealed no meeting of the minds.
Cited 14 timesPublishedBoozell v. Estate of Pine Top Insurance
292 Ill. App. 3d 597 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 30, 1997
The liquidator is clearly a party to the liquidation proceeding. … Clearly, this was the intent when Rule 304(b)(2) was promulgated.
Cited 6 timesPublishedOwens v. Department of Human Rights
403 Ill. App. 3d 899 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 13, 2010
Under that policy Exxon Mobil promised to “reimburse employees for actual cost for registration, tuition, regular instruction fees and required textbooks,” if the employees qualified for reimbursement. … It is well established that there is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional and that the party challenging its validity will bear the burden of clearly establishing that the statute is unconstitutional.
Cited 77 timesPublishedThomas v. Zoning Board of Appeals
72 Ill. App. 3d 934 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 12, 1979
use,” i.e., as a motion picture theater, and therefore that his proposed theater qualifies for the exception set out in section 2— 20.4005. … Clearly, plaintiff is proposing a change in use from restaurant-night club to a motion picture theater, and plaintiff is therefore required to provide off-street parking facilities.
Cited 0 timesPublished268 Ill. App. 3d 1019 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 22, 1994
The evidence established defendant’s guilt of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. … So I’m not agreeing that this somehow would — these convictions would somehow qualify ***. * * * THE COURT: Therefore, the next question is whether or not your client, Mr.
Cited 6 timesPublished324 Ill. App. 498 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 19, 1944
The doctrine thus qualified was set forth by Shaw, O. J., in an elaborate opinion, in Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 193 . … court, that there is no evidence to prove that Mecartney, in writing the letter to Barrett and in filing the pleadings in the Municipal court proceeding, acted within the scope of his authority as the attorney for Kurz, is clearly
Cited 8 timesPublishedKaplan v. Department of Registration & Education
46 Ill. App. 3d 968 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 10, 1977
Thus, under the facts, the statute is clearly inapplicable to Kaplan at present. … It accordingly has sought to attain its justifiable end by making the conviction of any crime a violation of its professional medical standards, and then leaving it to a qualified board of doctors to determine initially the
Cited 25 timesPublished116 Ill. App. 3d 657 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 25, 1983
Upon being advised that defendant had transferred title of his house to his wife within the previous 12 months, the trial court found that defendant was not indigent and did not qualify for appointed counsel. … Clearly defendant was able to prepare his defense on the basis of the language of the indictment and furthermore, the indictment was sufficient to preclude any future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.
Cited 0 timesPublished74 Ill. App. 3d 487 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 1, 1979
The cases relied upon by defendants for the opposite conclusion are clearly distinguishable. … Her acknowledgment of the facts that she was drinking liquor and “high” near the time of the accident would likely help plaintiff establish liability in such actions and was clearly against her pecuniary interest. (Cf.
Cited 8 timesPublished
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