Case law

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  • Pearson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

    349 Ill. App. 3d 688 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 22, 2004

    Reversal of the judgment on that claim is warranted as the erroneous instruction clearly misled the jury and prejudiced Zenari. … A person need only meet one of these three prongs in order to qualify as a consumer under the Act. Dekelaita, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 807 .

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Brown v. Village of Lisle

    2023 IL App (2d) 210732-U · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 16, 2023

    The department’s director, superintendent, or foreman then determined if a weather forecast qualified for a weather event response from the village. … To require defendant to remove freezing rain within 30 minutes where it had no actual or constructive notice, and limited resources, would be clearly unreasonable.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Saia v. Scripto-Tokai Corp.

    Appellate Court of Illinois · May 26, 2006

    This case presents the question of whether a foreign corporation that designs a product can immunize itself from liability for negligent design by marketing the product through a subsidiary. … ANALYSIS Tokai argues first that we should ignore all discovery and affirm because the complaint does not state sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Pease v. ACE HARDWARE HOME CENTER OF ROUND LAKE NO. 252c

    147 Ill. App. 3d 546 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 24, 1986

    The Kimmel court also stated that it could not say, based upon its examination of the record, that “damages clearly proven had been overlooked.” 36 Ill. App. 2d 137, 142 , 183 N.E.2d 13, 15 . … We disagree and find Morita properly qualified as an expert.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Bjork v. Draper

    381 Ill. App. 3d 528 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 25, 2008

    Under sections 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and 170(h) of the Code, a person who contributes a “qualified real property interest” to a “qualified organization” exclusively for a “conservation purpose” can claim an income tax charitable … Section 23(d) clearly provides that the easement may be amended. The fourth reference to “in perpetuity” occurs in section 16.

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Central Illinois Light Co. v. Pollution Control Board

    159 Ill. App. 3d 389 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 24, 1987

    The permit, issued by the Environmental Protection Agency as part of the State of Illinois’ administration of the NPDES permit program established under the Clean Water Act of 1977 ( 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251 through 1376 (1982 … more qualified to decide technical problems and the mechanics of dealing with them.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Honeywell International, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

    366 Ill. App. 3d 187 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 5, 2006

    Accordingly, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. … Law Dictionary defines “possession” as: “The detention and control, or the manual or ideal custody, of anything which may be the subject of property, for one’s use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the proprietor of a qualified

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Micklos v. Highsmith

    149 Ill. App. 3d 779 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 25, 1986

    Thus Hightower qualified as an expert witness under Supreme Court Rule 220 (103 Ill. 2d R. 220). … This allegation of error does not specify the grounds upon which it is based and is clearly inadequate under the standard enunciated in Brown and in section 2 — 1202(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • McGuire v. North Breese Coal & Mining Co.

    179 Ill. App. 592 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 10, 1913

    The evidence establishes the following facts concerning Taylor. He was boss driver. He employed the drivers and gave them orders as to their duties. … The reason for the rule is clearly stated in the Moranda case, supra.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • In re: the Adoption of H.B.

    976 N.E.2d 1193 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 27, 2012

    See Douglas R.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 110321, ¶ 7, 968 N.E.2d 201 (“The language [of section 1(D)(n)] clearly establishes a 12- month period for a parent failing to communicate with or keep in contact with the … Had the legislature intended the statute to be construed in -7- such a manner, it would not have included the preceding, qualifying phrase, “although able to

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Dusthimer v. The Board of Tustees of the University of Illinois

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 27, 2006

    State universities, such as the University of Illinois, are individually established by the Illinois legislature and draw their funding primarily from State appropriations. … The regulation was intended to distinguish between institutions that qualified and those that did not.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • People v. Feazell

    386 Ill. App. 3d 55 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 31, 2007

    Feazell contends that Winstead’s testimony was substantive and does not qualify as a nonhearsay statement or as a hearsay exception. … Banks’ statements are clearly testimonial in nature.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • County Collector v. Du Page Art League

    157 Ill. App. 3d 355 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 6, 1987

    The Revenue Act provides three factors which must be met in order to qualify for a charitable exemption. … A taxpayer must qualify as an organization described in sections 19.1 through 19.23 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Davis v. Human Rights Commission

    246 Ill. App. 3d 420 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 30, 1993

    The initial burden of proof is carried by the employee to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The necessary facts to establish a prima facie case vary depending on the individual factual situations. … Here, the parties do not dispute the Commission’s finding that petitioner established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Konstant Products, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.

    Appellate Court of Illinois · May 4, 2010

    Illinois law is well established that when a pleading is verified it remains part of the record even upon the filing of an amended pleading. Robins v. Lasky, 123 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198 (1984). … Thus, the nonpermission allegation in the original complaint, which remained binding throughout the litigation, clearly would disqualify Meyers as a permissive driver and exclude coverage under the policy.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. and Medical Center

    377 Ill. App. 3d 43 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 20, 2007

    Kirchner was qualified for category II privileges through a grandfather clause. Pawlak testified that there was no grandfather clause in the rules. … (West 2000)) does not immunize Silver Cross against plaintiff's claims based upon the hospital's credentialing decisions.

    Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Board of Junior College District No. 508

    31 Ill. App. 3d 270 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 29, 1975

    Count XIII alleges that, as a result of an order to stop meeting with their classes, issued in violation of established Board policy, plaintiffs suffered irreparable injury to their professional ability in that they were … While not public officials and not public figures for all purposes, plaintiffs clearly had become public figures within the Wilson College community, which was the community served by the publication. In Basarich v.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Everly v. Chicago Police Board

    119 Ill. App. 3d 631 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 23, 1983

    The decision of the Board should not be set aside by a reviewing court unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. … Therefore, we hold that Everly established no conflict of interest by the corporation counsel.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Mattuck v. DaimlerChrysler

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 30, 2006

    A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon the evidence. Redmond v. … The testimony established that plaintiff had the vehicle serviced no less than six times and that the steering wheel shook violently when he applied the brakes.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Conti v. Health Care Service Corporation

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 26, 2007

    In her deposition, 6 1-06-1203 Patricia testified that “something was wrong” with her; however, she testified that she did not think her condition qualified as an illness … App. 3d 1023, 1032, 498 N.E.2d 302, 309 (1986), that an insurer’s employee or underwriter may testify to establish the materiality of a misrepresentation.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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